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BErXG A SERIES OF BRILLIANT AND AUTHENTIC SKETCHES OF THE MOST NOTABLE 

BATTLES OP THE LATE CIVIL WAR, mCLUDING MANTT INCIDENTS 

AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEVER BEFORE PUBLISHED 

IN ANY FORM. 



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' Through the walls of hut and palace shoots the instantaneous throe, 
When the travail of the Aces wrings earth's sjstems to and fro, 
At the birth of each new Era, with a recognizing start, 
Xation «iMIy looks at Xation, standing- with mute lips apart, 
And glad Truth's yet mightier man-child leaps beneath the t^iture's heart." 



isei-ises, 






188S. 
DETROIT FREE PRESS PUBLISHING COMPANT, DETROIT MICH. 



Sold ez Subscriptiok Only. 



Copyright, 1885, by 
THE DETROIT FREE PRESS PUBLISHING COMPANY, 

Detroit, JIich. 



Electrotyped and Printed by 

The Detroit I'reb Press Compant, 




The Volcano .... 

The First Gun of the War . 

First Bull Run 

Wilson's Creek .... 

Mulligan's Defense of Lexington 

Ball's BluflE . . . . . 

Fort Henry, the Man-Trap . 

The Capture of Fort Donelson . 

Pea Ridge .... 

Yorktown and Beyond 

Williamsburg .... 

Shiloh — The First Day . 

Shiloh — The Second Day 

Seven Pines .... 

Cross Keys and Port Republic 

Behind the Eartli -Works . 

Colonel Morgan's Defense 

First Confederate Gun-Boats 

Yan Dorn's Blow at Grant . 

Army Panics .... 

The Waste in War 

Stonewall Jackson in the Yalley 

The Fall of New Orleans 

Over the Guns ..... 

The Turning Point in McClellan's Career 

Change of Base 

Toward the James ..... 
The Spot Where MeClellan Cried "Halt!" 
McClellan — Lee — Pope 
Pope's Figlits Around Manassas 
Defeat — -Invasion ..... 
The Crisis 



Page 
1 

3 

9 

12 

16 

20 

25 

30 

37 

43 

47 

51 

60 

66 

72 

70 

82 

85 

86 

89 

91 

93 

99 

106 

109 

116 

120 

123 

130 

132 

139 

141 



IV 



CONTENTS. 



Yard 



South Mountain .... 

Surrender of Harper's Ferry 

Sharpsburg ..... 

Murder in War .... 

The Abandonment of Norfolk Navy 

How the Dead Were Uncovered 

The Harbor Defenses of the Confederacy 

Eccentricities of Bnllets 

The Merrimac and Monitor . 

Tlie Evacuation of Corinth 

Tlie Battle of Perryvllle 

The Evacuation of Pensacola 

The Fight at IsLand No. 10 . , . 

The Fate of British Blockade Runners 

The Famous Castle Thunder at Richmond 

How the Gun-boats Passed Island No. 10 

The Career of the Ram Arkansas . 

Stuart's Great Raid 

Zagonyi's Charge ... 

The Federal Blockaders of the War 

The Alabama and the Hattei-as 

Some Famous Confederate Cruisers 

How the Confederates lost Hilton Head 

The Panic at Nashville 

The Peril of an Army 

The Slaughter-Pen at Corinth 

The Blockade-Runners of the War 

The Fight Before Memphis 

The Last Fight of the Monitor 

How the Federals Retook Fort Pulaski 

The Siege and Capture of Vicksburg 

The Capture of Port Hudson 

Burnside's Crossing at Fredericksburg 

Stone River .... 

The Fight at Lavergne . 

Lincoln — Emancipation 

McClellan — Burnside — Hooker 

Confederate Scouts and Spies 

Destruction of Nashville 

The First Test of the Iron-Clads 

Rams, Gun-Boats and Iron-Clads 



Page 

143- 
145 
147 
153 
154 
159 
163 
169 
172 
179 
184 
190 
195 
201 
207 
212 
216 
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224 
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239 
245 
250 
252 
255 
259 
273 
277 
282 
287 
312 
318 
325 
356 
363 
366 
370 
374 
379 
385 



CONTENTS. 

The First Federal Attack on oumter 

The First Cavalry Battle 

Eeminiscences of the Ilarriet Lane 

The Fight at Grand Gulf 

Raising the Blockade at Charleston 

Morgan the Raider 

Chancellorsville .... 

Stonewall Jackson . 

Brandy Station .... 

Capture of Raiders 

Aldie and Middleburg 

Dahlgren's Dash 

The Gettysburg Campaign 

Gettysbui-g — First Day . 

Gettysburg — Second Day . 

Gettysburg— Third Day 

Gettysburg — Results ... 

Gettysburg Campaign and the Cavalry 

From July to December 

The Fight in Stono River 

The Federal Attacks on Fort Wagner 

A Strange Breastvrork 

Bragg's Siege of Chattanooga 

How Forts Wagner and Gregg were Abandoned 

Averill's Raid 

Sheridan versus Early 

Gilmore at Charleston 

In the Darkness 



Pass 
391 

398 
401 
406 
412 
417 
423 
431 
432 
43C 
438 
441 
443 
451 
454 
4G1 
467 

. 470 
477 

, 480 
483 

. 490 
491 
496 
501 

. 502 
513 

. 518 




Bombardment of Fort Sumter 

Fort Sumter in 1860 and in 1864 

Malvern Hill . . . . . 

Combat Between the Monitor and Merrimac 

Island 'No. 10 and Pittsburg Landing 

Stuart's Eaid Around McClellan . 

Gen. E. E. Lee . . . . . 

Maj. Gen. Geo. B. McClellan . . . . 

Death of Stonewall Jackson 

Custer's Charge at Aldie .... 

Gettysburg 

Cavalry Fight at Gettysburg 

Tail-Pieces : 

The Volcano ...... 

Edmund RufBn ..... 



Frontisjoiece 
facing page " 9 
I 123 

• 178 
V 200 
./221 
v318 
v370 
.431 
.440 
■467 
47(3 



Page 

2 
8 



Squad Drill 15 

Cavalry Fight ........ 

Infantry Charge ....... 

Cavalry Bugler 

Cavalry Officer . . . . . . 

A Hand Litter ........ 

Military Accouterments ...... 

Hauling Cannon ........ 

Pickets ......... 

Ruins of Shiloh Meeting House ..... 

Road Between Yorktown and Williamsburg . 
Burning Dead Horses ....... 

Sharp Shooters 

Lady Davis 

The Lily 

Battery to the Front 



19 

24 
29 
36 
42 
46 
50 
59 
65 
71 
78 
81 
85 
88 
90 



ILLUSTRATIONS. 



VU 



Tau.-Pieces — Continued : 
Whitworth Cannon 
Savage Station 



Broken Cannon and Flowers 

After the Battle . 

Harper's Ferry 

First Maryland Regiment 

Palisades . . . . 

Floating Battery at Charleston 



LigJited Shell 



1862 



Rifle Pits . 

A Cotton Plant 

A Blockade Runner 

Grave on the Battle Field 

Mechunicsville Bridge over the Chickahonainy 

The Hartford . ..- . 

The Alabama 

Casemates .... 

Broken Arms 

Confederate Ship Sumter 

Interior of a Monitor's Turret 

Field Battery .... 

Bomb and Splinter-Proof 

Scene in Fredericksburg Dec. 12 

One of the Grayson Dare-Devils 

The Palmetto Tree . 

Ruins of the Steamer Nashville 

Ram Manassas Attacking the Brooklyn 

Torpedoes 

John H. Morgan, the Raider 

Washington Artillery . 

Army Cabin 

Gauntlet and Sword 

A Confederate General 

Defenses on Culp's Hill 

View on Little Round Top 

A Parrott Projectile . 

The Swamp Angel 

A Cannon in the Mountains 

Fort Wagner 

Torpedo 

Knapsack and Canteen . 



Paoe 

108 
119 
129 
131 
142 
144 
158 
168 
171 
183 
194 
206 
211 
223 
232 
238 
249 
258 
272 
281 
286 
311 
324 
369 
373 
378 
390 
405 
422 
430 
435 
440 
453 
460 
466 
482 
489 
495 
500 
517 
520 



C^c Dalniuo. 




■•S a inole-hill men passed it by, but it irritated and 
annoyed and set bad blood in circulation. Men Jioped 
that it would grow no larger, but even as tliey hoped 
they saw it rise higher and higher, and increase in 
circumference. 

The mole-hill became a mound. Its existence had a place in the 
speeches of statesmen, and its presence bronglit dreams of war and 
glory to warriors. A few — wise in their dread and anxiety — would 
have leveled the mound with hands of peace, but even as tliey 
stood around it tliere were mutterings and threats which fed its 
rapid growth. 

The mound became a hill. The hill hid sections from each 
others' sight, bnt the voices of men wrangling and cursing and 
uttering threats of vengeance rose above its crest and were heard 
from sea to sea. 

The hill became a mountain — grim, forbidding, and frowning 
down upon forty million anxious people. Flashes of tire darted 
from its dark ravines, and mysterious rumblings made men turn to 
each other with white faces. 

As a long day of apprehension drew to a close, the sun sunk 
slowly and sullenly into the unknown, leaving behind him signs 
which a child might read. Women gathered their children about 
them and prayed and wept, while husbands, and fathers, and sons, 
gathered in groups and ci'owds, and watched the frowning moun- 
tain and waited to see its fires of hate burst forth. 

The crest of that mountain could be seen from the shores of 
Maine and the valleys of California, and the rumblings were felt 
at every door-step in the Republic. Some were cool and possessed 
— others terrified and undone. 

Midnight came, but even the children had not slept. The 
rumblings were louder, and the fire-fiashes were lighting up a great 

Vol. 1.— 1 



2 THE TOLCANO. 

continent. Men who had sneered at the mole-hill and passed the 
mound in contempt, stood aghast in the shadow of the angry 
mountain. 

Tlie slow-moving hours but increased the darkness of the night 
and the terror of the people ; but those who prayed for the dawn 
recked not what it would bring. It was such a niglit as never had 
fallen upon a continent. It was such darkness as a happy people 
had never walked in before. 

Slowly, grudgingly, grimly, the hours dragged themselves along, 
and as the east was broken with the first signs of dawn the mount- 
ain air seemed to concentrate all its fires into one flame, which 
suddenly burst through its crest and went roaring to Heaven, while 
rivulets and rivers of blood poured down upon the plains and wet 
the feet of tens of thousands. 

The volcano of Civil War was lighting the whole world ! 





f I]{! lirst (!9uit af t|e Wihx. 

1 AYLIGHT is breaking over Charleston. 

It is tlie morning of the twelfth of April, 1861 — the 
most momentous moruing in the history of America. 

Fifteen thousand citizens of Charleston have crowded 
down to the esplanade, and every man has his face turned 
towards the sea. To the right, as they look down the harboi', is 
Morris Island ; to the left Sullivan's, and midway between is Fort 
Sumter, grim and silent, and not even showing its flag. 

The great crowd trembles with excitement and speaks in whis- 
pers. A bloody civil war is about to open. The young men are 
ready to hurrah over the prospect, but the older ones look grave, 
as they realize what war means. 

Now the gray mist creeps up from the waters of the harbor 
and floats away, and the eastern horizon becomes tinged with red. 
You can see more plainly now. At the head of Sullivan's Island 
is the floating iron battery, and it is to tire the first gun. Its 
echoes will awaken the huge iron monsters asleep in Forts Moultrie 
and Johnson — at Cummings' Point — at Point Pleasant and other 
localitieSo There is a flag over each Confederate fort and battery, 
and with a good glass you can see men on the ramparts. 

From December to April the Confederates have been busj- trying 
to get possession of the grim and silent fort rising out of the waters 
of the harbor. All demands for surrender have been refused, and 
the only other»way is now to be tried. Day by day batteries and 
forts have been erected, almost within rifle-shot of Sumter's walls, 
and Major Anderson has been powerless. His orders are to hold 
the fort, and he has no amthority to fire a gun until it becomes an 
act of self-defense. He has seen the forts rise — the great guns 
landed and mounted — the volunteers march in — the ammunition 
brought down from Charleston, and yet Federal policy kept his 
guns silent. 

PI 



■4 . THE FIEST GUN OF THE WAK. 

Silence now ! In the floating battery is an old, gray-haired man — 
Edmund Rufiin. He has sought the privilege of firing the first 
gun of the war. The lanyard he holds in his hand is the rope 
which will ring the bell of destiny. When that bell strikes a 
mighty Republic will fall in fragments, and it will take the blood 
of a thousand battles to cement it. 

" Boom ! " 

The bell has struck. At the word the old man has pulled the 
lanyard, and a solid shot whirrs across the water and strikes the 
brick wall of Furt Sumter with a heavy thud. For a long 'minute 
no one speaks. The echoes of that gun are fraught with mighty 
issues — the whirr of that shot means death to a quarter of a million 
soldiers. As the thunder rolls up and down the harbor and dies 
away twenty thousand people cheer. The war has begun ! There 
can be no backward step now. Old and young cheer and shout and 
shake hands and feel a glad relief. 

The Confederates had been all ready for a week. Every one of 
the fifty guns and mortars in position had been trained with 
mathematical precision to reach certain points with their fire. The 
order was to fire from left to right, beginning with the floating 
battery, and the gun which Edmund Ruflin fired was soon answered 
^by the next, and the fire swept clear around the circle until it came 
back to the same gun. Tlie projectiles used were solid shot, shell, 
and bombs, and every gun had the fort within easy range. At the 
time the first gun was fired a reporter of the Charleston Mercury — 
now on the staff of the News— was standing directly behind Mr. 
Ruflin, and to him I am indebted for many particulars of that 
attack never before published. He was one of the first in the fort 
after the surrender, and what he saw and made a note of can be 
depended on even when it clashes with the traditions of the his- 
torian. Taking up the firing in the order named, each gun was 
soon busy at work, and the tremendous cannonade shook Charleston 
from center to circumference. One standing on the esplanade, 
three miles away, felt the ground tremble under his feet as if an 
earthquake was struggling to reach the surface. There was no 
excitement among the Confederates after tlie first five minutes. 
The guns were loaded and fired with coolness and regularity, and 
officers sought positions from "yhich they could note with their 
glasses the work of every shot. 

Major Anderson was not only expecting the attack, but was ' 
ready for it. With the echoes of the first gun, all the men turned 



THE FIKST GUN OF THE WAR. 

out, and the morning roll was called and the flag run up, with the 
iron balls pounding away on the walls, each one jarring the masonry 
for several yards around and sending up a cloud of dust. It was 
just after roll-call that a gun fired from Sullivan's Island dis- 
mounted one of the monsters en harbette on the fort. The ball 
wiiieh struck and dismounted the gun broke in tiiree pieces, two 
of which fell inside the fort. 

Anderson knew it would be an all-day fight, and his first move 
was to send his men to breakfast. There was no particular excite- 
ment within the walls, as each one had been looking for the climax. 
It was during the morning meal, over an hour after the first gun 
was fired, tliat the first bomb-shell fell inside the walls. Others 
had fallen short or passed over, but the exact range had finally 
lieen obtained. 

After breakfast the handful of men were divided into reliefs, and 
the first went to the guns and opened fire in reply. As soon as 
the fort answered, the Confederate guns were ordered to fire one- 
third faster, and the result was that within an hour not one of the 
harhette or upper tier of guns in the fort could be used. One 
was struck in the muzzle and split down four feet, and three or 
four were upset and hurled yards away. Those left intact could 
not be worked on account of the enemy's fire. When a shell struck 
the wall anywhei'e within thirty feet of a gun, a shower of mortar 
.and pieces of brick were hurled clear over the fort, and solid shot 
were continuously passing over and around the guns. The dis- 
mounting of the guns was plainly noted by a hundred men with 
glasses, and the announcement called forth cheers all around the 
circle. 

Anderson could not have had the faintest hopes of saving Sumter, 
and he seems to have fought more to gain time or in the way of 
duty, than to silence any of the guns opposed. His firing for the 
fii'St two hours was very wild, and even in the afternoon not one 
shot hit where four missed. With the ordnance of 1864 he might 
have damaged Moultrie and the floating battery, but he could not 
have silenced them nor inflicted anv great loss of life. So little 
were his cannon balls feared that hundreds of Confederates stood 
■outside the works to get a better view of the fight. With so few 
men in the fort only a few guns could be worked, and those but 
■slowly. 

Before noon the Confederates began using hot shot, and the third 
•one which entered the fort set a building on fire. This emergency 



6 THE FIEST GUN OF THE WAE. 

had been provided for, and the flames were quickly extinguished, 
but to be kindled again and again during the day by the same 
means. After the men had orders to desert the upper tier of guns- 
and serve the next, they were well protected, and fii-ed with more 
regularity. When Fort Sumter was ready for occupancy it was pro- 
nounced by engineers and artillerists to be impregnable. From 
twenty to thirty feet of brick, stone, sand, and earth stood between 
the balls of an enemy and the defenders withjn. Within an hour 
after the first gun was fired the fort was not only being knocked to 
pieces by old-fashioned ordnance, but was menaced by a danger 
never dreamed of by its builders — that of the mortar firing. While 
subsequent events proved that the sti'onghokl could not be battered 
so badly but that it could be defended, it was a dozen times shown 
that bombs could be dropped into it from the sea as well as the 
land. 

As night fell, Anderson called his men from the guns, and 
preparations wei-e made for what was likely to occur during the 
long night. The last gun fired from Sumter that day was at the 
floating battery. The ball struck the water a hundred feet short, 
jumped over the battery, and, missing a small boat by only two or 
three feet, sank out of sight. Some believed because the fort had 
ceased firing it had surrendered, and there was intense interest to^ 
learn the truth. No one could set off in a boat and approach the 
fort on account of the Confederate fire, which did not slacken in 
the least, as the target was lost sight of in the gloom of night. 
When a shell struck the walls and exploded, a bright flash dispelled 
the darkness for an instant, and twice befoi-e midnight, the bomb& 
and liot shot renewed the conflagration inside. From the first 
gun in the morning until seven o'clock in the evening, Fort Sumter 
had been struck over twelve hundred times. Every harhette gun 
was dismounted, almost every foot of the walls scarred and 
pounded, and there were several spots where the walls were dug 
out to a distance of ten feet. At least once every five minutes 
during the day a bomb fell into the inclosure, and it seemed a 
miracle that half the garrison had not been wiped out. 

When day broke again, twenty thousand pairs of eyes were 
strained to catch sight of the fort. The flag was rippling in the 
morning breeze. Twenty-four hours of the most terrific pounding 
had failed to bring down the stars and stripes or weaken the brave 
hearts of the defenders. The men went to breakfast, as before ; 
were again toled off into reliefs, and as day broke in all its glory 



THE FIRST GUN OF THE WAR. 7 

the guns began bellowing defiance. Long before noon hot shot 
rekindled the tires, and at noon the barracks were burning fiercely. 
From this hour the guns were fired only at long intervals, every 
man in tlie fort being wanted elsewhere. Much of the powder was 
thrown out of the embrasures into the sea, followed by all the 
loaded shells which could be got at, but the explosions in the shell- 
room were plainly heard iu Charleston. The flames from the 
Ijurning barracks could be seen from Moultrie and other elevated 
points, and the Confederate fire was redoubled to push the garrison 
to desperation. 

Utterly unmindful of the fight without, the garrison battled 
against the danger within. At one time during the afternoon the 
shell-room was on fire, the barracks burning, the main gate ablaze, 
and every wooden building inside the fort walls, ready to go. 
Every four or five minutes a great bomb dropped from the sky and 
exploded with terrific violence, and it seemed wonderful that the 
garrison did not give up in despair. The remainder of the powder 
was wet down or thrown out, and then the men could only stand 
by and let the flames have full sweep. 

" Have they surrendered ? " was the query in the Confederate 
forts and batteries as the clouds of smoke hid the flag ; but now and 
then the query was answered as the wind rolled the stifling curtain 
aside and the old flag was seen streaming out to the breeze. 

Anderson would have held Fort Sumter another night at least, had 
it rested with him to raise the white flag. But the flag came from 
the Confederates, borne by Wigfall. That the Senator was acting 
solely on his own account, and that he had not even conferred with 
Beauregard, was shown by the fact that he rowed to the fort under 
the fire of his friends, and that several balls fell around him as he 
waited at an embrasure for admittance. He had come to propose 
a surrender, and Anderson was ready to come to terms. Federal 
history finds the Major in full uniform, clanking sword, and stern 
dignity. He was begrimed with smoke, covered with cinders, and 
received Wigfall with courtesy. The terms agreed upon had to be 
sanctioned by Beauregard, and they were far better terms than 
were ever subsequently accorded on either side. 

It is not disputed that Anderson made a brave defense — for the 
opening of the war. Two years after he would have been cashiered 
for surrendering under like circumstances. In after days, when 
that island was no more than a brick-pile, men defended it against 
such bombardments as the world had never seen — defended it 



8 



THE FIRST GUN OF THE WAR. 



against attacks by small boats — held it in spite of not twenty-four 
hours' cannonade, but long weeks of Ijombardment. 

Anderson knew that the storm was coining, and he had ample 
time to purchase provisions for a siege of a week at least. He had 
time to tear down the barracks and make other preparations. 
Some commanders would have assumed tiie autiiority to act, even 
though the Washington government was handling the question 
with gloves. 

As to provisions, Headly says the men ate their last cracker 
before the surrender. ■ Tradition has it thus, and the truth will he 
an unpleasant revelation. Later on in the war one hundred men 
would have lived for two weeks on the provisions left after tlie 
surrender, and no man would have been on half rations. While 
the fire was hot and long-continued, not a man was killed by it. 
While the fort was badly knocked about, it did not receive one half 
the damage inflicted by a Federal fleet in six hours one day 
in 1863. While Anderson received the fire of old-fashioned 
ordnance, the fort under a Confederate commander received such 
pounding from new and enormous projectiles that the bursting 
of a shell against the walls made the whole island tremble. 

Major Anderson's position was an embarrassing one in every 
sense, and his surrender was probably considered the only alterna- 
tive. Had he maintained the fight, he could not have been bom- 
barded out in a fortnight, but at the same time he could have 
inflicted no injury on the Confederates, and there was not a vessel 
in the Federal navy at tiiat time which could have run the gauntlet 
and brouffht him succor. 





FORT SUJITER IX 181)0. 




FORT SU5ITER IN 1864. 



|irst iull "Jttu. 

THE FIRST TEST IN THE EAST. 




^OULD the American fight? 

Ilis forcfatiier fought at Lexington and Bunker 
Hill and Yorktown, and a hundred other places 
made forever historic by bloodslied. His father 
fought at Churubusco and Eesaca de la Palma, and 
the city of Mexico. There was fighting blood in his veins, but it 
had been thinned down by years of continued peace. 

The test was coming ! 

Fort Sumter simply proved what no one would have denied. A 
fort of stone and brick can be battered, barbette guns dismounted, 
barracks burned by hot shot. Five thousand men, ensconced behind 
earth-works and provided with the best of artillery, deserve no 
particular credit for continuing a bombardment which finally results 
in the surrender of a fort defended by a hundred men. 

West Yirginia had brought Federal and Confederate face to face 
in battle array, and blood had been shed and fields had been won, 
but the test had not come. Wliere one regiment had shown its 
fighting blood, another had been ready to run away. 

Bull Run was to be the test. Every Federal soldier knew this 
as the long blue columns tramped across the bridges spanning the 
Potomac. Every Confederate realized it as the order reached 
camp after camp on the front to fall back and mass. There was 
good fighting-ground at Germantown and Yienna, but there was 
better at Bull Run. 

As the columns in blue pressed forward over the highways lead- 
ing south, every soldier eager and jubilant, the columns in gray 
slowly fell back from picket and post, and earth-work and fort, 
every man hoping for a battle. One day at noon the head of the 
Federal column filed into the straggling hamlet of Centreville, and 
from its hills the men looked down upon the dark green fields and 
forests, through which meandered the insignificant stream whose 
name was to become world-wide within a week. 

191 



10 FLKST BULL KUN. 

Beauregard had massed along the stream for a distance of seven 
7niles, guarding his rigiit in the strongest manner, but leaving his 
left to take care of itself. His center was impregnable. 

The head of the column turned to the left and took the road 
to Blackburn's Ford — Beauregard's right; a second body pushed 
straight on ; a third turned to the right. Before night over 40,000 
Federals were massed in front of the Confederates, whose number 
no one knew. 

The morrow would bring the test ! Bull Run was an experiment 
spattered with blood ; a farce which ended in tragedy ; a fire in 
which swords were tempered for long years of gallant work. 

McDowell's plan of battle was good. Under the same circum- 
stances it would be fol'owed ninety-nine times out of a hundred. 
He knew the risk of throwing soldiers who had never seen an 
enemy against a position which veterans might hesitate over, and 
he determined on a flank movement to compel Beauregard to fall 
hack from cover. 

^ The General plans — his subordinates execute. In the gray of 
that summer morning as three great columns in blue started out in 
as many directions to fall upon the enemy, the plan seemed excel- 
lent ; within three hours its execution was surrounded with diffi- 
culties. The flanking columns met unlooked for obstructions and 
were puzzled among the highways. The citizen-soldiery became 
sore-footed and lagged. Heintzelman found highways not marked 
on his maps, and others missing, and Hunter's men insisted on 
taking the pace which suited them best, despite the oft repeated 
orders to close up. 

At half past ten o'clock the Federals appeared on Beauregard's 
left flank, and within ten minutes McDowell's entire right and 
center moved down in battle line and the earth began to quiver 
under the terrible voice of artillery and the spiteful crackle of 
muskets. 

The test was at hand ! The query was being answered ! New 
York and Virginia, Michigan and Georgia, Massachusetts and 
South Carolina, Wisconsin and Louisiana, were shedding each 
other's blood ! 

It was a battle in which regiments fought like tigers, while other 
regiments seemed to be on the ground as spectators. Some general 
officers exhibited the greatest coolness, others might better have 
remained in Washington or Richmond. A glorious charge saved 
a battery — a cowardly retreat lost it. It was not that the men on 



FIKST BULL EUN. 11 

either side would not figlit, but that they had not yet learned how. 
It was the Lexington of the civil war. 

At two o'clock Napoleon would have looked down upon tlmt 
field to acknowledge a Federal victory and order the cavalry to be 
ready to pursue the routed Confederates. An hour later he would 
have been borne back towards Centre ville by the wildest mob that 
ever left a battle field. Johnston and Patterson had been facing 
each other miles away, each one under orders to prevent the other 
from moving down to reinforce. Patterson was duped and 
deceived by the thinnest strategy, and while in line and expecting 
an attack, his opponent stole away with the greater portion of his 
force and suddenly appeared to save the day at Bull Run. 

The Federal panic which followed the sight of this new army 
marching upon the field already considered won, started no one can 
say how, but could have been looked for. The soldier is a machine 
until victory is decided against him. Then he is no longer fo be 
controlled by orders or arguments. The panic among raw soldiers 
at Bull Eun was more than once imitated by veterans of a dozen 
battles. Had it been possible to retire the Federal forces to the 
heights of Centreville in good order, Patterson would have come 
up that afternoon and evening to balance numbers. The next day 
would have witnessed anotlier grapple, with a result which no one 
can predict. 

It mattered not who won that first battle. Had Beauregard been 
routed the war would not have been cut short by a single week. 
North and South had entered upon a war which was to drag its 
length through long years and leave trails of blood and disaster 
over countless paths. 

The Confederate jubilee was short lived. After a day of rejoic- 
ing it was remembered that only Johnston's coming had turned 
defeat into victory. There were dead to bury and grieve over, and 
wounds to heal, and it was realized that the issue must now become 
one of shot and shell. 

Defeat at Bull Run cemented a hundred factions at the North 
into one solid body whose watchword was : " War to the end ! " 
Victory would have been followed by appeals from a hundred 
factions for a compromise. 

Americans would fight ! They had been fairly tested at Bull 
Run. No matter what uniform he wore, or what his occupation or 
profession before donning the uniform, he had faced the murderous 
batteries and the deadly muskets with a nerve to be commended by 
the veterans of other wars. 



Milson's Crefk. 

THE FIRST TEST IN THE WEST. 







HE men of New England and the Middle States had 
met those of Maryland, Virginia, Alabama and the 
Carolinas, and each had stood the test. How would it 
be in the West, when Illinois and Iowa and Kansas and 
Wisconsin came to grapple with Arkansas, Mississippi 
and Texas ? 

The East was reorganizing. The giants had met, drawn blood, 
recognized each other's strength, and then gone into training for a 
fight to the finish. Peace was no longer thought of ; a long and 
bloody war was at hand. 

On the first of August, 1861, the Federal General Lyon was at 
Springfield with a force of a little more than five thousand men. 
The state echoed to the tread of both armies. The Federal govern- 
ment was determined that Missouri should not go out of the Union, 
no matter what action had been taken by her Confederate legisla- 
ture. The Confederate government was equally determined to 
hold the prize, and in the case of Lyon, two separate armies were 
ordered to move forward and crush him. The force under either 
Price or McCulloch outnumbered him, but when it was left to 
Lyon's discretion to retreat or fight he began to serve out ammuni- 
tion. He would figiit. If Lyon was wiped out then it was good- 
bye to Fremont at St. Louis. If he could check and detain the 
advancing armies, Fremont would have time to secure arms and 
artillery for the recruits who had flocked to his standard. 

Victories and defeats have their moral effect on nations. Defeat 
at Springfield meant ten thousand recruits for the Confederacy. 
Victory meant more than that to the Federal cause. 

The test in the West was coming ! 

Lyon would not wait to be attacked. Tlie enemy was strong 
enough to invest his position. At sundown on the ninth instant, 

[12] 



Wilson's creek. 13 

having been apprised by his scouts that the advance of the Confed- 
erates was only about ten miles away, he put his little army in 
motion, and with the exception of a few brief halts marched all night 
long. At daylight he was contronting the enemy. Had he seen a 
year's service in the field he would have massed his army on the 
ridge which offered such advantages, thrown up intrenchments, and 
waited for the superior force to hurl itself against him. 

Believing that his advance was unknown, he detached Sigel 
with a column to make a flank movement and strike the Confeder- 
ate rear, while the impatient Lyon moved forward and drove in the 
enemy's pickets and warned him of what was coming. It was 
bravery, not strategy. 

From an hour past midnight, the Confederates had been apprised 
of Lyon's march. Sigel's flank movement was promptly reported, 
and only waiting until he had fully cut loose, the battle-lines in gray 
moved forward to annihilate Lyon. 

The fight at Bull Run was preceded by marching and counter- 
marching. That at Wilson's Creek opened with a crash of mus- 
ketry and artillery, followed by a rush which was not checked until 
men could see into each other's eyes. For twenty-five minutes 
Lyon's right and center fought to keep from being run over and 
trodden into the earth by the masses hurled against them. Time after 
time the Confederates, three ranks deep, rushed against the positions 
to be checked and driven grudgingly back. It was in their last 
advance, when the dead almost blocked the path of the living, that 
Lyon's horse was shot dead and he himself received two serioua 
wounds. 

Eegiment met regiment at Bull Kun. At Wilson's Creek, army 
rushed against army with a shock which cumbered the ground with 
dead and rent the heavens with the cries of the wounded. The 
West would fight ! 

While the Confederates failed to carry the center, they massed on 
the right and left and fell with renewed fury upon those positions. 
On the left they were cheeked with grape and cannister. On the 
right Lyon, wounded as he was, placed himself at the head of a 
regiment and advanced to meet the battle-lines of gray. It was in 
this advance that he received his third bullet and fell to the ground 
a corpse. 

Now came a lull, which was hailed with glad relief. In after 
battles men learned to dread these lulls in the roar and crash and 
carnage of battle, and to rightly look upon them as the precursors 



14 WILSON S CREEK. 

of desperate advances. The command was assumed by Major 
Sturgis, and he employed the lull in bringing up ammunition, 
strengthening his position, and making all preparations for a last 
grapple. 

When the Confederates advanced again it was a living wall mov- 
ing up from the plains to crush all opposition. Sturgis was ready, 
and a sheet of fire flashed out to meet it. The wall staggered, but 
did not stop. Another blaze of fire halted it for a moment, but it 
came on again, slowly, steadily, vengefully. For ten minutes death 
reaped a grand harvest. Federal gunners were bayoneted as they 
loaded their pieces — Confederate infantrymen were blown to atoms 
at the muzzles of cannon. 

Theu the wall shivered — toppled — fell, and the Confederates 
were forced back to the plain. 

Where was Sigel 1 

He should have been heard from an hour ago! Let him but 
open on the Confederate flank or rear and the day was won. The 
echo of his guns would have been sweetest music to the ears of the 
weary, thirsting, anxious Federals, but they waited in vain. It was 
a blunder in detaching him, and his movements were a series of 
blunders. Without giving a thought to the idea that the breaking 
away of so large a force must have been noted, and that prepara- 
tions would be made to i-eceive it, he pushed ahead in a lawless 
manner and at length found his progress barred by a strong column 
thrown across the highway in battle-line. It pleased Sigel's 
advance to believe that this force belonged to Lyon's command, 
but to believe it they had to argue that five thousand Federals had 
walked over fifteen thousand Confederates and were still in pursuit. 
In straggling order Sigel's troops closed up the gap, and were 
within pistol-shot of the Confederate lines when they received the 
first volley. Confusion followed. The efforts made to rally the 
men in the face of sharp musketry was unavailing, and with 
scarcely a show of resistance the various regiments broke into panic- 
stricken detachments and fled for their lives. Out of two full 
regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery and a detachment of 
cavalry, numbering about two thousand four hundred men, Sigel 
sustained a loss of about eight hundred in killed and wounded. 

When Sturgis received word of this disaster he was holding his 
own bravely, but he lost not a moment in making jjrcparations for 
retreat. So far as the battle was concerned neither had won a vic- 
tory, but as he was permitted to withdraw in the face of a superior 



Wilson's okeek. 



15 



force without molestation, tlie North sang his praises without stint. 
The entire loss of the Federals was upwards of a thousand; the 
Confederate loss was two hundred greater. Had Sigel's troops 
remained with Ljon and fought as bravelj' as the others, the 
Federals would have held the battle field. Had his flank movement 
been the success Lyon hoped for, the Confederate forces would have 
.been routed. 

The East had poured out its blood on the field of Bull Eun. 
The West had formed its lines of battle and held them like heroes. 
The query ; " Will Americans fight ? " had been answered. 




uUigait's §dt\m of STfringloiu 




■HERE are pages in tlie history of the great Civil War 
which, though spattered witli the blood of friend and 
foe, and telling of terrible disaster, are yet so burnished 
with the lustre of heroism, that no matter on which 
side the reader fought, he must feel his pulse beat 
faster, and his heart swell with pride. Col. Mulligan's defense of 
Lexington forms such a page. 

In September of the first year of the war, Mulhgan, and his Irish 
brigade (Illinois troops), reached Lexington, with orders to hold it 
to the last, as it was looked upon as a strategic point of importance 
to the Federal government. The place was occupied by two or 
three different companies of Missouri home-guards, none of whom 
liad seen a skirmisii, and Mulligan's total force lacked but a hun- 
dred of four thousand men. The defeat of Lyon, at Wilson's 
Creek, gave the Confederate army, under Price, an opportunity to 
walk over various posts held by small Federal forces, and Mulligan 
had not yet reached Lexington when he received news that Price 
w^as marching for that point. 

About half a mile back from the river, on a high ground, and in 
the centre of the straggling village, the Federals enclosed several 
acres with a breastwork, and the large brick building used as a 
seminary was included in the enclosure and fortified as well as 
possible. 

While the position was the only one which could have been 
defended for an hour, Mulligan realized that anything like a siege 
must prove his destruction within a week The river was half a mile 
away, and he must depend upon it for water He had a lai-ge 
number of horses and mules with him, and subsequent events 
proved that it would have been better to have shot them down 
before the Confederates appeared. Barrels, casks, jugs, crocks, 
pails, and everything which would hold even a gallon of water was 

[16] 



MULLIGAN'S DEFENSE OF LEXINGTON. 17 

called into service, and filled by the night of the eleventli. At 
daylight on the morning of the twelfth the advance of Price's 
army drove in Mulligan's pickets on every road, and Lexington was 
soon invested. 

It was generally believed among the Confederates, that Mulligan 
had less than two thousand men, and that he had a large amount of 
treasure in his care. These rumors increased the enthusiasm of the 
large force of raw troops under Price, and the entire army was 
not yet up when a heavy force was massed and hurled at the weak 
point in the breastwork. Tliis was at its lowest spot, where it 
crossed a dry ravine. After a sharp cannonade lasting about an 
hour, a force of about six thousand infantry dashed forward with 
loud cheers, expecting to drive right over the earth-works. 

Mulligan had been watching operations until satisfied of the 
point to be attacked. Then he massed to repel the assault, and 
when the Confederate battle-lines broke cover and advanced they 
were greeted with such a fierce and continuous fire as to disor- 
ganize and drive them back. It was wonderful that raw soldiers, 
hundreds of whom were not two weeks from home, could be 
thrown against breastworks as these were. It was just as strange 
that Mulligan, with his equally raw material, could hold them 
steadily to their places under the play of a heavy artillery and 
musketry fire. The repulse was so emphatic as to convey the idea 
that the Federal force numbered at least five thousand men. 

Price formed a crescent about the fortifications, lodging his 
sharpshooters in houses, barns, trees, and every other spot where 
the elevation would enable them to secure a plunging fii-e; but 
wliat troubled him most was tlie fact that he could not advance his 
artillery sufiicient to make it more effective. Whenever one of his 
guns was hauled from cover Mulligan concentrated the fire from 
his six field-pieces and drove it back. In this emergency a private 
soldier stepped forward with a hint which eventually resulted in 
disaster to the Federals. Scores of wagons were at once dispatched 
over the country to bring in bales of iienip. As fast as they 
arrived they were rolled into the water until thoroughly soaked, 
and they were then as impervious to shot and shell and fire as 
Mulligan's earthworks. These bales were dropped in line all along 
the open ground, and the infantry and artillery advanced behind 
this strange shelter. Each bale furnished cover for three men, and 
while those at the ends heaved it along the one in the middle acted 
as a sharp-shooter against any Federal showing his head above the 



18 mulligan's defense of lkxincjton. 

breastwork. Years after, when Forrest was repulsed from the 
block-lioLises left by Sherman to cover his line between Chatta- 
nooga and Atlanta, he used bales of hay instead of hemp, and 
rolled his breastwork forward foot by foot until the block-houses 
had to surrender or receive the torch. 

From the twelfth to the eighteenth Price gave Mulligan no rest 
day or night. His artillery thundered all day and far into night, 
and ride and musket were kept busy in reducing his beleaguered 
force. As the water grew scarce the horses and mules were forced 
to do without, and one by one they succumbed to thirst or bullet. 
In expecting reinforcements he hoped against hope. Fremont was 
at St. Louis with a large force, but he received no oi-ders to succor 
Mulligan. Had he sent troops forward the Confederates would 
have been prepared to receive and drive them back. As the days 
went by the brave Colonel realized that the fate of Lexington was 
sealed. It was then a question of how long he could hold out. In 
eight days he had lost several hundred men, and now the Missouri- 
ans with him began to weaken. They liad all along been held in the 
background while the Irish brigade took the posts of danger, but 
the conduct of men and oiBcers proved that they could no longer 
be relied on in any situation. Twice on the nineteenth Mulligan 
led sorties in person, which resulted in driving back portions of 
the Confederate line, but the loss was heavy and the gain only 
temporary. 

On the night of the nineteenth, after midnight. Mulligan pro- 
posed to mass and cut his way out. Ho did not hope to get clear 
of Price, then numbering five to one, and reach some point from 
which he could receive reinforcements, but he would push clear of 
the investing line and fight Price a stand-up battle — twenty-six 
hundred men to more than fifteen thousand 1 The Missourians 
refused to go out, and the project was abandoned. 

On the twentieth the enclosure was a hell on earth. Men killed 
thirty hours before had not been buried, while their numbers were 
being constantly added to. Wounded men filled the air with their 
cries and groans ; an overpowering stench arose from the dead ani- 
mals ; men stood at the breastworks with clenched teeth and flashing 
eyes, and knowing that the end was near, but determined to fight to 
the death. Price had determined that this day should witness the 
capture of Lexington. His artillery had been reinforced, while 
two of Mulligan's six field-pieces had been rendered useless. More 
than a thousand bales of hemp had been rolled into line on ground 



MULLIGAN 8 DEFENSE OF LEXINGTON. 



19 



which gradually sloped towards the earth-works, and three thousand 
Confederates were behind this wall. At an early hour in the 
morning it began to move. Shot, nor shell, nor bullet could 
penetrate or stop it. Foot by foot, yard by yard, it moved down 
the slope, crowned by a sheet of flame which every moment 
brought death to some Federal. 

As this wall of Fate moved onward, Mulligan saw that a large 
force was massing on the opposite side. The home-guards realized 
that there was to be a simnltaneous assault, and to a man the}' flatly 
refused to fire another shot. Threats and appeals were alike in 
vain. They flung down their muskets and sought cover, and the 
twice-wounded Mulligan was forced to raise the white flag in token 
of surrender. Of the twenty-six liundred and forty men he sur- 
rendered to Price, upwards of four hundred had been wounded 
but would not leave the breastworks. 

Price was an enemy and conqueror, but he had a heart wliich 
reverenced gallantry in friend or foe. In returning Mulligan's 
sword to him he said : 

" The war may last for a decade, but no sword will be more 
bravely defended." 

As the Confederates swarmed over the breastworks and found 
the water-barrels dry, the dead unburied, the wounded uneared for, 
but every musket-barrel hot from the desperate defense, they 
extended their hands, and the bitterness of years was forgotten in 
the admiration of the moment. 




■SciirsSiuff. 




HE crossing at Fredericksburg — the march of Hooiver 
into the thickets of Chancellorsville — the rusli into the 
crater at Petersburg, and other fatal mistakes of the 
war conmiitted by Federal generals, had a bloody pre- 
cedent before the close of 1861. 

In October of that .year, while McClellan and Lee confronted 
each other along the Potomac, there were grounds for believing 
that Lee meditated a swift massing of troops at Leesburg and a 
rush across the river. This belief was not shared by McClellan, 
and perhaps not by the administration, but the fact that such a 
rumor was in circulation among the rank and file laid the ground- 
work for the terrible disaster at Ball's Bluff. 

Colonel Devens, of the Fifteenth Massachusetts, held a post of 
observation opposite Ball's BluflE. He had orders to keep scouts out 
along his front, and on the nineteenth one of them reported a new 
camp of Confederates opposite Devens' position and half a mile back 
from the Bluffs. One of the excuses afterwards put forth was that 
the scout, skulking about in the darkness, had mistaken shocks of 
newly-cut corn for Confederate tents. There were no shocks of 
corn there. In his desire to bring in a report of interest the scout 
had manufactured his story, having no idea of what would result 
from it. 

Devens reported the matter to his superiors, and at his own solici- 
tation received permission to cross the river and rout the force. 
While it was generally believed, as before stated, that Lee was 
massing on his left, Devens took only three hundred men with 
him to oppose the unknown force supposed to be in his front. This 
force was ferried over the wide and rapid stream in leaky old scows, 
and only after more than three hours' hard work. Not until his 
command had finally been placed on the Virginia shore did it seem 
to occur to Devens that in case of disaster he would be in an awk 
ward, not to say dangerous, situation. 

[20] 



ball's bluff. 21 

The Confederate force was reported to be encamped back of the 
Bluffs. Instead of crossing above or below, to take the supposed 
encampment en flank, Devens landed under the Bluffs and was com- 
pelled to ascend them by a winding cattle-trail in single file. Ten 
Confederate infantrymen could have held his whole force in check 
right there. When the command finally gained the crest of the 
Bluffs the}' had a long wait for daylight, but during this interval 
Devens sent a report to General Stone, and soon after daylight 
Colonel Lee of the Twentietii Massachusetts crossed with a full 
company. 

As daylight came, scouts were sent out in different directions, but 
not a Confederate was to be found. The encampment was a hum- 
bug, and not even a picket guarded the neighboi-hood. Devens' 
oi'ders extended no farthei', but he )5ushed on in the direction of 
Leesbiirg to see what force he could uncover. It was only when 
he saw Confederate troops riding and marching along Ins front that 
he ordered a halt. His presence on the Bluffs had been discovered 
soon after daylight by farmers, and messengers were dispatched to 
the nearest Confederate force, 

Lee was not massing there. In point of fact the neighborhood 
•was guarded by local companies who had seen no service. It took 
from daylight until after eight o'clock to bring up and concentrate 
a sufficient Confederate force to oppose the four hundred Federals. 
The way for retreat across the river was open all this time, but 
Devens had cai'ried the war across the Potomac and was deter- 
mined to stick. General Stone encouraged him by sending over 
the remainder of the Fifteenth, thus raising his force to nearly 
seven hundred men. He knew the Confederates were gathering to 
attack him, and that it was only a question of hours when they 
could bring up twenty to his one. He had no hopes of further 
reinforcement, nor did he expect to advance. What, then, could 
have influenced Devens to take up position for battle and wait until 
■noon to be attacked ! Confederate troops massed on him from 
points ten to fifteen miles distant, and by noon tiie force in his 
front was large enough to crush him and intended to do it. 

The Federal center and left were vigorously attacked, and a 
•column had almost succeeded in passing Devens' right flank when 
he checkmated it by falling back to the Bluffs. Here, while 
forming his lines anew, he surrendered his command to Colonel 
Baker, the ranking officer, who had been crossing with reinforce- 
ments since the first rattle of musketry proved that a fight was on. 



22 ball's bluff. 

Four scows furnished the sole means of transportation, and these 
were such wi'etched hulks tliat the men dared not take a six-pound 
field-piece and its horses over together. Three pieces of artillery 
were finally crossed and landed right under the Bluffs, up which 
they had to be hauled by ropes. The horses were pulled after them, 
roads cut through the thickets, and the pieces finally brought into 
action. 

Baker brought with him his California batallion and a New York 
regiment. It would have been far better had Devens surrendered 
his M'hole command to the Confederates. Reinforcements were 
simply to add to the victims of the blunder and the slaughter. 
Baker had the bravery of a hero and the coolness of a general. As 
soon as he could get his forces into line he began pushing the Con- 
federates Rack until he had room to maneuver. The three pieces 
of artillery were got in position, and when the fight again opened 
the Federals for a time had the best of it. But for the knowledge 
that retreat was cut off by the river his men would have gone into 
the battle in better spirits, but though the officers sought to offset 
this feeling by spreading rumors of reinforcements, the certainty 
that disaster meant surrender or slaughter acted like a chill. 

The Federal lines were so firmly planted that they coukl not be 
forced at any point, though repeated attempts were made during 
the afternoon. But if they could not be driven they could not be 
advanced. Unless reinforcements in sufiicient numbers to rout the 
Confederates reached Baker he must hold his position and see his 
ranks being gradually tliinned out by the steady fire. 

As the afternoon wore on the Confederates received reinforce- 
ments and began to be more aggressive. The Federal artillery, after 
all the trouble of crossing, was rendered useless at various inteiwals 
b}' the concentrated fire which swept away the crews at each gun, 
and every piece was finally disabled or abandoned. There were no 
signs of giving way until Baker fell. He had recklessly exposed 
himself all the afternoon, and received the fatal bullet while ming- 
ling with the men at the front and encouraging them to repel a 
sudden assault. He was shot by a Virginia soldier who was armed 
only with a self-cocking revolver, and he fired at Baker from a dis- 
tance of about six feet. 

Nearly all the fighting on the Confederate side up to noon was 
done by the Eighth Virginia, assisted by local militia and fanners, 
a large number of whom brouglit rifles and shot-guns and fought 
on their own hook. About noon three Mississippi regiments 



ball's bluff. 23 

arrived and went into line, and from this hour on, the day was lost 
to the Federals. The news of Bakei-'s fall produced something of 
a panic for a time, the more so as it was followed by a cliange of 
commanders and loss of valuable time in settling the seniority of 
rank. Colonel Lee, who first assumed command, directed the 
troops to fall back in order to shorten the lines, but being outranked 
by Cogswell, the movement was stopped and the men massed to 
break through the Confederates and attempt to reach Edward's 
Ferry It was too late ! Every Federal soldier on that field knew 
the day was lost, and the knowledge brought confusion and more 
blunders. 

It is asserted in at least two Federal histories that at this critical 
moment a Confederate officer on a white horse left the cover of the 
woods held by the Thirteenth Mississippi, advanced close to the 
front of the Tammany i-eginient, and pointing back to the woods, 
ordered a charge. No man could have lived two miimtes on that 
front, which was being swept with a continuous fire of musketry. 
Any person coming from the woods would have been known as an 
enemy and fired on at once. No member of the Thirteenth Missis- 
sippi knew of such an occurrence. The story was doubtless 
invented to excuse the blunder made when Cogswell assumed com- 
mand. 

" We are going to cut our way out ! " was passed from man to 
man along the lines, and the Tammany regiment was ordered by its 
own officers to advance. It dashed forward in fine style, carrying 
with it nearly the entire Federal front, thus breaking and throwing 
the lines into confusion. The Mississippians met the assault with 
such a murderous fire that it was almost instantly checked. Then, 
as the Federals fell back, order and discipline could no longer be 
maintained. There was a wild rush for the foot of the Bluffs and 
the scows. 

A year later any sergeant in the army would have known what 
step to take to prevent the slaughter that followed. Enough men 
could have been rallied to hold the Bluffs. The ground there was 
covered with trees, thickets, logs and rocks, and a single line of 
infantry could have repulsed five times its numbers. No such 
effort was made. A few officers and men, knowing that they 
would be drowned in the crossing, tarried for awhile on the Bluffs 
and kept up a feeble fire, but they were soon routed out by the 
Confederate advance. 

Then the slaughter began. The old scows were pushed out into 



M 

the river, with their loads of men, each one offering a fair target, 
and from the crest of the Bluffs the Confederates had a plunging 
fire on tlie panic-stricken mass huddled at the river's edge. They 
have been severely criticised for continuing this fire when no resist- 
ance was offered, but it must be remembered that no white flag 
appeared among the Fedei-als in token of surrender. The force 
was making every effort to escape, instead. Cogswell and Lee, 
together witli a portion of their commands, surrendered and received 
kind treatment, while a considerable number escaped up and down 
the i-iver, and finally succeeded in crossing. 

The Union loss, in killed and captured, was about one thousand. 
The Confederates lost about two hundred killed, and three hundred 
wounded, and captured the three pieces of artillery and several 
hundred muskets. It was a battle brought on by a blunder, fought 
amidst other blunders, and a victory for the Confederates that was 
unexpected and unhoped for. General Stone was held responsible, 
but this did not wasli the blood-stains from the bluffs nor restore 
to life the corpses floating heavily down the current of the merciless 
river. 

From Ball's Bluff', in tlie first year of tiie war, to A])pomattox, in 
the last, the Federal government had too many men. It could spare 
a thousand lives at any time us victims to a military blunder. 




I'jrrt Ijeno, tlje P'cnt-Cni|]. 




'h F the Confederates had been allowed more time, Forts 
Henry and Donelson would liave formed part of a quad- 



rilateral. As it was, one event crowded another so closely 
that the forts were not finished as intended, not armed as 
they should liave been, and not garrisoned for such 
attacks as Grant and Foote made. 

On the fourtli of February, 1862, Grant began landing his infan- 
try three miles below Fort Henry, and Foote was on hand with 
seven gun-boats. On the same night the Federals had possession of 
both banks of the Tennessee below tiie fort. The move was made 
suddenly, but had it been proclaimed a week in advance the garrison 
of tlie fort could not have been increased by a thousand men. 
Grant's move was a part of a grand movement wliich gave tlie Con- 
federates at each point plenty of anxiety, and no tlireatened point 
had reinforcements to spare. 

Could the original plans of the engineers have been carried out. 
Fort Henry would have been a strong work, mounting from fifty to 
sixty cannon, instead of eleven, and calling for a garrison of six 
thousand men, instead of two thousand seven hundred. jN^ot only 
the fort itself was open to attacks from both land and water at the 
same moment, but it was actually commanded from three or four 
different land points, which an enemy would be certain to occupy. 
To have had a fair show against Grant and Foote, with their seven 
gun-boats, eighteen thousand infantry and nearly one hundred guns, 
Gen. Tilghman, commanding, should liave had five thousand infan- 
try and four or five additional batteries of field artillery. He could 
not even think of holding the opposite shore, although Grant had 
but to post his batteries there to rake every acre of ground in the 
fort, and maintain a cross-fire over most of it. A rise of two feet 
•of water would give a gun-boat a direct fire into the intrenched 
■camps, and yet this matter did not seem to have troubled the 
engineers who laid out the works. There was not in Fort Henry, 

[251 



26 FOBT HENEY. 

when Grant and Foote were fairly ready for attack, a spot or place 
to shelter half a dozen men from the fire of one or the other. One 
who doubts has but to go over the ground. He can see the position 
of every gun, atid the river is still there. The roads which the 
Federals cleared along the banks are plain enough, and the enfilad- 
ing fire can be traced as easily as the blaze of an ax through the 
forest. Gen. Smith's forces, which moved up the west bank, walked 
into a position hardly a tliousand feet from the magazine of the fort, 
and from this position had three cross-fires on the garrison. 

When the Confederate commander realized the strengtli of the 
force closing in upon him he saw that the fort must fall. While 
Fort Donelson, twelve miles across the country, on the Cumberland, 
was a part of the same system of defense, it was better located for a 
vigorous defense, and the fall of one did not necessarily include the 
fall of the other. If he could save Donelson by letting go of 
Henry, it would still be a point gained. 

On the morning of the sixth, while the gun-boats were moving 
up and the infantry swinging into position, Tilghman sent away 
four-fifths of his garrison, by the highway, to Fort Donelson, 
Indeed, it was either this, or to see them cut to pieces by the enfil- 
ading fire, or captured as they stood in line. They had already been 
driven clear of the works before the fort had fired a gun. The 
command marched swiftly away, to be added to the garrison of the 
other fort, and that they might not be too closely' pursued, and 
because he had fight in him and would not surrender without strik- 
ing a blow, Tilghman went to his heavy guns and made ready for 
what was coming. There were exactly eleven of them in battery 
on the river side, and were not enough artillerists to work more than 
eight of them at once. These facts may read strangely to one who 
has perused the enthusiastic versions of certain historians regarding 
the Confederate strength, but they are facts, nevertheless. 

The Federal infantry held back to let Foote open the ball and 
silence the water batteries. Right gallantly the fleet moved up, 
opening fire while yet a long way off, and steadily maintaining it 
until coming as close as was deemed prudent. The first dozen shells 
from the fleet were altogether too high, and crashed among the 
trees. The second one fired struck a tree about twenty-five feet 
from the roots, just below where three great limbs branched out, 
and took the entire top off and flung it upon other tree tops to the 
rear. The trunk was split into quarters clear down to the roots. 

Undercover of their own rapid fire, the iron-clads advanced to within 



FORT HENKY. 27 

rifle-shot of the water battery, while those not protected remained 
at a safer distance. All were near enough to make their tire effec- 
tive, and when once the range had been obtained, it was not ten 
minutes before those in Fort Henry realized that the fleet alone was 
more than its match. 

Only eighty seven men had been left behind to work the guns, 
and not Ave ont of the number had ever witnessed a skirmish. 
They could not even be called trained artillerists, for their practice 
at the guns had amounted to nothing. Not a gun was tired from 
the fort until Foote's whole fleet was in position. Then the men 
opened fire with six or seven of the eleven guns. The iirst shot was 
fired from a twenty-four pounder. It flew over the gun-boat Essex, 
missing her by only three or four feet, struck the water half a mile 
below, bounded like a ball over another gun-boat, and sank a mile 
away. The next shot, from a columbiad, missed the Essex by a 
shave, and plumped into the river so close to the next in line as to 
throw water over her decks. After these two shots the guns were 
fired as fast as possible, and in a brief time the range on both sides 
was excellent. While three out of every five Federal shot cleared 
the defenses, the two which struck inflicted such damages as the 
engineers could not have thought possible. Banks of solid earth 
eight feet thick were blown away and dug out by the great shells, 
until they scarcely offered any defense, and the shells which ex- 
ploded in the rear furnished proof that there would have been no 
safety within the works for a garrison. 

The Essex and the Cincinnati were hit at about the same time, 
and that within five minutes after the fort opened fire. Then the 
guns were toled off and each selected its target. The fort used solid 



■&~- 



shot altogether, and after the first excitement the men fired coolly 
and deliberately and cheered whenever their shots made a hit. 
When the fight had been going on for an hour the Essex steamed 
in a little closer and delivered a shot wbich stimck the muzzle of a 
twenty-four-poimdcr and tore away an iron splinter three feet long 
and crushed one of the gunners to pulp. Tlie big gun was being 
fired at the instant, and it burst wide open and killed or wounded 
every man of the crew. 

At the same moment a solid shot from the fort crashed into the 
side of the Essex, penetrated one of her boilers, scalded a number 
of men, killed Captain Porter's aid, and so disabled the craft that 
she floated out of the fight. She received two more shot while 
drifting out of i-ange, making over twenty received in all. 



28 FOET HENRY. 

The dag-ship Cincinnati at one time approached to within pistol 
shot of the parapets, but it was a position slie could not maintain 
five minutes. Two of the big guns were devoted entirely to her, 
and she was struck about thirty times during the light. Wliile not 
so seriously injured as to compel her to abandon the fight, she was 
so badly knocked to pieces as to necessitate sending her off for 
repairs at an early date after the capture of the fort. 

Others of the iron-clads were repeatedly struck, and more or less 
damaged, and it was plain to see that had they taken broadside posi- 
tions, as at Fort McAllister and other points later on, they would 
have been sent to the bottom by the fire of the fort. The armor 
was in a measure experimental ; at least, these were pioneer iron- 
clads, and it needed a tight like this to settle the question of how 
thick tlie armor should be. Fighting bow on, all shots were 
received at an angle, and the I)oat was a small target to fire at. 

The fight lasted about two hours, and in this brief time the casu- 
alties in the fort were singularly numerous. The big twenty-four 
pounder was useless after a round or two, and five men were dis- 
abled. Then came a Federal shell, which struck another cannon 
fair in the mouth and tore it open and disabled its crew. Then the 
most valuable gun left was rendered useless by being accidently 
spiked with the priming wire. This disaster was followed by the 
dismounting of another gun, and before the fight was over. General 
Tilghman huaself was acting as the captain of a gun. During the 
last ten minutes of the fight he had only men enough to work two 
guns. There were two or three guns not fired at all during the 
entire fight for want of crews to woi'k them. As the great major- 
ity of the artillerists were for the first time under fire they naturally 
threw away a great deal of ammunition before getting settled down 
to cool fighting. The numerous disasters behind the parapets also 
served to unnerve them, but the history of war in this country 
does not furnish another instance like the defense of that fort. 
Less than one hundred men, surrounded by laud, opposed by iron- 
clads and mortar boats, receiving ten shots where they could only 
fire one — this little band held out for two long hours under a fire 
which Foote called terrible, and surrendered only when the crew of 
the last gun fell down exhausted, and were lying on the ground as 
the fiag came fluttering down and the surrender was made. 

At the time Grant appeared the river was rising, the country full 
of backwater, and the roads in a horrible condition. But for this 
latter fact evervthing in Fort Ilenrv worth tidcinsj awav could and 



FOET HENRT. 29' 

would have been removed to Donelson. Tlie Federals captured 
stores of all kinds and a number of valuable guns, and the number 
of prisoners surrendered, outside of the sick on the hospital boat, 
was seventy-eight. The killed, wounded and missing in the fleet 
was seventy-three. The surrender was made to Foote, and Grant 
came in for no share of the praise, although had he walked in on 
the fort instead of giving the fleet a chance, his skirmish line would 
have captured it in ten minutes, and perhaps without the loss of a 
man. 

The results were of direct benefit to both sides. The Confeder- 
ates saw that rifled twenty-four-pounders were a match for any 
Federal gun-boat then afloat, and the Federals at once set about 
securing stronger armor and strengthening the weak spots. The 
attack by the fleet was terrific for that epoch, and the men were 
enthusiastic and encouraged. The defense was heroic, and from 
that date Confederates wlio liad the shelter of parapets would fight 
a gun-boat as soon as anything else. 

The fort, as it then stood, witiiout the other contemplated posts, 
which would have made it a part of a grand combination of defense, 
was simply a man-trap. The engineer did not take a rise of the 
river into account, and yet four feet more than the stage at which 
work was begun would drive the men from the lower guns, and 
seven or eight feet would overflow a good portion of the fort. It 
was convenient of approach for an enemy, commanded on both 
sides of the river, and the wisest thing ever done by a Confederate 
commander was in Tilghman's getting his command out of the trap 
before the jaws came together. Had he been reinforced he would 
have lost every man. 




€^t Capture of Jort Jontlsaiu 



((^Jf^ OUT DONELSON, to which the majority of the garrison 

^^1 |f of Fort Henry retreated before the surrender, was distant 

'^■3)» but twelve miles across the country, on the Cumber- 
land. The earth-works on the Bluffs required a garrison 
of at least ten thousand men to fully man tliem, and 
were laid out to cover strategic points, thus giving the fort an 
irregular shape. Below, near the waters edge, the lieavy guns were 
put in battery to command the river, and the infantry supports had 
the cover of earth-works at fair musket range. 

Had Foote brought a score of gun-boats to the attack they would 
have been beaten off, but when Foote was assisted by a land attack, 
all the weak points of the fort were at once exposed. 

The defenders of Fort Donelson were a miscellaneous crowd. 
Floyd was there with his command ; Buckner had a command ; 
Pillow had a command, and Forrest had a command. While Floyd 
was in supreme command, he neither had a reputation as a fighter 
nor the entire confidence of tlie various commands. There was 
not that harmony among the officers that should have been dis- 
played, and it seems that some of them, from tlie hour the invest- 
ment became complete, were more occupied in jjlanning to break 
through and get away than in perfecting details for defense. 

The fort covered too much ground for the strength of any garri- 
son likely to be intrusted with its defense. One soldier in a fort 
should count for four attacking it, but the earth-works on the Bluffs 
were so strung out that one defender could count for no more than 
an assailant. The force defending the fort is not placed at above 
fifteen thousand men by any Confederate military report, and 
Forrest's cavalry were of little use as cavalry. 

Outside of Foote's fleet Grant had an investing force estimated 
at twenty-seven thousand or twenty-eight thousand men, and by the 
thirteenth of February he was in position. Whatever the s])ape of 
the Confederate line, he conformed to it, and if the Confederates 

[301 



THE CAPTURE OF FOBT DONELSON. 31 

lad the cover of an earth-work, the Federals were protected by logs 
and trees and ditches and ravines. 

The same plan was pursued as at Fort Henry. Had Grant been 
less generous Foote would have had no fighting to do. A Federal 
infantry force, by a land investment, or by breaking througli at any 
point, could have won a victory and taken the river batteries in 
reverse. The Confederates would have been forced to surrender 
them without firing a shot. But Grant completed his investment 
and then waited to give Foote a chance. The Confederates had 
not to exceed fifteen guns in the water batteries. Foote moved up 
with gun boats carrying a total of more than sixty, and of superior 
caliber at that. 

On the afternoon of the fourteenth, six gun-boats moved out into 
the great beud of the river and slowly advanced upon the batteries, 
opening tire at long range and keeping it up with a steadiness that 
soon set the earth trembling for miles around. If Foote could lay 
his fleet broadside on at close range, thirty minutes' time would 
either silence the batteries or send his gun-boats to the bottom. 
But he could not reach the position. He advanced to within five 
hundred yards, and there the Confederate fire became so accurate 
and so hot that further advance was impossible. Thei-e was not a 
gun in tlie batteries equal to the ten-inch guns on the fleet, and they 
were scarcely one-fourth in number, and jet the fleet went out of 
the fight in a crippled condition. 

In one hour's time the Louisville, after being struck over thirty 
times, drifted out of the figiit with the pilot having no control over 
her. Her armor was bulged and cracked and dented in a way to 
prove that a gun of heavier metal would have let daylight into her 
hold. The St. Louis was at the mercy of the current as she left 
the fight, the Pittsburgh was leaking, and the best gun on the 
Carondolet was useless. The four iron-clads, which advanced 
closest and took the brunt of the fight, were compelled to drift out 
of it in less than two hours, all more or less damaged, and having 
Infiicted no real injuiy on the battery. The accuracy of the Con- 
federate fire is shown by the report that the iron-clads were hit 
over thirty times each on an average, and tliis while fighting in 
positions oifering the least target for a shot. 

As in the case at Fort Henry, the guns were manned mostly by 
men wlio had never been under fire before, but they were in 
sufficient numbers to work the guns to their best. Not a man was 
killed in the battery, and only one wounded, and that by a pebble 



32 THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON. 

hurled in his direction by the bursting of a shell. Dozens of the 
Federal missiles buried themselves in the Bluffs above the batteries, 
and dozens more in the earth-works, but tliey were harmless. The 
men complained more of tlie annoyance of the showers of mud and 
dirt than of the pieces of shell and flying bullets. One of the guns 
was struck on the muzzle but not disabled, and another, partly dis- 
mounted at the opening of the fight, was repaired during the hottest 
of the fire. 

Had Foote alone attacked he could not have put enough gun- 
boats into the bend to capture the water batteries, though his iron- 
clads were fought with the utmost gallantry and were steadily held 
under a fire such as those crafts had never before encountered. 
Grant had given him a chance, and he had been beaten off. The 
Federal infantry were now to move up and settle the fate of Fort 
Donelson. 

After General Floyd had ascertained Grant's strength he enter- 
tained no further idea of resistance. The idea was to break through 
the investing lines and carry out as many men as possible. The 
fort was too large to be successfully defended by his command. In 
beating off the fleet tlie batteries liad not scoi'ed a single point in 
favor of the general situation. It was the infantry who were to be 
feared, and it was the plateau and not the river bank which consti- 
tuted tlie key-stone of the ai-ch. 

Up to night of the day of the fight between fleet and batteries 
tliere had been no real fighting between the infantry. Not 
more than one third of the Confederates had caught sight of a 
Federal. Floyd could defend the fort for a time, but the inevitable 
result would be surrender. He has been sharply criticised for not 
holding out instead of figliting his way out with a portion of the 
garrison, and he lost his official head for the manner in which he 
turned over the command of the post to a subordinate that he might 
not himself be made a prisoner. 

The plan was to mass the Confederate garrison, or the bulk of it, 
and full upon the Federal right with such vigor at early dawn as to 
crush it back and clear the highway running at Charlotte. Grant 
would be taken by surprise, and before lie could reinforce the point 
attacked, the Confederates would be clear of his lines. It was a 
simple plan, and as night came the Confederate commander began 
carrying out the details. The weather was cold and stormy, the - 
troops were in movement a good share of the night, and when the 
gray of the winter's morning began to light up the woods, hundreds 



THE CAPTUKE OF FOET DONELSON. 33 

of the men in the ranks had frost-bitten ears and fingers and were 
benumbed with cold. Tlie want of harmony among commanders 
had resulted in blunders among other officeis and tliese blunders 
delayed the attack, whicli was to have been made at early dawn, to 
nearly an hour later. During this delay the Federal scouts dis- 
covered that a move of some sort was on foot, and the attack was 
by no means the surprise that had been planned. 

An hour after da^'light the Confederates moved to the attack. 
On most portions of their fi-ont the men had not marched five hun- 
dred feet before they encountered the Federal line of battle, and a 
fierce and steady conflict -at once opened. The Federal right wing 
was matched, if not considerably out-numbered, but it was admira- 
bly positioned for defending such an attack. The ground was 
broken by ridges and ravines, mostly sheltered by heavy timber, and 
battle-lines were within stone's throw of each other as the men 
settled down to their deadly work. 

Grant could not have known the Confederate plan, and could not 
therefore have prepared his right for the blow suddenly given it. 
Knowing that the only way out lay in that direction, the Confeder- 
ates attacked with desperation. In the advance through the timber 
nearly every Confederate regiment had to march by the flank, and 
thus when the heads of columns were fired on, battle-lines had to be 
formed under a close fire. 

The number of troops in this movement against Grant's right 
was not quite eight thousand. Federal writers who have given it 
at twelve thousand have counted up the regiments and fallen into 
the error of estimating the strength of each at one thousand men. 
There was not a regiment there numbering seven hundred men, and 
some had less than four hundred. It was a rare thing after the 
summer campaign of 1861 to find a Confederate company, regi- 
ment, brigade or division up to its full strength. 

McClernand held the Federal right with a division, General 
"Wallace was in the center, and Smith on the left, the latter having 
nothing to do with the fight during the forenoon. The road to 
Charlotte lay between McClernand and Wallace, and both these 
commands were included in the attack, although for the first two 
hours McClernand received the brunt of it. Such of his division 
as came into the fight was opposed only by a single brigade, com- 
posed of the Seventh Te.xas, Eighth Kentucky, and First and Third 
Mississippi, and this brigade did not number two thousand men 
when it went into action. It formed under a fire so hot that some 



34: THE CAPTCEE OF FOET DUNELSON. 

of the regiments had to cliange front twice, and then advanced 
straiglit npon the rising ground held by McClernand. Witli a M'ild 
3'ell and a rush togetiier tliey swept up the hill, cleared it, held it 
for five minutes, and were then swept back into the ravine below by 
a counter-charge. Tliis was the first ground gained and lost by the 
Confederates. As soon as the brigade could reform, it began a 
steady advance in line, and at the end of forty minutes once more 
held the hill. Up to this time Wallace had scarcely fired a shot. 
Believing from the fighting ah-eady done .that the Federal right 
could be turned, a Confederate brigade was now pushed forward to 
skirmish with Walhice and prevent his sending away reinforce- 
ments, and the attack upon McClernand was renewed. He had a 
naturally strong position, being a succession of sharp ridges and the 
cover of ravines and timber, and his left hung to every foot of 
ground with the tenacity of old veterans. 

When the Confederates first moved out in the morning, McCler- 
nand's right, where it touched the river and thus conjpleted the line 
of investment, was composed of a Kentucky regiment, the Third 
Union. This regiment held as strong a position as any battle field 
ever furnished, and up to the moment of attack tlie men seemed 
full of determination. They were advanced npon by about thirty 
skirmishers from a Mississippi regiment, and \vitliin five minutes 
were thrown into a panic and so completely routed that the regi- 
ment was not reoi'ganized until after noon. The flight of this 
regiment left a gap tln-ough which the Confederates began to pour 
for an advance down tlie flank. 

As McClernand found himself hard pressed he sent to Wallace 
for reinforcements and was given Cruft's brigade. The men made 
a run of over two miles through woods and fields and up hill and 
down to reach the threatened point. Had they come into position 
just where they were needed, behind the liard pressed regiments, 
the tide of battle might have turned then and there. But, in the 
confusion of battle, unfamiliar with the ground, and simply anxious 
to secure position and open fire, the brigade formed its battle-line on 
untenable ground and was at once attacked with the utmost fury. 
For a time the conflict seemed to whirl round and round this single 
brigade, and though three-fifths of its members were in battle for 
tlie first time, not a company broke nor a man skulked. They held 
their first ground until flanked, and then they fell back to take a 
second position and fight as grimly as before. An oflicer in the 
Seventh Te.xas said of tlie way they fought : 



THE CAPTURE OF FOBT DONELSON. 35 

" They were the hardest men to drive I ever saw. We had been 
having it pretty much our own way before they came, but when 
they swung- into line and opened fire our advance was cliecked. 
Three different times we advanced so close upon them that the 
powder almost burned men's faces, but they would not move until 
the line had been flanked." 

The gallant fight of Cruft's brigade enabled McClernand to 
reform and bring Swartz' battery into position to cover the threat- 
ened point. When next the Confederate wave rolled forward it 
met a line of tire which shriveled it. Those who lived to fall back 
were reformed to advance again, and this time the lines ran into each 
other and men were brained with clubbed muskets, and bayonets 
were everywhere in use. The Federal battery was worked with 
such vigor that the Confederate advance was checked. Six thou- 
sand men were advancing, retreating, circling and clianging posi- 
tions in the smoke-cloud — now gaining a little ground — now being 
repulsed — now in solid front — now riven and scattered, when a 
move by a single regiment on the flank captured the battery and 
drove McClernand out of his camps. Soon after noon the Confed- 
erates had gained nearly two miles of ground on the front attacked. 
McClernand's whole division had been pushed back, one wing of 
Wallace's command bent back, and tlie road to Charlotte was open. 

At two o'clock on that afternoon the entire Confederate army 
could have passed out of Fort Donelson by the Wynn's Ferry road, 
thus opened by gallant tighting and at sucli cost of blood. Had the 
entire strength of the garrison been ready to attack Wallace as 
McClernand gave way, the Federal center and right must have lost 
tiie line of investment, if not suffering defeat. Up to the hour 
when the way out was clear several thousand Confederates had not 
yet fired a shot. 

Now came the blunder. Through some misunderstanding of 
orders, or because Pillow took it upon himself to ciiange the pro- 
gramme of his superior, the plan to march out was countermanded 
and a feeble attack made on tlie Federal left to cover the move 
of withdrawing into the trenches. Pillow claimed that Smith, 
holding the Federal flank, was ready to follow up the evacuation 
and make it a rout. Buckner proved that he was prepared to cover 
the retreat with fresh regiments and prevent any serious attack. 
Floyd could jjrove nothing, except that he was not the general to 
take advantage of a favorable crisis. Thus, after capturing six 
guns, three hundred prisoners, five thousand three hundred stand 



36 THE CAPTUBE OF FORT DONELSON. 

of arms, and a quantity of ammunition and camp equipage, and 
losing in killed and wounded about twelve hundred men to open 
the way out, the Confederates returned to the trap and the Fedeials 
returned to their lines of investment. That night Floyd, and 
Pillow, and Forrest skulked out with portions of their connnand, 
leaving Buekner, who was the real fighter, to surrender the 
remainder. No page of Confederate war record shows grander 
opportunities or greater blunders. The general who could have 
led his garrison safely out, after a fight in which every regiment 
engaged had proved its gallantry, blundered, hesitated, counter- 
manded, and finally disgraced his uniform by skulking out at 
midnight in the company of men who could have looked upon him. 
only with feelings of contempt. 




fen %\\i^t. 




N the sixth of March, 1862, General Curtis, with a 
Federal force not exceeding fifteen thousand men, had 
taken position at Pea Ridge, Arkansas. He had been 
following and driving the Confederate General Price 
out of Missouri, and had been drawn into a trap. 
Price had marched to a point where a junction could be effected 
with the forces under McCullongh and Van Dorn, and a force of 
at least twenty thousand fighting men now made ready to give 
Curtis battle. 

Acting with the Confederate force was a body of about three 
thousand Indians, half civilized, but lawless and blood-thirsty. They 
Iiad no reverence for the Confederate flag, but had been gathered 
into tlie army through the influence of gold and promises of plun- 
der. Only such as had no guns of their own were armed with 
Confederate muskets. Eight out of ten had their own rifles and 
equipments, and they went into battle with tomahawks and scalp- 
ing-knives in their belts. 

Previous to this battle the Confederates had placed considerable 
dependence on the Indian force, estimating that at least eight 
thousand could be recruited and brought into active service, but 
after Pea Ridge tlie red man was counted on no longer. It was 
found he was a coward in the face of artillery, a skulk under 
musketry, and that his disobedience of orders brought about dan- 
gerous confusion. 

All the roads by which Van Dorn could approach Curtis' posi- 
tion were swiftly and strongly foi'tifiod with rifle-pits, breastworks, 
and abattis, and at points the highways were blocked by falling 
trees across ti.am. The strong manner in which Curtis protected 
his front came near proving his ruin. Confederate scouts reported 
his front impregnable to assault, and Van Dorn determined on a 
flank movement. This was being carried out all night long on the 
night of the sixth, but it was almost daylight before scouts dis- 

[371 



38 PEA RIDGE. 

covered the nianenver and brought word to Curtis. Ho then found 
himself conijjelied to cliange front ahiiost completely, leaving his 
defenses on the llank and rear, and his army obliged to face three 
different points of the compass. 

As daylight came Van Dorn had not yet tinished massing, owing 
to the dirtiL-ult nature of the ground, and Curtis at once prepared 
to move forward and strike the tirst blow. It was a cold, bleak 
morning, and nine o'clock came before any important movement 
was made. Tlien, as Curtis moved out a force to strike Van Dorn, 
his own right flank three miles away was hotly attacked, and the 
battle soon opened on a front tliree miles long. 

Colonel Osterhaus moved from Curtis' left flank on a highway 
running to the northeast and meeting two others at Elkhorn tav- 
ern. His troops were scarcely in line before they encountered the 
Confederate skirmishers, who were pressed back foot by foot for a 
mile before any stand was made. A sharp engagement ensued, 
lasting about a quarter of an hour, when the Confederates seemed 
to have been routed. Here Osterhaus committed one of those 
unaccountable blunders of which so many were charged up to 
Federal generals during the war. 'He had been fighting over 
ground difficult even for the infantry to ti'averse, and his guns were 
got to the front only by the help of dozens of men at the wheels ; 
but in his excitement he brought up the Third Iowa Cavalry and 
ordered them to charge the thickets in his front. 

The brave fellows must have been amazed at the order, but with- 
out hesitation they obeyed, the lines all awry from the very start, 
owing to the natural obstacles encountered. Some at a gallop, 
and some at a trot, the Third moved forward with cheers, and the 
result was what miglit have been expected. The Confederates, who 
had simply sought shelter from the artillery fire, rose up and 
opened a murderous fire on the cavalry, and had its commander not 
been possessed of more sense than his superior, his command would 
have been annihilated. He got out as soon as possible, but left 
dozens of his dead in the thickets behind. 

As the cavalry fell back the Confederates advanced, and in ten 
minutes had two of Osterhaus' guns and were pressing him back at 
ever}' point. He would have been routed entirely had not Davis 
and Sigel appeared at the critical moment, both having fought 
their way to him under fire. Reinforcements also arrived for the 
Confederates, and what had been a sharp skirmish now grew into 
a fierce battle between ten thousand men. 



PEA KIDGE. 



39 



On this front were open lields, bushy ravines, thickets and patches 
of woods, and every rod of it was fought over again and again. 
Curtis could spare no more reinforcements, and the men on the 
ground realized tliat they must hold it at any cost. The liulians 
were distributed along the front, sheltering themselves behind trees 
and in the ravines and thickets, and their yells could all the time 
be heard above the roar of battle. Not once in that fight did any 
body of them appear in the open, and at several points where the 
Federals recovered lost ground they found dead men who had been 
scalped and otherwise mutilated by these blood-thirsty allies. A 
member of Davidson's Federal battery was shot in the leg in the 
charge on the guns, and was unable to leave the field. A Confed- 
erate soldier helped him to a seat with his back to a tree, and left 
him a full canteen of water, and two or three others addressed him 
kindly, but on their heels came a lot of skulking Indians. One of 
them tomahawked a wounded man belonging to the Third Iowa 
Cavalry and lying only ten feet from the artillerist, and another 
came running up with a knife in his hand to dispatch liim, when he 
drew his pistol and shot the savage dead. The act was witnessed 
and applauded by a Confederate lieutenant, who then drove other 
Indians away from the spot with his drawn sword. 

When the Federals came to bury their dead they found at least 
fifty corpses which had been scai])ed, and wlierever an Indian had 
found opportunity to approach' the wounded he had used knife 
and tomahawk to murder them. Many of the bodies showed tliree 
or four knife thrusts, and others were hacked and mutilated in the 
most dreadful manner. 

For two long hours the fight on the Confederate right resulted in 
no advantage to either, when the Federal commander decided on 
a fiank movement. Two Indiana regiments made a wide detour 
and passed the Confederate flank and swung around to the rear. 
There was not a suspicion of their presence until they poured in 
their first volley and followed it by a charge. In this charge 
they uncovered a large gang of Indians in a ravine, and such as 
did not get away were shot down as fast as reached, their shouts 
of " me give up ! " failing to arouse any mercy in the hearts of 
men who had seen their dead comrades hacked and scalped. 

That flank movement by an insignificant force doubtless won the 
battle of Pea Ridge. The Indians, at least, were entirely demoral- 
ized and of no further use, while MoCuUoch and Mcintosh and a 
large number of lesser officers were killed or disabled. It resulted 



40 PEA KIDCfE. 

in routing the Confederate riglit and driving it, and in securing 
strong positions for the Federals. 

On the Federal right the morning did not pass without disaster. 
Colonel Carr, who had the command, resented the Confederate 
attack with such energy, that he advanced one of his batteries too 
far and had some of tiie guns captured by a suddeu rush. Almost 
immediately following, liis entire front was attacked so vigorously 
that it was pressed back at every point. Contracting his lines and 
throwing up breastworks of logs and earth and i-ails, and- half-fac- 
ing some of the troops to protect his flanks, he settled down to stay. 
Charge after charge was made upon his position — now on the right 
— now on the left — now at his centre, but his lines could not be 
penetrated. 

Nevertheless, fighting one to five, as he was doing all along his 
front, his loss soon became serious. Curtis had no troops to spare, 
and it became a fight simply to hold his own until annihilated or 
a victory on the left should afford a chance to spare him a few regi- 
ments. This chance came only after the field was strewn with his 
dead and wounded — one out of every four he had in line. His 
artillery was out of ammunition, liis infantry short of cartridges, and 
another quarter of an hour must iiave seen him broken and routed. 
Carr had fought like an old hero, but at every point he had been 
driven back. 

Just in the nick of time a Federal division arrived and fluTig 
itself into the fight, and at the same time a movement by Sigel 
alarmed the Confederates and caused them to shorten their lines. 
With numbers now more equal the fight along Carr's front was 
renewed with intense bitterness until night-fall shut each other out 
of view. The Confederate right had been broken and driven ; the 
center had sought to advance, but had been checked, the left had 
gained a mile of ground, but the loss had been heavy. The sum- 
ming up as darkness put an end to the conflict showed no advantage 
to either. Under the leaden sky, through which the moon burst 
now and then as it raced across the heavens, the dogs of war snarled 
and growled for a while, and then lay down to lick their bloody 
wounds. 

It was an anxious night for Curtis. He knew that he was out- 
numbered, and the reports from brigade commanders showed his 
losses to have been heavy. To retreat in the face of an enemy 
needs but some unlooked for accident to bring about a panic and 
anniiiilation. Had lie preferred retreat, he liad no point of safety 



PEA RIDGE. 41 

within reach. It would simply mean a march across a state, with 
the Confederate infantry pressing his rear and their cavalry harass- 
ing his flanks. That meant destruction. 

But Curtis had no thought of retreat. His scouts kept him 
posted as to Van Dorn's movements, and he changed front to meet 
them. Tlie new positions he took up in again changing fronts, and 
adding Sigel's command to the force likely to receive the first 
attack on the morrow, were stronger than the old ones, and as the 
morning of the eiglith was ushered in every regiment was ready 
for what was to come. 

As the Confederates let the sun come up and time fly past with- 
out attacking, Curtis advanced his center to feel them. This 
opened the battle at once, and the Federals had to fall back under a 
fire of artillery such as none of the troops had ever faced before. 
There was now an interval or lull of half an hour, during wiiich 
both commanders were bringing up every man and gun. Curtis 
was ready first. With every piece of artillery in his army massed 
along Jiis front and supported by lines of battle lying on the ground 
in front, he suddenly opened such a fire that there was no holding 
men in front of it. Whole regiments were moved by the flank or 
ordered into ravines for shelter, and for nearly two hours the fight 
was almost wholly confined to the artillery. 

The Indians had been prettj' thoroughly broken up the day 
before, and this finished them. They could not be held anywliere 
within the Federal range, and the Texans, who were relied on for 
hot work, had not counted on facing such a fire as this. Said one 
of the officers who became a prisoner to the Federals : 

" The thicket which covered the front of my regiment was right 
in play of a Federal battery of six guns, and within grape-shot 
range. In a quarter of an hour it was entirely cut away, and in 
spite of all we could do to prevent, the men broke and sought 
shelter in a ravine. It was a splendid rifle-pit, Jjut so hot was that 
rain of grape and canister that we could not get a sharp-shooter to 
put his head above the bank. Up to the time this fire opened on 
us our men were full of fight, but it had not continued half an 
hour when I caught dozens of them stealing away to the rear." 

Curtis had still another card to play. During the fire his lines 
were closed up and made ready, and at the word the guns ceased 
their roar and the whole army moved forward. A feeble resistance 
was offered here and there, but in half an hour Yan Dorn was in 
full retreat. He had probably intemlud this movement since the 



42 



PEA KIDGE. 



evening before, as bis wagons were sent off and most of tbe plunder 
of tbe battle tield secured. His retreat was by no means a rout, as a 
strong rear-guard prevented anytbing like aggressive pursuit. Ten 
miles away be baited and sent back a flag of truce and received 
perTnission to bury bis dead, after wbicb be marcbed away to leave 
Curtis in full possession of tbat section of country. 

Counting numbers and tlie average ebances of war, Van Dorn 
sliould bave'won tbat battle before nigbt of tbe first day. Leaving 
out liis force of Indian allies, Confederates never fougbt witb more 
determination tban on that field, and it was from no want of cour- 
age tbat tbey met defeat wbere victory seemed waiting. Van 
Dorn's subordinates were out-maneuvered, and be himself made a 
mistake in attacking tbe Federals in that position. It was a place 
offering a small army a chance to escape destruction, and it was 
held witb such bravery as to stamp every man a hero. The losses 
were about equal — fourteen hundred killed and wounded, but tbe 
entire Federal force in the west felt the enthusiasm of tbe hour and 
were an.xious to go to tbe front. 




i«>:- 



jr'***f'\>. 



i)orktoliin anit ^IfDouif. 




I AD McClellan been permitted to carry out Lis original 
plan of moving on Richmond and the Confederate 
army defending it, there would have been no siege of 
Yorktown to chronicle. He was to land at Fortress 
Monroe, Banks to move down on Hanover Junction, via 
Fredericksburg, and McDowell to be landed at a convenient point 
for placing himself between the Confederate army and Richmond. 
The three separate Federal armies were to be timed to act in con- 
cert, and, in all human judgment, the movement must at least have 
resulted in the retreat of the Confederates from the Peninsula. 
The weeks of delay, the waste of treasure and the loss of life in 
front of Yorktown would have been avoided by this policy, and 
had one of the three armies suffered a defeat the situation would 
have been no worse. 

McClellan's plan was thoroughly known to the administration in 
every detail, and it must have been approved or he could never 
have carried out the portion he did. It was a plan not for his army 
alone, l)ut for the entire armed force of the Federal government to 
move upon the enemy simultaneously, giving battle to any force 
found in their front. Such a proceeding would have given every 
Confederate army plenty of business to look out for itself, but 
there was a Congi'ess behind Abraham Lincoln and a nation behind 
that Congress. 

Washington must not be left defenseless. That was one of the 
bugbears of the war. Half a dozen times in the four years Rich- 
mond was left to the defense of government clerks, cripples and 
boys, and there was no time tliat twenty thousand militia could not 
have been collected at a day's notice to occupy the defenses — 
stronger than those of Richmond — around the capital. 

McClellan had moved, Banks was concentrating for his march, 
and McDowell was actually' embarking, when a cowardly trepidation 
caused Lincoln to modify the plan by a stroke of the pen and retain 

[431 



44 TOEKTOWN AND BEYOND. 

McDowell's corps to defend Wasliingtoti. That pen was dipped 
in the blood of twenty-five thousand Federal dead. The order 
resulted in the siege of Yorktown and the bloody battles of the 
Peninsula. 

In the wet and weeping days of April, 1862, McClellan landed 
his army within twenty miles of Yorktown and slowly advanced 
upon the place. Lincoln's order retaining McDowell was known 
in Kiclunond within twelve hours after it was known in Washing- 
ton, and the Confederates made their preparations accordingly. 
There were forty thousand men less to look out for — there was 
another corps of Confederates for McClellan to light. 

At Yorktown McClellan found a lion in his path. Time had 
been given to throw up extensive earth-works and add tu the number 
of guns mounted months before, and behind Yorktown was a C!on- 
federate army which meant fight. McClellan must withdraw or 
lay siege to the place. He felt of the entire line of defenses like 
one knocking on a wall to find a tender spot, but every movement 
was stained with blood. There wei"e no weak spots. Infantry 
could not carry those defenses — field artillery might as well have 
been loaded with peas. 

Yorktown must be battered down, and to do it required such 
preparatory labor as Federal soldiers had not encountered lie fore. 
The heaviest cannon which the arsenals or navy yards could furnish 
were forwarded to McClellan, and the monsters had to be dragged 
those twenty long miles over roads on which empty army wagons 
stuck fast. One would have said that not a single gun conld have 
been lumled to Yorktown, but every one landed was pulled across 
the country and placed in position. When ten or twelve pairs of 
mules were stuck fast with a gun, five hundred soldiers tailed on to 
the drag-ropes and brought it through. 

For a month McClellan \vas bringing up his siege guns, con- 
structing earth-works and forts in which to mount them, and in the 
early days of May he reported one hundred caimon and mortars in 
position. It has been asked why the Confederate army, numbering 
at least one hundred thousand men, and all within striking distance, 
was not hurled \ipon McClellan before his lines closed around York- 
town. No answer has even been made. Had Lee then been in 
command he would have been waiting for that army, and as the 
three columns, demoralized and dispirited by the weather, straggled 
across the country towards Yorktown, there would have been a 
spring and a blow, with the chances in favor of a great Confederate 



YOKKTOWN AND BEYOND. 45 

victory. At any hour during tlie first two weeks of April a Con- 
federate attacl\ by tiie wiiole army would have had seven chances 
out of ten of success. 

McClellan had opened with a part of his guns, and by the fourth 
of May would have had every one of them lending its ponderous 
missile towards the destruction of the defenses, when, on the 
second instant, it was decided by a Confederate military council 
that the place must be evacuated. "Why ? Not because it could 
not be held ten days longer, but because the opportunity to attack 
the Federal army with hopes of success had long passed, and because 
the evacuation freed that great army in gray from trench and fort 
and earth-work and left it free to select its battle ground. 

On the morning of the third, before day had fairly broken, the 
Confederates opened against the Federal works with every gun 
which could speak, and McClellan replied with almost an equal 
number. For the first time in the history of the war the earth 
was quivering under the concussions of the largest cannon east at 
any foundry in the Republic. The uproar was tremendous, shaking 
buildings miles away and making the whole Peninsula seem agitated 
by an earthquake. The Confederate shot and shell plunged into 
the Federal earth-works to tear up showers of sod and earth, or fell 
in the trenches to maim and destroy; and the Federal missiles 
dropped into Yorktown in a way to hasten the preparations for 
evacuation. From dawn until midnight the uproar continued, and 
when it finally ceased the silence was almost as painful as the 
cannonade. 

Confederate troops began moving away from Yorktown on the 
first, and were followed by other commands as fast as the roads 
were clear. It would have required a month's time to remove the 
heavy guns, and the orders wei'e to spike them. This work was 
entered upon soon after midnight, and while the guns were yet hot 
from the long-continued fire. Of the eighty-five or ninety left to 
fall into Federal hands the greater number were rendered useless 
for a long time, and some were entirely disabled. A large quantity 
of ammunition was removed to Richmond, together with the most 
valuable supplies, and on the morning of the fourth, when the 
strange silence in the Confederate works aroused suspicion, an 
investigation resulted in uncovering the fact that Yorktown had 
been evacuated. 

It was a victory for McClellan, but not such a victory as he had 
hoped for. Evacuation is not surrender. The enemy simply leaves 



46 TOEKTOWN AND BEYOND. 

an untenable position to occupy a strong one. He could marcli 
into Yorktown, but the Confedei-ate army Jiad marched away from 
it. He had come into possession of their abandoned works and 
spiked cannon, and the York River was now opened, but that great 
Confederate army was still intact and anxious for fight. 

McClellan did not lose an hour in beginning the pursuit. The 
Confederates had witlidrawn by the York and the James River 
highways — McClellan followed by both. When the Confederates 
determined on the defense of Yorktown it was likewise determined 
to secure the line of retreat across tne Chickahominy. Ten miles 
north of Yorktown, and a mile and a half from the quaint old town 
of Williamsburg, the two highways mentioned meet each other and 
are absorbed into one. Here strong earth-works had been erected 
for heavy guns, breastworks thrown up for infantry, and it only 
remained to dig a line of I'ifle-pits to be prepared for the pursuing 
Federals. Tiie right of the Confederate position was open ground, — 
coi'n fields, meadows and orchards, — and the flank defended by 
earth-works and troops massed under natural cover. The center 
commanded the two highways, and was considered impregnable. 
The left was covered by a dense forest, and here, in rifle-pits and 
behind log breastworks, a thousand men in gray could hold in 
check five thousand men in blue. While the great bulk of the 
Confederate army passed on over the Chickahominy to baifie any 
Federal attempt from West Point to get in its rear, a strong rear- 
guard was left at Williamsburg to check and delay McClellan's 
pursiait. There was no idea of fighting a great battle tliere, but 
that policy which kept McDowell idle on the plains of Warrenton 
called for blood elsewhere. Forest and thicket and meadow and 
corn field were soaked with the spring rains, but earth is ever 
thirsty for blood. 



.a? 




^lilUamsburg. 




'HE abandoned guns and other projierty left in York- 
town led McClellan to believe that the Confederate 
army was retreating in a panic, and he ordered swift 
jjursuit. Federal scouts and spies had claimed to have 
passed around the entire Confederate army, and yet 
tliey had not discovered the earth-works in front of Williamsburg. 
The pursuit was taken np without thought of a battle nearer than 
the crossing of the Chickahominy. 

When Stoneman arrived at the junction of the Yorktown and 
Lee's Mill highway's, he suddenly uncovered a Confederate force 
which drove him back in confusion. He skirmished until he un- 
covered the defenses and found them manned by heavy guns, and 
then drew off and waited for the infantry to come np. The com- 
mands of Smith and Hooker were first up, but the afternoon was 
so far gone that operations were contined to skirmishing and further 
uncovering the Confederate position. It was found to be a stfong 
one, and the Federal soldiers who rested in woods and fields through 
that night of steady rain felt that hot work awaited them on the 
morrow. 

Hooker was ready to move as the darkness of night gave place to 
the gray of morning. Impatient and impetuous, he had determined 
to bring on a great battle or walk over the defenses in his front. 
As soon as the lines could be formed, and with scarcely time for the 
men to make their coffee, Hooker pushed them forward. Fort 
Magruder, the strongest work on the line, was in his front, and he 
opened on it with a battery and sent forward a brigade to skirmish 
up to the front. Two of these regiments found a slashing in their 
path, and they were opened upon so fiercely that they could make 
no headway, while the casualties were very numerous. 

The batter}' placed in position had scarcely sent its first shell into 
the Confederate lines when the fire was returned with such vigor 
that the Federal artillerists were driven from the guns and two of 

[47] 



48 WLLLIAMSBDEG. 

the pieces dismounted, and it was a quarter of an hour before the 
battery opened again. No sooner had it done so than a laige force 
of Confederates advanced upon it, and almost in a moment there 
was terrific fighting. The brigade supporting the battery did not 
hold their front lialf an hour before a message was sent off for rein- 
forcements, and within an liour from the firing of tlie first gun 
twelve thousand men were fighting back and forth over a field of 
less than one hundred acres. 

By eleven o'clock Hooker's whole force had been sent in, and 
every gun he had was belching shot and shell into the Confederate 
lines. The first note of battle had recalled Longstreet's whole corps 
from its march, and as the different brigades came up, they swung 
into battle-line and pressed forward to rout Hooker. He could not 
advance, but he was determined to hold his own. Between eleven 
and one o'clock three desperate charges -were made at intervals on 
his center. His lines were breasted back by the rush, but each time 
they rallied and recovered their ground. Then there was a sudden 
rush from the lines in front of Magruder, and it was not checked 
until Hooker's center had lost five guns and several hundred pris- 
oners. This was his hour of peril. The gray lines broke cover 
with a yell, and as they swarmed across the fields and along the 
highway and burst out of the thickets, there was no checking them. 
The right and left centers turned their fire on the advancing foe, and 
the artillery changed to grape and canister. It did not seem as if 
human beings could face that fire and live, but the cheers drowned 
the roar of battle as the Confederates swept up to the guns and 
surrounded them. They were not given up until encircled by the 
dead and dying, and every spoke in every wheel carried its mark of 
bullet or plash of blood. 

Hooker had been too impetuous. The highways were not only 
crowded with vehicles and troops, but the rains had made them 
perfect rivers of mud. It was impossible to hui-ry up troops or am- 
munition. At half-past four, when General Kearney finally reached 
the front, Hooker gave him the front and fell back to cover 
with his shattered regiments. He had held his position, but over 
seventeen hundred of his men had been left there to mark his front. 

Kearney went in with a rush, and in a quarter of an hour he had 
swept his front clear and the music of a score of guns long silenced 
was heard again. By flanking the slashing he seized some rifle-pits 
and detached works, and although he could not further advance his 



WILLIAMSBURG. 49 

lines, he had strengthened them until he felt they could not be 
carried. 

Hancock had come up on the Confederate left, and greatly to his 
surprise he found the redoubts defending that flank unoccupied. 
He at once took possession, and Fort Magruder was flanked and the 
Confederate route to Richmond menaced. Had Hancock had five 
thousand men, instead of half that number, he could have executed 
a movement which must have relieved the pressure on Hooker, if 
not resulting in the speedy capture of the fort. But he had no 
more men than needed to hold his ground, and all his advantages 
were finally annulled by an order to fall back and form a new line 
of battle. 

He had scarcely made his dispositions when General Earl}', lead- 
ing the Twenty-fourth Virginia infantry, charged hinu The charge 
was made across the open fields of a farm, with man}' of the fences 
and walls still standing, and Hancock's battery was supported by 
two full regiments. Every gun and musket opened fire as the Vir- 
ginians broke cover, but with muskets at the trail and every right 
hand swinging a cap, they rushed forward at the guns and would 
have taken them had they not been retired. A whole brigade had 
been ordered to participate in this movement, but only the Vir- 
ginians and the Fifteenth North Carolina left cover. When the 
latter regiment came up, the supporting Federal force was driven 
away, and the two regiments formed a line of battle to fight a whole 
division, and did fight it until orders came to retire. It was in the 
retreat from this position that both regiments were nearly wiped out, 
having over two hundred captured and twice as many killed and 
wounded. 

Night was now falling. There had been ten or eleven hours of 
hard fighting, and the troops on both sides were worn out and short 
of ammunition. From five o'clock to twilight both sides had been 
robbing their dead and wounded of cartridges to continue the fight. 
The same causes which prevented the Federals from hurrying up 
reinforcements and ammunition had likewise operated against the 
Confederates, and as darkness began to settle down the fighting 
ceased as if by mutual consent. McClellan firmly expected a renewal 
on the morrow, and all night long his columns were coming up 
through the terrible mud and taking positions. Under the trees — ■ 
in the terrible abattis — in meadow and cornfield and orchard, the 
wounded groaned in their agony or uttered prayers for succor, 



50 



WILLIAMSJBUKG. 



while the dead grew cold and still' and the grouud licked up their 
blood. 

When daylight caine again the Confederates were miles away on 
the road to liichniond, having abandoned their works early in the 
night. They left behind them their dead and womided, but noth- 
ing more. Wliile there was time to remove the majority of the 
wounded, tliere was no transportation. Longstreet had returned to 
help hold tiie Federal advance only until the Confederate trains 
were well out of the way, and he had returned in light marching 
order. Tliere was no order from Johnston to bring on a battle at 
Williamsburgli. The sole idea was to hold the Federal advance for 
half a da}^, or possibly until night. This was successful. When it 
was discovered that Hooker was fighting without support, the Con- 
federates assumed the aggressive in hopes to deal him a fatal blow. 

At sunrise McClellan had possession of Williamsburg, and 
Johnston was pursuing his march unmolested. More than two 
thousand Federals were lying dead or wounded, while the Confed- 
erate loss, above prisoners, was only a few hundreds. It was called 
a Federal victory at the North, and a drawn battle at the South. 
McClellan's path to the Chickahominy was now clear, but he had 
paid a heavy price for the open highways. 




^Ijilolj— C^e lirst inn. 




)jTUPIDITY — Luck— Fate! McClellan permitted tlie 
insigniticant Cliickahoiiiiny to divide his army, and he 
paid for it with five thousand lives. Bull Run Creek, 
over which a boy could jump at any point, was a barrier 
before which hundreds fell. Peach Tree Creek, a stream 
just as insignificant saved one of Sherman's corps from destruction. 
It was General Grant who dared place his array with its front to 
an unknown foe and its back to an impassable river ; and there, 
without digging a rifie-pit or throwing up a breast-work, wait for 
reinforcements. 

Johnston's center was at Corinth, and he was working like a giant 
to get his army in order for the spring campaign. Througli the 
month of March many of his troops drilled with borrowed guns, the 
muskets of one regiment being made use of by three or four. A 
few regiments were completely armed and uniformed on the first 
of March, but whole regiments which took part in the battle when 
it finally occurred, were without arms up to three days previous. 
There was a deficiency of artillery and ammunition and clothing^ 
and the chances of battle depended on Fate. Blockade-runners 
were on their way from England with the desired equipments. If 
spared by storm, would they escape the Federal blockaders 'i Fate 
decided. Two ships loaded with arms entered Charleston by the 
closest shave, and with feverish haste and by special trains the arms 
were conveyed to Johnston's men. 

Grant seemed to hold Johnston in profound contempt. His 
army at Pittsburg Landing had its right guarded by Snake Creek 
and its left by Lick Creek, with no particular cover for the center. 
As the troops were landed from the transports they took up their 
positions as follows : Sherman, McClernand and Prentiss making 
the front from creek to creek, with Smith's division (commanded 
on the day of the battle by Wallace) supporting the right wing, 
and Hurlburt supporting the left. Wallace's own command was 

[51] 



52' SHILOH THE FIRST DAY. 

strung- along the river to Savannah, to cover the line of communi- 
cation. The extreme left was held by one of Sherman's brigades, 
and though it had the creek on its flank, the ground across the 
stream commanded the position. 

Not only did the Federal army rest in that position from the 
seventeenth of March to the sixth of April without making the least 
preparation for defense in case of attack, but the various divisions 
were not even closed up. There were two long gaps between com- 
mands in Sherman's division, and between Sherman and McCler- 
nand, and between McClernand and Prentiss were gaps through 
which whole Confederate brigades afterwards charged. The posi- 
tion of that Federal army was criticised even by citizens who knew 
■nothing of the tactics of war, but Grant was sullen and determined, 
and he would not rectify it.' His position was weak in a dozen dif- 
ferent ways and his presence was a challenge for a superior force 
to move up and crush him. Lincoln would have been justified in 
taking measures for the safety of that army, but was reassured by 
dispatches from Grant that Jolinston was so strung out that con- 
centration was impossible before Buell's arrival. 

Johnston's wings were widely scattered, and arms were being 
issued the day that Grant crossed the river. It was a grand oppor- 
tunity to strike a telling blow, and Johnston was the man for tlie 
emergency. With a celerity seldom exhibited in the war, he called 
in and concentrated, some of his troops tramping for twenty-six 
hours without a halt, and thousands of men marching across fields 
and through forests to save distance and avoid the mud. Every 
Confederate soldier who could trace a map or read a newspaper saw 
the situation and the opportunity, and they moved forward feeling 
that victory was absolutely certain. The safe arrival of two block- 
ade-runners and the blunder of a Federal general liad placed the 
, "West in peril. Fate sat around the camp-fires of the Federals on 
the banks of the muddy river — in the dark forests on the Purdy 
and Hambui-g highways, and she flitted along the front of John- 
ston's legions as tliey tramped steadily and sturdily forward toward 
victory or defeat. 

Between tlie twentieth of Marcli and the first of April, the Con- 
federate cavalry were continually hovering along the Federal front, 
coming witJiin a mile of the lines of battle, and it was known that 
Grant had neglected even the most common-sense precautions. 
Confederate farmers were permitted to enter the lines witii their 
" truck," and tliere was not a day for the last two weeks tiiat spies 



SHILOH THE FIKST DAY. 53 

were not taking notes. Johnston knew the situation exactly. 
Could he have waited one week longer he miglit have increased liis 
force by tliirty thousand men, but to wait was to permit Buell to 
come up and join forces with Grant and outnumber Iiim. 

Johnston's entire force moved to within four miles of the Federal 
front without having met scout or picket or created the least sus- 
picion of a grand movement. On the fifth of April every 
man and gun was up. Reinforcements were coming on, and were 
only two days away, and Joiinston at first decided to wait for them. 
Two reasons decided against the delay: Buell was hurrying up 
faster than the expected reinforcements, and the position of the 
army, only four miles from the Federal camps, miglit be discov- 
ered any hour. 

On the evening of the fifth it was decided that the attack should 
be made at daylight next morning. It was a damp, ciieerless niglit, 
but while the Federals slept peacefully in their camps, the Confed- 
erates were held in line without camp-fires, and with but little 
chance for sleep. Thus far the movement had been a complete 
success. 

Dayliglit had not yet broken on the morning of the sixth when 
preparations were begun for the advance, and as the lines moved 
forward tlie fii'st notes of the birds were heard in the branches 
overhead. Hardee had the advance ; behind him followed Bragg; 
beliind Bragg came Polk ; behind Polk wei-e the reserves under 
Breckenridge, making a fourth line of battle. Cavalry and artillery 
moved with eacli line, and the army of forty thousand, three hun- 
dred and thirty-five men pushed forward in the early morning like 
a great tidal wave which was to sweep an island clear of human life. 
About half a mile in front of the Federal lines the pickets were 
encountered. They heard tlie tramp ! tramp ! tramp ! of ten 
thousand men ; tiiey felt the ground trembling as the gray wave 
rolled over it ; they saw a battle-line bursting out of wood and 
thicket and field upon them, and they turned and fled in terror. 
The step of the advancing Confederates was quickened, and along 
Sherman's front the alarm had no sooner been somided than Har- 
dee's line of battle was bursting upon the camps. 

Not a man on tliat wliole front but was dumbfounded with 
astonishment, and in hundreds of cases this feeling gave way to 
terror and flight. Soldiers were lialf dressed or still asleep, guns 
unloaded, artillery useless, and officers lost tlieir wits with the rank 
.and file. Troops from Bragg's corps struck Hildebrand's brigade 



54 SHILOII THE FIRST DAT. 

of Ohio troops and scattered it like chaff in a tempest, hundreds of 
the men leaving camp without coats and hats, and scores of them 
without siioes. Ten minutes' time was given Buckland and 
McDowell to rally their men, and for half an hour they made a 
gallant fight, assisted by artillery and troops sent forward by 
McClernand. Then the lines were slowly pushed back, each flank 
rolled up, and Sherman was pushed into a position which he could 
for a time hold against any advance. 

It is more than a score of years since that momentous sixth of 
April, and yet he who rides over the ground will still And a 
thousand signs of that sudden rush upon Sherman. Hundreds of 
trees bear the scars of ball and bullet, and one can tell just where 
the Federals rallied for a moment in a vain attempt to stem the 
bloody wave. There is not a rock, or tree, or stump on Sherman's 
front, and for two miles over the route of his dogged reti-eat, which 
does not tell of the fight. In the open ground one may find bulleta 
and pieces of shell, and in the dark woods one is startled by the 
gleam of bones, which time has whitened and the teeth of the 
wildcat have polished. 

Sherman and McClernand had been terribly smitten, but were 
fighting for every inch of ground, when the hammer fell upon 
Prentiss. He had received warning, and was prepared iis well 
as circumstances would permit. The three regiments first iiit 
returned blow for blow for a few minutes, but were then walked 
right over by the advancing lines, and such as would not retreat 
were taken prisoner. One after another four brigades were brought 
up and flung into the gap, but the advance was only temporarily 
checked. A whole division stretched across the front, and pouring 
in a murderous and bravely-continued fire, held the gray wave less 
than twenty minutes, when it had to fall back to prevent being 
flanked. The gaps between corps and divisions were being sought 
for and found, and wedges of living men were being driven into 
them. 

While giving ground slowly along his whole front, Prentiss 
made a determined stand on a new Hue, a part of which was open 
ground, then a portion of a plantation and bare of the least shelter. 
A part of this field is now in cotton, and a portion overgrown with 
briers and thicket. Bones and blood are a great fertilizer. Trees- 
have shot up twenty-five feet high, and brier and bramble thrive 
here until a horse can hardly break through. 

The Federals fornred in the open field and there met the attack. 



6HIL0H THK FIRST DAT. 55 

The gray lines swept up to the edge of the field, and there, shel- 
tered and [)rotected, poured in such volleys as soon tore regiments 
to pieces. Every Confederate had siielter ; every Federal was a 
fair target. While whole companies were wiped out in the open 
field, there was hardly a casualty in regiments posted in the woods. 
The Federals held gallantly, fighting like heroes doomed to die, but 
of a sudden the gray lines pushed out, the Federal flanks were 
folded back like the wings of a bird, and over three thousand pris- 
oners were caught as in a trap, while the remainder of the division 
was practically routed. Prentiss himself, surrounded by fragments 
of regiments who disdained to fly, rallied in a strong position, where 
they drove back assault after assault, and surrendered only when 
entirely surrounded and about to be exterminated. 

As Prentiss gave way, Johnston, reinforeed along the fronts of 
Sherman and MeClernand, and the additional weight thrown against 
them pressed the two Federal commanders back, but they gave up 
the ground only as it was stained witii blood. Eveiy piece of Fed- 
eral artillery which could be brought up was opened in an effort to 
check the advance, and the uproar along McClernand's whole front 
was pandemonium itself. Had the flanks been secure the artillery 
might have been effective, but a front could not hold its line when 
enfiladed. A sudden rnsh upon the massed artillery bent back the 
Federal lines and captured gun after gun. 

An hour before noon there came a lull in the battle. Prentiss 
had been scattered, Sherman had been driven, MeClernand had 
fought like a tiger, but had lost ground, and everywhere along its 
front the Confederate army liad won a victory. Five thousand 
panic-stricken and unarmed men were crowding back to tiie river 
with white faces and tales of disaster, and apprehension was written 
on the face of every Federal officer. If the advance of that victo- 
rious wave could not be checked the entire Federal army would be 
driven to the banks of the Tennessee by liigh noon. Now, as 
Johnston paused to reform his lines and bring up his artillery, 
Sherman fell back to join hands with MeClernand and make a 
fight to save the army. It was a battle without a commander to 
direct. Each division was fighting as best it could, and there was 
no head to appeal to for support. When pressed too hard it must 
fall back to a new position. Grant had come up from Savannah, 
but in that confusion no one could secure an intelligent idea of the 
whole situation. 

The position taken by Sherman and MeClernand was a strong 



56 SHILOH — THE FIRST DAY. 

one. The forest was a cover for a part of the front, and in the open 
advantage was taken of the ditclies and dips. Along some regi- 
mental fronts the men had time to build slight breast-works of logs, 
and rails, and rocks. One can to-day see where trees were rent and 
riven, and tields reaped of the terrible harvest of death. 

Down on what was McClernand's right I found a negro plowing 
in a field which had been cleared since the tight. Asking what 
relics he had discovered, he pointed without a word to the heaps he 
Had made along the edge of the field. There were bullets, frag- 
ments, solid shot, unexploded shell, old bayonets, musket barrels, 
belt-buckles and what not, and as he started the plow it turned up a 
grinning skull and a rust-eaten sword. From the field of a few 
acres had been taken five thousand pounds of lead and iron and steel. 

After Johnston had drawn a long breath, he advanced upon 
Sherman and McClernand. If he could roll them away the battle 
of Shiloli would be decided before noon. If they could hold him 
in check for an hour lielp might come to turn defeat into victory. 
Now all along a front of two miles there was a conflict in which 
exultation was met by desperation. The Confederates swept right 
up in solid battle-lines, determined to ride over and break through, 
but they were repulsed. The wave receded to come again and 
again, and it seemed as if every man in gi'ay had become a devil. 
Here and there the heads of charging columns broke through the 
Federal lines, but only to be cut off and made prisoners. The 
Federal artillery mowed down the attacking lines by scores and 
hundreds, and yet, as at Stone River, the wave receded but to gather 
greater power and come again. 

There was not a Federal battery on that front which was not 
taken and re-taken from one to three times. In thirty minutes 
from the advance not a field-piece could be moved for the want of 
horses. ■ There were hand-to-hand grapples all along that front, 
and the bayonet was used as often as the bullet. It was such a 
resistance as Thomas made at Cliiekamauga — as Rousseau made at 
Stone River — as rallied divisions made at Fair Oaks. But it was 
only a check. 

At noon the Federal army had been rolled back at every point, 
.and the shore of the Tennessee was lined with enough skulkers 
and cowards to form two brigades. The Federals had lost two to 
one, and many thousand stands of arms and large quantities of 
ammunition had fallen into the hands of the Confederates, while 
several thousand prisoners had been marched to their rear. 



SHILOH THE FIEST DAY. 57 

At early dawn the Federal army was a crescent with a front of 
six miles. At noon it is a tliin semi-circle, and the distance from 
flank to flank is not three miles. Not by Grant's orders, but by a 
sort of mutual understanding, as they are crowded back, the shat- 
tered lines of Sherman and McClernand reform with those of 
Hurlburt, and form a new line. Nine out of every ten pieces of 
artillery had been drawn back by hand, and men too grievously 
wounded to walk to the rear are left among the dead. The Feder- 
als have changed their tactics now. The have posted themselves in 
the thick woods and behind natural cover, and to reach tliem the 
Confederates must cross the open cotton and cornfields and the 
plains covered with pines too small to afford protection. 

Johnston's plan was to crush the left and center back on the right, 
and he was succeeding. There was scarcely a breathing spell before 
his battle-lines burst from the woods and surged across the tields at 
the Federal position. He had but to break through here, and his 
work was done. Nightfall would witness the utter annihilation of 
Grant's army. Every general in that Confederate army, including 
Johnston himself, rode at the liead of his command, and the lines 
broke cover with cheers and shouts. 

There is a hell-spot on every field of battle — some spot which 
becomes a maelstrom of cold, cruel slaughter. This was the hell- 
spot of that first day's fight. As the gra}' lines advanced across 
the open ground they met such a flame of death as left one or two 
men standing to represent companies. Lines wavered, broke, van- 
ished, and when the smoke lifted the flelds were clear of all but the 
dead and wounded. 

And now the gray brigades of Chalmers and Jackson are brought 
up and massed as a wedge to drive forward and split the centre of 
Federal resistance. Among the seven thousand men in the two 
brigades are one thousand recruits who are smelling powder for the 
first time. Two thousand of the men are armed with rifles and 
shot-guns, and are without bayonets. The wedge settles itself into 
a compact mass, catches a long breath, and then there is a forward 
movement such as Napoleon never saw. The wedge of seven 
thousand men drives at the Federal center with yells and cheers, 
reaches it, penetrates it for a short distance, and then the whirlwind 
picks it up and drives it back to the woods, limp, torn, bleeding, 
and with more than a thousand dead left behind to prove its valor. 

And now the whole line moves forward like a mighty wall, and 
men look straight into the eyes of death without flinching. The 



58 SHILOH THE FIRST DAY. 

same billow of tl;inic i-olls along the Federal front, tiie f5aine terri- 
ble roar and crash, and the gray lines melt away, and the dead lie so 
thickly that tlie living can hardly pick a way through them. 

Again there is a breathing spell. Johnston is hurrying up fresh 
brigades, and posting thein to overlap tlie Federal position. Dur- 
ing the brief respite the Federals make ready for what they know 
will be the last assault. When it comes it is like a tornado sweep- 
ing out of tlie woods. The same terrible tire is directed upon the 
advance — lines break and reform, hundreds go down to rise no 
more, but the toi'nado sweeps on and drives the Federals from 
their position. They fall back grudgingly. They turn and fight 
at every step. The cowards depai'ted long ago, and only brave 
men ai'c left. The left and center are crowded back until the river 
is behind them, and though the right has made a gallant fight, 
the news of the disaster is beginning to tell in the ranks. From 
flank to flank of the Federal army the distance has been reduced 
from six miles to one. Johnston can concentrate twenty-five 
thousand exultant men against what is hardly better than a mob. 
He is moving to do so when death claims him and the command 
devolves upon Beauregard. 

From the hour wiien Johnston fell until the sun was gilding the 
tree tops the Confederates continued to gain ground, but it was 
only foot by foot. There were cowards and cravens lining the 
bank of the Tennessee, but there were heroes between them and 
the exultant wearers of the gray. Prentiss had been captured, 
Wallace was down, and a score of field oflicers were out of the 
fight, but the Federal lines broke back only to reform again. 

Wallace's division, which as before stated, was stationed along 
the river, had been ordered into the fight before noon, but owing 
to a confusion of orders this entire division was kept marching 
around the country all day and did not get into the tight. There 
were times when it seemed as if, had this body of troops been 
where it could have been hurried to imperilled points, the Federal 
lines could have been held, but yet the successes of the morning had 
made the Confederate army determined on victoiy at any cost. 

At sunset there came anotlier lull — a long breath before closing 
in for tlie final struggle. Wliat was left of the Federal army under 
arms was huddled together on the plateau above the river in no 
more space than a brigade would need for a drill. As a last hope 
all the artillery had been collected on the three fronts, and the two 
gunboats in the stream would add their tire. The lull was broken 



SHIl.OH THE FIRST DAV. 



59 



by the sudden roar of artillery and the rush of the gray lines. On 
came brigade after brigade — Cheatham, Anderson, Pond and ten 
thousand others, and for half an hour it was a tight for life on one 
side and a fight to anniiiilate on the other. 

Did Beauregard issue orders to stop the tight? Did the lines of 
gray reach a point beyond wiiicli men could not advance and live'< 
Johnston knew there were no earth-works there. AVas Beauregard 
deceived by Prentiss into lielieving that works of great strength 
had been erected? Tiie fight ceased in a sullen, grudging nuuiner, 
and the Confederate troops drew back out of the range of the 
artillery on the plateau. Grant had lost all but the plateau, Beau- 
regard had won all but that. Both are living to tell the readers 
of magazines why and how it happened, and to smooth away their 
blunders. 

The Confederates had the Federal camps, immense supplies of 
commissary and ordnance stores, many captured battle-flags, thous- 
ands of muskets, and had won the battle. Grant had not been 
driven into the river, but he had been sorely defeated. Beauregard 
must have gained information that Buell's advance had reached the 
river at sunset, and military critics could not have shadowed his 
record had he gathered up the spoils of battle during the night and 
withdrawn to a position of his own, or even into Corinth. But he 
had determined to complete his victory. 




5l]ilol]— tijc .§eronii Jau. 




■'S tlie night drew on the fire along the plateau slackened, 
and by and by it fell away to an occasional growl from 
a cannon and the fitful crackle of ninsketry. The 
Federal gun-boats took position, and all night long 
their great guns roared at intervals and their monster 
shells went shrieking through the woods towards the Confederate 
lines. 

Who were in front of the Federals massed on the plateau? 
Not an army — not a corjis — not even a division. Simply the 
brigades of Chalmers and Jackson. Both had been fighting since 
daylight, and the two did not nuuiber over six thousand men. Of 
this number at least one half had never been in a skirmish. Bragg, 
commanding the division in which these brigades were numbered, 
was acting under Johnston's orders to push the Federal army to the 
river bank, and to carry out his plan of attack he had changed front 
with some of his forces. The two brigades had gone forward 
before Beauregard's order to cease fighting. Two regiments in 
Jackson's brigade had less than seven rounds of ammunition per 
man, and one regiment in Chalmer's brigade had less than three. 
Even as the battle-lines moved forward men were heard begging 
cartridges of each other. These two brigades advanced for three 
hundred yards in the face of the fire of Webster's artillery, and 
were halted only when within pistol-shot. Here they held their 
position and waited for reinforcements, but in place of additional 
troops came the order to fall back. 

General Beauregard may not have been as well posted on the 
situation as some of his officers at the front, or the order he issued 
would not have been given. He saw before him troops which had 
been fighting since daylight without food or rest — he had captured 
many prisoners and great quantities of stores — he had the wounded 
of both armies to see to, and he had Grant penned up and demoral- 
ized. He may have reasoned that he could finish him in the 

[60] 



SIIILOH THE SECOND DAY. 61 

morning and that Buell was still far away, and the order to rest on 
their arms was issued. Such an assault as was made upon Sherman, 
Prentiss or McClernand would have taken the Confederate army to 
the banks of the river before the sun was out of sight. 

Tlie tire of the gunboats can still be distinctly traced. Great 
limbs and entire tops of trees were cut off and dashed about, but 
the statements that this fire either demoralized or drove back the 
Confederate army are without foundation. It is doubtful if half a 
dozen men were killed by the fire, and those were far in the rear. 
I saw one unexploded sliell in a field at least a mile and a half from 
the landing, and it is agi-eed by all Confederates that nearly every 
shot whistled through the tree tops. 

The Confederate victory was rich in spoils, Grant's army having 
been supplied with everything an organized body could make use 
of. Johnston had sadly needed artiller3\ Here his forces captured 
gun after gun and turned them upon tlie Federals. More than ten 
thousand muskets and half a million rounds of ammunition were 
picked up during the night. Having captured all the camps but 
one, the Confederates captured with them great stores of provisions, 
considerable clothing, and supplies of forage. It was not a night 
for rest and sleep, but for hard work in gathering up the wounded 
and taking care of the spoils of victory. While engaging in tliis 
work the Confederate front became disorganized. Gaps were 
opened between divisions, regiments were detailed from brigades, 
and entire brigades were moved back to new positions. Tiius it 
happened that much of the advantageous ground won the day 
before by terrific fighting was given up during the night '■o preserve 
a front. 

Buell in person reached the battle-field during the afternoon, but 
the advance of his army did not appear until the battle was dying 
out. While the Confederates were busy gathering up the spoils the 
Federals were straining every nerve to wrest victory from defeat. 
Entire divisions in Buell's army advanced for miles at the double- 
quick, and as fast as they came up they were ferried across the river 
and ordered into position. ■ Wherever the Confederates retired the 
Federals advanced and occupied tlie ground, and thus before morn- 
ing came the Federal front had almost the length it measured at 
noon the day before. In the long hours of night broken brigades 
and scattered regiments were collected, the stragglers sent l)ack to 
their commands, and field batteries reorganized and sent to advanced 
positions. 



62 tjHILOH THE SECOND DAY. 

When daylight sent its gleam down into the forests both armies 
were ready for the mighty struggle which was to decide the fate of 
Shiloh. Grant's defeated forces were panting for revenge, Buell's 
veterans were cool and assured, and the Confederate army, knowing 
that reinforcements had arrived, were grimly determined to win a 
still greater victory. On a front less than two miles long the battle 
lines were ready and the dogs of war were waiting the sound of the 
first gun to rush at each other and drink their fill of blood. Most 
of the wounded had been removed, but the dead lay thickly over 
the whole ground, and where Sherman and McClernand had made 
their halts and fought to gain time and save the army the dead had 
to be lifted out of the way before the batteries could take positions. 
All night long the gun-boats had maintained a steady tire, directed 
upon the heavy woods sheltering the Confederate wedge, and day- 
break revealed such a spectacle as is seen after a cyclone has come 
and gone — -only worse. 

The first two hours of morning were spent in massing the ti-oops 
and batteries as tliey reached the front, and those already in line 
boiled their coffee and opened their haversacks. It was the same 
in the Confederate army. There was no thought but that of pre- 
paring for the tei-rific fighting which all could see was at hand. 
The three divisions of Kelson, McCook and Crittenden, with their 
splendid batteries, were there; Wallace had at last found his place, 
and the battered commands of Sherman and McClernand had solid 
fronts as they waited for the signal. 

Nelson moved first. Hardly were his rear lines in motion before 
his front lines were driving in the Confederate skirmishers. Then, 
sweeping through thickets and over fields, they struck the gray 
lines and pressed them back with a force which nothing could resist. 
In Crittenden's front it was the same — the same in front of 
MeCook. As the blue lines advanced the gray fell back — grudg- 
ingly — slowly — figliting all the time, but giving ground. The 
Federals were exultant — the Confederates sullen and desperate. 

For an hour or more Grant had it all his own way. If there was 
a check it was only momentai-y, and the over-sanguine were believing 
that the day was won, when the Confederates reached a chosen 
position and would give way no longer. Here their lines rested, 
and here they received reinforcements. You have seen a sturdy 
oak in the arms of the gale? It strains and tugs and braces — it 
gives way — it recovers — it bends to the blast with sullen growl of 
anger — it recovers its poise with a roar of defiance. So with those 



SHILUII THE SECOND DAT. 63 

battle-lines, only the gale was a whirlwind of death, and the oak 
was represented by fifty thousand desperate men. 

Almost in an instant the Confederate retreat was checked, and 
along tlie lines there blazed forth such a flame of fury that Nelson 
was stopped in his tracks — Crittenden held at bay — McCookmade 
to believe that his flank was overlapped. Then, with shouts of 
defiance, and moving like a great gray cloud before a migiity wind, 
the entire Confedei'ate army advanced. Nelson was rolled back — 
Crittenden lost his lines — McCook had his center driven back as if 
struck M'ith a mighty hammer. 

Here is the field : Two miles of forest, thicket, swamp and plan- 
tation — ravines cutting across — fences here and there — three 
highways leading out at angles — three or four houses from which 
the people had fled. It is all there to-day, and the changes are so 
few that every feature of the fierce battle can be distinctly traced. 
It was over this field that hell let loose its furies when Beauregard 
turned at bay. He saw victory slipping from his grasp — he saw 
honor and glory replaced by retreat and disaster, and his despei'ation 
seemed to infect every wearer of the gray. The meeting of two 
great storm-waves makes the whirlwind. The waves rush at each 
other and grapple and surge and struggle — retreat to breathe — 
advance with increased fury — whii'l round and round, and Death 
reaps such a harvest that men who live to count the dead are 
appalled. Batteries were taken and retaken — guns were left alone 
amidst the carnage — regiments were shriveled and companies almost 
wiped out. 

In the woods you will find strange-looking trees — trees without 
limbs, without tops — trees split and riven and growing incurious 
shape. Along the ravines you will find the moss and wild fiowers 
and vines growing thickly and the odor of the violets will be 
lost in the scent of blood. In the fields the stones will reveal their 
scars — every shade tree will be a witness, every furrow turned by 
the plow will speak of the carnage that day in the long ago when 
the whirlwind of death leveled its thousands of brave men. 

When that death-struggle had Listed for an hour there came a 
moment of weakness. Fresh batteries advanced to the aid of the 
Federals, and Federal brigades and divisions suddenly reformed and 
advanced with great ardor. For a moment the gray lines held firm. 
Then they wavered, gave ground, and fell back a few hundred feet 
to close up again and renew the struggle. 

It was thus in front of every Federal commander. The advance 



64 SHILOH THE SECOND DAY. 

would be checked — rolled back — ^grappled with — and then the gray 
lines would melt away under the steady fire, or fall back. McCook 
gained ground and lost it, and sprung back again to give a dozen 
lives for every inch. Wallace was rolled through the woods and 
across fields, but when the fury of the movement had spent itself, 
he recovered his ground and gained something. It was here that 
Rousseau won glory — here that a score of regimental commanders 
won the swords made for heroes. 

Slowly, but steadily, hour by honr, and foot by foot, the Confed- 
ei-ate army was pressed back, until Grant had regained all the 
ground taken from him the day before. Then the fighting died 
away. The gray lines would give back, but there was neither sur- 
render nor panic. "While Beauregard was defeated, he was not 
crushed. With his solid ranks facing the Federals, he slowly 
retired toward Corinth, his cannon roaring grim defiance and his 
bayonets gleaming spitefully through the trees. 

Did Grant direct the battle of Shiloh? If so, where are his 
orders to Sherman, or Prentiss, or McClernand, as they desperately 
strove to save the army on the first day ? The historian who 
weaves a crown of glory for Grant must forget that it was Buell's 
orders, delivered amidst the awful carnage, which advanced the 
Federal army at the proper moment. That advance won Shiloh. 
When Sherman's division was baited and breasted back in the 
great open field, now in corn and cotton and rich with the blood 
of three thousand men, it was Buell's order to Wallace which 
sent the latter sweeping down on the gray flank and disorganizing 
it. It was Buell's orders which massed the batteries — which 
brought up reinforcements — which looked for and found a weak 
spot in the Confederate lines and drove Marsh into it as a wedge; 

There has been much dispute over the number of men Johnston 
carried into the first day's fight. Headly puts it at seventy thou- 
sand, Lossing at over forty thousand ; Grant's first report gave the 
number at "over one hundred thousand." Not more than two 
Federal historians place the number as low as forty thousand, and 
yet the real strength, as returned by the Adjutant-General of the 
army, was forty thousand, three hundred and thirty-five. 

It has been admitted and denied by Federal officers that there 
was any surprise. If it was not a surprise, Sherman's men must 
have been inventing a way to fight a battle in their sleep or half- 
dressed. Hundreds of them were driven out of camp in a half- 
nude state, and hundreds went without a thought of taking their 



SHILOH THE SECuND DAT. 



65 



muskets along Could the whole front have been struck simul- 
taneously, the camps would have been abandoned with hardly a 
return shot. Sherman was hit first, and liis front line scattered like 
sheep, but his second stood firm long enough for the alarm to run 
along the wliole line and prepare other troops for the desperate 
work to come. 

In killed, wounded, and prisoners, the Federal loss exceeded thir- 
teen thousand. The Confederate loss was about ten thousand. On 
that field of six miles front were live thousand dead and ten thou- 
sand wounded men. Almost every foot of ground liad its stain of 
blood ; every yard had its burden of dead or wounded. Dismounted 
cannon — dead and dying horses — exploded caissons — broken musk- 
ets and wreck of fury^t was a picture to make the living turn 
away with a shudder. 

Grant had blundered — he had suffered defeat — he had regained 
his ground at terrible cost. The Confederates had grasped at an 
opportunity — seized it — lieki it — fougiit for it, and been forced to 
let go and fall back. 




Vol. I. -5 



.^clieii lliius. 




HE Chickahoininy is the same to-day as wlien its waters 
were first tinged witii the blood of assaihmt and 
defender — a deceptive river, running through dark 
woods and reptile-haunted marshes — through barren 
fields and cultivated acres — here stopping to foam and 
fret over a riffle — again gliding along with smooth current which 
hides a bottom of blackest mire or treacherous quicksand. To-day 
a lad may ford it without wetting his knees ; to-morrow it may be 
a stream deep enough to float a ship, and violent enough to sweep 
an army to destruction. 

In falling back from Williamsburg, Johnston had massed for the 
defense of Richmond. As soon as McClellan had buried the dead 
and the roads had Ijeconie passable he had followed on to tlie Chick- 
ahominy and beyond, and detached commands had been sent out in 
various direetions'to cut railroad lines and keep Johnston on the 
defensive before the Confederate capital. 

In the last days of May, Keyes had advanced Casey and Couch's 
divisions of his corps to Seven Pines, within six or seven miles of 
Richmond. Kearney was resting near Couch, and Hooker's full 
corps was beliind them to the north. Fair Oaks is a railway station 
on the Richmond & York River Railroad, and at that time the 
country about was but little cleared. Seven Pines was a hamlet a 
few miles to the northeast, on the Williamsburg Road. It was one 
and the same battle, but is called by both names. 

When Johnston became certain that the Chickaliominy divided 
MeClellan's forces he planned to strike a swift and telling blow. 
McClellan has been harshly criticized for his movement, but his 
answers are arguments which cannot be controverted. His desire 
was to attack Johnston. To reach him he must advance the army. 
An army cannot move except in portions. The forces advanced 
beyond the Chickahominy had occupied the highways for three days 
and nights, and as fast as they reached the points designated they 

[661 



SEVEN PINES. 67 

liad set about making their fronts secure by abattis and breast- 
works. Tiie advance could be made in no other way. Johnston 
held the winning card if he desired to use it. He was in position to 
move out of the defenses of Richmond by three great highways ; 
and if he did not move while the Federal army was broken up 
and strung out he had less activity than both sides credited him 
with. 

McClellan must take his chances. Could a commander do more 
than to order each division to fortify itself as it reached its position 
to wait for the remainder of the army to come up ? 

On the morning of the thirty-first, General Longstreet moved 
out by one road. General Huger by a second, and General G. W. 
Smith by another. Longstreet would strike the Federals square in 
the face at Seven Pines ; Huger would skirt the White Oak Swamp 
on its western side, and Smitii would come from the northwest by 
way of the Old Tavern highway, and strike Fair Oaks station first. 
But for the storm which liad rendered the roads almost impassable 
the Confederates would have been up and ready to attack at day- 
light or soon after. As it was, they drove in Casey's pickets 
between ten and eleven o'clock. It was Longstreet who was going 
to batter at this Federal front. 

Was Casey prepared? In 1S84, twenty-two years after that 
terrific struggle, I found the remains of his earth-works and breast- 
works to answer in the affirmative. Prisoners brought in from his 
front gave information of an intended attack, and scouts reported a 
heavy Confederate force at hand. Casey's men should have been 
in line to meet the threatened storm, but they were not. Even 
when the heavy picket firing in his front should have created appre- 
hension, men in his camps were cleaning their guns, mending their 
clothes and preparing dinner. 

For an hour Longstreet had been forming battle-lines across his 
front, unmolested and undetected. Just before noon all was ready, 
and three lines of battle moved down on Casey, the wings over- 
lapping him by a quarter of a mile. The Federal earth-works and 
breastworks were strongly manned by artillery, while Longstreet 
could advance nothing but light pieces, and those only over the 
highway. Federal history, which says that Casey was ready and 
expecting the attack, is strangely silent as to what occurred within 
twenty minutes after the fight opened. His first line of battle, 
formed in front of his works on good defensive ground, might have 
checked the Confederate advance but for the panic which suddenly 



68 SEVEN PINKS. 

took several regiments out of the fight. Hundreds of men threw 
down their muskets and ran to the rear in aifright, and this left a 
gap wiiich caused the whole line to be retired behind the defenses. 
If Casey was prepared, this line could have been held until flanked. 
The attack was directly on the front, and every Confederate was a 
fair target, but again a panic set in and a mob of cowards went 
rushing to the rear to disorganize other troops. Tliei-e fras no 
checking this rush. Men wlio had fought at Yorktown and Wil- 
liamsburg now submitted to be called cowards and poltroons and to 
be beaten witli the officers' swords, but they could not be induced to 
return to the front. A little after one o'clock Longstreet's men 
were sweeping througli Casey's camps victorious and jubilant, and 
the otlier Federal commands were changing fronts or taking new 
positions to prepare for the fast-coming storm. 

As Casey fell back, Keyes advanced five regiments to stem the 
tide, but they were rolled to the left by Longstreet's battle-lines, 
and fortunately drew off towards Fair Oaks Station to do good 
work as the Confederates came up on the Old Tavern Eoad. Seven 
Pines now became the right-center and Fair Oaks the extreme 
right. The Federal right-center clung tenaciously to its ground, 
every man who could be spared being brought up, but it was slowly 
pressed back, giving ground foot by foot and wiping out the dis- 
grace that had fallen on Casey by surrendering hundreds of 
precious lives. 

At four o'clock in the afternoon Smith was ready to strike the 
Federal right at Fair Oaks, and it was a swift and stuiniing blow. 
In one brief hour he scattered Couch, breasted Ileintzelniau back 
half a mile, and flung Kearney into the swamps. The day seemed 
lost, but Sumner was coming up. As soon as across the Chieka- 
hominy the oi-der to advance on the double quick was passed along 
the whole command, and his men pushed through mud and mire 
and water faster than liis field batteries could follow. Eegimonts 
were sent in as fast as they arrived, and Smith had only gotten rid 
of one force in his front when he found a second disputing the 
path. 

From five o'clock until sunset the fighting around Fair Oaks was 
terrific, no matter whether the lines encountered each other in the 
semi-darkness of the woods or the sunlight of the open fields. 
Smith had won a victory, and he was determined tliat it should not 
be changed to a defeat. Sumner felt that the safety of the Federal 
army depended on liis fighting, and he would not give ground. 



SEVKN PINES. 69 

Again and again his lines were charged witli such desperation as 
had not before been wicnessed in tlie war, but every shoclc was 
resisted. 

In the ineaiitimo tlie riglit-center at Seven Pines was fighting 
for life. As Berry's Michigan brigade was brought into the fight, it 
was advanced as a battle-line to hold the ground until a second line 
■could be formed. It held out for twenty minutes against double 
its nuiidier, but it left four hundred dead and wounded as it fell 
back. Kearney had bought up his last man, and now he fought 
without hope except to see the sun go down and night come on. 
He was pressed back, and back, and back, leaving blood-stains on 
every foot of ground, and though giving up the ground, he could 
not be broken or disorganized. When the sun went down he had 
his front to the foe. 

Sumner had saved the day at Fair Oaks. Regiments and brig- 
ades went into the struggle with cheers and hurrahs, and his guns 
were massed where every shot must tell. Every gun on his line 
was charged again and again, and over the pieces in Brady's battery 
men clubbed their muskets and used the bayonet. 

Smith was checked, but as ho massed for a fresh effort, Johnston, 
who had been the controlling mind on this wing, was wounded and 
sent to the rear. His men cried out for revenge, and two brigades 
were hurled upon Sumner's flank with such fury that the fire of 
musketry betokened a conflict among fifteen thousand men instead 
of half that number. As night fell the Confederate assault was 
hurled back, and the ci'ackle of musketry and roar of cannon soon 
died out. Sumner's rapid march and quick lighting had not won a 
victory, but had saved that portion of the Federal army south of 
the Chickahominy. Nightfall found him holding his ground, but 
the Confederates had full possession of the camps of Casey and 
Couch, and the spoils of battle belonged to them. 

During the long night the pickets along Sumner's front crouched 
down within fair pistol-shot of each other, while nearly all the dead 
and wounded were within Smith's lines, and but little effort was 
made to alleviate the sufferings of the latter. All night, too, the 
Federals were being reinforced, and a hirge body of Confederates 
which had been delayed on the Old Tavern road reached the front. 
In the gray of morning there was a sudden and powerful rush at 
Sumner's center, but it was checked by grape and canister from 
the guns massed there. Then, for nearly three hours. Smith struck 



70 



SEVEN PINES. 



terrible blows at the Federal sliield — now to the rigiit — now to 
the left — now full in the center, but he could not break it. He 
piled his dead and wounded in windrows but the sacrifice came too 
late. 

Was it wise in Johnston to attack as he did ? The opportunity 
to strike a crushing blow was a grand one, and he would have been 
no soldier had he let it pass. His plans conld not have been better 
laid, but the impassable roads brought difliculties and delay's. The 
commands under Rodes and Pluger were at least six hours behind 
time, having to construct bridges over streams and march for miles 
through swamp and water. Longstreet was to have attacked at 
daybreak, but he was not only not in position at that hour, but he 
delayed five or si.x hours longer for other commands to come up. 
Two events would have brought about the annihilation of the Fed- 
eral army. Had the entire Confederate force been up to begin the 
battle at daybreak, they must have swept the field. Had they been 
massed within an hour's march and then waited one day more, the 
same result must have been accomplished. The Chickahominy was 
rising fast, and Sumner's troops crossed with the bridges afloat. 
By noon of next day not a company nor a field-piece could have 
crossed to the rescue. 

The Confederates held their lines on the battle field all day of the 
first, but under cover of darkness returned to the defenses of Rich- 
mond, taking with them nine pieces of captured artillery, four 
battle-flags, eleven hundred and fifty prisoners, and enough camp 
equipage and ammunition to load sixty wagons. 

Johnston's army numbered a few hundred over forty thousand 
men, but at least six thousand did not participate in the fight. The 
Federal strength was about the same, but every man was brought 
into action. Sumner's coming up sent the scales down in favor of 
the Federals, and thej' recovered considerable of the ground lost 
between one and five o'clock. The Confederate loss was reported 
at six thousand and eighty-four, but of the "missing" included in 
this report nearly six hundred afterwards returned to their com- 
mands. The Federal loss was five thousand seven hundred and 
thirty-nine. 

The command of the Confederate armies was now to fall upon 
General Lee — a pure citizen — a gallant soldier — a general who 
believed in the aggressive instead of defensive. He did not over- 
estimate Confederate valor, nor underestimate that of the men in his 



SEVEN PINES. 



71 



front. The Confederates liad scarcely left the woods and fields and 
swamps of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks when General Lee began 
planning the destruction of McClellan. The dead at Williams- 
burg and Seven Pines were to be forgotten in the holocaust pre- 
paring. 



*>,J^^?^^^^'=^^-* 




Cross |up aiiil Jort 'Sciublic. 




^.S I saw Port Republic nestling asjainst the shaggy 
mountains one September day in 1S84, so it looked 
ill tlie mellow days of June, 1862. It is a strange, 
wild spot, and tiie eountiy for miles around is full of 
wildness and romance. Here is the same Shenan- 
doah across which Federal and Confederate shells screamed and 
shrieked — here the eternal hills which trembled as artillery 
boomed and nmsketry crashed. These sooty-faced ciiildren playing 
on the door steps know nothing of war, but the gray-haired women 
behind them remember the day when the fury of battle startled 
them as never eartlupiake or tornado could. 

Fremont had followed Jackson out of the Shenandoah Valley — 
Shields was coining up the Luray to close in. Jackson had sent 
off his plunder and prisoners through Brown's Gap, and there was 
time for him to follow. Either Federal army outnumbered his, 
but when the great Confederate fighter reached Port Republic he 
turned at bay. They had pressed him close and drawn blood, and 
they meant to do moi'c. They would close in and make an end of 
him. He must retreat or fight. He would not retreat, and when 
Jackson meant tight he meant to be the attacking party. In ten 
minutes after he understood the situation his men were moving. 

Shields was hastening up, but Fremont was nearer. Ewell 
moved out to Cross Keys to check and hold him, while Jackson 
could prejjare for Shields. What five thousand Federals could 
have done at Strasburg three or four days before, five thousand 
Confederates now accomplished at Cnjss Keys. Two hours more 
would have taken Fremont to the Shenandoah, when he suddenly 
discovered Ewell in his front. Fremont waited — Ewell attacked. 
It is one of the prettiest battle-fields nature ever made, and for 
three hours it was one of the fiercest of the war. If Ewell could 
not hold Fremont, Jackson must retreat. If Fremont could not 
break through. Shields might be beaten. Artillery was never 

[72] 



CROSS KEYS AND POET EEPUBLIC. 73 

■better used than at Cross Keys, and from an hour before noon 
until three o'clock the crash of musketry was terriiic. Fremont 
could maneuver only five or six thousand men — Evvell had no 
more to maneuver. Without a man in reserve, with every man 
closed up and every musket speaking, he slowly drove Fremont's 
left wing foot by foot, crushed his center back on his right wing, 
and with another full brigade he would have won a complete vic- 
tory in half an hour more. But he had no more men, and he had 
to be satisfied with holding his ground. This he did until dark, 
when he was ordered back to Port Republic with his main com- 
mand. Fremont had been checked — now for Shields! 

And yet the road to Port Republic was not to be left open to 
Fremont. A single regiment was left in his front, and it was to 
stay there. If driven back it was to take another position. If 
driven from that it was to take another, and if driven to the river 
it was to fire the bridge. You smile at the idea of a thousand men 
checking the impetus of an army corps. Ride from Strasburg to 
Cross Keys and you will pass fifty places where a liundred men 
could check ten thousand. If the advance of an army is a regi- 
ment, the army must halt until that reginaent breaks through or 
rides over an opposing force. At the turn of a narrow mountain 
road, shut in by walls of granite which a fox could not climb, ten 
men may hold an army u!itil the ten are corpses. 

Jackson's advance had scarcely entered Port Republic before 
Shield's cavalry appeared, closely followed bj' a regiment of infan- 
try, Brigadier-General Carrol being in command. He charged 
into the town and captured and held the bridge. He has been 
freely abused for not burning it, and thus preventing Jackson's 
crossing. He was making preparations to do so, and had piled up 
wood and saturated it with oil when a charge by the Confederates 
whirled him into the suburbs of the town. Here he waited until 
Tyler came up and assumed the command, and the Federal troops 
then began preparations for the battle which must come. Tyler 
must have known that Fremont had been checked on the other 
side of the river, and that he was face to face with Jackson. 
Banks, Milroy or Fremont would have retreated — Tyler remained. 
He had less than four thousand men, but Shields was hastening up 
to join him. Over there is Cole Mountain where his left rested, 
and where his park of artillery was so admirably posted. Down 
here is tlie Shenandoah, where his right rested, and between is a 
^orn field and a potato patch. No general could have massed his 



74 CKOSS KEYS ANi) POKT KEPUBLIC. 

army to more advantage, and Shields was to prove that his men 
could fight better tlian they could march. All night long he was 
getting into position and strengthening the weak points, and 
scarcely had his men snatched a hasty breakfast when they caught 
the ripple of Jackson's banners moving down upon them. 

Jackson smiled grimly as he surveyed the Federal position. He 
was again face to face with tiie men who had beaten him at Kerns- 
town. He saw that Tyler meant tiglit, and he must have honored 
him for it. He who had boxed Fedei'al armies about from end to 
end of the ShenandoaJi, now found in his front a general who 
would not give an inch. Over the river a single regiment was 
holding Fi'emont. Here, under the shadow of the mountain, 
Tyler was waiting the onslaught of Jackson's whole army. The 
preponderance of numbers was with the Confederates, but Jack- 
son must attack. He coolly and carefully surveyed every foot of 
the Federal line from mountain to river, and he could not discover 
a weak point. It was a short, strong line, and to attack any point 
was to meet a cross-fire. Tyler would not leave such a position 
to attack Jackson — Jackson could not delay for fear that Fremont 
would come up behind him. Already the morning breeze brought 
to his ears sounds which told him that the single regiment left to 
fight and fall back over the mountain road was being pressed, 
Tyler was waiting the onslaught. 

Jackson hoped that a grand dash at the Federal center would 
break it. The ground from mountain to river was then a wheat 
field, with nothing to obstruct a charge. The great Confederate 
fighter picked out five regiments of his best troops and hurled 
them against that wheat field with a shock which made the earth 
tremble. As sudden as a thunder peal, artillery boomed, musketry 
crashed, and ten thousand men shouted and cheered. Over the 
rolling ground — over a barren strip — into the waving wheat 
marched the five thousand men in gray with ranks unbroken. A 
double line of battle waited their coming with never a tremor. 
Then sheets of flame leaped over the wheat — down from the 
mountain side — up from the river, and a cloud of smoke covered 
all. For twenty-five minutes there was fighting to kill. That 
center would not give an inch. Again and again the lines in gray 
hurled themselves forward until bayonets drank blood, and blue and 
gray died together, but each time they were forced back, and every 
moment the cross-fire grew hotter. The Federal artillery used 
nothing but grape and canister, and every gun had a fair range. 



CROSS KEYS AND POKT EEPUBLIC. 75 

All at once the fire of musketrj' slackened and wild cheers were 
heard above the sullen boom of cannon. Jackson's five thousand 
were falling back ! They had struck the Federal center, but they 
could not break it. More than four hundred dead men were left 
lying on the trampled and bloody wheat field as the Confederates 
fell back. When tlie gray lines retreated the blue advanced. They 
met three fresh regiments, and yet they were not checked. Like a 
great wall of fire those lines swept on through the wheat, driving 
the foe and capturing such artillery as was not hurried off. Jackson 
was being driven ! 

The Federal infantry fire was terribly hot — that of the Federal 
cannon a hurricane of deatli. Unless that park of artillery 
on the Federal left could be taken Jackson was defeated. It was a 
brigade of Louisiana troops which dasiied away for this purpose, 
closely followed by two regiments of Virginians. It is a run of half 
a mile with the guns at a trail — a dash up the mountain side — a 
rush tlirough the undergrowth, and the Federal gunners turn their 
pieces upon the new foe. It was not war on that spot. It was a 
pandemonium of cheers, shouts, shrieks and groans, lighted by the 
flames from cannon and musket — blotched by fragrants of men 
thrown high into the trees by bursting shells. To lose the guns was 
to lose the battle. To capture them was to win it. 

In every great battle of the war there was a maelstrom. At Port 
Rejjublic it was on the mountain side. For an hour men ceased to 
be men. They cheered and screamed like lunatics — they fought 
like demons — tiiey died like fanatics. Long enough before they 
reached the guns each one of those six Confederates regiments has 
lost over a hundred men. Once — twice — thrice their battle-lines 
have pushed forward, to be literally wiped out. The Seventh 
Louisiana finds itself opposite the Seventh Indiana, and there is a 
duel — a rush — a grapple. In fifteen minutes the Louisianians have 
lost more than one-third of their number — the Hoosiers scarcely 
less. In the little valley across which the Confederates rush for 
the guns, there are four hundred corpses left behind the living. 
The Federals do not retreat their guns. Tiiey stand by them, and 
many are shot, thrust with their bayonet, and hacked to pieces with 
sword and sabre. There is a whirlwind of blood and death 
sweeping round and round the guns for five minutes, and then 
Jackson's men liave won. They raise a cheer, but it dies away in a 
scream. The Federals gave way only to rally and return. Tiiey 
advance with a rusli that sends the enemy whirling over the corpses 



76 CEOSS KEYS AND PORT REPUBLIC. 

— across the valley — back into tlie thick xindergrowtli, and a minute 
has hardly passed before tlie guns are again tlirowing grape and 
canister at Jackson's left, now being slowly puslied by the Federal 
right. If Tyler dallied on tiie march, he is making up for it now. 
If he failed to reach Strasbnrg on time, he is showing his mettle 
here. Across the river a single regiment is holding Fremont in 
cheek. Here on this field of blood Jackson's Ijest troops are being 
pushed back and his Louisiana Tigers find their match. 

And now they come again ! The cheers from the Federal left 
have nerved those six regiments until they would charge hell itself. 
They reform under a terrific fire, and rush with an impetus which 
even the hand of death cannot stop. They reacli the guns again, 
and again men shoot, stab, cut, hack — aye ! they grapple and roll 
under the wheels of cannon so hot that they would almost blister. 
There are no wounded. It is a grapple to the death. For the 
second time the Federals are pressed back, ami for the second time 
the guns speak under Confederate hands. Will it end here? No! 
Panting like dogs — faces begrimed — nine-tenths of them bare- 
headed — the Federal wave rolls back on the guns, and now there is 
a grapple such as no other battle ever furnished. Men beat each 
other's brains out with muskets which they have no time to load. 
Those who go down to die think only of revenge, and they clutch 
the nearest foe with a grasp which death renders stronger. Down 
where the Federal right is pushing Jackson they hear this pande- 
monium of shrieks and screams on the mountain-side, and they halt. 
It is a sound ten times more horiible than the whistle of grape or 
the hiss of canister. Men cease firing to look up. The}' can see 
nothing for the smoke, but what they hear is a sound like that of 
hungry tigers turned loose to tear each other to the death. 

If Tyler had had two more regiments in reserve behind his 
guns they could not have been taken. Wiien the Federals were 
driven for the third time they were not disheartened, but wiped out. 
To recover his artillery the Federal commander detached a brigade 
from his right. Weakened only by that much Jackson could drive 
it. He divined where other generals had to grope. In the same 
breath he ordered reinforcements to the men holding the guns and 
3, charge on the Federals center and left. From that moment the 
battle of Port Republic was decided. 

Tyler must have realized it, but he would die game. With his 
own artillery pouring death into his ranks, he shortened his lines 
and for half an liour held Jackson with a fire of musketrv so hot 



CKObS KEYS AND POET REPUBLIC. 7T 

that men advancing against it were struck by five or six bullets at 
once. It was his last effort. Foot by foot he lost ground — foot 
by foot Jackson advanced — and when there was no longer any hope, 
the Federal army faced about for the Luray and acknowledged its 
defeat. It was not a panic, but Tyler was routed. He was 
pushed for a couple of miles and then left to pursue his way toward 
the Potomac with only cavalry to sting his rear-guard and keep 
him going. 

"When Tyler was out of sight of the battle field Fremont came 
up. He had at last brushed the Confederate fly from his path and 
reached the river. Fremont was on one side — Jackson on the other, 
and the long bridge spanning the stream was on fire. If Fremont 
had fight in him he had come too late. Ne.xt morning he began 
his retreat on that Mecca of Federal pilgrimage, to be heard of in 
the valleys no more. 

Port Republic was one of the squarest figlits of the war. Tyler 
had the advantage in acting on the defensive, and he iiad every 
reason to hope that Fremont would come up in time to participate. 
Jackson had less artillery, but his troops were nerved by the knowl- 
edge that Fremont would be held, and that a victory at Port 
Republic would clear the valleys. 

After Jackson had passed Strasburg and was on his way to Port 
Republic, Fremont fell in beliind him. It was known for a fact 
that Shields was hastening up the Luray to reach Port Republic 
first. There was a plan to get him between the two armies. How 
could he say that he would defeat it? How could he know that he 
was to check one army, whip the otiier and clear the valleys of both ? 
And yet Jackson so calculated. On the sixth of June, with 
Fremont at his heels. Shields hurrying up, Ashby dead and the 
Confederates pushing at the top of their sj^eed, he sent a courier to 
Johnston at Richmond with the message : 

"Should my command be required at Richmond, I can be at 
Mechanic's Run depot, on the Central Road, the second day's 
march." 

He did not mean that he would leave the valley in possession of 
the Federals and hurry on to the spot named, but he meant that he 
would have finished the both armies by the time Johnston wanted 
his command. 

Two days before Cross Keys — three days before Port Republic — 
that strange man had planned what would happen and what did 
happen. He had a strange power of intuition, shown in a dozen 



78 



CROSS KEYS AND PORT KEPUBLIC. 



instances. He never halted uor hesitated nor groped — he divined. 
Was it a gift ? His men say yes ; his enemies cannot say no. 
Once more, when we find him hurrying through Tiioronghfare 
Gap to strike Pope's army in the rear, we shall see evidences of an 
intuition which startled those who shared his dangers and knew him 
best. 




'hW 'i'>4s;eKi^''^!W 



ieljinir tlje €itrtt)-toorb. 




*H ! it was one of the prettiest June days even Virginia 
ever saw. Tliere was such a mellow sunshine that 
every flower and blossom turned its face to be kissed, 
and there was such a happy, peaceful look down across 
the fields towards the Jataes Kiver that men forgot for 
a moment that war existed. In the trees overhead the robins called 
to each other, and ouce a blue-bird alighted on the wheel of a field- 
piece which had its shining brass uiuzzle thrust through the embra- 
sure, ready to send its shrieking shell whenever hand pulled the 
lock-string. 

There were a thousand of us down behind the earth-works, and 
we were so quiet that the voice of the colonel reached the last men 
on the flanks as he cautioned us : '■ My lads, we are going to hold 
this position against a whole army ! " 

See! A thin line of men — skirmishers to the number of fifty — 
suddenly break cover fiom the woods half a mile away, and advance 
upon us. They skulk — they dodge — they drop down and suddenly 
rise again and advance as stealthily as Indians intent upon surpris- 
ing a hamlet. Bah ! Fifty men against one thousand ! No, it is 
not that. The Octopus is in the woods — these skirmishers are 
the long arms he is reaching out to feel for us — to uncover our 
position — to ascertain our strength. 

"Puff! puff!" 

It is the fire of the skirmishers. You know where the watch-dog 
is by his growl. They are trying to provoke the beast to betray 
his retreat. Zip! zip! How the bullets sing as they fly over our 
heads ! There is dead silence behind the works. We breathe faster 
and harder — we clutch our guns wiUi tighter grip, but we are silent. 
To kill an Octopus you must strike at the body. Sever his arms 
and they will grow again. 

" Pop ! pop ! pop ! Zip ! zip ! zip ! " 

" Steady, lads, and wait for the word ! " says the colonel. 

[T91 



80 BEHIND THE EAKTH-WOKKS. 

There is no excitement among us. I hear the man on my right 
shut his teetli with a gritting sound, and the one on my left is 
breathing like a weary man in profound slumber. If I should look 
up and down the line I might see pale faces, but I am looking down 
across the fields and over the heads of the skirmishers. The 
grandest sight of the v/orld is to see the Octopus of War leave his 
lair and come forth thirsting for human blood. 

Ah ! here he comes ! His feelers have failed to uncover us, but 
he can judge for himself that such a short line of works cannot 
conceal more than a full regiment. He does not know that our 
right flank rests on a swamp, and our left on an impassable ravine, 
while our front offers no shelter even for a rabbit. Look ! the sight 
is worth ten years of your life ! A full brigade pours out of the 
woods and forms for the charge. Regiments and companies swing 
into position as if on parade. The skirmishers redouble their fire, 
and a general gallops along the front of the brigade, as if to see that 
every foot is on line with its neighbor. 

Now they get the word to advance, and at the same instant our 
field-pieces open fire. The cruel sliell are striking plump into the 
front rank and tearing men to pieces by the half-dozen, but as the 
smoke lifts we find the Octopus marching on with steady movement. 
He wants blood. He will demand drop for drop — and more! Ha! 
The shriek of shell has changed to the whistle of grape and can- 
ister, and the men at the guns are working as if the fate of nations 
depended upon them. The smoke drops down in a great cloud, and 
one cannot see beyond his bayonet. Now it is rent and shattered, 
and it lifts and floats away in great pieces and fragments. 

'' Now lads — and fire low ! " 

The Octopus has been staggered — wounded — halted — but here lie 
comes again. Right in front of me I see a face and form which I 
select as a target. I could kill him now, but I grimly wait for 
him to come nearer. He is pale with excitement, and as the man 
at his left is struck down my target loses the steady step of the line. 
But only for an instant. Now he is not over forty feet away, and 
the fire of musketry has checked the advance. My weapon points 
straight at him. I am looking right into his eyes. I note his 
brown curls, his high forehead — the white teeth shut tigiit together 
in his excitement. He is not over twenty years old. He has a 
mother whose poor old heart will almost break to-morrow. He has 
sisters who will refuse to be comforted for long months. And 



BEHIND THE EAETH-WOKKS. 



81 



such a fair-faced boy must have a sweetheart whose very soul will 
cry out in anguish at the news of his death. 

I am going to kill him ! The excitement of the check has con- 
fused him. He looks to the right and the left, and then into my 
eyes. He is standing almost alone. As our eyes meet, he sees 
murder in mine, and I read an appeal for mercy in his. The result 
of a battle does not hinge upon the life of a corporal. The war 
will not be over the sooner for his death. But I take deliberate 
aim at his breast and press the trigger, and even before I' feel the 
shock of discharge I see the red blood spray out from the horrible 
wound, and he falls back with a shriek upon his lips. 

The Octopus is beaten back. I go over the works and find my 
target. Those brown curls are damp with death — the fair face as 
white as snow — the ground soaked with blood so precious that 
every drop will call for a hundred tears from women's eyes. The 
blue eyes are wide open, the lips are parted, and as I bend over him 
it seems as if his voice came back for an instant to whisper the 
exclamation : Murderer ! 

And that was war ! That was one of the acts which helped to 
make a victory for tliousands to shout over — for flags to ripple — 
for rockets to ascend— for children to cheer and women to bless 
high heaven ! 




Vol. I.— 6 



Cokitfl Horgait's §dt\m 




■ HE Federal Colonel William H. Morgan's conflict with 
Confederate troops belonging to Van Dorn's command 
and liis spirited defense of Davis' Mills, Mississippi, in 
1862, was an incident of war which none of the his- 
torians have given more than a line, althougii it was 
one of the most plucky affairs witnessed during the whole war. 

Colonel Morgan, with about two hundred Indiana infantry and 
half that number of Ohio cavalry, was stationed at Davis' Mills, 
Mississippi, to defend a saw-mili, three or four storehouses, and a 
trestle bridge on the Central Railroad. The saw-mill was not in 
running order, but strongly built and situated so as to fairly com- 
mand both the railroad and a country bridge over the creek. 

This saw-mill was converted into a fortress in a novel manner. 
Eailroad ties were placed on end all around it and firmly lashed, 
and then a second course of ties laid horizontal was constructed. 
Bales of cotton were then rolled into position and piled up until 
nothing of the mill could be seen. Port-iioles were left for the 
muskets of the defenders, and a supply of water in barrels was at 
hand to be used to drown out fire. 

When the block-liouse had been completed the Colonel proceeded 
to tlii'ow up an earthwork wliich not only commanded the approach 
to the block-house, but was a second key to the bridges. This 
earthwork was still in fair condition in the spring of 1SS4. All 
this work was begun only after news had been received tliat Van 
Dorn had dispatched a strong force up the railroad to sweep it clear 
of Federal occupation, and it was finished as scouts brought in word 
that Confederate cavalry was close at hand. 

Morgan placed one hundred and fifty men in the block-house 
with plenty of food and ammunition, fifty of his dismounted 
cavalry in a ravine from whicli they had a fair range of the bridges, 
and the remainder were gathered in the earthwork. This was' to 
be the first fight with most of the men, but with the exception of 

[821 



COLONEL MORGAN S DEFENSE. 



83 



two of the force all went to their positions in good spirits. These 
two, one belonging to the cavalry and the other to the infantry, 
deserted to the woods half an hour before the Confederates 
appeared, and during the tight were discovered by the Confederates 
and dragged out of their hiding places and shot as spies. 

Soon after noon Van Dorn's troops formed for a charge over the 
country bridge and moved forward with cheers and yells. The fire 
of the entire Federal force was concentrated on a front of about 
fifteen rods, and the assault was checked within ten minutes. The 
Confederates supposed they were charging a camp, and anticipated 
only a slight resistance. When driven back their front was 
extended, reinforcements brought up, and preparations made for 
hot work. From a front of half a mile long they opened a hot 
fire of musketry lasting twenty minutes, and then a second rush 
was made for the bridge. The Federal fiie was again concentrated, 
and again the column of assault was checked, broken and driven 
back. 

After the second repulse at the bridge, troops were massed at 
different points on the front and attempts made to force the passage 
of the creek, but the result in each instance was the same. Said a 
member of Company M, Fifth Ohio Cavalry : 

" Men never exhibited such reckless bravery as those dare-devil 
Confederates. It must have been plain enough to every one of 
them on that front that any attempt to cross the creek was offering 
up their lives, but they kept trying it as if anxious to be slaughtered. 
It was only pistol-shot from my position to the stream, and I had a 
dead rest and a sure bead as fast as I could load and fire. It seemed 
to me like murder to drop a man with every bullet." 

"When the entire Confederate force had been brought up and 
massed a third attempt was made on the bridge, the lines of assault 
being five deep. The head of the column gained perhaps fifty feet 
on the one preceding it, but the concentrated fire had the same 
result. The approach to the bridge was now covered with dead and 
wounded, and many of the latter, crazed with pain and maddened 
by thirst, drew themselves up the railing and dropped into the 
water below. 

It was murder to order the Confederates to a fourth charge, but 
the commanding officer seemed to have lives to throw away. 
When he massed again he had a solid column in the middle of the 
highway, and on each side of it a line of men who were ordered to 
carry their guns at a trail and speed across the bridge without firing 



84 COLONEL MORGAN S DEFENSE. 

a shot. As this cohiraii was ready to break cover a hot fire was 
opened from riglit to left to distract attention, and at the same time 
balls of cotton soaked with turpentine were liglited and flung upon 
the railroad bridge with the hope of burning it. 

When the assaulting column uncovered itself it was to meet that 
concentrated fire again, and although about twenty men succeeded 
in crossing, the remainder were struck down or driven back after a 
fight of ten minutes. This ended the serious fighting, although a 
scattering fire was maintained for an hour after, during which time 
the Confederate commander sent in a flag of truce and demanded 
an unconditional surrender! His messenger took back the request 
for a few more assaults to be ordered. 

When the Confederates retreated they left in Morgan's hands 
upwards of one hundred killed and wounded, ninety-six muskets, 
two dozen sabres, two wagons, a lot of ammunition and about 
twenty prisoners, and drew off under the belief that the post 
was garrisoned by at least two thousand men. The loss to the 
Federals was only three wounded. One of the causes contributing 
to such a victory was the fact that the dismounted cavalry had just 
been armed with seven-shooters, thus enabling them to maintain a fire 
without a lull in which the assaulting columns could recover from 
their confusion. Yan Dorn's force was at first estimated at six 
thousand men, but was subsequently known to have comprised only 
half that number, although this gave him at least ten to one. 




iirst Conffkrate 6uitboats 




ARLY in the summer of 1862, Miss Sue Golzer, a young 
lady residing in Charleston, donated an amount of 
money to a fund to be called " The Ladies' Gunboat 
Fund " — the idea being to raise a sufficient cash fund 
among the ladies of South Carolina to build and equip 
a Confederate gunboat. The scheme became popular in a day, and 
in a few weeks the sum of thirty thousand dollars in cash was in the 
hands of the treasury. Many of the contributors to this fund had 
to sell jewelry and other articles to obtain the money forwarded. 
As soon as it was seen that a large fund was certain to be raised, 
the work of building the first boat was begun, and she was not yet 
half completed when money enough had l^een raised to warrant the 
building of anotiier. The second week in October both boats were 
launched at Charleston, in the presence of a great crowd, the tirst 
being named the "Pahiietto State," and the second the " Chicora." 
The crafts were constructed entirely for the defense of Charleston 
harbor, and both took part 'ii repelling the several attempts to enter 
the harbor. In the attempt to raise the blockade, as described else- 
where, in a separate article, these two gunboats took the lead in 
attacking the Federal blockaders. The action of the ladies of South 
Carolina was followed in other States, and the money contributed 
or collected by the women of the South from 1862 to 1865 
amounted to hundreds of thousands of dollars. 




185] 



iaii ioni's llottr at (^rant 




NE of the severest blows Grant received in any of "his 
campaigns was the capture of Holly Spi'ings, just as he 
was prepared to make it the base for a grand move- 
ment against the western Confederate army. For 
weeks and weeks he iiad been collecting forage, provi- 
sions, and munitions of war at the Springs, and the garrison consisted 
of eighteen hundred men under Colonel Murphy. This force was 
considered all-powerful, as reinforcements could be hurried in at a 
moment's notice, and the only fear was from small bodies of Con- 
federate cavalry. 

Van Dorn went quietly to work about the middle of December — 
it was in 1862 — to consolidate all detached commands, and on the 
twentieth he had a force of cavalry numbering at least two thoii- 
sand. His movements were closely watched by Federal spies, and 
when Grant became satisfied that Holly Springs was the point 
aimed at, he notified Murphy to be on his guard against an attack. 
It is not clear whether this Federal colonel was a coward or an 
idiot. He had at least sixteen hours in which to prepare for the 
attack, but he made no movement beyond telegrapliing Grant to 
hurry up reinforcements. Not a street was barricaded, not a 
defense thrown up, no official order transmitted to the men. 

Soon after daylight on the morning of the twenty-second the 
Confederate advance dashed into the town and brought up at the 
railroad depot. Here was a guard of one hundred and eight Fed- 
erals, and although seeing that they were overpowered ten to one, 
they made a hot little fight to save the depot, and had twenty men 
killed before they surrendered. Had all the Federal infantry been 
stationed here, the depot and its trains, at least, would have been 
saved. There was one long train, loaded with bales of cotton, and 
these would have made an excellent breastwork for at least five 
hundred men. 

As soon as the Confederates had possession of the depot, their- 

[86] 



VAN DORn's blow AT GKANT. ST 

regiments came charging in by every highway. The remainder of 
the Federal infantry was of no use, because broken up into detach- 
ments. Most of the cavah-y in the town were Illinois troops. The 
men were anxious to barricade the streets and fight, but had orders 
from Murphy not to do so. When Van Dorn's men swarmed in 
these lUinoisans stood holding their horses until entirely sur- 
rounded. Then, when called upon to surrender, and with no regi- 
mental ofiicers to lead them, seven or eight companies drew sabre 
and cut their way out and got safely away. 

As soon as the captured Federals were paroled. Van Dorn began 
to look for greenbacks. There were scores of cotton buyers in the 
town, together with many sutlers and speculators. These men 
were " gobbled uji," one after another, and taken to headquarters, 
where each one was ordered to "shell out." About fifty gold 
watches, a dozen diamond pins, and nearly one hundred and twenty- 
five thousand dollars in greenbacks were gathered in from private 
individuals. Over forty cars at the depot were loaded with cotton 
belonging to Federal speculators, and every bale was consumed, 
along with the trains and depots. In addition, two thousand bales 
were piled up in the town, and it made a grand bonfire. The idea 
was to cripple Grant's intended movement by destroying his stores, 
and the work was done in a thorough manner. What the Confed- 
erates did not wish to carry away they gave to the flames, and at no 
other time during the war did the torch find .such a rich harvest. 
Every locomotive and ear — every bale of cotton — every store- 
house — every forage pile — every public building, made a bonfire. 
Grant had taken possession of scores of buildings and tilled them 
with medical and quartermaster stores. On the vacant lots he had 
piled up sugar, meat, coffee, rice, molasses, beans, and bales of hay 
and sacks of oats. Not a hundredth part could be taken away, and 
the rest must be destroyed. 

Buildings filled with ordnance stores were set on tire, and there 
were several explosions which wrecked houses two squares distant. 
One hundred and twenty-two barrels of powder were stored in one 
building, and when this explosion took place men half a mile away 
were knocked down by the concussion. The destruction included 
two million cartridges, six thousand muskets, three tliousand sabers, 
two thousand five hundred revolvers, ninety-five thousand uniforms, 
eleven thousand barrels of flour, one million dollars' worth of medi- 
cal stores, five hundred thousand dollars' worth of sutler's stores, 
eight hundred thousand dollars' worth of ordnance stores, twelve 



88 



VAN DDRN S BLOW AT GRANT. 



hundred dollars' worth of quartermaster and commissary stores not 
included in the above, four hundred hoi-ses, eighty-four army wag- 
ons, twenty-two ambulances, a battery of field pieces, and enough 
to bring the total loss of the Federal government up to over seven 
million dollars. 

Grait knew that Van Dorn would attack, but he felt confident 
that Murphy could beat him off. He, however, forwarded rein- 
force.'' ints, but the troops reached Holly Springs to find the place 
in asht 1 and the Confederates gone. In his official report, Grant 
gave Murph}' and his officers a rebuke, which followed them until 
the last one resigned his commission, and tlie rank and file, willing 
to fight had they been permitted, were told that their conduct in 
accepting paroles could not be justified. 




%mi fantcis* 




' HE panic which seized upon a portion of tlie Federal 
army at First Bull Run and resulted in demoralizing 
the whole, was repeated many times afterwards in both 
armies. Place a regiment in ever so favorable a fight- 
ing position, and give it the best officers in the service, 
and one thing more is needed. Unless men are driven to despera- 
tion they will not fight their best until possible disaster is provided 
for by an aveime of escape in the rear. Troops can be quickly and 
steadily half-faced to meet a flank attack, but if it continues long a 
panic is almost certain to be the result. The soldier fears that his 
retreat will be cut oflf. Even if he has no thoughts of retreat, this 
feeling forces itself upon him and demoralizes the bravest troops. 
Tiie slightest cause has led to gravest results in battles. Let a 
battery change position with a rush, running through a brigade, 
and those men must be handled firmly to prevent a falling back. 
Caissons in search of ammunition have stampeded regiments time 
and again. Let one regiment fall back hastily to secure a new 
position, and it is a cool line of veterans indeed which will open to 
let the men pass, and then close up firmly after them. It is not the 
fear of being killed tliat unnerves a man fighting in the ranks. 
Men who have fired seventy five rounds at close range have been 
afterwards stampeded by the fear of being surrounded and cap- 
tured. With veteran fighters the fear of being made a prisoner is 
perhaps stronger than that of death itself. A man falling dead a3 
a line advances produces no consternation. The gap is closed as 
quick as the men on either side can move up. But, let a man be 
wounded and call out at the top of his voice, as was sometimes the 
case, and a sort of quiver runs up and down his wliole company. 
Let a second and third be hit, and it requires the stern: "Steady, 
men !" of the captain to prevent disorder in the ranks. 

The teamsters were the direct cause of more than one panic. 
Being non-combatants and unarmed, they were, of course, helpless. 



90 AEMY PANICS. 

and for this same reason easily frightened. Let one single shell 
fall among the wagon-train, and nine out of ten wagons were bound 
to move. If one teamster abandoned his wagon, others were certain 
to follow his example, no matter how slight the danger. 

When Gen. Sturgis had his fight at Gruntown, Miss., the wagon 
train was by some blunder brought too near the front and parked 
in an open field. As the figliting grew hot the Confederates 
brought forward a single section of artillery and got the range of 
this train. Four or five shells did the work. A panic seized the 
teamsters, and the few who brought their wagons out of tlie field 
abandoned them along the only highway. This action blocked the 
road, preventing any movement of artillery along the thoroughfare, 
and in half an hour there was a panic among the men who had all 
along been fighting with the greatest bravery. The panic resulted 
in a rout entirely uncalled for, and the Confederates gathered in 
from nine hundred to twelve hundred prisoners, eighteen pieces of 
artillery, two hundred and thirty wagons and ambulances, six hun- 
dred horses and mules, and rations and ammunition in immense 
quantities. The bursting of five or six shells half a mile in rear of 
the lines of battle lost Sturgis that fight, and came near being the 
destruction of his whole command. 

An incipient panic was often crushed out by the coolness of a 
few officers, who, recklessly exposing themselves to the fire of the 
enemy, would reanimate a regiment, but a brigade once started for 
the rear in disorder paid not the slightest heed to demands, entreat- 
ies or curses. As a rule, a command disorganized early in a fight 
was of but little use during the rest of the day, the men seeming 
to be thoroughly unnerved and beaten. 




€\t Mastc in Mu. 




HE wars of 1776 and 1S12, together with the Mexican 
War, must have been conducted with an eye to economy, 
for the coiinti-y had little to spare during the first two 
named, and the Mexican War was fought at such a 
distance from liome as to demand tlie utmost care in 
preserving the supplies which reached the armies. But with the 
American Civil War it seemed to be the rule to waste and destroy. 
Not a single department of government attempted to check the 
wholesale waste, and not a branch of the service made the least 
effort to take care of military property. 

Beginning with the horse and the mule, without which no army 
could move, this terrible waste was apparent in the ordnance, quarter- 
master and commissary departments everywhere, and ran down the 
scale to the outfit of the poorest private. Uncle Sam paid any price 
asked for anything he wanted. There were better mules in Cheat- 
ham's Confederate wagon train the day he surrendered than Grant 
had at any time daring the war. Farmers who had a poor horse or 
mule to sell, sold it to the government for double its worth. Too 
many teamsters had no care whether an animal lived or died. Nine 
out of ten teams would begin to fall away in flesh as soon as any 
work was demanded of them. In and around Harper's Ferry the 
government buried fifteen thousand animals which were used up by 
gross carelessness, stuj^id brutality, and the trickery of teamsters in 
sellino; forage. 

At Pleasant Valley, below the Ferry, which was for two years a 
remount camp for cavalry, it came to be the rule to shoot a horse 
which had the slightest ailment. An animal with a sore back, 
which two weeks' rest would cure, or one with a cough which 
needed a dose or two of medicine, would be led out and shot down 
without an attempt to save him. Cavalry horses were never better 
provided for by a government, and yet horses never died faster in 
any war. 

[911 



92 THE WASTE IN WAR. 

The waste around a camp was a matter of astonishiaeiit, but it 
could not be fully realized until the troops moved. Then one could 
pick up muskets, bayonets, wagon loads of sabres, belts, tents, uni- 
forms, cartridges and provisions. While some of these articles 
were picked up and turned into the ordnance department, not live 
per cent of the value of the whole was saved. OflScial mismanage- 
ment placed millions of rations in depots, which had to be given to 
the torch. The want of nerve and strategy on the part of various 
commanders lost the government not only campaigns, but miles of 
wagon trains, and arms and ammunition enough to supply whole 
divisions. Beginning with the First Bull Run, the loss to the Fed- 
eral government in arms, munitions, provisions and medical stores 
by reckless waste must have counted up tens of millions. What was 
captured by Jackson and others amounted to millions more. From 
July, 1861, to April, 1865, the Confederate government had the 
benefit of at least three hundred million dollars' worth of Uncle 
Sam's money. What Jackson took from Banks in one single cam- 
paign cost many millions, and for every dollar it cost the" Union it 
was worth ten to the Confederacy. Indeed, from the very first 
battle, Uncle Sam was paying for the entire cost of the war for one 
side, and a very large share of the cost for the other. 

The destruction of public and private property in various 
Southern States, falling upon counties, cities and individuals, milst 
be estimated at hundreds of millions. Sherman alone, in his 
inarch from Atlanta to Savannah, caused the State of Georgia a 
loss of seventy million of dollars. A Federal cavalry raid which 
did not destroy at least two or three million dollars worth of pub- 
lie and private property was looked upon as a failure. 

The war begot a reckless waste and extravagance on the part of 
the North which was carried from the field to the store and fac- 
tory and shop and family, and which after all these long years may 
still be held responsible for many commercial disasters. 



5toitetoall larksott in tire ialk^. 




NE cannot look over the history of war for the last 
century and find another just such general as Stonewall 
Jackson. He was a strangely peculiar man in all 
respects. He fought in a strange way — his plans were 
peculiarly original — he had such faith as few men ever 
possessed. Lee was deep and strategetic — Jackson was a surprise. 
He never fought a battle after war's tactics. He never moved as 
other generals moved. He never attacked where he was expected. 
He never understood his opponent's plans as was hoped he would. 
As a man he had no vices. As a Christian he had faith and rever- 
ence. As a general his strange career gave him fame in every land 
where brave deeds find admirers. 

When Jackson moved there was no halting by the wayside. H 
he started with ten thousand men to reach a certain point by day- 
light and attack the enemy, he was there at the hour. If his troops 
were not all up he attacked with those he had in hand, even if there 
was but a single regiment. • When, in March, 1862, he swept down 
the Shenandoah from Mt. Jackson to Kernstown, he reached the 
latter place at the head of a regiment. His foot-sore troops were 
strung out on the pike for a distance of twelve miles, and yet that 
one regiment formed a line of battle and moved to the attack. 
Sliields had upwards of ten thousand men and was in position. 
Jackson had less than four thousand men when all had arrived, and 
yet for three hours it was one of the sharpest tights of the year. 
For nearly an hour Jackson fought two brigades with a regiment. 
His boldness in attacking the moment he arrived on the ground so 
astonished Shields that he acted on the defensive. It was only 
after he found that Jackson's troops were all up, and that they 
numbered less than four regiments, that he moved out and took the 
offensive. When night fell Jackson was beaten — his first and only 
defeat of the war. So continuous was the fire of musketry on the 

[93] 



94 STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. 

Confederate side in that fight that scores of the men had to cool 
their musket barrels in the creek. 

A Confederate lieutenant who was captured three daj's after the 
Kernstown tight was asked if the defeat had not greatly demoral- 
ized Jackson's men, and his reply was ; 

" Bless you, no ! Why, his men never have time to be demoral- 
ized!" 

And such was the fact. He fell back beyond Strasburg and in 
three days made such a demonstration that Shields called for rein- 
forcements. Twenty days after lie was being pushed into the Blue 
Ridge by Banks, and Banks telegraphed the North that the Valley 
had seen the last of Jackson. That boast had scarcely been jirinted 
when Jackson was moving. On the fourth day he struck Milroy 
beyond Staunton, drove him out of his path and picked up his 
army train, and was back in his lair before Banks had moved a 
man. 

Milroy was defeated. Banks humiliated, and the government was 
determined to punish the swift-moving raider. While it was plan- 
ning Jackson was moving again. By a rapid march over fields, 
througli forests, across mountains and rivers and along almost 
impassable highways, he siiddenly appeared ir. the Luray Valley. 
The Federal force at Front Ko3'al could not have been more sur- 
prised liad the ancient bui'ying-ground there given up its dead. 
There was a quick attack, a sharp fight, and then the road leading 
into the Shenandoali Valley behind Banks was open to Jackson. 
Even while the fightiug was in progress at Front Royal his columns 
were hurr3'ing down the pike with the bullets singing over their 
heads. If Jackson could strike the Valley anywhere between 
Winchester and Strasburg he would be between Banks and the 
Potomac, and for hours his men moved at such a pace that the 
hoi'ses of the officers had to trot to keep up with them. It was 
Ewell's corps which was moving on the direct road to Winchester. 
Jackson took the road to Strasburg. Both would strike Banks 
on the flank. 

But swiftly as moved the Confederates, the news went faster. It 
reached Banks, and he turned pale. He had over fifteen thousand 
men — Jackson had less than ten thousand. Why not stay and 
fight him ? He had four hours' warning. He could pick his own 
battle field — he could even protect his men with earth-works. But 
Banks had no fight in him tlien. He who had " driven Jackson 
out of the valley forever " now ordered a retreat. He had good 



STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. 95 

blood under him, and men cursed his lack of resolution as they 
obeyed his orders. A retreat without a figlit is a run. The 
cowardice of the action makes cowards of the bravest men. In 
one hour after Banks heard that Jackson was on his flank, he was 
sending off troops towards the Potomac. If it was not a panic it 
was a helter-skelter march, and the confusion increased as the hours 
passed and as it became evident that the Confederates were hurry- 
ing up. 

Jackson and Ewell struck the marching column miles apart, but 
almost at the same moment. Jackson cut it in two, driving 
two regiments back on Strasburg, from which place they broke up 
into detachments and escaped over the roads and hills to the nearest 
Federal forces. Ewell drove the remainder of the column down 
the valley upon Winchester. Here Banks made a stand. He had 
still enough men to whip Jackson had he been the general to 
manage them. One quick rusli, a crash of musketry and the roar 
of a few pieces of artillery, and Banks was again flying for his life, 
nor did he stop until safe across the Potomac. Is it disloyalty for 
a Federal who fought Jackson to write of his brave deeds ? If so, 
Banks could be nothing short of a traitor. He ran from him — 
skulked away in the darkness like a thief, when he had an army 
large enough to crush him. When Sheridan and Early fought at 
Winchester, Early, at one point in the battle, fought a whole 
division with a brigade for nearly an hour, retreating only by inches. 
When Jackson struck Banks on the same field the Federal general 
hardly waited for the Confederates to reach him. The northern 
ultra-partisan, if there is such, who hates truth when it tells of 
Confederate successes, had better post himself on what led to those 
successes so often. Incompetency, mismanagement, cowardice and 
jealousy whipped the Federal armies often and again, and men who 
write in the years to come will tell more ugly truths than one dares 
to at this day. 

Jackson again had the valley. When he drove Banks from Win- 
chester he pushed on to Charlestown. The Federal post there went 
flying. At Halltown there was a crash of musketry lasting five 
minutes, and Jackson's men pressed on towards Harper's Ferry. 
Lines of battle had been formed for the attack when the retreat 
was sounded. What did it mean? 

The North was wild with excitement, and the government at 
Washington never acted with more promptness. Federal armies 
were then lying in such positions that it was easy to set a trap for 



96 STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. 

Jackson. McDowell detached a column from his position near' 
Fredericksburg and pushed it for Front Royal with all speed, and 
from thence it was to push on to Strasburg, there to unite with 
another heavy column under Fremont, coming from the West. 
Both columns were in rear of Jackson, though on the other side 
of the mountains, before he knew of the trap. If either Federal 
column reached Strasburg first, Jackson must fight supei'ior odds. 
If both reached it in advance of him, he was lost. Forty thousand 
men could not fail to crush fifteen thousand. 

The column from McDowell's army under Shields had orders to 
move rapidly. Fremont could not dally if he would reach Stras- 
burg first. Jackson had three thousand Federal prisoners and a 
wagon-train thirteen miles long, but he had the shorter road. Not 
an hour nor a minute was spent in sleep - — no time was lost in pre- 
paring meals. " Close up ! close up ! " was the oft-repeated order, 
and footmen made their three miles — sometimes four — an hour 
for hours on a stretch. It was a close race. When Jackson's cav- 
alry reached Strasburg, Fremont's cavalry were almost within gun- 
shot. 

Both Fremont and Shields had imperative ordei's to make all 
haste to reach Strasburg in advance of Jackson. Shields knew of 
the orders to Fremont. Fi-emont knew of the orders to Shields. 
And Jackson knew of the orders to both. He did not let go his 
grip on a single prisoner who could march — on a musket — aye! 
he did not even leave a cartridge on the road, and yet he need not 
have hurried. Fremont did not wish to reach Strasburg first, for 
then he must fight Jackson alone. He had five thousand more men 

than Jackson, but ! Shields did not wish to reach Strasburg 

first. Why ? He had fifteen thousand men, while Jackson, out- 
side of his train-guards and the escort for prisoners, could not have 
mustered over ten thousand fighting men. Was Shields afraid ? 
If not, why did his army creep at snail's pace for the last twenty- 
four hours ? They inarched one mile to Jackson's two. Fremont 
hardly marched faster. If the two columns united, one Federal 
general must outrank the other. If Jackson was defeated, only one 
would receive credit. 

Shields and Fremont were the two jaws of the Federal trap set 
to catch the wily Confederate. The road into Strasliurg was the 
bait. When the game took the bait the jaws refused to spring. 

When two Federal generals let cowardice and jealousy lose a 
chance to bag a whole Confederate army, what shall be said of it ? 



STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. 97 

I have been over the routes taken by both Shields and Fremont as 
they inarched to bag Jaekson. I can walk farther in two hours 
than either army marched in the last eigliteen. Jackson said of 
tiiat affair : 

" Either one liad men enough to whip my army. Ten thousand 
men ought to have held me in check until the forty thousand had 
come up. Both armies ought to have reached Strasburg hours 
ahead of me." 

Fremont had come up, willing or unwilling. Jackt^on had come 
up, also ; and the Federal commander must make a show of attack. 
But Jackson waited for that attack until its failure to come off 
made him suspect a trick. Then he sent Ewell forward and opened 
the fight himself. Shields was not far away, and Fremont must 
be held back until all that long train was safe, and until the last 
Confederate had come up. A single brigade of Ewell's men drove 
Fremont's advance back in confusion, and two brigades held his 
whole army in check for hours. Such is the lay of the ground in 
that locality that a single Federal brigade might have halted Jaek- 
son. But that brigade was not there in time. When the last 
wagon and the last soldier had passed, Ewell was recalled, Ashby 
took the rear and Fremont entered the town to find it occupied 
only by women and children. 

Any one can be brave when chasing a flying enemy. When Fre- 
mont found that Jackson was trying to get away, he pushed after 
him with all speed, fighting the rear guard every mile of the way 
to Harrisonburg. In one of these attacks Ashby was killed — Jack- 
son's right arm. The war had developed no braver fighter, and one 
of the finest eulogies jironounced over his dead body fell from the 
lips of a Pennsylvania Colonel captured at the same moment. 

The failure to catch Jackson at Strasburg brought Shields and 
Fremont such new orders as made them think their heads would 
fall if his did not, and while the first hurried up the Luray, the 
latter followed in Jackson's footsteps. If Shields could reach Port 
Republic first, Jackson would be between two armies. It was a 
neck-and-neck race, and the Confederate won. He not only walked 
out of tlie jaws of the trap, but he carried the trap off with him ; 
that is, by destroying the bridges he made it impossible for Shields 
and Fremont to unite. Then Ewell was sent to amuse and check 
Fremont, and Jackson girded himself for one of the quickest cam- 
paigns war has ever known. He meant to crush Shields with one 
hand and Fremont with the other, and he did not mean to be ten 

Vol. l— 7 



98 STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE VALLEY. 

hours about it. Men fought there as they could not be made to 
fight at Gettysburg. 

Call him a rebel fighting for a bad cause, but that will not hide 
his generalship from the eyes of the world. In ninety days tliis 
singular leader, who had neither an army wagon nor an ambulance 
when lie began his campaign, captured over four thousand wagons, 
one hundred ambulances, thirty-six sutler's outfits, two hundred 
thousand dollars' worth of medical stores, four thousand prisoners, 
twelve thousand stands of arms, more than a battery of artillery, 
and such quantities of ammunition, forage, clotliing and provisions 
that they were estimated by the ton and carload. In that ninety 
days his men marched over six hundred miles. There was more 
or less fighting during sixty of the ninety days. He infiicted 
square defeat in four battles and a dozen heavy skirmishes. When he 
struck Front Royal he caused such an alarm for thirty miles around 
that thousands and tens of thousands of dollars worth of Federal 
stores were burned. He captuied in the valley over eight hundred 
horses and a large drove of beeves, and even when encumbered 
with a wagon train thirteen miles loug, in addition, he marched 
twenty miles wliilo the Federals marched twelve. In a campaign 
begun only after a Federal general had "driven him out of the 
valley," he whipped four Federal armies in succession and secured 
for the Confederacy sucli spoils as could not have been purchased 
for six million dollars in gold. 

Stonewall Jackson's niemory is such that the world has given his 
character as a citizen, and his success as a general, a leaf in history 
which can never be torn out. He hated no one. He fought for 
principle, and not for glory. He fought to win — to defeat Federal 
armies; and yet almost his last words related to a captured Federal 
colonel — spoken with all the kindness of an old friend, instead of an 
enemy fighting to destroy: 

"Take Colonel Wilkins to the i-ear and see that he is well used." 

Thirty seconds after the last word had left his lips, Jackson was 
mortally wounded. 



C|^ |all of fxto mimn. 




NE night in the spring of 1881 five Confederate 
officers, eacli one of whom had assisted in tlie defense 
and witnessed tlie fall of New Orleans, were assem- 
bled in Richmond, and to the question: "Was New 
Orleans ably defended?" each one answered with 
an emphatic "No ! " 

That New Orleans would have fallen into Federal hands within 
the year is quite probable, but that it might have held out for 
months longer will be admitted by unbiased readers when the situ- 
ation is stated. 

Neither the Confederate Secretary of War nor the Secretary of 
the Navy seemed to understand the danger which threatened, and a 
more unfortunate combination of circumstances working against the 
defenders cannot be found in the history of war. 

In the last days of March, 18G2, the advance of the Federal fleet 
destined to capture New Orleans entered the Mississippi river. 
About twenty-three miles above the bar were Forts Jackson and St. 
Phillip, being the only defenses of any moment between the city 
and the gulf. While these forts were well located to command the 
river, and, armed and garrisoned as they should have been, could 
have sunk any vessel afloat, they were not, in the first place, armed 
with anything above second-class guns. When the test came, it was 
discovered that the best gun in either fort fell short of the poorest 
gun in the fleet. 

If it was anticipated by the Confederate authorities that New 
Orleans would be attacked by way of the river, no special prepara- 
tions were made to ward off the blow. Neither of the forts had 
its complement of cannon, and neither was able to secure them, 
though the government was repeatedly appealed to. 

AVhile the city itself was garrisoned by ninety-day men, hundreds 
of whom had no other accoutrements than the pistols and shotguns 
brought from home, the garrisons of the forts were weak in num- 

[99] 



100 THE FALL OF NEW OKLEAJS^S. 

bers, poorly provided for, and had powerful enemies to combat out- 
side of the Federal fleet. Tlie powder in the magazines was of poor 
quality, the fixed ammunition could not be relied on, and there was 
such a lack of co-oj^eration between the forts and Confederate river 
fleet as to prevent any concert of action until too late to avail. 
Porter reaped a glorious harvest at New Orleans, but let us see how 
it came about. It will not detract one iota from any Federal's 
patriotism to state facts as they appeared to Confederates, and as 
they can be verified in military reports. 

About the middle of March the Mississippi began rising, and by 
the last of the month there was a flood which covered thousands of 
acres between the city and the bar. The two forts were not only 
isolated, but inundated, and coiild only be reached by boats. For 
days the water stood knee-deep on the parade ground, and the first 
guns tired at Porter were worked by men standing in ten inches of 
water. All the powder and much of the fi.xed ammunition, together 
with quartermaster and connnissary stores, liad to be handled two or 
three times over by tlie garrison, and scarcely a man escaped chills 
and fever. For six days previous to Farragut's appearance every 
soldier in both forts had been worked like a slave, with scai-cely 
time to eat or sleep, and when they beheld the overwhelming force 
making ready for the attack, one must wonder that they had the 
pluck to go to their guns. 

Early in tlie war the Confederates had the prudence to anchor a 
raft in the channel between the forts to obstruct the passage 
and hold an enemy under tire. It was easy enough to construct 
and anchor a raft, but one would not remain tliere. Wind, wave, 
flood and drift-wood all fought against it. 

When a raft could not be made to remain on the surface a differ- 
ent plan was tried. A number of old sailing vessels were loaded with 
stone, towed to the right positions and sunk so as to completely 
blockade the channel, except a narrow opening. Heavy chains 
extended from one vessel to the other, and it seemed as if the great 
problem had been solved. As if in league with Porter, he had 
scarcely sighted the forts before a terrible gale came on one night 
and disarranged the raft so as to open several channels thi-ough it, 
and it was then too late to make any repairs. 

The river fleet and naval force at hand consisted of eight or nine 
vessels, including the famous iron-clad Louisiana, then about com- 
pleted, and the ram Manassas. The other vessels were passenger 
steamers and tugs, armed almost any way, and protected by bales of 



THE FALL OF NEW OELEAIJS. 101 

cotton. The fleet was expected to aid the forts in driving back any 
advance Ijy the river, but there was a series of blunders, mishaps, 
and misinterpretations, wliich rendered the fleet almost a ciplier in 
the stirring events. 

During the two weeks consumed by Farragut in feeling his way 
up the river to within gunshot of the forts, the Confederate fleet 
had time to prepare fire-barges and rafts, mount additional guns on 
steamers, and make ready for what was to come. 

By the ninth of April, Farragut had closed up his entire fleet to 
within six miles of the forts, and on this day a Federal gun-boat ran 
within range of the Confedei'ate guns to draw their fire and locate 
their number and calibre. The entire fleet, including the mortar 
schooners, had a safe anchorage in the elbow of the river below the 
forts, and here again the flood was an enemy to the Confederates. 
But for the overflow five hundred sharp-shooters could have been 
sent into the woods to harass and annoy, and no vessel coTild have 
remained within rifle-shot of the banks. 

When scouts reported the entire Federal fleet in the bend, it was 
realized that the time had come to prove the worth of the fire- 
barges and rafts. The first one sent down was the only one out of 
the dozen sent at different times which kept the current and 
appeared among the fleet, and this one occasioned no damage and 
but little annoyance. In sending down the others the steamers 
towing them out exercised such poor judgment that the floating 
bonfires grounded on the banks long enough before reaching the 
bend. Much labor and trouble had been expended in constructing 
these barges, and it was time thrown away. 

Porter had been a long time getting ready, but on the morning 
of the eighteenth of April he was heard from in the most emphatic 
manner. He had a fleet of upwards of twenty mortars, and the 
steady fire of these was backed by the heavy ordnance of the gun- 
boats. At least thirty-five Federal guns and mortars opened on the 
forts at fair range, and from half-past eight o'clock in the morning 
until night had fully set in, there was a steady pounding away 
with serious results. 

It was wonderful how exactly Porter secured the range. Most 
of the mortar fleet lay behind the woods, entirely shut out from 
view and miles away, and yet the very first shell fired from a mortar 
fell fair within Fort Jackson. During the day four shells hit where 
•one missed, and the firing, taken together, was more accurate than 
any fleet ever scored afterwards. 



102 THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. 

Within half an Iiour after the bombardment opened Fort Jackson 
was on fire, and men liad to leave the guns to help subdue the 
flames. A conflagration was hardly extinguished in one locality 
before the incendiary shells started another, and three different fires 
were raging at one and the same time. 

Before noon the garrison had lost its quarters, togetlier with 
nearly all cooking utensils, bedding, blankets, and three or four 
days' cooked rations. Not a man or officer had a change of cloth- 
ing left, and the suits they stood in were in some cases nearly 
burned off their backs. Had the men not been called from the 
work of extinguishing the flames, thus giving them full play, to 
that of still further protecting the magazines, the fort would have 
been blown up. 

There was not in either fort a single gun to match the rifled ord- 
nance of the gun-boats. This was before the Federal iron-clads and 
gun-boats had brought out the terrible eleven and thirteen-inch 
guns. Forts and vessels were armed alike from tlie ordnance on 
hand when the war broke out. Fort Sumter and other eastern forts 
had the heaviest and best ordnance. Forts Jackson and St. Phillip,, 
guarding the path to a great city and a strategic point, had only a 
gun apiece which would even carry a shot to the nearest gun-boat. 

The Confederate Secretary of War knew how the forts were 
armed and equipped, and yet he ordered one of the best guns away, 
instead of adding to the number. Even after Farragut had reached 
the bend the garrisons had to go to work and mount short-range 
guns to play on the channel. Indifference, jealousies, want of enter- 
prise, and a great flood, were enemies working day and night to 
assist the Federal fleet. 

When the fleet finally opened fire, the gun-boats took position, 
in plain view and maintained it. The guns in the forts could 
scarcely reach them with the heaviest charges the metal would bear,, 
while with ordinary charges the shot fell into the -water long 
before reaching the first of the vessels. The powder had become 
damp and heavy and burned slowly, and within an hour after the 
bombardment opened, the Confederates realized that they were 
helpless until the fleet should come nearer. Four guns were dis- 
mounted in Fort Jackson by the first day's fire, and fifteen hundred 
mortar shells fell within the area of the works. Nearly everything- 
that would burn had been reduced to ashes when the first day 
closed. 

During the night of the eighteenth, Farragut's scout-boats as- 



THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. 1U3 

ceiided tlie river to the raft and even beyond, and the nature and 
position of eacli obstruction was known. Federal scouts also pene- 
trated far enough into Fort Jackson to ascertain that the bombard- 
ment had inflicted great damage. Not a Confederate picket-boat 
was below the raft that nigiit. 

On the second morning the fire opened hot and was continued 
witli fury all day and nearly all night, and thi-ee out of every five 
mortar siiells plumped down within Fort Jackson. An oflicer told 
mo that witiiin two hours over one hundred shells fell upon the 
parade ground, plowing and digging it up in fearful shape. On 
tliis day seven or eight guns in the fort were dismounted and many 
of the gunners torn to pieces, and, as night came down, the over- 
worked and dispirited garrison liad but one consolation : during 
the afternoon three or four gun-boats had advanced within range of 
the fort, and in each instance had been driven back. 

If Fort Jackson could hold out until Farragut was ready to make 
his rush, its guns would give a good account of themselves. But 
could it stand the terrific pounding? At the close of the second 
day five thousand shot and shell had been flung at its walls or' 
dropped down behind them. Tiie wet earth was bed and bedding 
for the men, and their rations were raw meat and damaged bread. 
Federal historians have written of the glories of tliat movement. 
If there was glory for the one side there were hardship, suffering, 
self-sacrifice and heroism for the other. 

The third day of tiie bombardment was a counterpart of the 
others. Heavy weather sent the water up until it was knee-deep on 
the gun platforms in the lower battery at Fort Jackson, and the 
shoes of tiie gunners, soaked for days and days, fell off their feet. 
More guns were dismounted, more men killed, and the return fire 
of the fort went for nothing. 

Had New Orleans been properly prepared for what had come, 
the garrison at Jackson would have been increased or relieved. 
Had the naval force been imder brave management, it would liave 
attempted to create a diversion and run some risk of hearing the 
whistle of a shot. There were no troops to send down, and no 
vessels with the pluck to steam down and try the range of their 
guns. 

Tiie success of the Federal scout boats emboldened Farragut, and 
on this third night a gun-boat left his fleet, steamed up to the raft, 
and when discovered and chased away she had been at work for 
hours picking up the trailing ropes, cutting the chains and dragging 



104 THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. 

the linlks out of the channels. Tliree of the old schooners were 
actually dragged a distance of fifty feet and a broad channel 
opened, and this within talking distance of two forts and a fleet 
which was to blow Porter sky-high ! 

The fourth day it was the same terrible story told again — dis- 
abled gnns, suffering men, a I'ain of shells, a score of the garrison 
torn to fragments by the bursting of the dreaded missiles. Fort 
St. Phillip was escaping with an occasional shell, but Porter, with 
his bomb fleet, seemed determined to wipe out the very spot on 
which Fort Jackson rested. It would have taken three hundred 
men a week to repair damages ali-eady inflicted, and yet the Federal 
fire held steady and continued its destruction. 

On this day the iron-clad Louisiana, mounting sixteen guns and 
being complete except as to her steam power, dropped down to the 
raft to act as a battery. Had she taken position lower down, among 
the obstructions, she could have brought such a broadside on any ves- 
sel attempting to pass as would have sent a ship like the Hartford 
to the bottom at one discharge. But she selected a different post, 
and one apparently much safer. Not one of her gnns but would 
have easily carried to the bombarding fleet, but every one was 
silent. The Confederate navy was taking care of itself, and ex- 
pected the forts to do the same. 

For six days and nights there was a steady, galling, damaging 
fire, directed mainly at Fort Jackson. The fort was torn and rent 
and scorched and battered, but it was there yet and full of pluck. 

Movements in the Federal fleet showed that Farragut was pre- 
paring for a rush past the forts, and the Confederates were ready 
for the event — that is, orders were issued to make ready, but they 
were not carried out. The rams were acting independently of the 
river boats, and the Louisiana was acting independently of the rams, 
and all were seemingly indifferent to suggestions from the forts. 

General Duncan planned for the Louisiana to anchor in mid- 
channel at the raft. She had not only plenty of men aboard to 
work her guns, but at least one hundred and flfty I'iflemen. The 
rams and other vessels were to take positions to cover the channel 
on either side, using their stern guns to get a raking Are, and each 
having a supply of riflemen. Had this programme been carried 
out, is there a naval' officer alive who will believe that Farragut 
could have worked a single vessel past the fort i Such a fire could 
have been brought to bear as would have shattered wood and iron 
and sent whole crews to graves at the bottom of the mighty river. 



THE FALL OF NEW ORLEANS. 105 

But the Confederate navy had its own plans; and when, just 
before daybreak on the morning of April 24, Farragut's fleet 
advanced, there was nothing but the fire of the forts to be feared. 
Fire barges had been collected by the score to be sent among the 
Federal fleet as it advanced, but not one of them was cut loose. 
Not even a bonfire was lighted to show the vessels to the gunners 
at the forts. 

It was grand in Farragut to make the movement he did. He 
expected to meet the ju'ogi-amme suggested bj' General Duncan, and 
a man not born for war would not have dared push liis fleet up. 
"When he was fairly within range both forts opened upon him with 
every gun which would bear, and the Confederate vessels at least 
added to the din and excitement. Cold shot, hot shot, shell, grape 
and canister were hurled down upon the moving vessels, and in 
return they poured out such broadsides as would have made Nelson 
rub his hands with delight. 

In the darkness neither forts nor ships could be made out, and 
and the firing was all done by the flash of guns. The fleet steamed 
steadily and slowly along, each ship sounding as well as fighting, 
and before daylight broke thirteen of them had passed up the river 
clear of everything, and the fate of New Orleans was decided. Not 
a vessel could stand that fire after daylight gave the Confederates a 
chance to see what to fire at. Had the fire barges been sent down, 
Farragut might have been forced to try again. 

The forts were passed and cut off, and j'et they had not surren- 
dered. Indeed, it was not the intention to surrender while the 
guns could be worked. 

The many bitter pages of Confederate war history, made up of 
meager rations, ragged uniforms, long marches, and fighting at 
terrible odds, were rarely blotted by mutiny on land or sea. On 
the night of the twenty-seventh the garrisons in both forts revolted. 
They were cut off, isolated, discouraged, and felt that further resist- 
ance was a useless sacrifice. They gathered on the parade-ground 
in their wet and ragged clothes, scores of them shoeless, hundreds 
of them hatless — all of them suffering from exposure and want of 
food, and respectfully but firmly declared that the time had come 
to surrender the forts. The officers tried to drive them back to 
their stations, but without avail. They had fought gallantly and 
well, but, with a powerful enemy on either hand and New Orleans 
in possession of the Federals, of what hope was further resistance? 



#kr t^e ^utts. 




:ERE is the position. Tiiree guns of a divided battery 
are stationed on tlie crest of a liill to tlie left of an old 
orchard which surrounds an ancient farm house. The 
other three are on the right of the orchard, and tlie six 
pieces point at the meadows below — meadows broken 
by fences and hay stacks and lone trees, until they are lost in the 
edge of the woods a mile away. The eye ranges over the fields in 
front and sees uotliing to fear. The ear listens to sounds in rear 
of the battery and hears the ominous preparations for a bloody 
struggle. Cavali"y are swinging away to the right to get position, 
infantry are marching here and there, guns rushing along at a 
gallop, and aids Hy from point to point with orders. In ten min- 
utes a deep stillness begins to settle down over the left wing. 
The doves fly down from their cotes, the hens walk about in search 
of food, and the gray-headed farmer stands at the door and shades 
his eyes with his hand and looks curiously about him. Twenty 
minutes ago he sat rocking on the porcli, and the bees flew lazily 
in the June sunshine, the birds sang in the orchard, and afar down 
the meadows he heard the voices of his sons as they swung their 
scythes. 

Ah ! what's that ? Down there, where meadow and forest blend, 
we can see quick puffs of smoke, and here comes the sound of 
muskets. A blue cloud just begins to gather and rise down there 
when we catch sight of men. They are retreating back — coming 
towards the orchard. They fall back slowly, halting at every fence 
to tear it down, and to deliver a fire from behind the scattered 
rails. Now we see a long, thin line of skirmishers emerge from 
the woods and occupy the ground as the other line loses it. Back! 
back ! Forward ! forward ! and you might think it pantomime if 
men did not fall out of the lines here and there and drop heavily 
to the earth. 

[1061 



OVEE THE GUNS. 107 

There is a stir around us. The silence has been so deep that the 
jingle of a sabre or the rattle of a spur has made men nervous. 
Out from tiie edge of tlie woods, by the broad highway and across 
the peaceful fields, pours a host of armed men. Regiment after 
regiment, and line after line, sweeping forwards like mighty waves 
— now undulating, like tlie course of a serpent — now marching as 
steadily as the stride of Time. One — three — five — ten — you can- 
not count the flags. Silk and fringe, and gold and bunting stream 
over the heads of the men whose eyes are fixed on the orchard and 
the hillside. 

Tlie stir deepens. There is a tramping of feet; orders are given 
in quick, sharp tones, and three companies of infantry come up at 
a double-quick as a support and fling themselves down under the 
trees. Just a moment now to listen to the notes of the blue-birds 
and robins — to see the blue smoke creeping lazily from the farm 
house chimney — to note that the marching lines are almost within 
musket shot, and down over men, and guns and sabres and shot and 
shells, falls a shower of pink and white apple blossoms — emblems of 
purity and peace ! Aye ! a rough hand brushes them off — a caimon 
which a moment later is carrying a horrible death to a score of 
men. 

" Boom ! boom ! boom ! " 

Now the fight has begun. Men raise their voices from whispers 
to mad shouts. The smoke leaps up and stains the pure blossoms. 
The flame springs forward and scorches the green grass to yellow, 
and then burns it to the roots. 

Are the lines yet advancing ? 

You cannot see ten feet beyond the guns, but you can hear. 
Heavens ! but how they shout and scream, and shriek and curse ! 
The guns are using grape and canister, and the murderous missiles 
cut men into shreds and scatter flesh and blood over the living far 
behind. We are driving them back ! hip! hip! hur ! 

No! Here they are! Through the cloud of flame and smoke 
they rush at the guns — spectres of death bursting through and 
over the vapory barrier which has reared itself between the living 
and the dead. They shout in fury! They shriek in despair! 
They fight the very fiame which dissolves them, and they pass the 
muzzles of grim monsters. Here on this acre of ground — here 
beneath the apple blossoms — • is a hell on earth — a hell in which 
smoke and flame, and curse and wail, and blood and wounds and 
death are so mingled that those outside of it only hear one terrible 



108 



OVER THE GUNS. 



and appalling roar, as if some fierce beast had received its death- 
wound. 

Shoot to the right or left — over tlie guns or under them. 
Strike where you will, but strike to destroy ! Now the hell surges 
down even to the windows of the old farm-house — now back under 
the apple trees and beyond it. Dead men are under the ponderous 
wheels of the guns — mad devils are slashing and shooting across 
the barrels. No one seems to know friend from foe. Shoot ! 
Slash! Kill! And ! 

But the hell is dissolved. The smoke is lifting, shrieks and 
screams growing fainter, and twenty or thirty living men pull the 
bodies of the dead away from the guns and renew the slnughter 
against the lines marching across the meadow. Three hundred 
dead and wounded on the single acre ! Blood on the grass, blood 
on tire and spoke and gun. Arms hacked off — brains spattered 
against the trees — skulls cleft in twain, and bloody fingers clenched 
fast into blood-red grass ! 

They tell of war and glory. Look over this hell's-acre and find 
the latter ! 




CJe Cuniiiig f oiiit in ^IrCkllan's Can^, 




SPENT the whole day riding over the fields of New 
and Old Cold Harbors. McClellan's first great battle 
with Johnston brought on his second with Lee. He 
fought Johnston at Fair Oaks in the last dajs of Maj' — 
he confronted Lee at the Harbors in the last days of 
June. It is a country of farms and forests, and hills and plains. 
Atitumn was dropping its ripe apples on the half-leveled breast- 
works erected twenty years ago, and the wild grapevines covered 
many a scar left on the trees by ball and bullet. Here are the swamps 
in which the dead and wounded were sucked slowly down by the 
treacherous ooze as shot and shell flew above them — here the slopes 
and fields across which death i-ushed with bloody hands to claim his 
victims by the thousand. At the top of this hill, where Federal 
caimon thundered destruction, a flock of sheep crop at the short, 
dry herbage. Down there where the little creek steals softly under 
the green banks and noisily rushes over the pebbles, the dead lay in 
heaps and the wounded crept to the stream in such numbers that 
the waters were dammed back and eddies of blood went circling 
round. Here, behind Powhite Creek, where Porter was massed, a 
school-boy would tell you that infantry would have a terrible advan- 
tage. All along this ridge is a grand sweep for cannon, and in the 
ravines below a whole division can find safe cover. Here are scars 
to make you wonder. Great limbs lopped off — trees cut in two — 
rocks broken and shattered — scars of bullets on every trunk and 
limb which was growing here on that June day. It is the only 
other spot in the world resembling the place at Port Republic where 
the Federal guns were massed, and over which men fought and died 
like demons. There were thickets and jungles in the path as battle- 
lines moved that day. They are here yet. As I sit on the old 
earth-works along the Gaines' Mill road to smoke a cigar at noonday, 
down in those dark swamps the owls scold each other and the frogs 
call out as if evening had come. You would wonder that a farmer's 

I If 91 



110 THE TURNING POINT IN JIcCLELLAn's CAKEEE. 

horse conld draw a cart over tliese fields, and jet it was here that 
batteries came into jiosition at a gallop — whole divisions charged — 
thousands of men marched, fougiit and died. War may seek the 
green meadow or the dark jungle — the hill-top or the dense forest. 

McClellan had been warned of the ajjproaching hurricane. His 
cavalry pickets had been driven in from the left bank of the Cliick- 
ahoniiny ; Meadow Bridge had been seized by the enemy ; the green 
grass at Beaver Dam had been wet with blood ; Jackson was reach- 
ing out beyond tlie Federal flank. The bell had tolled its warning 
— a warning which rose on the air above the shrieks of the wounded 
and the roar of musketry and cannon. The warning was : 

" Fall back — shorten your lines — mass your artillery on the ridges 
— hide your infantry in the ravines." 

McClellan had obeyed. Jackson had struck him like a thunder- 
bolt, but he was not paralyzed. With a grim coolness he issued the 
orders which massed men and cannon where they could not be 
flanked. 

Down tliis winding road leading past the Mill the Federal picket 
boiled their coffee and munclied their liard-tack at noon of the 
twenty-seventh of June, with the birds singing in the trees and the 
air filled with the lazy hum of perfect peace. Jackson's cannon 
sounded in the distance, but here all was quietness and peace. The 
noonday meal is scarcely finished when strange figures appear in the 
road — in the fields — in the woods. It is the advance of A. P. Hill. 
In thirty seconds the peace is broken by the pop of musketry and 
the cheers of men. The Federal picket gives way, fighting at 
every step, and sounding the alarm — the Confederates push on with 
a confidence which proves that battle-lines are following. From 
the McGhee iiouse to Powhite swamp the alarm runs up and down 
the Federal lines — Lee is attacking I 

Here on this ridge was the artillery. The Federal line ran to the 
right to that farm-house half-hidden among the cherry trees — to the 
left to tliat bluff covered with trees and under-growth, while cavalry 
were massed on either flank. Along the base of the ridge is a 
ravine — the bed of a crack now dry. A division of infantry occu- 
pied the ravine. Half-way up the ridge I can still trace an old 
breastwork of logs. Behind this defense was a second line of 
infantry. On the crest of the ridge I can find tlie old rifle-pits 
and tlie breastworks thrown up for artillerj'. On that June day the 
ground in front of this ridge was mostly clear. Here and there 
was a thicket — here a glade — there a swamp — here a few acres of 



THE TUENINa POINT IN McCLELLAN's CAEEEE. Ill 

forest — there five acres of open ground. To reach the ridge every 
Confederate must make a fair target of himself. He must meet the 
terrible fire of three lines of infantry rising one above the other, 
and the cannon beyond will use nothing but grape and canister. It 
is a stronger position than Lee had at Fredericksburg — than Meade 
had at Gettysbui'g — than McClellan had elsewhere in his campaigns. 
Civil engineers have said it was the strongest position of the whole 
war. 

A. P. Hill had tlie dash of Jackson in striking a swift blow. 
Hardly waiting to form a line of battle, he pushed his troops to the 
front in assault. There was no spirit of recklessness in that move. 
He knew the Federal position and its terrible strength. It could not 
be flanked. Could it be carried by direct assault ? The way to answer 
that query was to advance. There was no halting to parry and 
thrust and look for a weak link in the chain. Gathering his division 
in hand Hill flung it square at the ridge. Twelve thousand Con- 
federates, two thousand of whom had never seen a Federal soldier, 
moved as one man — moved as tlie tornado wliieh levels forests and 
blots out landmarks. The moment that gray mass swings into view 
twenty thousand muskets open fire — fifty pieces of cannon shake 
the earth and send their echoes into Richmond and beyond. 

Can flesh and blood stand such a fire ? The air screams with its 
burdens of death, and the awful roar sways the tree-tops as in an 
autumn gale. There is a rush of feet — a cheer — and out from under 
the smoke-cloud that gray division dashes into the ravine — dashes 
up the ridge and over the logs — springs to the very crest and is 
among the guns. Neither storms of bullets nor walls of bayonets had 
checked it. It was only when the living wave had reached the crest 
and actually captured some of the guns that the surprised Federals 
rallied. The recklessness — the cold blooded abandon of that rush 
had so amazed the defense that many men stood without firing a 
shot. 

Cheers of victory and shouts of defiance rose above the trees and 
floated down to Longstreet's men in reserve, but the sound died 
away in a wail. The Federal arm was uplifted — it swept througii 
the air, and almost in a moment that gray division was hurled back 
to its starting point — shattered — limping — blood-stained — and a 
fifth of its number lying dead behind it. It was one of the most 
gallant dashes of any war — it was a repulse so bloody that men 
shuddered at the sight. It was the men under Gregg who led that 



'&' 



112 THE TURNING POINT IN MoCLKLLAn's CAKEKE. 

assault — it was the men under Morell and Sykes who hurled them 
back. 

The repulse was not enough. As the Confederates retired they 
were followed by the Federals with a rush which notliing could 
check for nearly half a mile. Back, back, back, and for a time it 
looked as if Hill would be annihilated. It seemed beyond human 
power to reorganize those shattered regiments, but it was accom- 
plished, and Hill stood up and took his pounding like the brave 
man and stubborn fighter. 

At Groveton Pope hurled Kearnej" at Jackson to pierce his 
army. Kearney could fall back and endanger nothing. Hill had 
hurled himself at the center of the Federal position and been 
repulsed. If driven too far Longstreet would be taken in tiank — 
Jackson's advance checked. Thus it was that when the great wave 
of blue had rolled over swamps and thickets and woods and fields 
until its impetus was weakened, it suddenly found Hill again in 
battle-line, with feet firmly 2>lanted. For an hour the firing was 
terrific and murderous, but Hill would not budge a foot. By 
twos — by fives — by dozens, his men went down where they stood, 
but those unhurt held their lines against every assault. 

The Confederate army was waiting for the arrival of Jackson, 
who had been recalled from a move on the Federal flank. He wafS 
coming, but his advance found a foe at every step. Hill would be 
wiped out in another hour unless relieved. Longsti'eet was ready 
to I'elieve him, not with fresh troops, but by making an attack on 
the Federal position higher up — .squarely against Morell's division. 
He swept forward like a mighty wind, coming so suddenly against 
the Federal position that the scene of Hill's assault was re-enacted. 
At the first rush Anderson's and Pickett's brigades were carried 
over the lines of blue and right among the smoking cannon. For 
ten minutes that rocky crest was a scene of dreadful carnage. Men 
used the bayonet — they clinched with bare hands — gunners wielded 
their rannners — cannon were discharged Mdth the foe touching the 
muzzles. The mighty wind liad struck a stone wall. The wall 
stood firm. Ten minutes of that awful fighting was enough for 
the Confederates, and a strong volley lifted them off their feet and 
hurled them back. 

Warren's troops faced to the northwest, its left flank near the 
road running down across Powhite Ci'eek to Gaines' Mill and con. 
necting with Griffin's right. A part of Longstreet's men advanced 
on this highway as the fight opened, but never a man lived to reach 



THE TUENING POINT LN McCLELLAn's CABEEK. 113 

it. A Federal battery, with infantry supports lying in the dry 
roadside ditclies, checked every dash. It might well have been 
said of the regiments puslied at this battery that every man had 
lost all consciousness of fear. As tliey swung out of a belt of forest 
they dressed their lines in the face of grape, canister and bullets, 
whicli cumbered the ground with dead before a man had advanced. 
When the order came tiiey rushed forward with heads down, as if 
the shower of death was a snow storm. Over the open ground — 
across the bit of marsh — but no farther. Death met them there. 
It tore oif legs and arms — it left headless bodies — it mangled 
human beings beyond recognition — it blotted bodies off the face of 
the earth, leaving only a horrible smirch of bloody atoms to tell 
that they had been there. Again and again these charges were 
made, but they only added to tlie awful sights in the open held over 
which the Federal torrent of death swept unchecked. For an hour 
Longstreet thundered at Morell and Hill at Sykes, and then all of a 
sudden there came a dread silence. As if the voice of some man 
rising above the crash of fifty thousand muskets and the roar of 
fifty cannon had comnuinded it, there was almost absolute silence. 
It was a time for the bravest to tremble. Nothing is so grim in 
war as a sudden silence falling upon a field of battle. Death is 
gathering its bloody robes clear of the ground to strike a new 
blow. Men refill their cartridge boxes — lines are moved — the 
artillery wheeled about — bloodshot eyes peer into the woods and 
over the fields. What meant that silence there ? 

"Jackson is here!" A shout rose on Hill's left and ran along 
the lines to Longstreet's right. Jackson had come up from Old 
Cold Harbor, D. H. Hill on his left, Ewell on his right. Each line 
was now almost a half-circle, but Jackson had scarcely come into 
position on the left before Slocum came up to strengthen the Fed-, 
eral right. Mid-afternoon had passed. The thick spots of forest 
began to cast dark shadows. The whole Confederate array was up — 
McClellan could not give Poi'ter another man. If he could not 
hold his ground with what he had, it was destruction to the entire 
Federal position before Richmond which had been reached at such a 
cost of blood and treasure. The cheers for Jackson subsided, and then 
the woods were so still that men looked at each other in wonder. 

From the Gaines' Mill Road clear around to Old Cold Harbor a 
wave suddenly rises up and sweeps forward. The Federals hear it 
as it starts. It is a roar in which the voices of men — the tramp 
of feet — the rumble of wheels and the gallop of horses are com- 

Vol. I. -8 



114 TUB TUKNING POINT IN McCLELLAn's CAKEEE. 

billed. Jackson's whole corps, with the exception of the Stonewall 
Brigade, is advancing. Tiie roar increases — tlie tramp comes nearer, 
and almost at the same instant thirty tliousand streams of fire leap 
forward and thirty thousand muskets crasli into tlie same echo. 
Hood's Texans rush forward like a thunderbolt, but they are checked 
by a tire so rapid and destructive that men fall flat to escape it. 
Hill seeks to overlap Buchanan's right tlank, but a swamp blocks 
his path, and in ten minutes he is not even able to hold his ground. 
Hood, too, is being pressed slowly back, when up thunders a score 
of Confederate guns to his relief, and now it is a death grapple 
all along the line. The roar of a dozen Niagaras would have been 
drowned in that crash of battle. Men do not hear; if they see 
the line moving to the right or left, they move with it. They 
advance — fall back — load and fire. The Confederate shot and shell 
cut off whole tree-tops — sever trunks of trees — send great rocks 
whirling through the air. Logs and limbs are torn out of the 
breastworks and become agents of destruction. A shell bursts 
where a score of men are crowded together, and when the smoke 
lifts the spot is bare of life. 

Hill's rush when first attacking was to be outdone. After the 
terrible cannonade had lasted half an hour, the Stonewall Brigade 
was advanced to reinforce D. H. Hill on the left. In half an hour 
more the sun would be down. If the Federals could hold the line 
an hour more they could hold it forever. The roar of cannon died 
away all at once, and the whole Confederate army advanced. 
Hood's brigade of Texans formed behind a thicket, through which 
shot and shell from the Federal guns were mowing great, wide 
swaths. As they moved out they rushed. Grape and canister were 
exchanged for shot and shell, but still the lines advanced, over 
ground into which men sank to the knees — over a deep raviiie — over 
rocks and through thickets — death mowing them down at every 
step, and then they rushed. It was not a rush of men, but of devils. 
Their screams rose above the crash of musketry, and even as they 
rushed they fixed bayonets. Not a Federal moved out of the path 
of that advance. It struck the blue lines and melted them as liquid 
iron would melt snow. It cut a swath into the Federal position just 
its width, reaching from ravine to the Parrott guns on the crest. 

It was just at sundown. Already the sombre sliadows of 
approaching night were settling down upon hill and valley. The 
flash of every musket could now be seen — the red flames from the 
cannon made the whole field blaze. Slocum had been put in across 



THE TUENLNG POINT IN McCLKLLAn's CAKEEK. 115 

the liigliway which led to Gaines' Mill in one direction and towards 
Old Cold Harbor in the other. It was between Warren and Lovell 
that the Texans rushed. It seemed as if no body of men could 
live through such a hurricane of death. The fire of at least eight 
thousand muskets and twenty pieces of artillery was concentrated 
on that one brigade leading the rush, but it came on, and on, and on, 
and it wedged itself in the Union lines and remained there. For 
ten minutes a mob of ten tliousand men whirled round and round 
in that eddy of death, and then the Federals gave way — slowly, 
foot by foot, and fighting so desperately and dying so gallantly "that 
every Confederate historian has lifted his hat to the dead and spoken 
in praise of the living. 

Wiien the Union lines began to fall back the Second New Jersey 
and Eleventh Pennsylvania refused to move. They were fighting 
desperately on flanks and front with McLaw's Te.xans, and though 
exposed to a merciless fire their lines could not be broken. Unable 
to break their front, the Confederates flanked them, and yet they 
fought on. Aye ! and it is Confederates who tell it, too, those 
gallant men continued the fight after they were entirely sur- 
rounded; and their arms were only laid down when the Confed- 
erates, awed at such bravery, ceased flring. 

Wlien it was seen that the Federal lines were breaking some one 
ordered a charge of cavalry on D. II. Hill's flank. Five hundred of 
the regular cavalry massed and charged into the jaws of death. 
They were swallowed up as a drop of water sinks into the dry earth 
— a useless sacriflce, and yet a forlorn hope. 

Night came down to still the boom of cannon and the crash of 
musketry — to hide the blood-stained trees and stones and grass— to 
give brief rest to men with blood-shot eyes and hoarse voices and 
exiiausted bodies. Then, from hillside and ravine — from field and 
swamp — from thicket and open came the wails and groans of the 
wounded. Men crawled hero and there — men struggled up to fall 
and scream out with new agony — they dragged themselves over the 
bloody ground to lap the red waters of the creek and gain strength 
for another shout for succor. 

And there were thousands who neither cried out nor moved. As 
they fell and died so they lay, the soft dew of a summer's night 
falling upon white faces which war's glory would lighten no more. 

McClellan's right was beaten. He must fall back — he must have 
more than the sagacity of a Napoleon to bring that army to the 
James as a body. 



Cljaiige of i'ds^. 




'HE result at Gaines' Mill made the Federal situation 
extremely critical. Lee not only had Johnston's old 
army splendidly in hand, but Jackson's forces had been 
added to swell the number. Lee was not only moving 
on the short line, but had assumed the otl'ensive. 

McClellan has been viiitied and maligned without stint because 
he did not pursue Johnston with more speed after tlie light at 
Williamsburg. A general may order his army to move, but Provi- 
dence must be consulted. Three hours' rain on the Peninsula 
meant highways without bottoms, and a condition of affairs which 
neither orders nor proclamations could better. 

He has been grossly insulted by various Federal historians 
because he threw a portion of his army across the Chickahominy 
to be attacked at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks. Does an army move 
in a body or by portions ? 

He has been fiercely attacked because he did not follow up the 
Confederates as they sullenly retreated from those battle fields 
towards Richmond. After a battle there is work to be done. 
Commands which have even been held in reserve all day are more 
or less disorganized. At the front the cartridge boxes and caissons 
are empty, and the men who have fought for eight or ten hours 
must have food, if not rest. And it must not be argued that the 
columns of Longstreet, PInger and Smith left the ground in a 
panic. When they drew off it was after having had the whole 
day in which to reorganize. They fell back slowly and in good 
order, and a pursuit over country roads knee-deep in mud wotild 
have been senseless and dangerous. 

He has been placed in a false light because his movements 
between Fair Oaks and Richmond were not more rapid. Lee had 
the inner line; he was intrenched; he was watching for a chance 
to strike a blow. He had his army in hand, and provisions and 
ammunition at his back. McClellan's army was strung out ; he 

[iifi] 



CHANGE OF BASE. 117 

had the long line ; as a corps moved it had to prepare itself against 
a sudden onshuiglit by tiie vigilant Confederates. He had every- 
thing in the way of provisions and forage to bring up, and he had 
a thousand unforeseen difficulties to contend with and overcome. 

And the historian who has asserted that Richmond was in a 
tremble and ready to be evacuated at the first sign of a vigorous 
movement en masse by the Federal army had not one grain of 
trutli for the assertion. Johnston realized that McClellan should 
have two men to his one to make anything like a successful strug- 
gle for the prize. Lee was not troubled for a moment as to the 
result if he was attacked. After Jackson left the Shenandoah 
Valley to join forces, McClellan's fate, unless heavily reinforced, 
was as good as decided. 

The battle of Gaines' Mill was the climax to McClellan's anxie- 
ties. Before that three courses were open to him. Jackson was 
already on his flank, and his base of su]iplies was tineatened. He 
could concentrate either nortli or soutli of the Chickahominy and 
give battle to Lee — that is if Lee would attack him on the ground 
he selected. He could mass and j^ush for Richmond, hoping to 
find it almost defenseless, or he could call in his right wing and 
retreat to the James. Tlie slanderers would not have been satisfied 
had he accepted eitlier of the first two courses instead of the la.st. 

Richmond was not left defenseless. McClellan's advance would 
have been promptly resisted from the first movement, and the 
heads of his columns could not have forced their way two miles 
before Lee and Jackson would have been heard from on his 
flanks. 

Had he concentrated to figlit Lee, would tlie latter have felt 
obliged to attack him in the position thus selected? 

A retreat to the James was decided on. The beginning of this 
movement brought on the battle of Gaines' Mill, altliough Lee did 
not yet suspect tliat the Federal army was intending to slip away. 
To get his stoi-es away McClellan had to throw a strong force along 
the west side of White Oak Swamp, to hold every highway by 
which Lee might advance on Savage's Station, and these were all 
in position by the night of June twenty-eight. As soon as the two 
or three nari'ow and bottomless highways were clear of marching 
troops tlie stores began to move. These included heavy guns, 
forage, provisions, and a large drove of cattle, and the roads were 
packed and confusion' I'eigned supreme. Do the best he could, 
McClellan had to leave more or less behind, and that it might be 



118 CHANGE OF BASE. 

of no benefit to the Confederates, what would burn was given to 
tlie flames and tlie rest destroyed. 

Having cut loose from the White House, his base of supplies, 
the Federal commander ordered everything at that point destroyed, 
and the sacrifice amounted to tens of thousands of dollai-s. His 
movements puzzled Lee to a certain extent. But for this he might 
have been broken at any point. Wiiile McClellan sliowed a bold, 
front everywhei-e, it was but sti-ategy to secure a few hours more 
time. It was only on the night of the twenty-eiglith that Lee dis- 
covered he had been deceived. McClellan was neither prepared 
to give battle nor to retreat down the Peninsula, but was making 
for the James and a new base. He had formed his lines at Savage 
Station to hold the ground until his trains could reach a point of 
safety. They were coming up and swinging into position all day 
and all night of the twenty-eighth, and on the morning of the 
twenty-ninth were ready. Trains and stores were being pushed 
rapidly towards the James, but they must be covered. 

There was no transportation for the sick and wounded in hospi- 
tal ai-ound Savage Station. An army on the retreat is sullen — 
anxious — seMsh. An army in pursuit is exultant — vindictive — 
vengeful. The helpless must be left behind, as the Russian throws- 
away his children to appease the appetites of the pursuing wolves. 

McClellan, smarting and indignant over defeat wliich he firmly 
believed had been brought about through the meddling of the 
administration with his original 2:)lans, and the half-hearted manner 
in which his subsequent movements had been assisted, saw his rear- 
guard ready for battle and then dispatched to the Secretary of 
War : 

Had I twenty thousand, or even ten thousand fresh troops to tise to maneu- 
ver, I could take Richmond; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall be glad 
to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. I have lost 
this battle (Gaines' Mill), because my force was too small. I ajiain repeat that I 
am not responsible for this, and I say it with the earnestness of a general who 
feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed. 
I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that 
the government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now the game 
is lost. If I save this army now I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you 
or any other person in Washington ! You have done your best to sacrifice this 
army I 

Such a dispatch could only have come from a soldier wlio had 
every confidence that he was in the right, and that the verdict of 
the country would be in his favor. 



CHAMGE OF BASK. 



119 



And us the June sun lifted itself into the Heavens and poured 
ills warm rays down into the tangled thiclcets and dark woods and 
miasmatic swamps around Savage's Station, tlie Federal lines 
watched and waited. Lee was on the trail now. Pie liad called in 
his comiuauds and was sweeping down ou his prey. 




Cohrarir tlje |umes. 




^EE was advancing in three columns — Jackson striking 
tlie Federal rear-guard, Longstreet and Hill pushing 
along tiie Williamsburg road, Magruder and Huger 
closing in by the Newmarket highway. 

Ten days previously the Federal army was an Octo- 
pus, reaching out long arms which drew blood in every direction. 
On that morning of the twenty-ninth it was a Fugitive — a Fugi- 
tive but not a coward. Let it alone and it would grant everything; 
press it too closely and it would turn and draw blood. 

When the commands of Sumner, Franklin, and Heintzelman 
were in position at Savage's Station ^to give Jackson a check, 
McClellan pushed ahead Lo prepare for other contingencies. Two 
other armies were preparing to strike him territie blows before 
he reached the James, and he must provide for the peril. 

An hour after sunrise Magruder's advance encountered Sumner's 
front and was whirled back, and the fighting from that time 
until afternoon, when the whole Confederate command was up, was 
confined to the picket lines. About mid-afternoon the storm 
broke. Massed in solid lines of battle, and cheering as they 
stepped out, the Confederates broke cover and rolled up against 
the Federal position. Blow after blow was rained down upon the 
shield iield up by that rear-guard of a retreating army, but it was 
like a rock. 

Now the hammer falls upon Hancock, holding the woods on the 
extreme right — now upon Sumner's center, held by Richardson — 
now on SeJgewick, way down on the left, and riding about as if 
bullets could not kill ; but each and every blow was returned with 
mighty strength. Blood flowed under the green trees — blood 
stained the velvet grass in the open fields — blood mingled with the 
dark and poisonous waters of the swamps, but the blue lines would 
not be driven. They were there as the sun came up ; they were 
still there, but terribly thinned, as the sun went down. As night 

[320] 



TOWAiJD THE JAMES. 121 

came on and the Tiger drew back from the flame and smoke to 
lick his wounds, the Fugitive began his further retreat towards the 
James. Seven thousand dead and wounded men in blue and gray 
held the field of battle. 

Magruder had been temporarily checked, but the two other Con- 
federate armies were thirsting for blood. On the morning of the 
thirtieth McClellan realized that he could not advance beyond the 
Charles City Cross Roads without stopping to give battle. He 
must here wrestle with Longstreet and A. P. Hill. Seeing the 
storm gathering to sweep liiin away, McClellan turned at bay to 
draw blood. He had failed to reach Richmond — he had been 
obliged to plan a retreat — but he was not In-oken. In his retreat 
he would prove to the world that he had the skill of a great general 
and the courage of a hero. 

His disposition to meet this second attack on his army placed 
McCall's division on the right, Slocum on the left, and Kearney in 
tiie center, each well supplied with artillery, and a reserve of several 
brigades of infantry held in hand to bo thrown at any imperilled 
point. The ground was field and forest and undergrowth, and the 
line of battle as finally formed, had a front like the windings of a 
serpent. 

The forenoon passed with lieavy skirmishing, and it was not until 
two o'clock in the afternoon that Longstreet was ready. Then he 
hurled ten thousand men down upon McCall's weak division, and 
for two houi's he was enveloped in flame and smoke and harried by 
a terrible shower of shot and shell. But he could not be driven. 
He was there to hold the right, and there ho would die. Just 
before sundown he was breasted back for a quarter of a mile, but 
he gave up the ground foot by foot and finally secured a new line. 
It was in this movement that he lost a battery by a charge, and two 
more from being abandoned outright by their cowardly companies. 

After striking McCall the attack rolled down the line upon 
Kearney. He had open ground on most of his front, and his bat- 
teries were ready with their deadliest missiles. As the gray lines 
appeared within range they were opened on with a fire wliich 
seemed to sweep the front clear of every blade of gi-ass, but with 
their faces towards the guns the Confederates kept closing up the 
terrible gaps and sweeping forward. Shell was changed fur grape 
and canister, and now the front was a wall of flame which rose far 
above the heads of the artillerists. Through this wall burst the 
lines of gray — right up to the muzzles of the death-dealing guns — 



122 TOWAED THE JAMES. 

but then to encounter the close and destructive fire of the supports 
and be forced to retreat. 

Tlii'ce different times during the afternoon a fresh force massed 
on Kearney — eacli time to advance across the open ground to the 
muzzles of his batteries — each time to be sent back broken, rent, 
and bleeding. 

It was the same along the front of evei'y Federal coniinand — a 
desperate attempt to find a gap through which to pour — a desperate 
resolve to prevent. When night came Longstreet and Hill were 
bafiled. Magruder was following the Fugitive, but not too closely, 
and Franklin had struck Jackson in the face at White Oak Bridge. 
Under cover of darkness the Fugitive continued his retreat towards- 
the James, and again the dead and wounded were counted by 
thousands. 

Tiie hour of peril to McCall came when his two German batter- 
ies — Knierim's and Diedrich's — failed him. As the Confederates 
broke cover for a charge every gun in these batteries was rushed to 
the rear In a panic and without excuse. Returned to the front 
again, and receiving the sneers and hisses of the infantiy as they 
came up, it was not a quarter of an hour before every piece was 
abandoned as it stood, and such as were saved were hauled away by 
the infantry. As the artillerists broke for the rear they cut their 
horses loose and mounted them, and in dashing through the infantry 
they caused an excitement which for a moment threatened a panic. 

Randol's battery had been particularly aggressive, and was so 
continuously well served that the Confederates determined to cap- 
ture it at any cost. Instead of a line of battle advancing upon it, 
two Virginia regiments were massed in the shape of a " V," the 
point being toward the battery. The men were ordered to advance 
on a run and with arms at a trail and not to halt to fire a single shot. 

With a wild yell the " V " left cover and dashed forward, and 
the tire of the entire battery was at once concentrated. Grape and 
canister tore through the wedge-shaped command, and its point was 
shattered again and again, but nothing could check its momentum. 
It came straight at the battery — it pushed between the guns — 
it swept the field clear and cheered as it dragged away the blood- 
spattered cannon. 

Night had come, and the Fugitive — anxious — wounded — bleed- 
ing, but undefeated, pressed on. Malvern Hill was the beacon light 
held out to him as the black clouds gathered overhead and the 
darkness increased the difficulties of the march. 

The Tiscer was following — irrim — tliirsting — confident. 



C|e %ot mX^m PcClellan €xu^ "fait" 




)jTANDING in the front door of the old brick Malvern 
House you see Turkey Bend in the James River to 
the south. It is two miles away, over ravine, hill 
and thicket, and yet it seems almost at your feet. In 
that bend lay the gun-boats which helped save Mc- 
Clellan's army. 

Thirty steps in rear of the house is a natural sink, the beginning 
of a deep ravine which runs into Deep Bottom. The bottom of 
this sink is a solid bed of marl. In taking out marl they have taken 
out fifty cannon-balls and unexploded shells, and there are more to 
be discovered. The trees are broken and splintered, and a thousand 
bullets have been picked up along the steep sides. 

To the southeast, on a clear day, the eye can discern Harrison's 
Landing, which was McClellan's haven of safety. To the northwest 
is the Crews farm, across which the Confederates surged as they 
came to the attack, and on which blood poured out until the quiver- 
ing earth would drink no more. To the south and west is forest — 
below me is the road leading to Richmond by way of Varuna 
Grove. Between the hill and the road, where Porter was posted in 
reserve that day, is a field of ripened corn. To the right of this 
was a meadow. To-day it is a tangled wilderness of shrubs and 
vines. 

The old brick house has a story of its own. Four hundred and 
thirty-nine grape-shot and bullets hit the bricks that day, and 
thirteen cannon-balls left marks which only the trowel can efface. 
Here in the yard, under the shade trees, the surgeons worked, and 
as they plied saw and knife great branches fell upon them from 
the tree tops. Shell and ball and bullet are lying in the tangled 
grass, and the rank weeds hide rusting swords and broken bayonets. 

Malvern Hill is a singular spot. It is an almost level plateau of 
ground nearly two miles long and about a mile wide. On the river 
side the banks are too steep for soldiers to climb. In front, or 

[183] 



124 THE SPOT WHEEE McCLELLAN CRIED "HALT." 

towards Richmond, the ground slopes away like a lawn, and a creek 
winds in and out and furnishes with its banks natural cover for ten 
thousand men. McClellan had fought the battles of Fair Oaks, 
Williamsburg, Gaines' Mill, Peach Orchard and Savage Station, and 
here was his last stand. 

And so the retreating Federal army at last reached Malvern Hill. 
Every day had witnessed a bloody battle, and every night a long 
march. McClellan had been sacrificed, but he was doing what 
scarce another general in the world had ever done — winning victories 
in a retreat. Each battle was begun by the Confederates with the 
feeling that the Federal army would be cut to pieces and captured. 
Each battle ended in a victory for the men in blue. If McClellan 
reached City Point his army was saved. Therefore, as he reached 
Malvern Hill on his retreat, the Confederates made one last, des- 
perate effort to crush him. And, therefore, too, as McClellan reached 
that grand battle ground, he determined that the foe which had so 
exultantly pursued his trail should receive a bloodier check than 
had yet been given his legions. 

There were four roads by which the Confederates could pour 
their troops against McClellan's left. Sixty cannon were massed 
to strengthen this flank. On the crest on which forty of those 
guns bellowed thunder that day, a farmer's boy is dragging in fall 
wheat. Further to the left where the other twenty added their 
flame and smoke, there is a tangle of weed and briar and brush. 
As McClellan sat on his horse that day on this crest his eye could 
take in liis whole semi-circle of battle and count three hundred 
cannon with their black muzzles to the foe. 

Down under the crest of this hill, behind knolls and ridges and 
the banks of the creek, were four brigades of Federals. Before 
them were the fields and meadows of the Crews farm. Behind 
these fields were the dark pine woods in which the Confederates 
were massing. Above these men lying in ambush were the sixty 
cannon, each gun having a plunging fire on the plain. All night 
long Sykes, and Morell, and Couch, and Hooker, and Kearney and 
a dozen other heroes had been busy, and as morning came little 
further was needed. A few guns were shifted, lines dressed, gaps 
filled, and in the full glory of the glorious summer morning the 
men waited for the fury of the storm to burst. 

A death-like silence fell upon the army as it waited. Here for 
the first time since tlie sudden and overwhelming attack in the 
swamps of the Chickahominy there was exultation in the hearts of 



THE SPOT WHERE McCLELLAN CRIED " HALT." 125 

the men as they stood in battle line. The humblest soldier could see 
that attack meant defeat, no matter what the force. Couch's division 
was hiding at the foot of the plateau, eager for the fight to open. 
Further up were the grim cannon. Beyond these the blue lines 
and the drooping flags. Hunted and hounded, the Fugitive had 
turned at bay. Betrayed and abandoned, he was going to prove 
himself more than a match for the hosts of Lee, Jackson and 
Magruder. 

To the right of the Crews farm, on the fields hidden by rows of 
shrubbery, the Confederate infantry marched and massed until the 
earth trembled. To the left, under the dark pines, legions of men 
in gray stood waiting. From the pine-bordered Varuna Grove road 
other legions debouched into the forest and marched by the fiank 
until they formed in battle line across the green fields which were 
drinking in the summer sunshine. All the morning lines of gray 
marched to the right or left, batteries wheeled slowly into position, 
and that ominons silence whicli means more than murder held the 
air and the earth in its grasp. 

A sudden tremor quickly ran along tlie lines of blue. The Con- 
federate skirmishers came out of the pines in a long, thin line, and 
boldly advanced into the fields. They can count two hundred of the 
Federal cannon on the plateau, and they can see the blue lines massed 
for battle, but they are coming to feel the way across the fields — to 
see what that fringe of bushes conceals — to discover what is hidden 
behind the ridges. They skulk — they dodge about — they creep and 
crawl over the grass like snakes. It is a mere handful — routed and 
sent flying by one volley from Couch's advance line. The Confed- 
erates now understand what is before them, and they wait for other 
brigades and divisions to come up and swing into line. Every fifth 
man in those gray lines will be a corpse before this July sun goes 
down. 

An hour after noon the storm bursts. Out from those dark pine 
woods sweeps a double line of battle, banners rippling, muskets 
gleaming, and lines dressed as if on parade. In ten seconds more 
than two hundred cannon, each piece having a clear range, open on 
the moving lines with shot, shell, aTid canister. Where the shells 
burst a gap fifty feet wide is opened in the lines. Where grape and 
shot and canister tear through, men are piled three deep. Malvern 
Hill quivered from center to circumference under that terrible roar 
of artillery, and yet those gray lines came on. Behind them the 
fields were strewn with corpses, but the living wall rolled on and on 



126 THE SPOT WHEKE McCLELLAN CEIED " HALT." 

as if no power on earth could stop it. The same steady tramp, 
tramp — no faster, no slower, and men who looked at them under 
the smoke-cloud wondered if they were soldiers of Hesli and blood. 

Now, when tlie lines are only a stone's throw from the men lying 
behind the creek, a whole division springs up at the word, muskets 
are brought to an "aim," and a sheet of fire a mile long leaps across 
the narrow space and withers and scorches and shrivels whole brig- 
ades. It is one grand terrible crash — one leaping, hissing billow of 
flame — one furious shriek and scream of ten thousand bullets seek- 
ing for prey, and the ambushed tigers along the creek and the grim 
guns on the hill have no further work to do. Of all that grand line 
of battle a few poor hundreds hobble back beneath the shelter of 
the woods. From creek to the forest the grass is no longer green. 
It is gray with the dead — it is red with the blood of men torn to 
fragments. Men never made a more gallant advance — lines never 
met with a bloodier repulse. Slowly the blue cloud lifted and 
floated away over the thick forest towards Harrison's Landing, and 
the guns were still. 

Tlie Federal signal-men on Malvern Hill now gave the gun-boats 
in Turkey Bend the range and location of the Confederate right, 
and a dozen monster guns suddenly opened fire. Great shells rose 
with terrible whiri', sailed over the heads of Porter's men, and fell 
among the pines and exploded with a crash which was heard miles 
away. Branches as thick as a man's body and fifty feet long 
crashed down on the massing Confederates or were wliiiled about 
like straws; and pines which had braved the hurricane and the light- 
ning flash for half a century were splintered and riven and dashed 
to earth at a blow. Under the cover of the woods — amidst the 
awful explosions and the fearful crashes, the Confederates reformed 
and moved out again. 

The instant those gray lines were clear of the forest, Malvern Hill 
shook and trembled again with the roar of cannon, and the gun- 
boats redoubled their fire. Shot and shell, and grape-shot and can- 
ister whistled and screamed until there was one awful and continu- 
ous shriek. Every man in gray looked into the eyes of a horrible 
death, and yet the columns moved forward without an instant's halt. 
Regiments were decimated before tliey had traversed a third of the 
distance, and yet the survivors moved forward. One shell from the 
gun-boats struck down a score of men, but the gap was closed and 
eleven men were left to represent the company. Think of the three 
hundred cannon — the shrieking, screaming tons of iron hurled into 



THE SPOT WHERE McCLELLAN CEIED "HALT." 127 

that crowded mass, and then wonder ]iow men faced it! With 
Leads bent forward as if breasting a snow-storm- — with teeth hard 
clinched and muskets tiglitly grasped, tlie Confederates again dashed 
at the liill, to be again confronted and witliered by the fire of 
Couch's men. A single volley and the gray lines were no more. 
In place of them were heaps of dead, writhing, wounded, and a few 
battalions rushing back to cover. 

Then silence fell upon hill and forest, broken for the next two 
hours only by the sullen boom of the Parrotts on the gun -boats as 
their fire was still trained on the woods. McClellan's left was his 
weakest point, and that weakest point had beaten back two desperate 
charges by twenty thousand men, and had not lost above a hundred 
in killed and wounded. If the left could not be routed the center 
and right must be impregnable. Did the silence mean that the 
enemy had abandoned his purpose? Men looked down upon those 
fields sucking the blood of six thousand corpses, and answered yes. 

Silence is never more ominous than during a battle. Then it 
means that batteries are taking new positions, battle lines being 
changed, and new plans being brought into play. Let the roar of 
battle suddenly die away on the right or left and grim silence take 
its place, and those who were fighting like heroes a moment before 
will turn pale and tremble. 

At four o'clock the birds sang in the old trees around the Malvern 
House, and commanders of brigades and divisions asked each other 
what that silence meant. Not a living Confederate could be seen, 
and what was passing under the pines no man knew. 

Beaten back in those two desperate charges, the Confederates 
were the more determined. They had attacked by regiments and 
failed. Now they would attack by brigades and divisions, and suc- 
ceed. At six o'clock, as the sun hung like a great ball of fire above 
the trees, fury was let loose. Scarcely a gun was fired as a warn- 
ing. All of a sudden two hundred Confederate field-pieces were 
galloped to positions along the far edges of the fields and at once 
opened a terrible fire on Malvern Hill. Three hundred guns 
instantly replied, and the roar of that terrible artillery duel was 
plainly heardthirty miles away. 

For half an hour hill and plain was enveloped in semi-darkness, 
through which flames darted and missiles shrieked. Then the Con- 
federate batteries suddenly ceased and the gray infantrj' moved out 
of the woods. Over the bloody grass — over the dead — a mighty 
torrent of war swept forward to do or die. Death swooped down 



128 THE SPOT WHERE McCLELLAI^ CRIED " HALT." 

from the plateau and claimed scores aud hundreds. The gun-boats 
hurled death to hundreds more, but those lines never stopped till 
within thirty yards of tlie creek. Then Couch's men rose up and 
swept them off their feet with one terrible volley. 

The Federal cheers had not yet died away when the gray masses 
came again. Brigades reduced to seven hundred men by that tire 
rallied and reformed where the corpses lay three deep and dashed 
at the hill on the double-quick, but not to reach it. Three — five — 
seven successive times those gray lines rallied and rushed, and field 
batteries crept forward over the corpses until the color of the gun- 
ners' eyes could be told by the men under the hill. When the sun 
went down the fight was ended. McClellan's position was impreg- 
nable. His left wing alone had beaten back five times its strength, 
and the army which had so exultantly pursued, and which was so 
persistently determined to destroy, was shattered to the core. Those 
who looked down from Round Top at Gettysburg after Longstreet's 
charge did not see such a sight as tlie men wJio looked across the 
meadows of the Crews farm. Tlie horrors of war loft foot-prints 
there which fifty years of time will not efface. 

Not a hundred trees are missing from that dai'k silent forest. 
There they stand, jxist as wiien that July sun went down on those 
scenes of horror. It was not a tornado which rent- and twisted a;id 
shivered, and left scars and traces to astound. It was not the sud- 
den sweep of a whirlwind which brought down tree-tops and splin- 
tered trunks. 

In the sandy bed of a dry ravine in those woods which liid Ma- 
gruder's men that day, I found a startling reminder of that fierce 
grapple. There lay an unexploded hundred-pound shell, just as It 
crashed through the trees. Relic hunters have carried away thou- 
sands of bullets and hundreds of pieces of shell, and the battle field 
has sent to the Richmond junk dealers tons upon tons of lead and 
iron, but no man has been bold enough to disturb this sleeping 
monster. 

All day long, as cannon roared and muskets crashed, McClellan 
was hurrying his trains through Deep Bottom to the river, whose 
glimmer his soldiers could see when the smoke lifted. Night 
brought him victory, but it also brought retreat. Only when the 
river was reached could the army be fed and reorganized. 

The afternoon is waning as I turn for a last look at the old brick 
house with its scars of cannon-ball and bullet. The rent and shivered 



THE SPOT WHEKE McCLELLAN CRIED " HALT. 



12& 



trees cast their shadows on the bricks. No hand lias traced a word 
or letter there, but still I read : 

"Twenty thousand Federals lie dead between this hill and the 
Ciiickahominy. Who sao-iticed them ? " 

Aye ! who did ? Who baffled McClellan's plans ? Who left that 
army exposed ? Who refused him support to make victory of 
defeat? Who was it who muttered and sulked when that army 
was rescued and crowned with victory ? 

There is no tablet in the wall, but across the bullet-chipped bricks 
I read the words dispatched to Secretary Stanton from tlie Savage 
Station, and never to be forgotten while history lives : 

I know that a few thousand more men would have chan{!;ed this battle from 
a defeat to a victory. As it is, the governmeut must not and cannot hold me 
responsible for the result. 

I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded com- 
rades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. If 
you do not do so now the game is lost. 

If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to 
any other persons in Washington. 

You have done your best to sacrifice this army ! 

History need only preserve the words. Every house and hill and 
forest and meadow from Malvern to the dark waters of the Chicka- 
hominy will furnish accusing witnesses for half a century to come. 




Vol. I.— 9 



rClflUm — Jee — ^q$l 




SFTEE Malvern Hill— what? 

Lee had thrown his army at the plateau, and it had 
been flung back, broken — bruised — disorganized to a 
certain extent. 

When McClcllan issued his order for the army to 
fall back to the James, there was indignation among many of his 
officers, and Porter, Kearney, and others were loud in their protes- 
tations. Because the Octopus, reaching out his cruel arms in a last 
effort to clutch and destroy his victim, had been beaten off, certain 
officers leaped to the conclusion that Lee was sorely defeated and 
could be pursued back over the same route to the gates of Rich- 
mond. 

Was Lee broken? Emphatically no! As night fell upon the 
battle field of Malvern Hill, thousands of his men had not yet fired 
a shot. A few brigades were disorganized, as might have been 
anticipated, but the greater part of the army was well in hand. 
Had McClellan moved to the attack next day he must have left a 
defensible position to attack one of Lee's own choosing, with the 
odds of battle against him. 

And the hot-headed subordinates and carping critics seem to have 
lost sight of the important fact that, even had Lee retreated 
towards Richmond, McClellan was in no condition to follow. He 
had Inirned his stores at the White House — at Savage's Station — at 
every spot where he halted to make a fight for his life. He had 
lost scores of wagons and thousands of horses and mules, and as his 
troops swung into line at Malvern Hill it was with empty haver- 
sacks. To pursue Lee he must have time to reorganize his shat- 
tered divisions, replace his trains and find a way to feed his army. 

Could Lee have been beaten back over those roads by the Federal 
army, even if fully prepared for the aggressive? No, again ! As 
he left Richmond to fall upon McClellan it was by three different 
roads, with three different commands, to strike the Federal army at 

[130] 



McCLELLAN LEE POPE. 131 

three different points. In no one battle could he claim a vic- 
tory. 

Had Lee retreated, MeClellan's pursuit must have been by the 
same highways, held by strong rear-guards. Had Lee halted and 
McClellan been forced to attack, what were the chances for a Fed- 
eral victory? 

McClellan drew back to the river, his campaign ended. He had 
left behind him nearly sixty pieces of artillery, half a dozen battle- 
flags, thirty thousand stands of arms, fifteen thousand dead, 
wounded and missing, and had reduced millions of dollars' worth of 
stores to ashes. He was a fallen chief. "Defeat" was written on 
every wall, and the country called for his head. His proud spirit 
must have burned over his position — at the insults heaped upon 
him — at the knowledge that a hearty co-operation on the part of the 
government would have brought different results. 

As the army fell back to the James it made itself secure from 
successful attack and besran to reorganize. Lee remained before it 
for a few days, and realizing that it could not be moved for some 
time, he withdrew towards Richmond to assume the aggressive. 

On the twenty-third of July General Halleck was appointed 
commander-in-chief of all the Federal forces, and during the same 
month General Pope was paraded before the public as the coming 
successful general. 




^"^^&^§m^fi:^^^i^^^ 



fop's llgljts 3^ranntr ^anassas. 




lACKSON is moving! 

So said the Federal signal flags on the morning of the 

twentj-fifth of August, 1862. 

Pope had fallen back from his line on the Rapidan 

and retreated behind the Rappahannock. Lee had fol- 
lowed him and meant to attack. A part of the Confederates had 
forced the crossing of the river, and the two great commanders were 
moving their chess men here and there as they made ready for the 
great battle which could not long be delayed. 

Jackson was at Jefferson, on Lee's left. On the morning of the 
twenty-fifth he took the road to Amissville, and after crossing the 
river there, he turned to the northeast, in the direction of Water- 
loo. It was then that the Federal signal flags waved the news. 
With his right wing and center Lee meant to face Pope and hold 
him where he was until Jackson had carried out a plan. What was 
it, and where was he going? Pope did not know. From the 
direction of the march Jackson could strike into the Shenandoah, or 
he coiald swing into the rear of the Federal army. Which course 
he would take no one in that Federal army knew or seemed to care. 
At least no energetic movement was made to find out, and by and 
by Pope made up his mind that Jackson had started for the Shenan- 
doah and would bother him no more. 

All day long of the twenty-fifth Jackson pushed ahead at cavalry 
pace, and by the next evening he was at Bristol Station, squarely in 
the rear of the Federal army. Instead of turning to the west at 
Salem and making for the valley he had turned east and marched 
for Manassas. Five thousand Federals posted in Thoroughfare Gap 
could have held him until the arrival of an army corps, but there 
were no Federals in the Gap. Pope had seen Lee cut twenty-five 
thousand men off from his army and swing them beyond the Federal 
right, and yet he took no steps to guard the approaches in his rear 
until too late. As the hours passed by Jackson hurried on, and on, 

[1321 



pope's fights AKOUND MAJSfASSAS. 133 

and on, expecting each houi- that his great movement would be 
exposed, but never meeting with the sliglitest opposition. Had he 
found a division liolding Tlioroughfare Gap he must have turned 
back. On the niglit of tlie twenty-sixth, when lie struck the rail- 
road, Pope sent a single regiment down on the cars to drive away 
the " intruders," supposing that Mosby had dashed in. Instead of 
Mosby with a hundred guerillas, it was Jackson with twent3'-five 
thousand lighters. It was only on the morning of the twenty-seventh 
that Pope realized that any considerable body of Confederates was 
in his rear. 

Manassas was the great Federal storehouse. It was a part of Jack- 
son's plan to destroy everything, and he lost not an hour in begin- 
ning liis work. Ewell was sent in the direction of the Federal 
army, and the weak Federal guard over the depot was speedily over- 
come. Then, for an hour or two, Jackson's men were let loose on 
the stores. There was everything there to tempt a soldier's appetite, 
and the Confederates had not eaten full rations for three days. 
Men ate their fill, and then loaded themselves down with sugar, 
bacon, canned fi-iiits and choice hospital stores. Jackson's march 
towards Centreville could be traced by empty cans and bottles and 
the stores which the men were tired of carrying. What could not 
be eaten or carried away was to be burned, and it was only when that 
great cloud of smoke rolled heavenwards that Pope knew any part 
of Jackson's plans. Official Confederate reports show that they 
removed or destroyed supplies which had cost the Federal govern- 
ment millions of dollars. One of the captures was a field battery 
of eight guns, complete even to horses, and this battery was send- 
ing death into the Union ranks two days later. 

On the afternoon of the twenty-seventh, in pushing forward 
toward Manassas to develop the enemy. Hooker ran upon Ewell, 
and a battle opened which did not close till the dusk of evening. 
Jackson depended on Ewell to stay there until the stores were 
destroyed, and at sundown sent him word to fall back. Hooker 
plumed himself on having driven the enemy across Broad Run and 
put him to flight, but Ewell was retiring in obedience to orders. It 
was a fight between divisions only, but so hotly contested and so 
bravely maintained, that neither line had been driven a hundred 
feet when Jackson's order came. 

Pope reached Hooker after the fight and then made up his mind 
that Jackson was at Manassas and could be bagged. Oi-ders were 
instantly dispatched to different corps commanders to concentrate 



134 

on Manassas, but before any brigade outside of Hooker's divisiou 
had advanced a rod, Jackson was moving. Pope expected him to 
remain at Manassas until the Federal army found it convenient to 
bag him, and great was his surprise when he dashed out of the 
woods on the morning of the twenty-eighth to find Jackson gone. 
The Federal bag was ready, but the victim was nowhere to be seen.. 
In what direction had he gone ? 

Pope killed himself as a leader when he issued his bombastic 
proclamation to the army, but he was a fighter for all that. He 
fell back from the Rapidan to shorten his lines and secure a better 
fighting position. The best military writers have praised his 
sagacity in this. He meant to fight Lee on the Rappahannock, but 
Lee, Jackson, and one or two other things prevented. Lee mys- 
tified him by certain movements. Rain swelled the river and 
prevented Pope from crossing part of his forces to assail Lee's 
rear and flank. A corps commander retired from a position he 
should have held. Jackson cut loose, and no Federal knew his 
objective point. Pope did not believe Jackson would dare swing 
into his rear. He did not suspect that it was Lee's plan to 
march after Jackson and pour through the same Thoroughfare 
Gap to join him. 

Hooker lost his wits at Chancellorsville. Burnside lost his at 
Fredericksburg. Pope did not lose his around Manassas, but he 
failed to discover what the' enemy were doing, and all his moves 
were made in the dark. He sent orders by one courier and counter- 
manded them by another. He marched divisions and corps all day 
and counter-marched them at night. After Jackson had been gone 
from Manassas ten hours, Pope ordered up a corps to cut his march- 
ing line in two ! He expected to find Jackson on the twenty-eighth 
where he was on the twenty-seventh. He expected him to retreat 
through Thoroughfare Gap, when Jackson knew that Lee was 
coming to join him through the same Gap. He expected Jackson 
was after the wagon trains in one dii'ection, while he was really 
marching in another direction to pick his position to wait for Lee's 
arrival. Pope was no coward ; neither was he incompetent. 
But he was mystified and dumb-founded and groping his way from 
hour to hour. 

As soon as it was discovered that Jackson had gone towards 
Centreville, Pope acted with energy, but he made a mistake. He 
could not get rid of the idea that Jackson wanted to retreat 
through Thoroughfare Gap, and march back to rejoin Lee on the 



pope's fights abound MANASSAS. 135 

Rappahannock, and he hastened to tlirow a force between Jackson 
and the Gap. Jackson was simply looking for a position to await 
the arrival of Lee, and the force thrust between him and the Gap 
would presently find itself between two Confederate armies. Pope 
had liis plan to bag Jackson — Jackson had his plan to hold Pope 
until Lee came up. In this determined attempt to capture Jackson, 
Pope ordered McDowell to close in. To obey he must leave 
Thoroughfare Gap undefended. He took the responsibility of 
detaching the divisions of King and Ricketts and leaving them 
behind, but as soon as Lee made his appearance tliese divisions 
retired and permitted him to pour through and join Jackson. 

What is known as the battle of Gainesville was brought about 
through a mistake of Jackson. A Federal column on the march 
to a new position, was supposed by him to be in retreat, and he 
gave orders for an attack. The blue column wlieeled into battle- 
line at the sound of the first gun, and for about tliree hours the 
conflict was close and bloody. On the Federal side King's division 
alone was engaged, and though opposed by superior numbers they 
could not be driven a single foot. When Jackson discovered his 
mistake he would have drawn off, but this the Federals would not 
let him do. 

As Gainesville was the mistake of Jackson, so was Groveton the 
mistake of Pope. Still following up his theory that he could bag 
Jackson, he made the attack at Groveton on what he supposed was 
Jackson's army, but which was in reality the entire Confederate 
force, Lee having come up and been in line for many hours. Por- 
ter was to come up on Jackson's flank at Groveton, and was court- 
martialed and cashiered for his failure to do so. And yet, when 
Porter was ready to move, he found Longstreet in his front. Por- 
ter knew what Pope had to learn hours after — that the Confed- 
erate army was all up. Porter held fifteen thousand Confederates 
fi'om pusliing on to Groveton. When the order was sent him to 
move against Jackson, Lee was supposed to be still on the other 
side of the Gap. McDowell interpreted the same order to suit his 
own ideas, and no charge was brought against him. King and 
Ricketts fell back from Tlioroughfare Gap against all orders, let- 
ting Lee in, and yet they sat in judgment on Porter. Sigel misin- 
terpreted a plain order by which a part of the troops had a march 
of nine miles for nothing, but his l)hinder was excused. Pope 
attacked like a man who meant to win a victory, and when night 



136 pope's fights abound manassas. 

fell the fields of Groveton were heaped with dead and wounded. 
That was all. Jackson was still there. 

Late in the afternoon, after several hours of terrific fighting, and 
after Milroj, Schenck, Reynolds and Scluirz had taken their com- 
mands in and fought them until exhausted and obliged to fall back, 
Pope saw that Jackson could not be driven by any such fighting. 
The Confederate center was protected by a railroad embankment. 
Pope determined to mass a crack brigade and hurl it upon the cen- 
ter, and to follow it with a division. Hooker was to lead, and he 
selected Grover's brigade of five regiments. It was composed of 
regiments from Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania, 
and every man knew that desperate fighting was in store for him. 
With muskets loaded and bayonets fixed the blue regiments ad- 
vanced at a steady pace. Confederate shells tore through the ranks, 
and grape and canister cut wide gaps in the lines, but nothing 
stopped the onward march. Now they halt to deliver their fire, 
and then they rush for Jackson's center with cheers which are heard 
two miles away. After that one volley they must depend on the 
bayonet alone. They dashed into the smoke, over the dead and 
wounded, through the woods and thickets, and Jackson's first line 
of battle was driven from the embankment with cold steel at their 
backs. There was a shock — a grapple — and that Federal wedge had 
entered Jackson's center. Pausing only a moment to reform, the 
blue brigade rushed at the second line, bent it back upon the third, 
and for a few minutes men jabbed with the bayonet, struck with 
clubbed muskets, and fired at such close range that the flame of the 
powder seemed to follow the bullets through the victims. Two 
lines had been carried — the third was fighting as regiments fight 
when they realize that retreat means disaster to a whole army. 
Confederates who helped to bury the dead at that point say that 
scores of blue and gray clutched each other as the^' went down in 
tiie agonies of death. Dozens of men lay dead with bayonets pin- 
ning the corpse to the earth. 

Grover's brigade was to have been supported by a division, but 
that division did not come. The wedge had penetrated — Jackson's 
third line could not stand another blow, and yet not another Fed- 
eral advanced. Why? No need to ask Pope — he had no explan- 
ations. Longstreet was there at noon, and ^-et when tliat charge 
was made, hours later, Pope was seeking to bag Jackson and igno- 
rant that he had been reinforced. Slowly the blue lines yielded, 
retreating foot l)y foot, and when that brigade had reached the 



pope's fights abound MANASSAS. 137 

Federal lines again it had left live hundred dead behind it. It had 
penetrated Jackson's center — it had left live hundred corjDses in its 
path — nothing more. 

Pope could have advanced his whole line as well as a single 
brigade. History is silent as to why he did not. He was trying 
to bag Jackson. Did he expect to do it by throwing him men 
to shoot at? When Grover was driven back, bloodstained and 
defeated, Kearney was ordered to try the same dash at another 
point. He put himself at the head of Stevens' division and he 
rnshed npon A. P. Hill. Had Phil Kearney been ordered to lead 
a single company against all the artillery in the Confederate service 
he would not have flinched. Gallant as any cavalier of old — 
brave as any knight of history, if the whisper had reached his ears 
that death would clasp his hand a few hours later at another point 
on the same fleld, he betrayed no sign. He had seen Grover driven 
back — he knew what desperate lighting awaited him, but no man 
saw his face grow paler as he took the place of honor and dashed 
straight at Hill, who was on Jackson's left. 

Every Federal history which is written in truth will admit that 
Hill was outnumbered on the start. Some of his men had only 
three or four rounds of ammunition left, when Kearney swept down 
upon them. They were rolled back, and Jackson's left was actually 
turned and taken in flank. Then again men foiight with clubbed 
muskets — with the bayonet — even with branches twisted off the 
trees, and with rocks pulled from the soil. Gregg's brigade received 
the first shock. What it cost him is told in Confederate reports. In 
five minutes he was out of ammunition and fighting with the bayo- 
net alone. In a brief quarter of an hour that one brigade had lost 
over six hundred men. It was pushed back, but it could not be 
routed. Regiments which had not a cartridge fell back in order, 
with bayonets pointed towards the Federals. Where was the 
Federal support? Did Pope expect that one division to bag Jack- 
son ? It had almost cut him in two in the center, but when it had 
done all that desperate men could do, Hill threw forward two 
fi-esh brigades, and Kearney was driven back, leaving a thousand 
dead and wounded to prove his valor. 

And still Pope labored under the delusion that he had only Jack- 
son's army in front of him. Longstreet had been there ever since 
noon — Stephen D. Lee was there with all his artillery- — Porter was 
being held by a Confederate force, and yet Pope would not believe 
it. Even when the Confederates shortened their line for an 



138 pope's fights around manassas. 

expected advance by the whole Federal army at sunset, Pope was 
pleased to construe it into a retreat, and he pushed three brigades 
into a position where they were decimated and driven out. Six 
thousand Federal dead were 13'ing on the field of Groveton — every 
assault of Pope's had been repulsed, and yet he sat down and tele- 
graphed, after being forced to believe Longstreet had come up : 

" We fought a terrific battle here yesterday. . . . The enemy 
were driven from the field. . . . The enemy lost two to one. 
. . . He is retiring towards the mountain. . . . We have 
made great captures." 

The enemy had not been driven a single rod. He had simply 
shortened his lines. He was not retiring. He had not lost two to 
one. Pope had captured nothing; the enemy had captured many 
prisoners and several thousand stands of arms, and yet Pope 
thought he had won a great victory, and he spent the night in pre- 
paring plans to crush the whole Confederate army on tiie morrow! 
That morrow was to see the number of dead quadrupled — to see 
Pope driven at every point — to see the blue lines falling back upon 
Washington. Pope was to be defeated and driven, and his head 
was to fall, but some one else was to suffer with him. Fitz John 
Porter, held at bay by Longstreet, and likewise saving Pope by 
holding Longstreet from moving on, was to be degraded and dis- 
graced, and his judges were to be the men who left fords open to 
Jackson — who left bridges for his artillery — who skulked away from 
Tiioroughfare Gap at Lee's thunder and let him through to Jack- 
son's aid ! Pope groped his way over those fields like a man blind- 
folded ! He ordered and countermanded in the same moment. He 
remembered dozens of orders which he never wrote. He filled 
every road with wagon trains and then expected whole army corps 
to march at the rate of three miles an hour. The best Federal 
military authority, writing for the years to come, and writing in a 
spirit of peace, with all tlie facts before them, have pointed out 
such grave errors and serious mistakes in his campaign that readers 
must wonder that any part of his army reached a haven of safety. 



Jrfcit. — |iili;isii)ir. 



M 




HE battle of Groveton was Pope's last effort before 
being driven north of Bull Run. It proved his pluck, 
but it brought another defeat. When he had with- 
drawn to the heights of Centreville hope returned for 
a few hours. He had a short line, a strong position, and 
reinforcements from McClellan's array were hastening up. If Lee 
would only attack him in front he might hold his ground. 

But Lee had no thought of hurling his troops against that strong 
position. He had counted Pope's dead and wounded — he had seen 
thousands of Federal prisoners marched to the rear — he felt certain 
that Pope was more or less disorganized and debating on further 
retreat. 

Jackson was sent on another flank movement. Detaching his 
command and that of Ewell without confusion or delay, he crossed 
Bull Run, gained the Little River turnpike, and then swept around 
towards Fairfax. Pope must retreat beyond Fairfax or find his 
army between Lee and Jackson. 

Jackson's movement was on too large a scale to escape detection. 
Pope divined his intentions, realized the danger of the situation, 
and at once ordered a retreat. He fell back just in time to prevent 
Jackson from gaining his rear, but the wily old fox was already on 
his flank at Chantilly, and he hung there until he drew blood from 
two thousand men. It was here that the gallant Phil Kearney 
yielded up his life, and the same pitiless storm beat down upon the 
faces of other dead for whom a nation was to mourn. 

Pope began his "headquarters in the saddle." He scoffed at 
" lines of retreat." Pie would study " the probable line of retreat 
of his opponent." He would " look before and not behind." That 
address was issued on the fourteenth of July. On the second of 
September his army was cowering behind the defenses of Washing- 
ton. He had lost over twenty-five thousand men, twelve battle- 
flags, forty pieces of artillery, twelve thousand stands of arms, three 

[139] 



140 



DEFEAT INVASION. 



hundred wagons, two thousand animals, and stores worth millions 
of dollars had been destroyed. Lee had lost ten thousand men, but 
he had gained forty miles of ground and all the spoils. 

Lee had no thought of assaulting the defenses of Washington. 
McClellan had been deposed — Pope beaten — -Virginia practically 
swept clear of Federal commands. The hour was ripe for invasion. 
By the seventh of September he was in Maryland, and the cry of 
*' Invasion 1 " had startled every hamlet in the North. 




CI]C Crisis. 




^S Pope rode to the front, McClellan's array was being 
recalled from the James. As Pope reached the climax 
of his military glory, McClellan was ordered to report at 
Alexandria — deposed — degraded — disgraced. As tlie 
roar of the guns at Chantilly reached his ears he for- 
gave the blow struck by Halleck and telegraphed him : 

" I cannot express to yon the pain and mortification 1 liave 
experienced to-day in listening to the distant firing of my men. As 
I can be of no further use here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a 
probability of the confiict being renewed on the morrow, I may be 
permitted to go to the scene of battle with my staff — merely to be 
with my own men, if nothing more. They will fight none the 
worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to trust 
me with the command of my own army, 1 simply ask to be per- 
mitted to share its fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this 
to-night." 

The records of war do not show another such appeal from a 
deposed commander. Fremont would not serve under Pope because 
the latter had been his inferior in rank in the west. McClellan was 
willing to serve as a volunteer under the man who had done his best 
to cover him with insult. Halleck made no reply to the appeal, 
but in his arrogance he was preparing for a terrible fall. Scarcely 
twenty-four hours had passed when, after an interview with the 
humbled and broken Pope, he telegraphed : 

" I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and 
experience." 

This was followed by a request from Lincoln for McClellan to 
hasten to Washington, and he was at once placed in command. He 
understood the danger, and he planned to meet it. Lee was throw- 
ing his whole force across the Potomac, and the Federal array must 
march fast and fight as it never had before. 

In five days the troops which had sought the defenses of Wash- 

[141] 



142 



THE CRISIS. 



ington after Chantilly, broken, dispirited, and their pluck gone, 
were raarcliing over the highways of Maryland to meet Lee and 
defeat him. Accident placed in McClellan's hands Lee's pLans, and 
it was discovered that Stonewall Jackson had Harper's Ferry as his 
objective point. McClellan needed the men and material there. 
So long as it held out Jackson would be unable to combine with 
Lee, and McClellan had the fewer to encounter in the struggle 
which must take place. 




cutlj Mffwntaiit» 




*T Sonth Mountain Lee waited for McClellan to come 
up. He must hold him until Jackson had solved the 
problem at Harper's Ferry. 

Passing out from Frederick, the Federal army moved 
in two great columns — one towards Turner's Gap in the 
Mountain— the other towards Crampton's. D. H. Hill, with a 
weak division, was left to defend Turner's Gap, and on the morning 
of the fourteenth the advance of one Federal column appeared 
before him. South of the Gap, to prevent a flank movement, he 
had posted Garland's division. 

Reno, who had the Federal advance, lost no time in calculating 
the chances. Driving ahead with a division, he planted his batter- 
ies at the base of the mountain and ordered his infantry up its 
steep and wooded sides. If he could gain the crest he could take 
the Gap in reverse. The Confederate defenders were posted 
behind rocks and trees, having the strongest natural cover, and as 
the Federals advanced both sides resorted to Indian tactics. Men 
sprang from tree to tree and rock to rock, each one tighting on his 
own hook, but at noon the Federal force had pressed the Confeder- 
ates to the crest. Reno could hold his ground, but he could 
advance no further. Longstreot was reinforcing Hill as rapidly as 
possible, and the Confederates on the south crest were able to hold 
their own from noon until night. 

By two o'clock in the afternoon all the Federal troops which 
could be handled on the ground were in battle line, and McClellan 
was hammering away at every point. 

The Confederates who were defending the Gap itself had the 
advantage of twenty to one. It was simply a country highway^ 
narrow — winding and full of natural defensive positions — from 
plain to crest. Only two Federal brigades advanced into the 
Gap, and they gained ground only by the inch. A dead man was 
left at every foot, and the Confederate lines fell where they were 

[1431 



144: 



SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 



posted. It was long after dark before the Gap was won to tlie 
crest, and of the men lying on the rocky road nineteen out of 
twenty were dead. 

The Federal right, as in case of the left, could advance only as 
men afterwards stormed Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. 
Lines of battle could not be preserved as the men pulled them- 
selves up by the rocks and trees, but the tight never slackened for a 
moment. Two hours after dark the Federal army had gained the 
crest of South Mountain, and now had an equal footing as to 
position. 

During the same hours of daylight the other Federal column was 
hammering at Crampton's Gap. On this column depended the sal- 
vation of Harper's Ferry from the clutch of Jackson. It was the 
same as at Turner's — the Gap desperately defended — the flanking 
mountain sides witnessing the same tactics of advance — the fall of 
night bringing a victory to the Federal arms. 

If Miles still held Harper's Ferry, Lee was in a position of 
peril. If Jackson had seized it lie could form a junction with Lee 
to face McClellan. Lee had fought at South Mountain to gain 
time — McClellan to save Miles. Fifteen hundred Federal dead and 
wounded, and over two thousand Confederate, told of the bitter 
figliting, but Lee's object had been won. 




hirnitkr of |j"ar|tr's $tni. 




yllOP an apple into a bushel basket and you have the- 
situation of Harper's Ferry. It is not a village at the 
base of a mountain, but a village surrounded by moun- 
tains, and a field-piece on Maryland or Louden Heights 
can hurl its missile into any part of the antiquated 
town. 

As McClellan's army left Washington in pursuit of Lee, Harper's 
Ferry became a burden of anxiety to the Federal commander. To 
capture it, Lee must detach from ten to fifteen thousand men from 
his force. If bravely defended every one of its defenders would 
count as a man in the field confronting Lee. 

As Jackson swept down from Williamsport the small Federal 
force at Martinsburg retreated to the Ferry, and as the Confed- 
erates appeared before it they found the place garrisoned by about 
twelve thousand men. Garrisoned is not the word, considering 
that the place was at the mercy of any five hundred men who might 
secure the Heights spoken of. It was a pen in which twelve thou- 
sand Federals cooped themselves up and waited for capture. 

It is on record that Miles was positively ordered to fortify the 
Heights at least a month before Lee crossed the Potomac, and he 
had the men, tools and cannon to do so, but he made not the 
slightest move to carry out the order. There was time even after 
Lee had crossed the river to place Harper's Ferry in such a defen- 
sive condition as would have made a hot fight necessary for its 
capture, but not a step was taken. 

Miles was neither a traitor nor a coward. He was simply one of 
that class of incompetents so often met with holding responsible 
positions in the Federal service. He had less common sense in the 
face of danger than any one of those twelve thousand men penned 
up with him. 

By the morning of the fourteenth Jackson had the Heights, and 

Vol. I- 10 [145] 



14:6 SURRENDER OF HARPER's FERRY. 

the garrison was very nearly cut oflF. When it was realized that 
this state of affairs had been brought about through Miles' incom- 
peteucy there was mutiny and rebellion in the garrison. Officers 
went about cursing the fate wliich had placed such a man in power, 
and soldiers destroyed their arms and could scarcely be restrained 
from burning the town. 

Colonel Davis, who had about two thousand cavalry under his 
command, saw that a surrender was coining, and he gathered bis 
men together at dark, and broke through the line of investment 
with slight loss and made good his escape. During the night a 
number of Federal scouts and rangers made their escape on foot, 
and there was an abundance of time to spike every cannon and 
destroy most of the stores. 

But Miles was like one dazed, issuing no orders and having no 
control. At daylight next morning, when the Confederates opened 
.on his battery on Bolivar Heights, the colonel seemed for a moment 
to feel something of the spirit of a soldier. He went among the 
guns and encouraged the men, but soon realized that his position 
was untenable and ordered the white flag run up. It was after this 
flag had been raised that Miles was killed bj' a cannon-shot. 

Harper's Ferry was surrendered with its twelve thousand men 
when Ave thousand could have held it if Miles had obeyed his 
orders. Lying there unmounted were seventy-three large can- 
non, and Jackson likewise came into possession of thirteen thou- 
sand five hundred muskets, two hundred and thirty army wagons, 
six hundred horses and mules, eight hundred tents, two thousand 
blankets, six hundred sabres, half a million cartridges, and hospital 
stores almost worth their weight in gold to tlie Confederacy. Not 
an hour was lost in preparing to convey all this property across the 
Potomac into the Confederacy. When these arrangements had been 
made he left A. P. Hill to carry them out, and started with his com- 
mand to join Lee. Franklin was coming up to +he aid of Harper's 
Ferry, and Lee had to move every command swiftly and concentrate 
at Sharpsburg to prevent the Federals from getting some of his 
detached corps into a trap. 



5^arjsbnq. 




.EE has fallen back from South Mountain to the Antie- 
tam River, and is posting his forces on the ridge above 
the town of Sharpsburg. 

Word has been sent to Jackson, and his infantry are 
marciiing at the rate of five miles an hour. 

Word has been sent to McLaws, and his detached command will 
make no halt until it faces the Federal lines at Sharpsburg. 

It is the morning of the seventeenth of September, 1862. Here 
is going to be a struggle which shall be remembered as long as 
there is an American nation. 

Who can record the feelings of McClellan? Ten days ago he 
was in disgrace. Lee had driven him from the Peninsula, Halleck 
had insulted him, and the country had lost confidence in his general- 
ship. 

He is here this morning in supreme command. He is facing 
that same general and that same army once more. He can stand in 
front of his headquarters and look down upon an army of eighty- 
seven thousand Federals. 

On the hills of Sharpsburg arc forty thousand Confederates — 
less than half McClellan's strength. It is a grand opportunity to 
strike a blow which will demoralize the whole Confederacy. 

Stand here with me, in Lee's center, and we will look down upon 
a struggle which will not be equalled in fierceness again during the 
war, except at Gettysburg and Chickamauga. 

From this center we can look down upon sixty thousand Federal 
troops and witness every movement. 

Here is the Federal position : Hooker, with three divisions, is in 
the woods and fields on the extreme right, with Mansfield's corps 
behind him, and Sumner's just ready to cross the stream. Burnside 
has the left wing, and the center is formed by the troops of his 
right and Sumner's left. 

Stonewall Jackson has the Confederate left, opposite Hooker ; 

[1471 



148 SHAEPSBUEG. 

Longstreet the center, and there is really no right, nor will there be 
until the arrival of the Confederates who are hastening over the 
dusty highways. 

Boom! boom! crash! The battle has begun! Hooker has 
picked up his eighteen thousand men and is hurling them at Jack- 
son's less than six thousand. Jackson has one Hank on the Hagers- 
town highway — the other on the river, while his center is near the 
Dunker Church. He has the cover of woods and walls and depres- 
sions, and when those three Federal divisions bear down upon him 
he opens a fire so hot and so continuous that eighteen tliousand men 
are halted — broken — repulsed. The Federals reform and advance 
again, and for an hour tlie crash of nmsketry is terrific. 

The Federal sword thrusts at the left — at the center — at the 
right, but there is no opening. Every thrust is parried — every 
blow returned. 

If Jackson is forced down on the center, as Hooker has planned, 
it is ruin to Lee. Every Confederate lealizes this, and every 
man is desperate. 

For more than an hour Hooker uses his eighteen thousand men 
as a sledge-liammer to batter away at one third of their number, but 
he does not drive the Confederate line a single yard. It is only 
when thirty pieces of Federal artillery on the other side of the An- 
tietam are massed to enfiLuIe Jackson that he falls back, but he 
retreats step by step through the woods and across the fields. He 
falls back almost to the Dunker Church, but will go no further. 

To let go of the Hagerstown road means defeat. To let go of 
the river means destruction. To give up another rod of his line 
may mean the annihilation of the whole Confederate army. 

Jackson has lost a thousand men since the fight opened, and the 
remainder of his command are out of ammunition. He sends to 
Lee for aid, and Hood and Early bring up five thousand men to 
help Iiira hold liis lines. 

Hooker is bafSed — enraged — determined. He brings up Mans- 
field's corps, and now twenty-five thousand Federals bear down 
upon ten thousand Confederates like a raiglity wave. The wave 
rolls up to the line of flame, but no further. It recedes and rolls 
forward again, but only to be broken. Here on this contracted line 
death holds carnival and shouts in exultation. 

In the forest the freshly fallen yellow leaves are being stained 
with blood. In the meadows the parched earth is enjoying a feast. 
In the cornfields the yellow stalks are plashed and splattered, and 



SHAKPSBURG. 149 

the dead of Jackson and Hooker lie side by side. Here, after the 
armies have left, farmers will collect shot and shell by the wagon 
load and haul them down to a sink or morass near the church and 
dump them in to have them out of tlie way. Not two or throe 
wagon loads, but fifteen or twenty; and every year the plow will 
turn up grape and canister by the busiiel. 

Jackson is again reinforced, though the two skeleton brigades 
scarcely make good his loss, and now Hooker orders up Sumner and 
is wounded as the latter reaches the front. Sumner assumes com- 
mand, but hardly has he issued his first order when Jackson pre- 
pares for a desperate move. 

The Confederate left does not number over twelve thousand 
men, and yet Jackson is going to advance in the face of the three 
corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumnei- — numbering over thirty 
thousand men ! 

The Confederate ammunition M'agons arc driven right up to 
battle-line, and the soldiers refill their cartridge boxes as Federal 
bullets fall around them. 

Now, at the signal, Jackson changes from the defender to the 
assailant, and from river to highway his lines advance. 

Shell and grape and canister beat at them, but they do not halt. 

The crash of musketry is appalling, and the hail of bullets has no 
interval. 

Forward ! forward ! 

Gaps are torn in the advancing lines, but the living will not halt. 

Flags go down to be soaked in blood, but there is no stop. 

From the troubled waters of the Potomac to the Dunker 
Church and beyond, the gray lines are breasting the storm of death 
and gaining ground. 

One after another. Federal brigades and divisions are pressed 
back — flung aside — walked over — annihilated. 

Back — back — back — and Jackson has finally regained his lost 
ground, and McClellan must order Franklin's corps to that flank to 
even hold the Confederates where they stop for a time to reform 
and replenish their ammunition. 

Three Federal corps shattered by less than fifteen thousand Con- 
federates! In after months General Sumner will testify before 
the committee on the conduct of the war: 

" General Hooker's corps was dispersed ; there is no question 
about that ; I sent one of my staff officers to find where they were, 
and General Ricketts, the only ofiicer he could find, said he could 



150 SHAEPSBUEG. 

not raise three hundred men of the corps. In the meantime Mans- 
field liad been killed and a portion of his corps thrown into 
confusion." 

Jackson holds the Confederate left secure — Franklin can liold the 
Federal right. 

Look down upon the center, into what the citizens of Sharpsburg 
will ever refer to as Bloody Lane — into what history will call the 
Sunken Road. It is a highway cut through hills for a distance of 
a mile or so, and troops passing over it do not even show their 
heads to an enemy forty rods away. In this sunken road two brig- 
ades of Confederates are massed to protect Lee's center. They are 
there when Burnside, who had been ordered to cross the Antietam 
at eight o'clock and attack Lee's right, finally moves at noon. His 
advance compels the withdrawal of several batteries on Lee's center, 
and a half-right-about-face of a portion of the troops tliere, and 
McClellan now pushes forward some of his batteries until they 
have the range of this sunken road. 

Grape and canister go screaming and shrieking through the 
massed Confederates, "and not one-half of them escape from the 
trap. Citizens here who will look down into that sunken' road 
to-morrow, before a corpse of all these thousands on this l)loody 
field has been buried, will tell you that it is the most awful sight 
men have ever looked upon. 

It is a slaughter-pen and worse yet. Heads, arms, legs, feet, 
hands, and bloody trunks of mangled humanity fill the road from 
bank to bank, and old soldiers look down from the banks and turn 
away sick at heart. 

Now turn to the Federal left — -to Burnside's bridge. It is a 
stone bridge over the Antietam, and in crossing it from McClellan's 
battle line to Lee's position there is a deep cut in the hills as the 
road rises to surmount the range. McClellan's right and center 
has moved forward and fought. At noon Hooker has pushed 
Jackson a mile and a half, and the center has advanced a mile, 
forcing Lee to change his headquarters to a brick house half a 
mile back of the town. Had Burnside advanced at eight o'clock 
in the morning, Lee would have been driven at every point. His 
right was terribly weak, as Longstreet's men were strung out all 
the way from the bridge to Harper's Ferry. The order was to 
carry the bridge, but there is no point for a quarter of a mile up 
or down that a soldier could not ford and keep his cartridge-box 
dry. A skirmish line is sent forward, a few shots are fired, and that 



SHAKPSBUEG. 151 

is Burnside's effort to carry out orders. At nine Hooker has lost 
two thousand men, and Burnside lias hardly fired a gun. At ten 
the center has lost two thousand men, and Burnside has not killed 
a Confederate. At eleven he is where daylight found him. At 
noon six thousand Federals lay dead, and Burnside lias not lost a 
man. He is dead now, but he lived to have historians ask him if 
he was not cowardly seeking a new downfall for McClellan by 
thus cowardly refusing to obey orders. 

At one o'clock Colonel Key is ordered by McClellan to force 
the bridge with Burnside's troops, leading them himself if Burn- 
side will not — and then the latter moves. 

"What is in front? The answer is that two single Federal regi- 
ments carry the bridge in ten minutes, as soon as let loose. Lee 
has been sending troops to aid Jackson, and his contempt for 
Burnside is shown in placing less than eight hundred men to 
guard this approach to his right. Burnside has the bridge, biit 
Lee holds the heights above. One determined rush will capture 
his guns massed there or drive them back through the town, but 
Burnside advances — halts— advances — hesitates — and finally sends 
back for reinforcements, although he already has five to one. 

Some of the guns on Lee's right are positively without infantry 
supports. A dash by a single brigade may decide the great battle, 
but it is not made. 

Franklin can hold Jackson, but notliing more. 

Lee has made his center secure in its j)osition, and any direct 
assault means the destruction of assailants. 

Burnside can break through Lee's right without losing a thousand 
men, and he has force enough to crush that wini; back on the 
center, but he is not the man for the emergency. 

We can see the right of Porter's fifteen thousand reserves lying 
hidden along the Red Hills across the valley. Let Burnside move 
with vigor and strike a worthy blow, and he can have aid to 
follow up success. 

Those reserves are a menace to Lee. They prevent his right 
and center from any advance when opportunities offer. But for 
them he would, in the early morning, have flung the few skeleton 
brigades composing his right across the bridge and boldly sought 
to drive Burnside's whole corjis down on the Federal center. 

Night comes and the battle dies away, each army clinging fast 
to its position. It is a drawn fight. Burnside could have made 
it a defeat for Lee. 



152 SHAKPSBUBG. 

What a storm the North raised because McClellan did not bag 
Lee's army! Hooker, Mansiield, and Sumner driven back to their 
battle line of the morning — Burnside plotting, hesitating, and fail- 
ing — the center having enough to hold its own, and it was 
McClellan who would have been bagged but for the menace of 
the reserves lying along the Red Hill. There was a great flaunt 
made of Lee's army being demoralized. Demoralized armies do 
not go into camp as he did that night within canaon-sliot of his 
battle line and coolly wait for a river to fall and uncover a ford. 
He waited and showed his teeth. When he retreated he fastened 
his teeth into the flesh of those who followed. When the advance- 
guard pushed on after that "demoralized" army tlie Potomac 
ran red with the blood of Porter's men. 

The sun goes down as on that day. To-night there is the low- 
ing of kine, the far-away voices of men, the soft rustle of the wind 
over fields of corn and wheat and clover. On that night more than 
fifteen thousand corpses lay on those fields before me, with white 
faces and bloody hands uplifted in pitiful appeal to the young 
harvest moon. Meadow and corn field and thicket shivered under 
the stains of blood, and the swift- moving waters of the creek 
ceased their flow as they found the channel filled with dams 
made of human corpses. All this here, and yet it was not 
enough. In the dark woods beyond the shot-riven church, in 
which each Sabbath day was raised a prayer to God for peace, 
were limb and trunk and corpse until wounded horses turned 
back and sought another way. 

It is dark as I ride slowly over the hill wet with blood that 
day, and now and then I look back and almost believe that I am 
followed by a troop of spectres, who wave their skeleton arms in 
the faint moonlight, as if driving me from that direful field. 




urkr in Mar, 




'^^^=^ HE object of war is to kill, but even in the killing there 
are methods recognized as legitimate, and others which 
are stamped as infamous. A command which used 
explosive bullets in a battle need look for no mercy to 
the prisoners captured, altliough it would be perfectly 
legitimate to run a mine under a fort and blow a hundred men into 
the air. 

At the evacuation of Yorktown the chief of ordnance under 
Johnston directed that a large number of torpedoes be placed where 
they nnist be encountered by Federal soldiers. Some were placed 
near wells — others in tlie works — -others alongside of highways. All 
were so prepared that the slightest pressure of a foot on the board 
or stone covering them would bring about an exjjlosion, and from 
twenty to thirty Federals were killed by them before the murder- 
ous plan was understood and a general warning sounded. A search 
was then instituted, and scores of unexploded torpedoes were 
unearthed and rendered harmless. 

Again, as the rear-guard of the Confederate army left Williams- 
burg, large shells, provided with sensitive fuse-primers, were bui-ied 
in the highway, and as the Federal cavalry rode upon them six or 
eight men and horses were torn to fragments by the explosion. 

Such killing was nothing short of murdei-, and whether supported 
by the Confederate military authorities or not it was so repugnant 
to tlie fighting men in the field tliat the practice was abandoned. 
There were a thousand times during the war when picket firing 
s6emed so much like cold-blooded murder that both sides called for 
a truce, and men who had the courage to make good soldiers 
stamped the use of foot-torpedoes and sub-terra shells as barbarous. 

[153] 



Cl^ ^banilonmnit of Borffflk J^aiij Jar^. 




HERE were dozens of reasons why the Federal govern- 
ment should have held on to Norfolk navy yard, and 
not one single solid reason why it should have been 
abandoned as it was. On the nineteenth of April, 
1S61, tiiat yard was one of the finest in the world. On 
the morning of the twentieth it was a scene of such desolation as 
men look upon but once in a life-time. The government had spent 
millions of dollars in machinery and buildings and appliances, and 
the yard was full of cannon, anchors, cables, shot and other material 
almost worth their weigiit in gold jtist on the outbreak of a war. 

Virginia had seceded, and many government posts in the South 
had been taken possession of in the name of the Confederacy. 
Every citizen J^ortii and South knew that war was coming like a 
billow of flame, but the volcano had not fairly burst forth. There 
were only a few marines at the yard, but one hundred volunteers 
could have been thrown into the place by a snap of the President's 
finger. New York, Boston, or Pliiladelphia would have raised five 
hundred or a thousand men to hold the yard within ten hours 
after being appealed to, and tliere was no moment previous to the 
evening of tlie nineteenth when a band of volunteers could not have 
been landed. 

In spite of the protests of army and navy ofiicers, it was decided 
to abandon Norfolk. Had it been decided to send a small rein- 
forcement the place could have been held until everything of value 
had been removed. It was down on the Confederate programme 
that Norfolk would be vigorously defended, and its easy possession 
was a matter of intense surprise. 

On the nineteenth of April the Confederate General Taliaferro, 
then in command- of the few thousand militia Virginia had rushed 
into the field, reached Norfolk and boldly entered tlie navy 3'ard to 
see what Uncle Sam was going to do about it. Commodore Mc- 
Cauley, then commandant, held a " talk " on the subject, and it was 

I1S41 



THE ABANDONMENT OF NORFOLK NAVY TAED. 155 

agreed that neitlier party should take an offensive step until receiv- 
ing further instructions from their suj^eriors. It was a confab of 
two hypocrites. McCauley had already received instructions to 
abandon the place, burning and destroying what he could not take 
away. The Confederate general had his instructions to capture the 
yard, and troops were already on the march to attack it. 

As soon as Taliaferro left, the gates were locked, extra sentinels 
posted to prevent citizens from discovering what was going on, and 
then every man in the yard set to work to carry out the plan already 
matured. The Pawnee and Cumberland were the only two vessels 
which could be made use of, and all articles of a portable nature 
were carried aboard as fast as possible. In this way most of the 
small arms, many small cannon, all the books and records and 
models and various other things were saved. But the chief loss to 
the Federals would result from what could not be moved in a few 
brief hours. 

There were four or five fine vessels in various stages of completion, 
and two afloat. Just then those ships were worth millions in the 
North — tens of millions to the Soutli — Init neither were to profit 
by them. 

McCauley intended to destroy everything and then slip out like a 
fugitive from justice. Had Dupont, Dahlgren or Porter been in 
command there would have been a fight, ;ind when forced to evacu- 
ate, the Federal forces would liave played the guns of the Pawnee 
upon everything in reach. Instructions from Washington at that 
time were suggestions, guesses and suppositions, and McCauley 
could have taken the same coarse as Major Anderson did. 

But there was to be no figliting. The man who had a chance to 
become a hero preferred to be a deceiver. Within half an hour 
after he had agreed to hold things in statti quo until further orders, 
the two ships afloat were being scuttled and property Avas being 
hurried aboard the Pawnee. The capstans, windlasses, and other 
fixtures on the vessels were rendei-ed useless, standing-rigging, 
destroyed, and so many holes were bored through the bottoms that 
it was hoped they could never be raised from the deep. 

There was the grand old Pennsylvania, carrying guns enough to 
have replied to every piece of ordnance thus far mounted by the 
Confederates — the Columbus — the Merrimac — the Raritan — the 
Delaware, and the Dolphin, together with two or three half-finished 
cutters and frigates yet unnamed, and four or five vessels to be 
repaired. No plan was proposed or discussed to save one of these, 



156 THE ABANDONMENT OF NOEFOLK NAVY YARD. 

although the Pawnee could have towed them out one by one in 
spite of any hindrance from the Confederates. 

The ships which could not be scuttled were to be burned. 
Cabins, forepeaks, and holds were filled with wood and coal, and 
the hulks on the stocks were smeared with turpentine and oil and 
piled around with cordwood. With each hulk would go the ship- 
liouse, and with the ship-house all the sails, cordage, and such material 
as had been stored up or could be dragged there. 

When the destruction of the ships had been insured, attention was 
turned to the various buildings in the yard. Most of these were of 
brick and of the most substantial sort, and only a part of the furni- 
ture could be removed. The machinery in the bakeries was broken 
up, desks and chairs knocked to pieces for kindling-wood, and two 
or three small engines destroyed. Then bonfires were prepared in 
the various houses, and for fear that the flames might not complete 
the destruction intended, kegs of powder were placed here and 
there, as was afterwards done at Pensacola by the Confederates. 

Although the commandant had only about twenty hours in which 
to begin and finish his task it was time enough to work appalling 
destruction. At dark it was known throughout Xorfolk and Ports- 
mouth that the two ships liad been scuttled and that something 
unusual was occurring in the navy yard, but the Confederates 
were not yet ready for a movement. It was not anticipated that 
the place would be abandoned, and no one dreamed that possession 
could be had without resistance and bloodsiied. 

The afternoon wore away and evening came, and still every man 
in the yard was hard at work. It was intended to drive a rat-tail 
file into the vent of every cannon, and thus render them at least 
temporarily useless to the Confederates, but in the haste of doing 
so much this enterprise was not carried out, nor was the fixed am- 
munition thrown into the water, as contemplated. 

The ship-ways, basins and dry docks were damaged as much as 
possible, the spars and timbers prepared for burning, and by ten 
o'clock there was little more to do before applying the torch and 
sailing away. 

Tiie great powder magazine, containing tons of various grades of 
powder, was in charge of a single sentinel — a petty officer named 
Oliver, who had been in the United States service as man and boy 
for upwards of twenty years. On that eventful day he was still a 
Union man, and was ready to obey every order from his superior. 



THE ABANDONMENT OF NOliFOLK NAVY YAKP. 



157 



He had been given no special instructions, nor did he know at dark 
that the place was to be abandoned. 

In the evening, as Oliver sat at the supper table surrounded by 
his children — his wife being dead— there suddenly came the tramp 
of many feet and he found himself a prisoner to a band of thirty 
or forty of the Norfolk Fire Department. It was a band which 
had volunteered for this very duty, and their appearance was a com- 
plete surprise. 

Oliver surrendered only after he had been overpowered and bound, 
and his captors eonld neither coax nor threaten him into giving up 
the key of the magazine. Axes were brought and the doors cut 
away, and the powder went to Richmond and was served out to 
fight the battle of Bull Run. 

Tlie magazine was captured before ten o'clock in the evening, or 
two hours before the Pawnee steamed away. At any moment 
during this interval she could have trained her guns upon the spot 
and driven the Confederates away, but she did not make a move, 
much to their astonishment. But for that powder Beauregard 
would have had to fall back from Bull Run, perhaps to Richmond, 
without a battle. Such a movement might have changed the com- 
plexion of the entire campaign, and the first battle fought might 
have resulted in a crushing Confederate defeat. 

An hour before midnight the loading of the Pawnee and Cum- 
berland had been finished, and the marines and employees filed 
aboard. Citizens of Xorfolk and Portsmouth had heard of the cap- 
ture of the powder, and were assembling in excited crowds, but no 
one could secure information as to what action McCauley intended 
to take. Being an old oflicer, it was generally believed that he 
would fight, and the assertion that he would abandon the post with- 
out firing a musket would liave been resented even by his enemies. 
Tlie guards were kept at their stations until a quarter of twelve, 
and then withdrawn very quietly and detailed to light the various 
fires. 

Ten minutes was time enough to apply the torch to everything 
prepared, and before the first blaze had thrown its light over the 
yard every soul was aboard the vessels. In ten minutes more, after 
seeing that the destruction would be complete, the Pawnee steamed 
away for Fortress Monroe, the Cumberland following in tow. It 
was not until the midnight heavens were alight with the angry 
flames that the Confederates realized what had taken place and 



158 THE ABANDONMENT OF NORFOLK NAVY YARD. 

was then occurring. Then a grand rush was made for the navy 
yard. 

The Federal commander h;id made sure work with liis incendiary 
torches. The Confederates ruslied in to find hulks and storehouses 
and offices in flames beyond any hopes of salvation. Men rushed 
here and there, seeking to save what could be dragged out, but as the 
mines which had been prej)ared began to explode the excited popu- 
lace were forced to fall back and become spectatoi's of a scene full 
of grandeur and desolation. Everytliing was dry as tinder, and 
the flames took hold fiercely and towered aloft until the white-caps 
rolling into the bay changed color to blood-red, and the sentinels at 
Fortress Monroe stood aghast to see midnight turned into day by the 
awful reflection. 

All the remainder of the night and far into the next day the 
flames continued their work of destruction, but what was saved to 
the Confederates was of inestimable value just then. It was a work 
of little magnitude to raise the Merrimae, which afterwards became 
the celebrated iron-clad ram, and within ninety daj's many of the 
cannon were thundering defiance at Federal forces hundreds of miles 
away. 

Tlie North was indignant over the way Norfolk had been given 
up, and it was ever a matter of regret with the government. There 
was a slur, too, in the commandant agreeing to a truce and then 
going to work to burn and destroy. Had McCauley defied the Con- 
federates he could have held them at bay for tiiree or four days at 
least, and had the government backed his spirit with reinforcements, 
who can say that Bull Run would have been a Union defeat, the 
Meri-imac ever rebuilt, or Norfolk become a Confederate strong- 
hold ? 




goto tlj^ Jfdtr tocre litcobeni). 




• ARDLT had the civil war closed before steps were taken 
to establish national cemeteries adjacent to great battle 
fields for the re-interment of the Federal dead ; and 
Southern people, to their great honor, though utterly 
impoverished, collected their dead as far as possible and 
gave the bones a resting place in grounds donated for the purpose. 
The sentiment of the country to-day would let the dead in blue 
and gray sleep side by side. 

The idea of gathering all the Federal dead together at certain 
points seemed at first an utter impossibility. Men had been covered 
by the sod in every State in the South, and there was not a high- 
way in some of the States without a grave to almost every rod of 
pike. But the work was long ago accomjjlished by both Fedei-al 
and Confederate hands, and the cities of the soldier dead, visit 
them where you may, are and will always remain points of deepest 
interest. 

Of course the greater portion of the dead at Antietam were 
killed right there on the battle field, and the work of resurrecting 
the skeletons and transporting them to the graves in wliich they 
now rest was compai-atively easy, although by no means pleasant. 
When those in the near vicinity had been removed, wagons were 
sent out for a distance of twenty miles. Those who were buried 
at Halltown, Shepardstown, Hagerstown, and other points within 
reach, were resurrected and conveyed to Antietam. 

It was generally supposed that all who fell in battle were identi- 
fied by the burial parties, or at least tlie greater number, but such 
was far from being the case. Many of McClellan's dead at Sharps- 
burg were dropped into the trenches without the least effort to dis- 
cover their identity, and hundreds more had their names written 
on slips of paper pinned to their clothing. Time had reduced the 
paper to mold and dust, and unless a finger ring or a button could 
furnish a clue, the bones had to be buried as "unknown." But for 

[159] 



160 HOW THE DEAD WERE ITNCOVEEED. 

the gross carelessness of certain officers it would now be possible 
to find the grave of almost every Federal soldier who fell in battle. 
At least ninety-nine soldiers out of every hundred had note boolc, 
wallet, watch, key-tag, Testainent, or something from which his 
name could be learned with little trouble, and there was no excuse 
for burying him without a search. In one part of the field at 
Antietam, the dead were placed side by side in tlie trenches, each 
one's name plainly written and inclosed in a bottle, and canvas 
covei'ed over the bodies before the dirt was heaped on. These 
bodies were rapidly handled, but in other cases the diggers had to 
search among the dirt and mold and bones for a clue even to the 
division to which the dead belonged. What is said here of Antie- 
tam applies equally well to all other battle fields. A shameful neg- 
lect of plain duty has given up a big corner of every national cem- 
etery to the " unknown " dead. 

At Winchester ai"e collected tiie dead from half a dozen of the 
battlefields in the valley, and from a hundred skirmishes between 
Staunton and Harper's Ferry. The Federal cemetery is situated 
just out of town on the Berryville pike, and the Confederate dead 
are buried in the city cemetery close by. Both grounds shook with 
the turmoil of battle in the struggle between Sheridan and Early. 
Where the headstones have been planted for tlie Federal dead, 
Early made a last fierce stand against Sheridan during the battle of 
Winchester. Where the Confederate dead sleep tlieir last sleep 
and the marble figure of Stonewall Jackson overlooks all, bullets 
clipped the headstones of those who were buried there years 
before, and the soldiers rested their muskets on the grass-grown 
graves as they fought at bay. 

Hiding out towards Malvern Hill from Richmond, one finds the 
National Cemetery strangely located in the woods — a dismal, lonely 
location, and one attracting but few sight-seers. Between that spot 
and the battle field are a dozen beautiful locations for such a cem- 
etery, and one can but wonder what influence passed them all by. 
Outside of the hundreds who fell at Malvern Hill, there are buried 
here hundreds who died at Harrison's Landing and other points, of 
disease and wounds. Indeed, some of the bodies were transported 
thirty miles. 

Many of the dead at Chaneellorsville were reburied at Fred- 
ericksburg, together with those who fell at Ely's and Germania 
fords. From this point wagons were dispatched twenty-five and 
thirty miles to bring in bodies buried here and there by the I'oad- 



HOW THE DEAD WEEE UNCOVERED. 161 

side. Many a poor fellow who gave up his life in a skirmish at 
some crossroads and was hastily buried while the column waited, 
has been resui'rected to sleep his last sleep where his comrades lie 
thickest. One has but to walk up and down the graveled streets 
of these cities of the soldier-dead to see what brigades and regi- 
ments were foremost in the fray. Here a captain of a New York 
company has grouped around hira thirty — forty — even fifty of the 
brave men who followed him into the charge and fell beside him. 
Here is Michigan — there Ohio, further on Illinois and Indiana 
with their sacrifices, and the names of battles engraven on the mar- 
ble stones will thrill the blood of him who reads them fifty years 
hence. 

It is an unpleasant reflection, but the contractors who exhumed 
and reburied the bodies were paid so much for each, and this led to 
base trickery and worse frauds. Cofiins were furnished for each 
"subject," and in scores of cases two and thz-ee bodies were made 
to fill from four to six coffins. In opening the battle field trenches, 
" about so much " was averaged off to represent a corpse, and was 
duly cofiined up and taken to the cemetery. One of the men who 
had assisted to resurrect over six thousand corpses told me that he 
had often seen three skulls in one coffin. In other instances three 
or four coffins would be filled with bones and dirt. The idea was 
to hurry the work as fast as possible, and make as much money as 
possible, and it was not always that the diggers would stop to look 
for the identification of the skeleton before them. Military reports 
gave the names of those wlio fell in this or that battle, and there is 
cause to believe that they were called into use to give names to 
headstones covering no one knows what poor fellow's bones. The 
more corpses, the more coffins ; the more coffins, the more head- 
stones; the more graves, the more pay. That was the scale on which 
all worked, and if all did not get rich out of their contracts it was 
not the fault of the government. 

In uncovering the bodies the diggers found plenty of evidences 
of reckless and hasty burials. Many of the cemeteries have glass 
cases filled with rusty watches, rings, keys, medals, knives and other 
articles taken from the dead, and yet the cemeteries did not secure 
a hundredth part of these rusty treasures. Gold and silver watches, 
often in good order, were appropriated by the diggers, and in more 
than one instance they captured sums of gold and silver. 

A curious story is told of a body uncovered at Chancellorsville. 
The poor fellow had crawled into a thicket to die of his wounds. 

Vol. I.— 11 



162 HOW THE DEAD WEEE UNCOVEEED. 

and though the Confederates held the field and buried our dead, 
they did not discover the body in the bushes. Only when the 
Fedci-als, years after, were gathering up the dead for reburial did 
one of the party stumble upon the moldy blue cloth covering the 
wasting skeleton. A gold watch was the first valuable secured, 
and upon opening the back case this much of a will was found 
written in pencil, and perhaps during the darkness of night : 

" If niy body is found by Federals I want my watch and money 
sent to my wife." 

Who was his wife ^ Who was the soldier? Had the body been 
discovered directly after the battle the name would doubtless have 
been found with it, but now there was nothing left but blackened 
bones and moldy fragments. Tliere was no money, but there was 
a handful of black mold wliich had once represented greenbacks — 
perhaps a large sum. 

Few soldiers are sanguine enough to believe that all the Federal 
dead were gathered into the cemeteries, altliough the contractors 
had every inducement to hunt them out and bring them in. Every 
highway in northern Virginia has its forgotten graves of men sud- 
denly stricken down and hastily buried by those who could not 
have recognized the spot a week afterwards. The same is true of 
portions of Tennessee, Missouri, Mississippi, Arkansas and other 
States. And those riddled by canister and shattered by shell and 
buried in one horrible mass of blood and shreds — -what of them? 
The Potomac river has never given up a tenth of its dead. So 
"with the Mississippi and other streams. 

And yet it was a grand, nol)le thought alike in Union and Con- 
federate, to search out the dead of war and give them burial in 
some sacred spot, over which men may walk with uncovered heads 
as they remember the fierce cries of war and realize the blessings 
of peace. They sleep peacefully and well, whether there is a name 
on tlie tombstone or not — only to be awakened on that day 
when the names of men shall count for nothins'. 



%\}t f arbar flefrnsfs of tijc Conffkrac^. 




NE aboard of a vessel on Charleston bar, looking up 
the harbor would have said in 1861 that no vessel 
ever constructed could run the gauntlet to the city. 
Uncle Sam had long prided himself that that harbor 
at least was impregnable to foreign foe, and had there 
been no war at home he might so flatter himself to this day. 
Fort Sumter was built to knock wooden ships to pieces. In turn, 
iron ships were built to knock Fort Sumter to pieces. The Ameri- 
can rebellion not only taught America a lesson in war, but it 
instructed the whole world. 

The lirst gun of the war being fired in Charleston harbor, and 
that seaport being the most valuable in the South, it was but 
natural for the Confederates to infer that the Federals would 
make the most determined efforts to possess that strongliold. 
Outside of all sentiment in the case, it was tlie great port for 
blockade runners, and had it been captured in 1862 or a year later 
there would have been no need of Siierman's march to the sea. 

Its haste to begin the war saved Cliarleston to the Confederacy. 
Had Anderson evacuated Sumter as he did Moultrie, it is not prob- 
able that any further defenses would have been erected. The 
Confederates would have argued just as tlie government has always 
argued, that the two forts were ample protection. So they would 
have been until the first iron-clad came out, and then it would 
have been too late to take the needful steps. To reduce Sumter, 
Fort Moultrie was strengthened, a floating battery constructed, and 
several dirt forts erected just where they afterwards proved the 
worst kind of eye-sores to the Federals. 

When the iron-clads came out they found Charleston harbor not 
only defended by the most impregnable earth-works, but in posses- 
sion of fine ordnance and artillerists who had learned the science 



of long-range firing. 



(1631 



164: THE HAEBOR DEFENSES OF THE COMFEDEEACY. 

The time had then gone by when the Confederates were willing to 
take any chances, and they at once began further harbor defenses. 
Forts Sumter and Moultrie had been repaired and strengthened, and 
eight other forts and batteries erected between the city and the bar. 
Every buoy has been removed in the channels, and the channels 
obstructed. Across the i-ight-hand channel was a cable supported 
by casks, and to the cable were hung ropes, nets, torpedoes, and what- 
ever else could be thought of. The left-hand channel was filled with 
piles driven into the bottom, and projecting six or eight feet out of 
the water. In the center was a passage forty feet wide, defended by 
torpedoes containing twelve hundred pounds of powder. Seven 
or eight heavy guns could be trained on this one spot at rifle range. 
Half a mile above the first row was a second, and above that a third, 
and the ship which might safely pass all would then be under the 
fire of the Confederate iron-clads. No craft ever built and no 
commander ever born would have dared such a passage. Had the 
war endured for a score of years Charleston could never have been 
captured from the water side. That it was not taken from the other 
side on at least three different occasions is still a matter of surprise 
to the Confederates who were defending it. Like Richmond, it was 
a great bugaboo to the Federals, and like Richmond it escaped cap- 
ture time after time when the right soi't of movement would have 
brought victory without scarcely an attempt at defense. 

While the Yankee must be credited with upsetting the world's 
notions of ordnance and ship-bnilding, having shown that a monitor 
and two guns had every advantage of a line-of-battle ship loaded 
down with old-fashioned muzzle-loaders, the Southerner is entitled 
to the credit of showing the world how to obstruct harbors and 
make use of torpedoes. Both the iron-clad and the torpedo will 
play equally important parts in all wars to come for the next two 
hundred years. America is to-day almost solely dependent on the 
torpedo to protect her coast and harbors, and those who fully under- 
stand the nature of that weapon of war are satisfied that it is a safe 
protection. 

Having no navy of its own, the sight of Federal vessels float- 
ing their rivers and blockading their harbors naturally forced the 
Confederacy to cast al)ont for some destructive agent to come to 
their assistance. Torpedoes had not been sufficiently studied to 
warrant success, but it was not long before they were in use in a 
dozen forms. It was clear enough to every one that if a large 
quantity of powder could be exploded under or against a vessel 



THE HAEBOE DEFENSES OF THE CONFEDERACY. 165 

afloat serious damage must ensue; but liow to get tlie powder 
there was the serious question. 

Among the first, if not the very first, torpedoes planted, were 
those in the James River. Tlie Federals scouted the idea at 
first, but after two or three terrible calamities had been brought 
about through the explosion of these hidden monsters, no Federal 
«raft feared the dangers of land so much as it did the hidden dan- 
gers of the water over which she sailed. 

One of the first Federal victims on the James was a transport 
loaded with forage. She was steaming swiftly on her way when all 
of a sudden she rose several feet in the air, broke in two before she 
came down, and sunk out of sigiit before one could have counted 
ten. She had struck a four-gallon demijohn filled with powder. 
Her destruction was followed by that of several others, and by and 
by it became a part of the duty of the crew of an armed vessel to 
take small boats and hunt out these monsters, and many of the iron- 
clads were furnished with grapnels to fish them np. 

The first efforts at torpedo warfare were crude enough. The 
torpedo itself was a demijohn or a keg, and the design was to fire it by 
percussion. Not one out of eight were of any value. The powder 
would get damp, or the torpedo would be carried away, or some- 
thing would occur to render it useless. A Confederate who helped 
to plant torpedoes in the James told me that he saw one 
explode after a steamer had passed over it and was a hundred feet 
beyond. The explosion threw a column of water fifty feet high 
and ran a wave over two feet high along the shores for a mile. 
Had the explosion occurred under the steamer she would have 
been lifted high in the air and destroyed. 

When the Confederates called electricity to their aid their torpe- 
does became a real terror, and the wonder is that the Federals did 
not lose ten vessels where one was actually destroyed. It is no 
wonder, either, when one comes to understand what difilculties con- 
fronted the Confederacy whenever anything out of the ordinary 
line was demanded. In building a ship at New Orleans the anchors 
had to be sent from Charleston, some of the bolts from Richmond, 
and other things were forwarded from Wilmington or had to run 
the blockade from Liverpool. It was as much of a task for the 
Confederates to make a torpedo holding six hundred pounds of pow- 
der as it was for the Federals to plate a gun-boat. If they had had 
the wealth and conveniences of the North, no Federal gun-boat 
could have passed up or down, their rivers or anchored off their 



Itj6 THE HARBOR DEFENSES OF THE CONFEDERACY. 

harbors. The Confederacy would have planted a hundred of the 
monsters where she actually planted one. 

In December, 1862, as the gun-boat Cairo was steaming up the 
Yazoo River to attack the works at Drumgool's Bluff, she lan afoul 
of an electric torjjedo and was sent to the bottom in six minutes. 
Tliat river for the space of a dozen miles was defended l^y tiiese 
monsters. The torpedo itself was notliing more tlian a demijohn 
full of powder, ancliored three or four feet below the surface. Tlie 
float was a log, and this was anchored or held in place by a rope 
running to the bank of eitlier sliore. By pulling or slackening 
these lines the torpedo could be held at any desired distance from 
the surface. Anything striking the line on eitlier side sent the gal- 
vanic spark straight to the powder. 

Had a battery of six guns been discharged at the Cairo, and all 
the missiles struck in one spot, the damage could hardly have been 
greater. A hole large enough to back a buggy into was torn open 
in her bows, all her heavy guns upset on their backs, the boilers 
lifted off tlieir beds, nearly every man knocked down, and several 
severely injured ; and there was not time to save a tliing'before she 
went down in twenty-five feet of water. Thus, in six minutes, at 
less than fifty dollars expense, the Confederates destroyed over 
three hundred thousand dollars worth of Feder^al property, and 
cleared the river of a much-dreaded gun-boat, besides sending forth 
a warning which made the remainder of the fleet timid for weeks. 

On several other occasions on that same river Federal vessels had 
narrow escapes from following the Cairo to the bottom, and the tor- 
pedo-terror prevented many movements which might have been 
made at night. 

Mobile Bay, at the tiine of Farragut's attack, had at least a dozen 
torpedoes planted in the channel, and although only one exploded, 
the consequences were appalling. That was an electric torpedo sus- 
pended by two buoys. As the iron-chids moved to the attack the 
Tecumseh ran afoul of this torpedo. It appeared to the Confederates 
who saw what followed that she was lifted thirty feet high, accom- 
panied by such a mass of water that it seemed as if she was about 
to sail away in a water-spout. When she dropped back the shock 
must have shattered her into sections, for she went down like a 
cannon-ball. Every gun was overthrown, most of the crew knocked 
senseless, and at least a third of the bottom of the craft was torn 
away. Four-fifths of the crew went to the bottom with the Tecum- 
seh, many of them dead before the waters closed over them. It 



THE HAEBOR DEFENSES OP THE COISITEDEEAOT. 167 

has been asserted that tlie Tecumseh carried a torpedo into the figlit 
to use against the ram Tennessee, and that this monster doubled 
back under her bottom and exploded. Farragut makes no mention 
of any such torpedo in his official report, and the Confederates who 
planted the infernal machine in the channel saw the Tecumseh lifted 
just as she reached the spot. 

It was calculated by Confederate authorities that the torpedoes 
planted in Mobile Bay alone destroyed three million five hundred 
thousand dollars worth of Federal property and four hundred and 
eighty lives. Something like fifteen vessels altogether were blown 
up and totally destroyed, and out of this number three were first-class> 
iron-clads. 

Dozens of chimerical plans were j^roposed for the destruction of 
the blockading fleets, and there were many dismal failures. One 
plan was to string torpedoes on a long rope suspended by buoys and 
let the affair drift down across the bows of the ships. This might 
have worked in a narrow river with a swift current, but it was a 
failure in the harbors. The line would foul or be carried to one side, 
or in some other manner render its freight harmless. Scores of 
floating torpedoes were sent down with the tide in hopes tliey might 
inflict damage, but it only one or two instances did they pay for the 
wasted powder. ''On one of the Western rivers a Federal gun-boat 
one day fired into one of these floaters, and, thougli pistol-shot away 
from it, tlie explosion shook the vessel until she groaned, and flooded 
her decks with muddy water. 

Later on in the war both Nortli and South made use of a torpedo 
fastened to a spar which projected from the bow of the boat and 
could be exploded fi'om inboard at tlie right moment. Tlie spar 
and its heavy weight in the water was a terrible load on a ship, and 
only in a few instances did the invention meet with success. 

Shortly after the new Ironsides had taken her station before 
Charleston, the Confederates bronglit out the torpedo-ljoat which 
now lies in the Brooklyn Navy Yard among the relics. The 
" Devil," as it was afterwards known, was a baby monitor, showing 
scarcely an inch above the surface and carrying no smoke-stack. 
When sighted from the deck of a vessel it was mistaken for a flsh. 
A Confederate naval commander named Glassel ran this boat out of 
Charleston one nigiit with a torpedo and spar at her bow, having 
only men enough to work her. The Ironsides was at anchor, and 
he steamed straight at her. The boat made no more commotion 
than a sliark would have created, and the Ironsides was struck 



168 THE HAKBOB DKKENSES OF THE CONFEDERACY. 

before any one had a suspicion of the character of the strange 
vesseL 

The torpedo-boat ran fall at the great ship and exploded the tor- 
pedo fairly under her. The ship was not lifted, but was swayed to 
one side as if suddenly pushed, most of her guns upset, her crew 
thrown about, dozens of beams and braces broken, and sucii damage 
in general created tliat she had to leave the station at once for an 
overhauling. The explosion threw a colnran of water fifty feet 
high, almost drowning tiie vessel, and this very fact created dis- 
aster to the launch. Siie was buried three feet under water, rolled 
about like a fish, and some of the light stuff blown overboard from 
the Ironsides fouled her machinery at the same time her fires 
were drowned out. Thus incapable of motion, and right under the 
fire of the marines, the boat was obliged to surrender. 

Had the South used her gold to buy and plant torpedoes, instead of 
equipping privateers she might have shown their power for defense 
and destruction to a far greater extent, and probably inflicted fully 
as much loss in dollars and cents. Her privateers damaged only the 
public at large ; her torpedoes damaged the enemy at her doors. 
Poor as she was, and laboring under the difficulties she did, she 
brought the torpedo problem to such a point as to destroy in the 
last two and a half years of the war over sixty Federal vessels, at 
least twenty of which were armed crafts. The loss footed up 
millions of dollars, and the cost was a mere nothing. The new 
ordnance and new projectiles are making their mark in war, but 
tiie torpedo will be eventually empowered to say liow near a 
ship may approach a fort, and whether an armed craft may enter 
a river or harbor at all. 




O^ctentricitics of Ihillets, 




^T the battle of Peach Orchard when McClellan was 
making his change of base, a Michigan infantryman 
fell to the ground as if shot stone dead, and was left 
lying in a heap as the regiment changed position. The 
ball which hit him, first struck the barrel of his gun, 
glanced and struck a button of his coat, tore the watch out of his 
vest pocket, and then struck the man just over the heart, and was 
stopped there by a song book in his shirt pocket. He was uncon- 
scious for three quarters of an hour, and it was a full month before 
the black and bine spot disappeared. At Pittsburg Landing, a 
member of the Twelfth Michigan regiment of infantry stooped to 
give a wounded man a drink from his canteen. While in the act, a 
bullet, aimed at his breast, struck the canteen, turned aside, passed 
through the body of a man and buried itself in the leg of a horse. 
The canteen was split open, and dropped to the ground in halves. 
At the second battle of Bull Run, as a jSTew York infantryman was 
passing his plug of tobacco to a comrade, a bullet struck the plug, 
glanced off, and buried itself in a knapsack. The tobacco was 
rolled up like a ball of shavings, and carried a hundred feet away. 
Directly in the line of the bullet was the head of a lieutenant, and 
had not the bullet been deflected, he would certainly have received 
it. As it was, he had both eyes tilled with tobacco dust, and had 
to be led to the rear. At Brandy Station, one of Custer's troopers 
had his left stirrup-strap cut away by a grape-shot, which passed 
between his leg and the horse, blistering his skin as if a red-hot iron 
had been used. He dismounted to ascertain the extent of his 
injuries, and as he bent ovei', a bullet knocked his hat off and killed 
his horse. In the same fight was a trooper who had suffered several 
days with a toothache. In a hand to hand fitcht he received a pistol 
ball in his right cheek. It knocked out his aching double tooth and 
passed out of the left hand corner of his mouth, taking along a part 
of an upper tooth. The joy of being rid of the toothache was so 

[169] 



17U ECCKNTKICITIES OF BULLETS. 

great that the trooper could not be made to go to the rear tu have 
his wound dressed. An object however trifling will turn the 
bullet from its true course. This was shown one day at tlie 
remount camp in Pleasant Valley. They had a "bull pen" there 
in which about live hundred bounty- jumpers and otlier hard cases 
were under guard. Once in a wliile one of tliese men would make 
a break for liberty. Every sentinel in position would open tire, 
and it did not matter in tlie least if the man ran toward the crowded 
camp. On this occasion tlie prisoner ran for the camp, and as 
many as six shots were fired at him without effect. One of the 
bullets entered the tent of a captain in the Twelfth Pennsylvania 
cavalry. He was lying down, and the course of the bullet would 
have buried it in his chest. Fortunately for him, a candle by which 
he was reading sat on a stand between him and where the bullet 
entered. This was struck and cut square in two, and the lighted 
end dropped to the floor without being snuffed out. The ball was 
deflected, and buried in the pillow under the officer's head, passed 
out of that and through his tent into the one behind it, thence 
between two men, and brought up against a camp kettle. There is 
in Detroit, Michigan, a man who was wounded five times in less 
than ten minutes, at Fair Oaks. The first bullet entered his left 
arm ; the second gave him a scalp wound ; the third hit him in the 
foot ; the fourth buried itself in his shoulder; the fifth entered his 
right leg. While he was being carried to the rear, his bearers 
were killed. While his wounds were being dressed an exploded 
shell almost buried him under an avalanche of dirt. In being 
removed further to the rear, a runaway ambulance horse carried 
him half a mile and dumped him out, and yet he is seemingly hale 
and hearty, and walks without a limp. 

At the battle of Perryville, when the Fifth Wisconsin battery 
came into action one of the guns threw a solid shot which struck 
a soldier full in the breast, crushing him to a pulp. His nnisket 
flew to the rear, whirling savagely through the air, and it crushed 
the skull of one soldier and badly injured another. Tlie shot 
deflected to the left after striking the first man, and then it 
crushed a lieutenant's hip, broke the leg of a private behind him, 
and rolled along the ground and crushed the head of a wounded 
man. A shell fired by Sloan's battery struck a stone weighing 
about fifty pounds, and while the shell failed to explode, the 
fragments of stone killed and wounded several men. A Confed- 
erate shell which fell among Jackson's men alighted in a little 



ECCENTKICITIES OF BULLETS. 171 

creek at which scores of men were tilling their canteens. It came 
down in a group of ten or twelve men and plunged into the 
very spot where a canteen had just been tilled. While the shell 
did not explode, its fall splashed water over tifty men. An ex- 
Confederate captain now living in Atlanta who lost his arm in 
that battle, had a button cut from his breast by a grape-shot, his 
scabbard struck by a bullet, and his cap knocked from his head 
by a piece of shell before receiving the bullet which crushed his 
elbow. A gun in one of Anderson's batteries had a right hind 
wheel shivered by a solid shot. It had scarcely been replaced by the 
spare wheel when another shot crushed the left wheel. The men 
were trying to drag the gun back when a shell struck it fair in the 
mouth and split it for a distance of three feet. None of the men 
around the gun were hurt by this shell, but three soldiers in line 
over two hundred feet away were struck down. A Confederate 
shell sent into Stedman's brigade exploded over the heads of a com- 
pany advancing, and while no one in that company was hurt, fonr 
men in the center of the next company behind were mortally 
wounded. 




minute aiilr Monitor. 




NE dark night closely following the fall of Fort Sum- 
ter the United States soldier in charge of the powder 
magazine at Norfolk was treated to a surprise. A 
dozen members of the Norfolk Fire Department 
entered his quarters and informed him that he was 
a prisoner. The name of that sentinel was C. B. Oliver, and, 
although now a man of sixty, he is in good health, and is the trusted 
Janitor of the Exchange National Bank of Norfolk. He had then 
served in the navy over thirty years, and was gunner of the United 
States frigate Germantown. She had returned from a cruise in 
June, 1860, and he had been detailed in charge of the magazine. 
His wife was dead, but he had his children with him, and they were 
eating supper when the summons came. 

But Oliver stoutly refused to give up the keys to the magazine, 
and, in the confusion, managed to secrete it where it could not be 
found. While he was put under guard, men procured axes and 
crow-bars and broke down the doors and set about the removal of 
the powder. While they were engaged in this work the United 
States ship of war Pawnee came sailing into the navy yard on her 
mission of destruction. If Oliver could have signalled her she 
would have made short work of the rabble, but a strict watch pre- 
vented any movement on his part. Nearl}' all the firemen in Nor- 
folk were that evening engaged in taking out the three hundred 
thousand pounds of powder, and much of it was in Richmond the 
next morning. It was this powder which the Confederate troops 
used at first Bull Run. 

Oliver had long served with Lieutenant Jones, of the navy, and 
when the officer forsook his colors, the gunner followed him into 
the Confederate navy, and was again placed in charge of the maga- 
zine under a new flag. There he remained until assigned to the 

[172] 



THE MEEEIMAO AND MONITOR. 173 

Merrimae. He was ordered to her long before she was ready for 
sea, and as a matter of fact he helped to mount her guns. 

The Merrimae was the hull of a shijJ of war of that name which 
was burned to the water's edge when the navy yard was destroyed ; 
but wiio first conceived the idea of the iron-clad ram has been lost 
in the lapse of time. It was an experiment in which few believed 
and only a few hoped for great results. For this reason the work 
was not pushed, and again the plans were so vague that the Trede- 
gar Works had great difficulty in sending down what was wanted. 
Two or three times during her progress the Confederate govern- 
ment came near ordering all further work to cease. 

When the Merrimae was all ready for sea a call for volunteers 
was made to man her. She was still looked upon as a suspicious 
experiment, and no man was taken into iier by orders. She was 
largely manned by men who had seen service afloat, but her last 
thirty volunteers were from the Norfolk Heavy Artillery, Captain 
Thomas Kevil commanding. Tlie Captain is now and has been for 
many years Chief of the Norfolk Fire Department, and his stand- 
ing as a citizen is above question. He had cliarge of one of the 
nine-inch guns during the two days' fight, and he saw as much of 
both actions as any man living. 

Tiie Merrimae was armed with eight broadside guns, the lightest 
of which was a six inch rifled. She had a bow and a stern gun 
which weiglied fifteen thousand pounds each, and each was worked 
by twenty-five men. The broadside guns required fourteen men 
to each. Her total crew footed up at least two hundred and fifty 
men. All her ammunition was shell with the exceptio!) of a few 
solid shot to be used hot. The gunner was the Oliver before men- 
tioned, and his station was in the magazine. 

On the way down to tlie Roads to make her debut before the 
Federal fleet, it was found that tlie Merrimae steered so hard that 
four men had to be called to the wheel. This was because her rud- 
der chains worked at flve different angles, and to this fact is attrib- 
uted in part her failure to reach the Minnesota, and to destroy the 
Monitor. After her two fights the chains were altered so that three 
of the angles were dispensed with, and she then steered with one 
man at the wheel as freely as any tug. She plowed the water on 
an even keel, drawing about twenty-three feet, and not one single 
man among her crew was even nervous. Each one knew that tlie 
design was to attack the Federal fleet, and that the monster would 



m THE MERItlMAC AND MONITOE. 

meet with the hottest kind of a reception, but they laughed as they 
stood at their guns. 

It was Saturday, the eighth of March, 1862. As the Merrimac 
rounded Craney Island there lay the mighty Cumberland before 
her. All knew her for a gallant old ship, having the best battery 
aboard of any ship in the Federal navy. She lay idly rocking to 
the swells, boats at the booms and flag lazily floating in the light 
breeze, and the ii'on monster put on more steam and headed straight 
for her wooden-walled victim. 

The alarm was first given from the battery at Newport News, 
and was quickly taken up by tJie fleet. The Minnesota, the Roa- 
noke and five gun-boats advanced to meet the strange monster, 
making, with the Congress and Cumberland, a fleet of nine, and 
having ten times the armament of the Merrimac. 

The silence of death pervaded the rebel ram as she steamed on. 
Not a man spoke — not an order was given. It was understood by 
all that she was to dash into the Cumberland, and two hundred men 
looked from the open port-holes and almost forgot to breathe as the 
ram kept her course. Across the waters came the roll of the drum 
as the frigate beat to quarters, and three minutes later she swung 
broadside to, and pitched solid shot from twelve heavy guns full at 
her unknown enemy. Seven of them struck fair and square, but 
glanced off right and left. Without swerving a point from the 
course — without a cheer — without sign that she had life aboard, 
the Merrimac steamed onward. Another broadside, and yet 
another, from the doomed frigate, and then the monster struck her. 
Historians who say that the Merrimac fired a shot before she struck 
ai"e wrong. She fired her bow gun as she struck, and the man 
who fired it is still living. She was under such speed that the 
engines were reversed a full minute before the crash, else she 
would have cut her way to the other bulwark. When she backed 
out she left a yawning hole in tiie Cumberland, and she then lay 
off and used such of her guns as could be brought to bear until the 
frigate went down. 

The brave hearts in the old frigate fought to the last. Men who 
looked down upon her decks from the Merrimac tell me that there 
was no confusion — no shouting — no panic. Every man stood to 
his station, and even when the waters washed over her rail her guns 
were loaded and fired. Indeed, the last shot was fired from a gun 
half buried in the waves. Down she went, with over four hundred 



THE MEKRIMAC AND MONITOK. 175 

souls aboard, and of these over half were lost, -but she would not 
strike her tiag. 

Captain Kevil could look down upon the decks of the Cumber- 
land from his port-hole as the Merriuiac backed away and began 
firing. It was a sickening spectacle that met liis gaze. The shell 
had torn men to shreds and scattered arms, legs, and pieces of 
bloody flesh over the guns and even into the rigging. And yet 
there was no confusion. It was wash-day on board the Cumber- 
land, and long lines of shirts were hanging in the rigging over 
the men at the guns. The frigate was at anchor, wrapped in per- 
fect security, and had less than six minutes to prepare for action, 
and yet Kevil looked down upon her decks and saw every living 
man at his station, and every gun being worked as cooll}' as if the 
frigate's crew had fought a dozen previous actions. The men must 
have felt her going down under their feet, but no one deserted his 
post. Had the Merrimac been a seventy-four the Cumberland 
would have sunk her in ten minutes. 

Tlie Congress had opened fire from every gun which could be 
brought to bear, but tb.e amazed gunners saw their solid shot glance 
from the iron sides and sloping roof like filberts snapped against 
sheet iron. The third shot fired from the Cumberland struck the 
pilot-house of the Merrimac, flew a hundred feet straight into the 
air, and in its descent hit tlie roof and rolled off. 

As soon as the raui backed away from the Cumberland, the Con- 
gress slipped her cables and ran ashore. The Merrimac could not 
get M'ithin a mile of her, but, assisted by the Confederate wooden 
gun-boats, she soon made a wreck of the frigate. When the Con- 
gress hauled down her flag, two Confederate tugs and several small 
boats at once ran to her to take off the prisoners, and while engaged 
in this work and while two white flags were flying from the frigate, 
the Union shore batteries opened on the crowd. This is admitted 
in every Union history, but no historian has the courage to 
denounce the dastardly meanness of an act by which several Union 
prisoners were wounded while being transferred. It is charged by 
Confederates that they were also tired upon by the marines on the 
Congress. Those who deny the accusation can perhaps explain 
how the commander of the Merrimac and a dozen others were 
wounded by musket balls. At this act of treachery the tugs were 
withdrawn and the Congress was set on fire with hot shot and 
destroyed. 

By the time the Merrimac was through with the Congress the 



170 THE MEKRIMAC AND MONITOR. 

rest of the Federal fleet had run iinder the shelter of the batteries. 
The Minnesota would have followed, but unfortunately was aground. 
Darkness was now coming on, and the ram stationed herself so as 
to cut off the frigate's escape in case she should get afloat, and night 
settled down over the waters. 

Tiie Merrimac had been struck over a hundred times, and yet not 
a plate or a bolt had started. Her stem, whicli Headly and other 
historians describe as a terrible steel prow, was simply a mass of 
cast iron only fourteen inches thick, bolted to the stem timbers. 
It was in no wise a ram to cnish or a knife to cut, and Buchanan 
liad the word of all the mechanics at the yard that if he went head 
on against a vessel he would loosen this stem. When he crashed 
into tlie Cumberland he did loosen it, and all night long the Merri- 
mac liad to keep her pumps going to keep down the leak. 

All the guns had been mounted for point-blank firing. Tlieir 
elevation or depression was diificult and dangerous, and tlie ram had 
to secure a certain position in order to make her shot tell. This 
was the reason she did not attack the Minnesota after finishins tlie 
Congress. She drew more water than tlie frigate, and could not 
approach near enough to get the point-blank range. She had also 
steered very badly during the action, and had several times narrowly 
escaped running aground. 

The next morning would have witnessed the destruction of the 
Minnesota and all the other vessels in tlie Roads but for the arrival 
of the Monitor. The Confederates knew there was such a craft on 
tlie way down, and there was great curiosity to catch sight of her. 
She was as much of an enigma to the Merrimac as the Merrimac 
was to the Union fleet, and the opening of the fight was like the 
cautious sparring between two boxers. The Monitor had this ad- 
vantage: Her light draught enabled her to play all around her h\s 
antagonist, while the Merrimac with her deep draught, had a hard 
time to keep off the shoals. 

The first gun was fired by the Monitor, and the monster solid shot 
struck the ram witli a thud which was felt in every part of the ship. 
The Merrimac meant to run over her, and this feat was tried before 
she fired a shot. She did strike tlie " cheese-box," and she puslied 
her over until they tliought she was gone, but the prow of the ram 
slid off, the Monitor righted and then began the grandest fight those 
waters had ever witnessed. The little Monitor sailed round and 
round her antagonist, banging solid shot at her from every point, 
and the Merrimac used every gun which could be brought to bear. 



THE MKKKIMAC AND MOiNITuE. ITT 

In the action of the day before, shot and shell had beaten against 
the ram so rapidly that one could hardly have counted the concus- 
sions. Now it was a series of terrible concussions about a minute 
apart, and if the men had not been working their guns they would 
have heard the splintering of wood behind the heavy armor. 

In seeking to bring the bow gun to bear on tlie Monitor the ram 
ran aground , and at this critical juncture the Monitor made the 
circuit of her no less than three times, coolly looking for some weak 
point which a shot might pierce. In this circuit two of her shot 
struck the muzzles of two of the Merrimac's guns and broke pieces 
a foot long off their muzzles. One of these was the gun com- 
manded by Captain Kevil. It had just been loaded, and the con- 
cussion not only discharged it, but wheeled it into battery again 
unloaded. Pieces of the broken muzzle, as well as splinters from 
the solid shot, flew into the open port-hole, but without doing any 
damage. It was the damaged gun of Captain Kevil which sent the 
shell against the Monitor's look-out and blinded Lieutenant Worden. 

Every Federal historian closes his account of this engagement by 
having the Merrimac turn and retreat. Outside of the indignant 
denial of her crew, scores of Norfolk citizens, as well as a French 
sea captain who saw every movement, claim that the Monitor 
ceased fighting after Worden was blinded, and started for the cover 
of the shore guns. It is certain that the Merrimac had suffered 
no loss, her crew was full of fight, and there was no reason why she 
should have cried quits. 

Her disadvantages consisted in the difficulty of steering her, her 
deep draught, and the fact that she had no solid shot. She fought 
the Monitor with shells alone, and of course these were shivered 
when they struck her plates. Had she been provided with steel- 
pointed solid shot for her two large guns, the result might have been 
disastrous for the Monitor. When she returned to Norfolk her rudder- 
chains were altered, solid shot were taken aboard, and the damages 
inflicted by the Monitor were repaired in a day. Some of the shot 
had dented the iron and bulged the wooden planks behind. By the 
use of jack-screws these bulges were forced back and then stayed in 
place. I cannot find a single Federal historian willing to admit 
that the Merrimac fought under any disadvantages. They likewise 
carefully avoid mentioning that she had no shutters to her port- 
holes. Had this been the case with the Monitor she would not 
have remained above water ten minutes after the first gun was 
fired. 

Vol. L— 12 



178 THE MKKEIMAC AND MONITOR. 

When the ram went down into the Roads again, she meant 
fight. Pier plan was to run directly against the Monitor and throw 
a party of boarders on her deck. Tiiese men were provided with 
wedges to wedge the turret fast, and with hand-grenades and bags of 
powder to throw down her smoke-stack. Their first grapjDle was, 
however, to be their last. On more than one occasion the Merriraac 
defied the united fleet, Monitor and all, and was neve:- able to get 
another fight. On the eighth of May, while the Federals were 
slielling Sewell's Point from seven different vessels, two of them 
iron-clads, the sight of the Merriraac I'ounding Craney Island sent 
every vessel back to Old Point. 

Much has been written regarding the expectations of the Confed- 
erate government with the Merrimac. Slie would certainly have 
destroyed the fleet in the Roads, and perhaps had a fight with 
Fortress Monroe, but as for her going out along the coast, it was 
never dreamed of. She was lying off Tanner's Creek when the 
Confederates evacuated Norfolk, and the orders were to run her up 
the James River. She was lightered until her iron plates no longer 
protected her bottom, and yet she drew too much water for the 
river. She had no pilot for any other river or harbor, most of her 
ballast was gone, and it was decided to destroy her. 

The Merrimac was run ashore on Craney Island, her crew landed, 
and then Oliver, the gunner, set fire to her and laid a powder-train 
to her magazine. All her guns and ammunition were left aboard, 
and as the crew had a long march before them most of them left 
all baggage behind. Every gun was loaded and in battery when 
Oliver left, and the heavy doors of the magazine were thrown wide 
open. 

The crew had been on the march an hour when the explosion 
took place. Just in the gray of morning there came a terrible 
rumbling of the earth, followed by a shock which made them stag- 
ger. A column of smoke and flame shot up over the tree tops into 
the clouds, and from this fire-spout came the boom of cannon dis- 
charged in mid-air, while shell shrieked and hissed in every direc- 
tion. A monster solid shot from one of the big guns whii'led over 
four miles of space and fell with an awful crash among the pines 
ahead of the little band, and they had seen the last of the 
Merrimac. 



f |e €baamtioii o( Corint^. 




ORINTH was one of the cliarnel-spots of the war. From 
the time the Confederates first occupied it until the hist 
Federal left it the spade of the grave-digger never had 
an idle hour. The soldier who tented on its soil and 
drank of its water faced death as surely as in battle. 
Low, flat, its soil full of chills and its Waters unfit even for horses 
to drink, Confederate and Federal found it a graveyard as well as 
a strategic point. "Died at Corinth" is the legend on hundreds 
and hundreds of headstones in the national cemeteries, and "Died 
at Corinth" supplies the epitaph of hundreds and hundreds of 
Confederates. 

Directly after the battle of Shiloli, Beauregard retreated by slow 
and easy marches to (Jorinth, and there intrenched. It has Ijeen 
asserted that Halleck more than any other man was to blame for 
getting Grant into a position to be annihilated, and it is certain that 
directly after the battle he made no secret of his personal hostility. 
He at once proceeded to Shiloh and took command of the army in 
person, and in reorganizing it he took care to humiliate Grant by 
virtually depriving him of his rank. Grant's own immediate com- 
mand was divided and sandwiched until he could not find it, nor 
was he consulted in regard to its disposition. 

It was the last days of April before Halleck and his grand army 
of upwards of eighty thousand men were ready to move on Corinth, 
and in the interval he took due care to keep the nation on the watch 
for the end of the rebellion. 

While Halleck's proclamations and dispatches carried the idea 
that he meant to walk right over Beauregard and into Corinth when 
he was once started, he had scarcely left the Tennessee Kiver behind 
when he began to intrench. There is not to-day a single mile 
between Shiloh and Corinth where his old intrenchments cannot be 
found. Whenever his advance struck a Confederate picket and a 

[1791 



180 THE EVACUATION OF (JORINTH. 

dozen carbines were discharged, the orders went back for spades 
and picks. 

The artuy moved like a hobbled horse. Its average advance was 
not half a mile a day. Corps and divisions and brigades left one 
line of breastworks to advance and erect another, and had Corinth 
been twenty miles farther away Halleck would have been all sum- 
mer reaching it. From the third to the twenty-first of May, Halleck 
advanced only five miles, although the Confederate force on liis 
whole army front had at no time numbered a division. Every day 
he had a dispatch for the Northern press, and every night he 
hugged his intrenchments and routed out the whole army at every 
alarm from the picket posts. 

Beauregard had in and around Corinth a force not to exceed 
forty-five thousand men. His lines of works were erected for tem- 
porary defense, and were not started until after Halleck began mov- 
ing. The Federal works built three miles out of Corinth, and built 
in thirty-six hours at that, were far stronger than any erected to 
defend the city. 

And yet Halleck not only conceived the idea that he must lay 
siege to Corinth after the regular fashion, but he got such a train of 
siege-guns oa hand for the purpose that half his army was worn out 
in getting the monsters over the country and in position. Beaure- 
gard had cause to dread a prompt and rapid advance of the Federal 
army, with a quick and vigorous rush upon some one point of his 
works, but there was no cause for alarm over Halleck's programme. 

That the great Federal army marching on Corinth would eventu- 
ally arrive before it, and that its evacuation was only a question of 
time, must have been clear to the Confederate commander, but yet, 
to delay the time as long as possible, he delayed Halleck. Two of 
the Confederate attacks made upon portions of the Federal army 
while on the mai'ch were dignified as battles, although only a few 
brigades were brought into action. Whatever Beauregard did puz- 
zled and delayed Halleck and proved his incompetency. None 
of his corps commanders could have committed greater blunders, 
while Grant or Sherman were far more qualified to command the 
army and push it ahead to victory. 

Outside of the two attacks mentioned, the Confederates delayed 
Halleck by such skirmishing as would have delayed no one else. 
Whenever the Federal advance struck a Confederate picket which 
held its ground for any length of time whole brigades would be 
ordered np, and if a scout came in with the report of a Confederate 



THE EVACUATION OF CORINTH. 181 

division in position on one of the roads, tlie matter was serious 
enough for a council of generals. 

On t^ie twenty-eighth of May HalJeck had fairly invested Cor- 
inth, and liis siege guns were up and in position. Beauregard did 
not have an earth- work on his wiiole line that field artillery could 
not have battered down, nor was there one single point in his line 
■which was considered impregnable. It was pretty conclusively 
shown, when the Federals finally occupied Corinth, that had Hal- 
leck massed on his riglit and attacked sharply he would have doubt- 
less broken through. Indeed, a sudden dash by ten thousand men 
at any point on the Confederate line would have tried it severely. 

Halleck neither massed for a crusliing blow nor tried a sudden 
dash. He was going to besiege Beauregard, the same as if the 
Confederate troops had been shut up in a walled citj'. with no line 
of retreat and no way tc renew supplies of provisions. Having 
double the force of Beauregard, behind intrenchments equally as 
strong, Halleck waited for attacks instead of making them, and for 
three or four days routed the army out upon the slightest pretext. 
On the thirtieth day of May he fully expected an attack ail along 
his lines, and that without further excuse than heav^' picket firing. 

Beauregard had known for days and weeks that he must fall back 
when Halleck moved up. The value of Corinth as a strategic point 
was not worth risking a battle in which he would be outnumbered, 
and must attack intrenched lines at that. Therefore, on the last 
days of May, orders were given for the evacuation of the place. 
ISTo point was ever abandoned in a more orderly and systematic 
manner in tlie face of an enemy. 

Every infantry corps was ordered to move at a certain hour, by a 
■certain road, to a certain rendezvous. Every baggage train had its 
position assigned and was given a particular hour for leaving. 
Every ammunition train and batter}' knew its position in tlie line of 
retreat, tlie strength of its guard, and tlie spot wiiere it was to halt 
on the other side of the Tuscumbia. While four-fifths of the 
infantry were to begin the retreat at a certain liour, it was under 
.such instructions that, had an attack been made by Halleck at any 
point during the night, every brigade would have wheeled about 
.and marched back to the trenches without confusion. About one- 
fifth of the infantry was left in the trenches for some hours, and 
•cavalry in considerable force was at the front. The cavalry was to 
;skirmish and annoy and keep up apjjearances until the last of the 



182 THE EVACUATION OF CORINTH. 

infantry was miles away, and then in falling back to destroy bridges 
and obstruct the roads as much as possible. 

The whole history of the war does not furnish another such cool 
and deliberate proceeding as the evacuation of Corinth. Much of 
the Confederate line was under fire. Halleck was moving bodies 
of troops here and there, and his siege guns were expected to open 
fire every moment, and yet the Confederate evacuation was without 
hurry or excitement. Beauregard had two railroads by which to 
send away stores, and he did not leave ten dollars worth of public 
property behind him. All his guns, ammunition, tents, wagons, 
ambulances, and other stores were sent off in safety. The orders 
to each corps, division, brigade and regiment were so clear and 
plain that mistakes were impossible. 

The programme must be carried out in the face of a great army 
ready to spring at a moment's notice. The Confederates, therefore, 
resorted to Yankee cunning to conceal their movements. A balloon, 
not large enougli to hold a man, but big enough to fool Halleck, 
was sent up on the night of the evacuation and held suspended for 
some hours. The glare of the camp fires made the balloon plainly 
visible to the Federals, and the amount of iron and lead fired at it 
would have been a load for a freight car. 

At stated intervals through the night the railroad locomotives at 
the depots blew whistles as if trains were arriving, and soldiers 
detailed for the purpose cheered the " reinforcements " so vigorously 
that Halleck believed the whole Southern Confederacy was mass- 
ing in Corinth. 

Another of the tricks was to keep the camp fires burning and 
now and then send up signal rockets and open picket-firing. The 
Federal picket-line was thus kept disturbed and anxious, and Hal- 
leck was sorely puzzled to know what new plan Beauregard was 
carrying out. Worthless tents and ammunition and broken wagons 
were left as prizes, but whatever was of value, no matter what the 
trouble to move it, was moved. Several artesian wells had been 
bored in search of better water. The machinery of these was not 
only taken away, but the wells themselves desti-oyed. The pro- 
gramme of evacuation was carefully followed, and on the morning 
of the thirtieth Halleck had before him only the Confederate cavalry 
pickets. 

At daylight on that morning when Beauregard's army was miles 
away Halleck opened the siege of Corinth. His great guns roared, 
his army cheered, and round shot and shell pounded at undefended 



THE EVACUATION OF CORINTH. 



183 



earth-works. Wlieii he finally became satistied that Corinth had 
been evacuated lie rushed in, captured four hundred convalescents 
wlio had not been able to move, as many old muskets, a few half- 
burned freight cars and disabled locomotives, and that was the end. 

On tlie fourth of June, Halleck recovered sufKciently to report 
that Pope had pushed Beauregard many miles, capturing ten thou- 
sand prisoners, fifteen thousand stands of arms, twelve lield-pieces, a 
train of wagons, nine locomotives and many cars. 

Pope had not captured six hundred prisoners ; he had not even 
attacked Beauregard in force ; lie had not pressed him at all ; he 
had not captured eight hundred muskets, nor a single field-piece, 
nor an army wagon. He had captured some cars and disabled loco- 
motives, but had himself lost prisoners, and had abandoned many 
mules and wagons. 

Beauregard deliberately withdrew to a new position at Tupelo, 
and Halleck left for tlie East to secure a grander field for liis mili- 
tary ambition. He left no friends behind. Arrogant and conceited, 
he had perilled a cani]iaign, disgusted a nation and shown his utter 
incompetency every liour in the day. Had Halleck stuck to the 
West it is doubtful if Grant, Sherman or Thomas would have even 
continued corps commanders. 




-?~ *w.^ ■ 



f Ije fdttlf of Irrnibillc. 




'AD the war begun with the battle of Penyville as it did 
with Bull Run, history would have given it pages instead 
of lines, and yet it was one of the best-fought and most 
gallantly contested battles of the whole war, and its results 
were a hundred times greater than Fredericksburg, Chan- 
cellorsville, or Cold Harbor. It was Bragg's first grapple with the 
Federal commanders who were to work his downfall in after 
months, and it was a movement on his part destined to dispel the 
Confederate illusions that Kentucky had only to see the Southern 
Hag to rally by thousands. 

In September, 1862, Kirby Smith had driven the Federals from 
Cumberland Gap, and had pressed on to Kogersville and met and 
scattered the forces of Nelson, and then taken position at Lexing- 
ton. From this point he gathered supplies, recruited several reg- 
iments, and made such cavalry demonstrations as to seriously 
alarm Cincinnati. Bragg had pushed down and captured JVIum- 
fordsville and its garrison, and had then turned from the road to 
Louisville and established himself at Bardstown. Buell's advance 
at an early day drove him from his position, and it was not until 
the seventh of October that Bragg concentrated at Perryville 
for battle. Believing that he had Buell's forces so widely separated 
that he would have to deal with only a single corps, his plan was to 
concentrate, attack, defeat, and then make a junction with Kirby 
Smith and walk over the forces in that general's front. 

McCook had come up slowly, skirmishing heavily, and it was 
noon of the eighth before he swung into position on the Federal 
left. One can trace his lines these long years after. The woods, 
in which his first line of skirmishers was posted, liave disappeared 
and given place to fields of corn, and some of the houses and barns 
are no longer there, but the stone walls and the hills and the shade 
trees tell the story. It was a strong position — so strong that before 
Hardee moved forward to the attack he had a council with his divi- 

[1841 



THE BATTLE OF PEEKYVILLE. 1S5 

sion commanders and warned them tliat the attack must be made 
with a rush to be successful. Two hours after noon Hardee witli 
his three divisions moved out in splendid style, and the first musket 
fired from the Federal skirmishers in the woods along Rousseau's 
front killed a captain in Buckner's division. With that shot all the 
Federal batteries in position opened fire, and the Confederates broke 
from "connnon-time" to " double-quick," and rushed to the attack. 

Cheatham's division had come down the Maxville highway, and 
as they reached the bridge spanning the creek now called after him 
they found the Federals in their front, and the fight began in bitter 
earnest. The stone walls behind which the Federals were posted 
stand there to-day, showing the marks of hundreds of bullets, and 
so tierce was the fire from behind these defenses that line upon line 
of Confederates prostrated themselves until its fury should pass. 
From their positions along the banks and in the timber they soon 
opened a galling fire in return, and before the fight had lasted thirty 
minutes they were gaining ground. Many of the guns on the hill 
above the Federal position were silenced by the fire of the sharp- 
shooters, and when it came to be shouted along the lines that Jack- 
son had been killed, the raw troops in his division, many of whom 
had never fired a gun before, began to flutter. If they gave way 
they would open a fatal gap. A dozen officers rushed to rally them, 
and the Confederates were near enough to hear a captain cr3'ing out 
in stentorian tones : 

" Stand firm, boys — for the love of the dear old Union, don't 
give way ! " 

Jackson's troops rallied, even though some of the regiments wei-e 
in full retreat, and they stood to the stone walls and poured in such 
volleys that the Confederate advance was paralyzed. A captain of 
Buckner's division, in describing this part of the fight, said : 

" We saw Jackson's men giving way, and with loud cheers we 
pushed forwai'd to drive them. My company was within fifty feet 
of the wavering blue line, when all of a sudden it rallied and gave 
us such a volley that nearly half my seventy men were killed or 
wounded, and our advance fell back in the greatest disorder." 

Terrill's men had the strongest kind of a position, and two bat- 
teries behind them were so posted as to sweep the whole front. 
When the Confederates were forced back by Jackson's men they 
rallied and moved at an oblique against Terrill. In liis division 
were several regiments never under fire before. They waited like 
old veterans for the advance, but when the Confederates broke into 



1S6 THE BATTLE OF PEEEYVILLE. 

a run and began jelling the raw men fell back without discharging 
their muskets, and the enemy's bullets no sooner struck among them 
than they reti'eated in a panic that carried their officers with them. 
Where the batteries were posted is now a cleared Held. As the 
crowd surged back Terrill rode to and fro, commanding and plead- 
ing, and just beside a tree since dead and chopped down, he fell 
mortally wounded. This completed the panic, and most of the divi- 
sion rushed pell-mell for the rear, hardly a man taking his gun with 
him. Then was seen a brave sight. Starkweather's brigade was in 
reserve. It moved up in gallant style, opened ranks to let the 
friglitened recruits pass through, and then steadily advanced to the 
walls and rifle-pits, drove the Confederates out, and planted them- 
selves there to stay. McCook's left had been fairly turned, but this 
one brigade stood in the way. A whole division was hurled against 
it time after time, but it clung to the walls and maintained such a 
fierce and rapid fire of musketry that Buell supposed McCook's 
whole division was hotly engaged. For an hour and a half this 
gallant brigade repulsed every assault made, but then had to fall 
back to a shorter line to pi-event a flank movement. 

A Confederate colonel who wrote a newspaper account of that 
battle, said of Starkweather's brigade : 

" We had McCook's left fairly beaten and one whole division on 
the run, when a single brigade planted itself across our advance. 
Siicii nerve and gallantry will seldom be witnessed again. I myself 
was in four of the charges against their position, and twice I thought 
we should swarm rigiit over them, but each time we were driven 
back by tlieir cool and terrible fire, leaving the ground covei'ed with 
our dead and wounded. Hardee raved and stormed, and charge 
after chai'ge was made, but the blue-coats could not be driven. 
When they finally shortened the line they moved back under fire in 
a manner to reflect credit on the best troops Napoleon ever com- 
manded." 

Rousseau occupied a ridge partly crowned with trees and partly 
under cultivation, crossed by two highways and offering shelter for 
his infantry and good positions for his batteries. In his front was 
Crazy Creek, lialf hidden with willows and its banks forming 
splendid breastworks. Beyond were fences, walls and fields. 
Where Anderson formed his line of battle twenty years ago the 
corn grows rank and the wheat stands high. Where Rousseau 
pushed forward the brigades of Lytic and Harris to hold a skirt 
of woods, the May breezes rustled the ripening oats as I looked 



THE BATTLE OF PEKRYVILLE. ' 187 

down from the spot where Sloan's battery was stationed. There 
were many raw regiments in Anderson's division, a number of the 
companies being totally undrilled, and only three regiments having 
been in any previous engagement. Regiments were massed for the 
attack under artillery lire, and as tlie bugle sounded its notes the 
entire division moved forward. 

The two Federal brigades were firmly rooted and not a musket 
cracked until the Confederate lines were within pistol-shot. Then 
a rush was made, but it was met by such a fire that the men were 
appalled. Held to their work by the officers, many of tliem fired 
in tlie air, wliile whole companies in some cases charged bayonets at 
each other in the smoke. Some of the veteran regiments, however, 
displayed the greatest gallantry, charging squarely up to the Federal 
position and figiiting on either side of the walls and fences. It 
was a terrific fight for fifteen minutes, and wlien the Confederates 
retired, the ground from hill to creek was tliickly strewn witii vic- 
tims. In a few minutes tlie gray lines were reformed for another 
advance, this time resolved not to be lialted. Without stopping to 
fire, tiiey swung up tlie slope with yells and cheers. Tlie weight 
was overpowering — the Federals fell back to tlie main line. 

Tlie Confederates were pusliiiig on when another Federal brigade 
hurried down, and every piece of artillery which could be brought 
up was soon in position and using grape and canister. Anderson 
also brought forward his guns, and for half an hour there was a 
desperate struggle. Bragg said in after years that the fighting at 
this one point between two divisions was fiercer than any portion 
of the battle of Chickaraauga wliere an entire corps was engaged. 
When a fourth Federal brigade had been advanced, tlie Confed- 
erates in their turn had to give ground. Tliey were followed up 
briskly until Rousseau's lino rested where tlie fight opened. 

Failing to drive Rousseau, Hardee massed everytliing against 
Sheridan's division, and for a few minutes drove it before him. 
Sheridan called upon Mitchell for reinforcements, rallied his line 
across the Springfield pike, and after a quarter of an hour of hot 
work he ordered an advance of liis whole division, McCook's flank 
swinging at the same time. At some points the Confederates stood 
until bayonets clashed, but tlie impetus of the mighty wave swept 
field and wood and liigliway clear of tiie gray, and as they 
began to give way the Federals cheered along the whole front. 

This was the first battle in which Federal and Confederate 
regiments raised in Iveiitucky were placed opposite each other. 



188 THE BA'ITLE OF PEEEYVILLE. 

Both realized the fact, and they fought with a bitterness wliich 
other regiments could not feel. In the last advance, about a dozen 
men belonging to an Oliio regiment puslied ahead so rapidly that 
they suddenly found themselves surrounded and taken prisoners. 
Before they could be sent to the I'ear a company of Federal Ken- 
tuckians advanced to rescue them, and at the same moment a com- 
pany of Confederates raised in the same county rushed forward to 
hold the men. One of the Confederates, now living in Franklin, 
Tenn., says of the struggle which took place : 

" We did not stop to fire, but rushed forward with the bayonet. 
In a moment we were all mi.xed up, jabbing and jiroddiug with 
bayonet and striking each other with the butts of muskets. A 
Federal, who had formerly lived within two miles of my farm, 
made a push at me, and liis bayonet passed between my right arm 
and side and went through my coat. Before he could withdraw it 
I hit him a blow with my fist, and when he fell I sprang on him 
and held him down, although he bit my tliumb to the bone. We 
were having it hot and heavy when our folks fell back and left me 
to be captured. In those few minutes I saw the bayonets used at 
least twenty times, and I believe that fully thirty men were struck 
with muskets." 

The Confederates were being pushed, but they were giving ground 
rather slowly, .still fighting, wdien unexpectedly certain brigades 
began to march out of the tight. It is charged that Polk lost his 
head and ordered a retreat to a new line. Polk laid the blame upon 
Bragg, and an effort was made to hold Hardee responsible. No 
matter with which officer the fault was, the Confederates began 
falling back, and once the retreat was begun it ended in a helter- 
skelter rush through the town, and in the rapid jnirsuit and capture 
of many prisoners and a considei'able quantity of war material by 
the Federals. At night, against the protest of the division com- 
manders, the Confederates were withdrawn and the entire field left 
to the Union forces. 

Previous to this fight, Bragg encouraged the idea that a Confed- 
erate army could easily clear Kentucky of any Federal force and 
keep it clear. He promulgated the doctrine among his troops that 
the}' had only to charge the Federal lines to scatter them; and his 
men were led to believe that they had only to fire a few volleys to 
win a battle. Indeed, his plan was to whip the Federal army in 
about an hour and then make a rapid march to join Kirby Smith, 
who was held at bay elsewhere. Polk had the same contempt for 



THE BATTLE OF PEEETVILLE. 



189 



tlie blue-coats, and Hardee had often been sneered at for asserting 
that ISlortbern men would stand up in line of battle. The results 
of Perryville were bitter in several respects. The Confederate 
soldier realized that he had been deceived and defeated where he 
expected an easy victory. Bragg and Polk had their plans disor- 
ganized, and the idea of holding Kentucky had to be abandoned. 

As Bull Biin taught both armies in the East the fact that war 
meant fight, and fight meant kill, so also did. Perryville furnish the 
Western armies with a lesson written in blood. Future battles 
were to be fought with something more solid than a braggart's 
assertions. Both sides realized that where numbers were reasonably 
equal, the fight would be steady and furious, and so it proved 
through the long and bloody years that followed. 




Clie (Elnuivatioit of Itcitsitwht. 




•'^^^^"^HE evacuation of the Norfolk Navy Yard, with tlie 
destruction of whatever could not lie removed, had its 
parallel at Pensacola. In both cases it was a work 
regretted by commanders and dej^lored by the troops 
detailed to perform the work. In one case a great and 
valuable navy yard was destroyed at scarcely a day's notice, to pre- 
vent the Confederates from pi'ofiting by tlie immense accumulation. 
In the other, the evacuation was contemplated for many days, and 
time was given for the removal of the more valuable stores. And 
yet, the Confederate commander could not have issued his final 
orders without a sigh of regret. In the heat of battle men will 
needlessly kill ; on the march soldiers will recklessly burn and 
destroy, but when it comes to mai-ching out of a post surrounded 
by fi'iends and ordering the fire-brand flung into fort, barracks, 
storehouses, ship-yard, dry-dock, arsenal and quarters, and destroying 
that which is sadly needed elsewhere, man must be less than human 
to take delight in it. 

Early in the war, the Federal government determined to possess 
Pensacola, and operations in that direction were carried forward 
with audi vigor that in the spring of 1862 the Confederates realized 
tlieir inability to longer hold it. That they did not make sacrifices 
in other directions and cling to this post was something deeply 
regretted in after years. Here was a position naturally strong and 
easily made impregnaljle — a fine harbor fur blockade-runners, splen- 
did conveniences for building privateers, and stocked with millions 
of dollars' worth of arms, ammunition, tents and other stores. 
"While it was scarcely second to Charleston in general importance, 
it was given up almost without a skirmish. True, it had in one 
sense been isolated and endangered by the success of the Federal 
fleet on the Mississippi, but they could have made a fight for it 
where the Norfolk yard had not the least chance. Anxiety for 

[190] 



THE EVACUATION OF PENSACOLA. 191 

the safety of Mobile lost the Confederacy a prize the like of which 
was never to fall into its hands again. 

For .a week previous to the climax the Confederates were making 
ready for the certain destruction of everything. Although they 
had been moving the stores away for weeks, there was yet left an 
immense amount. Uncle Sam had not been stingy in his approj^ri- 
ations for that navy yard, and it was in realitj' overstocked. 
There were two liundred or three hundred tons of coal on hand, 
and a score of men worked for two days to make one of the hottest 
and most dangerous bonfires ever lighted. Twenty cords of wood 
were distributed through the heap in such a manner as to act as 
kindlings and give the flames a good start and scatter them, and 
then about one hundred loaded shell, fused and ready for firing, 
were distributed. This heap of coal burned for five or six days, 
giving out an intense heat, and the shells made it dangerous for any 
one to approach the locality. The last one did not explode until 
the fourth day of the fire. 

Every spar, plank and piece of timber of any value was destroyed 
by ax or saw or auger, the saw-mill sent away, and the basins of 
the dry-dock were blown up with powder. The charges were 
so placed as to blow out stones and timbers, and instead of the dry, 
clean basin, leave only a mud-hole full of debris. Every block, 
pulley and foot of rope were sent off, as also all the iron, lead, brass 
and copper. Even the door-knobs and hinges were taken off before 
the buildings were set on fire. The big ship-yard shears, derricks, 
ways, sheds, etc., were thoroughly destroyed before anything else 
was done. 

The anticipation proved to be correct, that as soon as the 
flames from the burning buildings lighted up the heavens, the Fed- 
erals would suspect an evacuation and open fire to drive off the 
troops detailed for the work of destruction. Therefore, to make 
sure that every fire once set would accomplish its work, garrets 
were filled with shavings, partitions saturated with turpentine, and 
rooms filled with light-wood. In each building loaded shells were 
scattered freely about, and nothing was left undone to add terror to 
the scene when the brand was once applied. 

There was a quantity of old powder on hand which was not 
deemed worth sending away, and kegs of it were rolled into differ- 
ent buildings and into the casemates and bomb-proofs of the forts, 
and the explosions produced all the havoc that could have been 
hoped for. 



^^2 THE EVACUATION OF PENSACOLA. 

There was only a limited quantity of shipping at Pensaeola at 
the time, but suci, crafts as had not escaped were collected for 
destruction Four or five steamers, two sloops, an old schooner, 
several flat boats and barges and all the small boats attached to the 
post were lashed together, filled with combustibles, and prepared to 
burn to the water's edge. f f -' 

It was a job of no small importance to remove the big guns from 
he forts. It would have required skill and patience and many aids 
to have accomplished it by day and in time of peace, while the 
Confederates liad to work by night and within cannon-shot of the 
^^ederals._ Every gun could be seen through a glass from the Fed- 
eral position, and knowing that each gun would be missed as soon 
as dismounted, the Confederate commander had spars sawed off at 
he slnp-yard o proper size and form, painted black, and put in 
the p ace of each gun removed; and so well did these Quakers fill 
tiie place of the columbiads that the trickery was not suspected. 
Only one old gun was left at Fort Barrancas, and this was never 
made use of by its captors. 

Among the articles which could not be sent away were a quantity 
of cannon-balls, grape-shot and several field-pieces; these latter of 
rather ancient pattern. It was easier to bury them than to dump 
them into the water, and graves were prepared at different 
points and the iron rolled in. Two years later a Confederate 
deserter pointed out one of the spots and its contents were taken 
out, but there must be tons of metal yet rusting under the soil of 
Jrensacola. 

In order to make certain of destruction at Barrancas all the gal- 
leries and casemates were filled with dry lumber and mined for 
explosion, and powder trains were run to different points It miy 
be added that the destruction was complete, the fire burning out 
everything and the explosions tearing down and filling up every 
passage-way. Just at that date the destruction of a fort like that 
was looked upon as a great event, but six months later war had 
taught, the men on either side that a sandhill with a couple of 
guns behind it was fort enough to answer all purposes. 

A few hght-draught steamers had been loaded with stores and 
sent up the Escambia River. For fear that they would be followed 
and captured the last boat up carried a detail of axmen, and where- 
ever a tree could be felled to obstruct the channel it was done. For 
two or three years, or until the Federals had worked long and hard, 



THE EVACUATIOX OF PENSACOLA. 193 

and the high water had assisted, the river was impassable even to a 
skiff. 

The signal to apply the torch was given shortly before midnight 
on the ninth of January, 1862, and in five minutes fires were burn- 
ing at every point. That Pensacola was being evacuated was now 
known to the Federals, and a fierce cannonade was at once opened 
on the place to drive out the incendiaries and if possible save some 
of the public property. 

An Alabama cavalryman who was in the detail to apply the torch, 
had assisted to fire a building or two and was approacliing the coal 
pile to light one of the spots prepared when a Federal shell came 
screaming through the air and dropped into the coal and exploded 
with terrific foi'ce. A ton or more of coal was flung about, and the 
flames from the powder set fire to the heap. Not a man applied a 
fire-brand to the pile, but singularly enough those who were striving 
to save it were the ones who caused the destruction. 

The Confederates who had begun their work amidst the most pro- 
found stillness were forced to finish it under a shower of shot and 
shell. Cavalry-men rode from point to point and applied the torch, 
and in several instances buildings were struck and the men nar- 
rowly escaped death. 

The only public buildings spared were those so situated that pri- 
vate property would be involved in their destruction, but it is 
known that the Confederate Secretary of AVar would have spared 
everything but the forts. But for the accidental delay of his letter 
of instructions, or i-ather, ])ositive orders, the forts would have been 
blown up and everything else left intact. 

Within an hour after the signal was given to begin the work the 
Confederates had accomplished all the}' had planned and were 
leaving the place. It was reported in dispatches at the time that 
hundreds were killed by the Federal fire. Three or four men were 
wounded by the shells, but no one killed. 

Not satisfied with the wholesale destruction enumerated above, 
the Confederates removed and carefulh' coiled up ten or twelve 
miles of telegraph wire, and also took up and carried away several 
miles of railroad iron. The design was to make the destruction com- 
plete, and a more thorough job was never accomplished. 

It was a sad sight which greeted the Federals as they took pos- 
session of Pensacola. Everything was yet in flames, and every 
minute or two the roar of the various conflagrations was broken in 
upon by the explosion of a shell. Long enough after the buildings 
Vol. 1-13 



194 



THE EVACUATION OF PENS ACQ LA. 



had been reduced to ashes tlie shells which had been filled so long 
as to be almost worthless, or which had fallen into the cellar and 
escaped the first heat, continued to scatter tlieir fras^ments about in 
an uncomfortable fashion. 

Nothing of any value to the victors had been left, but it was the 
position itself which the Federal government coveted and was 
determined to secure. It was gained almost without the loss of a 
life on either side. 




€\^t |i§|t at Island fa. 10. 




rE who seeks to write of the war ten years hence will visit 
battle fields to find no trace of war's struggles remaining. 
Forts are disappearing, earth-works being leveled, and 
fields are changing so rapidly that one who fought there 
can find no landmark. Fifteen years ago almost every 
man encountered on ears, steamboats, and in hotels in the South 
had fought in the Confederate ranks. To-day the proportion is not 
one in five. A decade hence it will not be one in fifteen. 

The other day when I steamed up the Mississippi to look for 
Island No. 10, it had disappeared. In place of an island large 
enough in 1862 to mount forty or fifty guns and furnish quarters 
for two thousand men, I found only a "tow-head" — just the faint- 
est proof that an island had once rested there. The great river was 
tearing at the little left in a savage manner, and he who passes the 
historical spot to-morrow may perhaps sail over the spot where the 
cannon thundered death and defiance to the Federals for month 
after month. 

One of the first plans of the Confederate government was to 
secure and hold the Mississippi, Tennessee, Cumberland, and other 
great rivers furnishing communication. Both the Tennessee and 
Cumberland were practically lost when Forts Henry and Donelson 
fell, but the Mississijjpi was to be a bone of contention to the last 
days of the struggle. Island No. 10 was one of a series of fortifica- 
tions intended to check the upper Federal fleet. While it was an 
island, only one of the channels around it was navigable, and that 
was so narrow that a pistol would carry a ball across it. 

In the winter of 1861 the Confederate government began fortify- 
ing the island. In addition to the score or more of guns mounted 
on the island, and protected by heavy earth-works, a full dozen were 
mounted on the main-land in such a position as to enfilade any boat 
passing up or down the channel. When fully occupied, it was one 
of the strongest positions on the great river. 

11951 



lyO THE FIGHT AT ISLAND NO. 10. 

Just before Foote appeared above the island, the Confederates 
built an iminense scow and had it towed to a proper position and 
anchored. Nearly a score of field-pieces were then placed upon it 
to assist the shore batteries should the Federals attempt to pass. 
While no official of the Confederate government speaks of this 
floating monster in his official reports, the pilot of the steamer 
which towed the scow to its place, as well as several members of 
the crew, can remember every incident connected with it. For 
reasons that can not be satisfactorily accounted for, the scow was 
either allowed to tioat away or was scuttled before she had served 
any purpose. 

In March, 1862, when Foote appeared above the island, he looketi 
upon it as an obstruction which could be brushed away in a day or 
two. His days ran to weeks, and weeks to months before his first 
gun boat slipped past. He had seven or eight gun-boats, all but one 
or two iron-clad, ten or twelve mortar-boats, and transports enough 
to carry a small army. The ordnance which Foote brought was the 
heaviest ever used upon the Mississippi. His mortars were mounted 
singly upon great barges, and each shell, when loaded, weighed 
about three hundred pounds. A charge of twenty-five pounds of 
powder would hurl these bombs over two miles, and the fall and 
explosion of each one was something truly terrific. The concussion, 
when one of the monstrous mortars was fired, was such that men 
became disabled after four or five rounds, and some were rendered 
deaf for days at a time. Hundreds of old logs and roots which had 
rested on the bottom of the river for years were brought to the sur- 
face by the concussion, and when all the mortars were engaged the 
roar and din covered the river with bubbles and drove thousands of 
men to fill their ears to protect them against the sound. 

As soon as Foote discovered the true nature of the obstacle he 
had encountered, he sat down for a regular siege, and this was pro- 
longed until the patience of the country was worn out. Plis siege 
operations were conducted from a distance of two miles, and lie had 
it all his own way. The Confederates did not have a single piece 
of ordnance which would begin to carry with his mortars. They 
soon discovered this and saved their ammunition, though it was a 
galling thing to receive a fire day after day, and week after week, 
to which no response conld be made. 

The works at Island No. 10 were detached batteries — six guns 
here, three there, five at another spot, and so on around to the last. 
They were sooner thrown up and easier worked that way, and this 



THE FIGHT AT ISLAND NO. 10. 197 

was also their salvation. For every shell striking inside of a battery 
twenty fell outside. While Foote's range was good, the distance 
was too great for accurate firing. When one of the mortar shells 
would burst in the river, it would throw mud and water into the 
tree-tojDS, and when it would fall upon solid land, it would excavate 
a hole large enough to bury a horse. Only a few Confederates 
were killed and wounded by the ten thousand missiles hurled at 
them, and those altogether by fragments. One man, who at the 
moment had a box of bread on liis shoulder, was fairly hit by a 
•descending bomb, and not so much as a button from his uniform 
was ever picked up as a reminder of his fate. Again, a bomb fell 
upon a cannon around which eight or ten men were lying, and al- 
though the gun was rendei'ed useless, not a man was injured. Dur- 
ing most of the time there was wind enough to destroy the aim of 
the Federals, and though the shores of the great river were shaken 
as by an earthquake, night and day for weeks, nothing was gained. 

General Pope, commanding a faii'-sized army and well provided 
with artillei-y, finally reached the river below the island, pursuant to 
a general plan to aid Foote. He was like a fisherman without pole 
or line. He could not get above to Foote, nor could Foote get 
below to him. He had neither gun-boats nor transports, and was 
obliged to listen to Foote's dreary cannonade and conjure up plans 
to aid him. He attempted to move up near enough to plant artil- 
lery, but high water and the activity of the Confederates prevented. 
After days of enforced idleness. Pope seized an idea which Banks, 
Butler, and Grant followed in after years. The country about 
Island No. 10 was and is to-day, except at low water, a great swamp 
■cut up by creeks and lagoons. Pope's engineers lived in dug-outs 
ill the swamps for a week, and then reported a plan for flanking the 
island. It was to connect and clear the creeks and bayous for a dis- 
tance of ten or eleven miles, so that the lighter-draught transports 
of Foote could be floated through and carried around to the Missis- 
sippi River below. 

A fisherman took me over part of the route in his skiff one 
day in 1884, and I found Pope's channels again filled up and ob- 
structed until we could hardly force the skiff tlirougli places wliere 
steamboats had sailed. Trees had fallen across the channel, drift- 
wood had piled up until only a water-rat could get through, and 
from the stumps of many of the trees sawed off by the Federals, 
limbs as large as a man's arm were growing' and thriving. 

With a Federal force above and below, Island No. 10 would soon 



■^^® THE FIGHT AT ISLAND NO. 10. 

be untenable. If Foote could get his transports down by the new 
route, he would take the chances of running his gun-boats past the 
batteries. , Pope put over fifteen hundred men into the great swamp 
A hue had been surveyed and was closely followed, no matter what 
obstrnctions were met with. While Foote's ten mortars bellowed 
forth, a hundred cross-cut saws were eating into pine and cotton- 
wood and one thousand men were pulling at chains and ropes. 
Hundreds of trees Jiad to be sawed off at least forty inches below 
tlie tlien stage of water, and every man had to work in from one 
to three feet of water. Small steamers followed the gangs to pull 
out the logs and trees as they were cut or sawed, and there were 
niany days when the gain was scarcely a hundred feet. The width 
of the cut was generally forty feet, and sometimes sixty, and one 
who lias not seen the swamp can have no idea of the herculean task 
and the hardships involved. As fast as there was room in the chan- 
nel a steamer or barge took her place, and the advance was literally 
foot by toot. In that ten miles the men must have sawed down 
lour hundred great trees and cut down one thousand smaller ones 
and yet this was not a fourth of the labor involved. Hundreds of 
gi-eat logs lay sunken in mud and water, and had to be moved from 
twenty to fitty feet. In some places the surveyed channel was tilled 
with such a mass of drift-wood, fallen trees, and tangled roots that 
the labor of one thousand men for a day seemed to make no impres- 
sion. I measured many of the stumps of trees cut off and some of 
them were fully six feet across, while it was hard to find one less 
than lour. 

When, after days of toil and hardships. Pope's men reported the 
way clear, the waters of the Mississippi must be turned in to give 
sufficient depth of water. Between the channel of the river and 
the levee there was a distance of a quarter of a mile. A channel 
had to be cut to the levee through logs and snags and stumps, and 
this of Itself was a task so full of difficulties that Foote and Pope 
twice consulted about abandoning the work. An opening was 
made at last, however, and the waters of the great river turned into 
the woods. Though the levee was repaired within a few weeks, the 
channel cut by the rushing current through the fields is still to be 
seen^ Where the soil was soft it cut a ravine twelve feet deep. 

When all was ready the boats began their strange voyage. Eopes 
held by men on the banks guided them between the^rees and 
around the sharp turns, but it was with the ^.reatest diflicultv that 
any progress was made. The rush of the new current undermined 



f. 



THE FIGHT AT ISLAND NO. 10. 199 

trees, brought out new obstruetious, and changed the channel, and 
before the tirst boat joined Pope over one thousand men had been 
sent to the hospital with chills and fever and rheumatism. One of 
the minor incidents was the plenitude of snakes. They were started 
up by the thousand, and the advance gangs often had to fight them. 
Monstrous water-snakes glided over the nasty waters, and rattlesnakes 
were at home wherever there was a solid bit of ground. Some- 
times when a hundred men were at work on one spot — chopping, 
sawing, and pulling — a reptile would be frightened out of a log or 
tree-top and dash into the midst of the crowd as if bent on ven- 
geance. 

There are several reasons why the Confederates did not interfere 
with the progress of the work. In the first place, its success was 
deemed impossible. In the next, the water in the swamps prevented 
the woods being filled with sharpshooters, as would have been the 
case at any other time. Could the swamps have been traversed by 
infantry, five hundred men would iiave been force enough to hinder 
Pope until he would have abandoned the task in disgust. Again, it was 
believed that if Foote and Pope succeeded in uniting, the former 
would not dare attempt to pass his gun-boats down the channel. All 
things considered, it was planned to let the enterprise proceed with- 
out interference and take the consequences. Certain historians 
have claimed that the work was all accomplished without a suspicion 
on the part of the Confederates. They knew the plan even befoi-e 
a blow had been struck by an ax. 

If the Confederates rested unconcerned regarding Pope's great 
engineering feat, they were alive to the possibility of destroying 
Foote's fleet at its anchorage. Three negroes were dispatched up 
the river to be captured as contrabands. Each one was picked up 
as planned, and after a detention of a few days, two of the trio made 
their escape with full reports as to the number of mortars, gun- 
boats, and transports. Tlie anchorage of each vessel was located, 
and such other information furnished as made it appear probable 
that at least part of the fleet could be sent to the bottom or dis- 
abled. 

Tlie first plan was to get rid of the mortar-boats. A picked body 
of men, numbering not over a dozen, were selected for this work, 
and they took their way Tip the river in twos and tlirees to carry 
out their designs as circumstances suggested or permitted. 

One night near the middle of March, during a rain which fell 
steadily and with great vigor for hours, two Confederates swam off 



200 THE FIGHT AT ISLAND NO. 10. 

to two different mortar-boats with tiie intention of spiking the pieces. 
One got aboard to lind the way entirely clear, and he drove a rat- 
tail tile into the piece and disabled it for several days. The other, 
while making his way across the deck, fell over some obstrnction, 
and the tile, which he was' carrying in his hand, entered his side and 
inflicted a wound from which he died a few hours after. 

Had it been later in the war, when torpedoes had been invented 
and made use of under like circumstances, Foote would have lost 
some of his vessels. As it was, one reckless Confederate proposed 
to sacrifice his life in destroying one of the gun-boats. One dark 
night he pulled out to her in a canoe, having a fifty-pound keg of 
powder to strap to her rudder-post. The keg was provided with 
hooks and straps, and the man was furnished with a piece of fuse to 
explode it. He succeeded in reaching the gun-boat, but found dif- 
ficulty in attaching the keg. While the night was dark it was also 
still, and the sentinels were on the alert. 

When the Confederate discovered that he could not attach his 
keg, as planned, he brought the canoe square across the stern of the 
gun-boat and proposed to explode the keg from the canoe. The 
match which he struck to light the fuse, and with which he did 
light it, revealed his presence to a sentinel peering over the stern, 
and the alarm was given and fire opened upon him. The Confed- 
erate went overboard, wounded in the shoulder, but succeeded in 
reaching the shore, while the canoe was upset and the powder-keg 
drifted away. Strangely enough, the fuse was not extinguished, 
and after drifting down about three hundred feet the keg exploded. 
Pieces of the keg were thrown on board of vessels six hundred feet 
awaj', and the decks of vessels nearer by wet with water. Had the 
explosion occurred under the stern of the gun-boat, as planned, it 
would probably have sunk her. 

Meanwhile, army and navy were awaiting the opening of the 
new route through the swamps, and its success was to be the signal 
of many daring exploits. 




TSLAXD No in. 




r>/.'r-ih':^':.'j-'.' ^'^^:~--< -■■■-'^^'^^^X/' ■ -^ 






PITTSBURG LANDING. 



CIji I'titc of lUitisl] IKodiak fluiuurs. 




■i^-' " ^ "'■ HE Emily Cornelius, a schooner, was one of the first 
dozen Confederate crafts entering into the blockade- 
running business. She had made two trips into South 
Carolina harbors, and was seeking to enter Bull's Bay 
when a Federal steam blockader gave chase. The 
schooner was of light draught, easily handled, and sailed fast, and 
by running across shoals she led the steamer a chase of more than 
three hours, and yet the two were in sight of each other every 
nionieTit. At last the steamer opened fire, and when it was seen 
that the schooner must be taken she was headed for the shore and 
run aground. The crew escaped with all their personal property, 
but the lire-train laid to destroy the vessel failed to do its work and 
she was pulled off and sent North as a prize. 

In October of the same year the British schooner Revere left 
Nova Scotia with a cargo of military stores for the Confederate 
government, valued at five hundred thousand dollars in gold. She 
made a fine run to the North Carolina coast, intending to put in 
at Wilmington. The Federal government had two gun-boats cruis- 
ing in that localit}', and one morning soon after daybreak the 
runner found both of them standing for her. She was a fast sailer 
and the steamers rather slow, and for the first thi-ee hours it was 
im]iossible for them to gain a foot. Had the wind held steady the 
schooner might have made a haven, but it suddenly went down and 
left the vessel an easy capture. The captain did not relish the idea 
of turning over five hundred thousand dollars to Uncle Sam, and 
he had planned to tire his vessel and take to the boats, when the 
crew interfered and prevented. The captain would not haul down 
his flag, however, and it fluttered aloft until it M'as lowered by Fed- 
eral hands. 

The British schooner Adelaide had run into Wilmington in Sep- 
temlier, 1862, carrying a cargo valued at over five hundred thousand 
dollars, and had then loaded with cotton in Topsail Inlet. In one 

[801] 



202 THE FATE OF BKITISH BLOCKADE EUNNEKS. 

way and another she was detained until about tJie middle of Octo- 
ber, and she then found several Federal gun-boats on the blockade. 
When ready to run out, the niglit being dark and stormj', the only 
pilot at hand was drunk and asleep. He was treated to a shower- 
bath and a drink of vinegar, and after much delay declared himself 
sober enough to take the vessel out. She set sail under his charge, 
but before half-way out of the inlet she was run hard and fast 
aground. 

It is stated on good authority that a negro fisherman, who saw 
the disaster to the schooner, headed his boat for the fleet at AVil- 
mington and arrived there safely with his information. One of the 
squadron was detaclied to capture the runner, and next morning 
entered the inlet to And her so fast aground that nothing could pull 
her off. A part of the crew escaped to the sliore before the gun- 
boat came up, and the rest were made prisoners. As much of the 
cotton as could he stored aboard the captor was taken out and the 
remainder given over to the flames along with the vessel. Soon 
after the schooner got aground the drunken pilot was missing, and 
next morning his body was found on tlie beach. One of the crew 
afterwards asserted that he saw the captain and mate catch hold of 
the man and throw him overboard. 

Late in the fall of the same year (1862) the British schooner 
Francis loaded at Nassau and made for the coast of Florida. Just 
as she had sighted the coast a fish-boat gave her the information 
that a Federal gun-boat was cruising in those waters. The schooner 
kept on her way until night fell, and was then becalmed. Pres- 
ently a curious incident occurred. The gun-boat had been looking 
into some of the inlets and had nat seen the schooner. Two hours 
after dark she steamed slowly out to within a quarter of a mile of 
the schooner and tlien shut off steam and extinguished her lights. 
Those on the schooner could at fii-st make her out with a night- 
glass, but presentlj' a fog arose and shut out the view. The night 
was still and the sea perfectly smooth, and those on the schooner 
could only wait and hope that a breeze would spring up during the 
night and enable her to creep away. 

In a calm one vessel seems a magnet to draw another. These 
slowly drifted towards each othei', instead of separating. Not- 
withstanding those on the schooner soon discovered that the crafts 
were drawing together, they were powerless to prevent it. At 
midnight they could hear the talk of the men on the gun-boat, 
though the fog was too thick to see anything. At one o'clock the 



THE FATE OF BRITISH BLOCKADE EUNNERS. 203 

vessels softly rubbed each other, and remained broadside on, as if 
lashed together. The Federals had simply to clamber over the rail 
to capture the schooner, and the chagrin of her crew can be imag- 
ined but not described. In half an hour after her capture a breeze 
sprang up whicli would have carried her thirty miles before day- 
break. 

Closely upon the heels of the capture of the Francis came that of 
another British craft — the steamer Scotia. She had been loaded in 
part at Liverpool and put on the remainder at Nassau and laid her 
course for Charleston. She was a fine, staunch craft, with a valu- 
able cargo, and she was within thirty miles of Charleston before 
she scented danger. She crept slowly forward during the night, 
and at early dawn discovered a Federal sail almost in her path and 
not two miles away. There was a fair wind blowing, and the sail- 
ing craft was so handled as to di-ive the steamer in towards Bull's 
Island. Two armed boats were then dispatched from the bloekader 
to cut off the steamer's retreat, and the result was that she was 
headed for the beach and run ashore and abandoned by her officers, 
most of the crew remaining aboard until captured. Had the Eng- 
lishman had the average pluck of his i-ace, he could have carried 
the Scotia into Charleston. All that was needed was the nerve to 
run within three quarters of a mile of the ship and risk the fire of 
three or four guns. But the captain seemed to labor under the 
impression that he would be hung if captured, and he made haste 
to run lier ashore and take to the woods, followed by his mates. 
So little was the steamer injured that she was pulled off next day 
and sent North. 

The Federals were still working at the Scotia when the British 
steamer Anglia ran into Bull's Bay. She had a valuable assorted 
cargo, and made a fine run from Nassau. In entering the bay she 
saw that the Scotia was in trouble, and the pilot at once began 
drinking whisky to brace his nerves and drive away thoughts of 
Federal prisons. His copious libations resulted in piloting the 
steamer ashore instead of up the channel, and though the crew 
worked hard all night long she was still fast when a fleet of Federal 
small-boats ran in next day and captured her, with the entire crew 
aboard. 

The crew would have set her on fire, but this the captain would 
not permit. She, too, was easily hauled off", and both captures were 
sent North at the same time. It has been remarked as a curious 
thing in naval matters that a sailing vessel, and a slow one at that, 



204 THE FATE OF BRITISH BLOCKADE KUNNERS. 

should have been the direct means of capturing two swift-sailing 
steamers almost on the same day. The value of the two prizes was 
a full million dollars. The Scotia had run the blockade seven or 
eight times, and the Anglia three or four. 

A day or two following the captures at Bull's Bay, the British 
schooner Trial, laden with salt, leather and other cargo, arrived ofE 
the mouth of Indian Kiver, Florida. She had made a quick run 
and had not sighted a blockader. Arriving within five miles of the 
month of the river, and finding all clear, so far as he could see, the 
captain ordered grog to be served to all hands, and then in a little 
speech to the crew he made light of the dangers and hinted at 
future voj'agcs attended with big profits. He was still speaking, 
when lo ! a Federal gun-boat stole out of the river and steamed 
straight for him and had possession of his vessel before he could 
realize the great change in the situation. He took the matter so 
much to heart that within the next three days he made two attempts 
to end his life. 

There were two curious facts connected with blockade-running. 
While the British made three-fifths of the profit they refused to 
assume even one-fifth of the dangers. Where a British captain 
would run his vessel ashore to escape a single shot, a Confederate in 
command of a craft would brave the fire of a whole fleet to get 
out or in. The case of the Hattie, the last runner to enter Charles- 
ton, illustrates one assertion, and the loss of the Princess Royal in 
1863 will illustrate the other. The Hattie passed through a fleet 
of twenty-six or twenty-eight vessels to get over Charleston bar. 
Between the bar and Sumter she had to ran the gauntlet of ai-med 
barges, taking the fire of muskets and howitzers, and when she 
reached the wharf at Charleston she showed a hundred scars of the 
trip. 

The Princess Royal was a large, fast, iron steamer, driven by a 
screw, and almost new at the time of capture. Most of her cargo 
was taken in at Bermuda, and it consisted of drugs, dry goods, army 
cloth, small-arms, field batteries, and two very costly and complete 
engines and boilers for two iron-clads in Charleston Harbor. The 
engines were made in England, paid for with Confederate gold, and 
the vessel had been waiting for them for months. Such a craft and 
cargo should have had a difterent captain. She made the coast all 
right, dodged two or three blockaders, and soon after daybreak was 
stealing along near the land and but a few miles from the bar, when 



THE FATE OF BRITISH BLOCKADE KUJSiMEES. 205 

she was siglited and pursued by a gun-boat. The latter, by way of 
bluff, began firing at the steamer when yet a mile and a half away, 
and the roar of the cannon gave the captain the cold shakes. He 
could have outsailed any bloekader on the coast, and all he had to 
do was to put on steam and drive into Charleston. Strange to 
relate, he at once headed tlie steamer for the beach, and as soon as 
she grounded the officers took to the boats nnd escaped into the 
woods. The loss was deeply felt by the Confederates at tlie time, 
and what made it hurt worse was tlie fact that no one could find an 
excuse for the captain's cowardly conduct. 

One of the first English blockade rnnners was the steamer Queen 
ol the Wave. She made three successful trips between ^Nassau and 
Charleston, and in March, 1862, cleared for another trip, having a 
cargo valued at seven hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars. 
The pilot she took at Nassau was either incompetent, or an enemy 
in disguise. Standing in for Charleston until it was discovered that 
three blockaders were on the watch, the steamer gave up the attempt 
to run in there, and headed for Georgetown. She would have made 
this port easy enough, had not the pilot ran her upon a reef. For 
three or four hours every effort was used to set her afloat, and she 
was then abandoned by her crew, and taken possession of by a Fed- 
eral gun-boat. 

In May, 1863, the British steamer Cherokee, after having made a 
successful run into Charleston, loaded with cotton and took advan- 
tage of a dark night to pass out. All lights aboard were carefully 
extinguished, the engines placed at half-speed, and the Cherokee 
quietly made her way through a blockading fleet of seven vessels. 
She had, as she thouglit, passed the last one by a mile or more, and 
the captain was in the act of opening a bottle of champagne to 
celebrate the escape, when, lo! a dark mass suddenly loomed up 
dead ahead and a voice cried from the darkness : 

"Heave to, or I'll give you the whole broadsitle 1 " 

Confederates took that chance time and again, but an Englishman 
never. He might possibly have made his escape, even though fired 
into, but he at once shut off steam and permitted himself to be cap- 
tured. 

Among other British blockade runners which were captured or 
run ashore may be mentioned the steamers Hebe and Venus, pro- 
peller Ouachita, bark Sophia, schooners Ariel, Anna Maria, Agnes, 
Ellen and George. During the first two years of the war the 
blockade runners were almost exclusively officered by English and 



206 



THE FATE OF BRITISH BLOCKADE RUNNERS. 



Scotch. During the last two scarcely any but Confederates could 
be induced to take the risks. During the first two hardly one of 
the runners were owned by Confederates. During the last two 
nine-tenths of the craft were owned in Charleston and Wil- 
mington. 




€\t Jfamaus Castle f Ijunkr at "^irljinoiitr. 




ASTLE THUNDER, at Richmond, was established by 
the Confederate government as a phiee of detention for 
Confederate deserters, suspected persons, and tlie cap- 
tured attaches of the Union army. When a Federal 
teamster, sutler or other attache was captured the Castle 
was his home until such time as he could be exchanged, or until the 
Confederates were tired of keeping him. 

First and last five or six war correspondents of Northern journals 
were obliged to take quarters in the Castle, and some of them were 
a whole year or more in securing their release. The power of the 
press, even though a hostile press, was respected to a certain extent, 
and the captive knights of .the quill were allowed some privileges 
not granted to others. Sam Ward, in tlie State Treasurer's office, 
in Richmond in 1884, was adjutant of the post at Castle Thunder, 
and he has all the records and documents pertaining to that prison. 
He remembers the name of every newspaper man who passed his 
door, and tells many anecdotes concerning them. He avers that 
Bulkley, correspondent of the New York Herald, was the most 
philosophical prisoner he ever had, and the only man who could sit 
down and convince him that secession was damnation, and rebellion 
ten times worse. 

One correspondent amused himself during his incarceration by 
writing a five-act comedy, but when his release came his joy was so 
great that he quite forgot his manuscript. Another wrote a book, 
a third obtained a German book and learned to read it, and all 
wrote poetry. One lamented as follows : 

" The hopes of other days have fled. 
And gone to meet with sorrow; 
To-day is but a blanli to me — 
Forerunner of the morrow." 

[2on 



208 THE FAMOtJS CASTLE THUNDER AT KICHMOND. 

Another wrote : 

"Oh, Johnny Reb, ungrateful kuss, 
What makes j'ou keep me here; 
Where roast of beef is never seen. 
And money can't buy beer? " 

And yet another : 

' ' Here in Castle Thunder, 
I sit and wonder. 
What miss or blunder 
Landed me here. 
Jeff Davis, thou traitor! 
You o!d agitator! 
You durued alligator! 
For me interfere." 

Some of the worst desperadoes in the Sonth were caged in Castle 
Thunder, and the discipline had to be strict and the vigilance 
eternal. 

During the last two years of the war the vicinity of Richmond 
was infested with bands of robbers and cut-throats, who rendered 
themselves a perfect terror and had to be hunted down by details 
armed to the teeth. "When captured they were taken to the Castle 
and there held until a battle was imminent, and then squads and 
even companies of them were marched to the front and put where 
Union bnllets would find them. But for this happy way of clear- 
ing out the prison, it would have been continually overcrowded. 

Over five hundred of these desperadoes were sent to Lee's army 
at Cold Harbor, and they went into that fight like wild cats. Inside 
of a week nearly two hundred of them were back in Richmond, 
having deserted as soon as the battle ended. Several instances were 
known where these men had joined Union regiments, lived well for 
a time, and tlien went back into the Southern lines with more or less 
plunder. 

Little trouble was had with the Federal prisoners. All of them 
realized that an escape from the Castle meant certain recapture 
within a few hours, and therefore they killed time as best they could. 
Not so with the Confederates, however. Almost every hour started 
a plan for escape, and dozens of them were shot while carrying out 
these plans. They dug into and under the walls and through par- 
titions, and one night seven of them dropped twenty-six feet into a 
court-yard, unlocked two doors with a spike and a piece of wire, 
and killed two guards before securing their freedom. 



THE FAMOUS CASTLE THnNDEK AT KICHMOND. 209 

The commissary at Castle Thunder drew all the provisions for 
that place, Libby Prison and Belle Isle, and the same wagons 
which delivered at one place delivered at all. For the two years 
of which Federal prisoners have complained so much, this com- 
missary was a born Northerner, who lived in New England until 
five years previous to the war. Such are the facts, and they are 
not all the facts. It was found that he was receiving presents 
from some of the contractors in Kichmond who were furnishing 
the three prisons, and an investigation showed that he was defraud- 
ing prisoners of their rations. When he found things getting uiicom- 
foi'table for him, he charged the commandant of Castle Thunder with 
cruelty to prisoners. This charge was investigated by the Con- 
federate Congress, and the finding was that if any cruelty had 
been practiced, the commissary himself was the guilty party. 

It has been asserted by half a score of soldier-authors that a 
monster blood-hound was kept at Castle Thunder to pursue Union 
prisoners who might escape from Libl)y or Belle Isle. It took one 
whole day to get at the facts of this dog story, but I got them. 
The dog was brought to Richmond the year before the war on a 
Russian ship. He was an animal of immense size, being able to 
eat off an ordinary table, and was used in Polish-Russia to hunt 
wild boars. He was considered a great curiosity in Richmond, and 
I traced him through five different owners before he reached the 
commandant of Castle Thunder. The dog went there because his 
master did. He was the soul of good nature, and would play with 
anyone who would notice him. Four of his owners told me that he 
was never known to bite a person, and as for his chasing prisoners it 
never happened. It was only at rare intervals that a Union prisoner 
escaped, and these were speedily intercepted by Confederate pickets 
or patrol. When the war closed the dog was owned by an old 
gentleman of Henrico County, (seven miles out of Richmond), named 
Chilvers. A soldier v/ho had heard of the dog went out to buy 
him, and failing in this, he took owner and dog North, advertised 
the beast as the terrible blood-hound used to recapture escaped 
prisoners, and no doubt made much money, as Chilvers returned 
to Richmond at the end of seven months with three thousand dol- 
lars in greenbacks as his share of the profits, .leaving the dog to 
continue his tour. Sam Ward had one of his puppies, and this was 
stolen from him and c'arried North and advertised and shown with 
the father. Any man can very easily find Ward or Chilvers or a 

Vol. I.-14 



210 THE FAMOUS CASTLE THUNDER AT RICHMOND. 

dozen other Richmond citizens who know the history of every week 
of the big dog's life from the time he landed at Rocketts. 

Among the Federal teamsters in the Castle in 1864, was one 
Henry Dyer, of (^hio. Instead of fretting himself over his impris- 
onment, he went to work to develop his genins. One of his several 
inventions was a railroad switch. Ward furnishing him all the 
material to make the model. When Dyer left, he was in snch a 
hnri-y that his invention was forgotten, but one daj', twelve years 
afterwards, he called for it. After a week's luint it was found in a 
junk shop on Main street, and the inventor departed in high glee 
over his success. 

One of the occupants of the Castle in the winter of 1864-5 was a 
Federal named James Hancock, claiming to be a scout attached to 
Grant's army. He was captured under circumstances which seemed 
to prove him a spy, and while waiting for his case to be investigated 
he was sent to Castle Thunder. Hancock was a jolly, rollicking fel- 
low, having wonderful facial expression, and great powers of mimicry. 
One evening, while singing a song for the amusement of his fellow 
prisoners, lie suddenly stopped, threw up his hands, staggered, and 
then fell like a bag of sand to the floor. There was great confusion 
at once, and as some of the men inspected the body and pronounced 
it without life, the guai'ds were notified of what liad occurred. The 
post-surgeon was called in to say whether it was a faint or a case of 
^ndden death. He had just come in from a long, cold ride, and his 
e.xa.nination was a hasty one. 

" De.">d as a door-nail ! " he said as he rose up, and in the course 
of twenty minutes the body was deposited in a wagon and started 
for the hospiiii^. to be there laid in a cheap cofiin and forwarded to 
the burying-place. When the driver reached the end of his journey 
the corpse was gone ! There was no tail-board to his vehicle, and 
thinking he might have jolted the body out on the way, he drove 
back and made inquiry of several persons if they had seen a lost 
corpse anywhere. 

Hancock's "sudden death" was a part of his plan to escape. 
While he had great nerve and an iron will, he could not have passed 
the surgeon under favorable cii'cumstances. On the way to the 
hospital he dropped out of the wagon and joined the pedestrians on 
the walk. When the driver returned to the Castle and told his 
story, a detail of men was at once sent out to capture the tricky 
prisoner, and the alarm was given all over Richmond. To leave 



THE FAMOUS CASTLE THUNDER AT RICHMOND. 211 

the city was to be picked up by a patrol; to remain was to be 
hunted down. 

Hancock had money sewed in the lining of his vest, and he 
walked straiglit to the best hotel, registered himself as from Georgia, 
and put in a good night's sleep, lu the morning he procured a 
change of clothing and sauntered around with the greatest uncon- 
cern, carrying the idea to some that he was in Riclimond on a 
government contract, and to others that he was in the secret service 
of the Confederacy. Shortly after dinner he was arrested on Main 
street by a squad of provost troops who had iiis perfect description. 
But lo! no sooner had they put hands on him than the jjrisoner was 
seen to be cross-eyed and to have his mouth drawn to one side. 
The men were bewildered, and Hancock was feeling " for letters to 
prove his identity," when the hotel clerk happened to pass and at 
once secured his liberty. 

Four days after his escape from the Castle, the scout found him- 
self out of funds, and while in the corridor of the post office he was 
again arrested. This time he drew his mouth to the right, brought 
a squint to his left eye, and pretended to be very deaf. He was, 
however, taken to the Castle, and there a wonderful thing occurred. 
Guards who knew Hancock's face perfectly well were so confused 
by his squint that no man dared give a certain answer. Prisoners 
who had been with him for four months were equally at fault, and 
it was finally decided to lock him up and investigate his references. 
For seven long days the scout kept his mouth skewed around and 
his eye on the squint, and then he became tired of it and resumed his 
natural appearance. The minute he did this he was recognized by 
everybody, and the Confederates admired his nerve and persever- 
ance fully as much as did his fellow prisoners. The close of the 
war gave him his liberty with the rest, but ten days longer would 
have seen him shot as a spy. 




fob tijc 6un-|]oats fassf^ |sUini} So. 10, 




' OOTE conld flank Island No. 10 with his light-draught 
transports, and Pope now had ferriage from bank to 
bank, but without some of the gun-boats below to pro- 
tect Pope, that general was liable to disaster. The armed 
boats must go by the regular channel, and they must run 
the gauntlet of such a lire as had never before been concentrated 
upon such a space. 

One night about the first of April a band of fifty Federals left 
the fleet under cover of darkness, bent upon such a desperate under- 
taking as is seldom planned outside the realms of fiction. Every 
gun which Foote could disable before his fleet was called upon to 
push down increased his chances of success, and this little band of 
men started out with the intention of landing on the main shore 
and spiking as many guns as possible before being discovered. 

The Confederates had a picket-boat out to discover and check 
any such attempt, but on this night the darkness was intense, the 
rain was falling steadily, and when the lightning came it was so vivid 
that men were blinded for the moment. The Federal launches 
from the fleet j^assed within a hundred feet of the picket-boat 
without discovery, and made a successful landing upon the shore. 
The first guns were planted about three Imndred and fifty feet from 
the water, and the ground around was covered with small bushes, 
rank grass and weeds, and considerably broken. Between the land- 
ing spot and the guns were two or three low spots full of water, 
and an attack from this direction did not seem probable. 

The Confederate sentinels were strung along the ditch in front 
of the battery, cowering in the storm and hearing nothing but the 
war of the elements. Had the party of Federals halted and sent 
three or four men forward, the smaller number could have passed 
the sentinels and perhaps had plenty of time to spike every gun. 
But the bolder plan of marching the whole command straight up to 
the ditch and into it was adopted, and a flash of lightning betrayed 

[212] 



HOW THE GUN-BOATS PASSED ISLAND NO. 10. 213 

them to a sentinel. His musket had scarcely sounded the alarm 
before it was taken up all around the battery. Then, in the midst 
of a furious storm, the thunder making the forest tremble, and the 
lightning striking trees along the river almost every moment, the 
Federals dashed into the battery itself. Muskets were cracking and 
men shouting, and it was a situation to try the nerve of the bravest 
man living. 

Every fifth man in the command was provided with a supply of 
rat-tail files, to be driven into the vents of the guns and broken off. 
The Federals had come for a certain purpose — the Confederates 
could not determine at once what that purpose was, and were natu- 
rally surprised and confused by the sudden attack. One writer says 
that seven guns were spiked ; another says five ; a third says that 
only one large pivot gun was disabled. Confederates on duty in the 
battery at the time agree that four guns were so thoroughly spiked 
that they were rendered useless for three or four days, or until the 
broken files could be drilled out. 

After the first moment of surprise the Confederates rallied and 
began an attack which forced the little band out of the battery, 
leaving three or four dead and as many prisoners. Three or four 
others were wounded in making their way to the boats, and two 
who became separated from the command and did not reach the 
boats were made prisoners next day. It was an exploit full of 
nerve and daring, but the i-esults were without real value to Foote. 
Had the entire battery been disabled he was not ready to send his 
gun-boats down that night, and the attack served to put the Con- 
federates on the watch for his real movement. 

If Foote could get two or three gun-boats below the island, he 
could control the situation. He hoped that a favorable night would 
enable them to pass without discovery. If discovered, the orders 
would be to go ahead at full speed and run out of the fire as soon 
as possible. 

The next day after the dash at the battery, a Federal gun-boat 
was made ready for the adventui'e. Her preparations were not 
com])leted when the Confederates had the news. It was a period 
of stormy weather and dark nights, and the only precaution they 
could take was to keep a picket-boat out to discover and signal any 
movement. Bonfires had been prepared on the shores, but the rain 
had given them a thorough wetting and rendered them temporarily 
useless. 

The gun-boat selected for the adventure had her vulnerable parts 



214 HOW THE OUN-BOATS PASSED ISLAND NO. 10. 

protected with baled hay, timbers, chains, and liawsers, and was to 
push through without answering a sliot. When all was ready, as a 
further protection, a barge loaded with hay was made fast to one 
side and a liarge loaded with coal to the other. The hay was piled 
high and secured with ropes and chains, and the pilot-house of the 
gnn-boat was the only portion of the craft exposed. 

It was another wild night when the gun-boat cast loose to run the 
gauntlet. In addition to the darkness there was again a war in the 
heavens, and the wind blew in a way to make an uproar in the tree- 
tops. The Confederates had sentries posted all along the island 
and shore, fearing another landing by the Federals. It is given as 
a matter of history that the boat betrayed herself by the soot in her 
chimneys catching fire. She was discovei-ed by the Confederate 
picket-boat while still half a mile above the island, and several 
vain attempts were made to fire rockets to warn the batteries. 
When these could not be ignited, owing to the terrific rain, the 
pickets discharged muskets and revolvers and thus gave the alarm. 

A canoe floating down that channel in daylight would have been 
knocked to pieces in a minute. A gun-boat rushing ahead in the 
darkness was quite another thing. She displayed no lights, fired no 
guns, and could be seen only when a flash of lightning revealed her 
situation. Every gun which would bear was fired as fast as possible, 
not so much in the expectation of disabling the gun-boat as with the 
intention of deterring the remainder of the fleet from following 
after. Most of the shot, as afterwards traced, were fired too high. 
Numbers of line-shots screamed directly over the boat and her 
barges and flew into the woods, while others plunged into the river 
so close as to throw water clear over the ln\y barge. Only three 
shot from the island batteries hit the barge. One shell entered the 
hay a distance of eight feet without exploding. A solid shot carried 
away a part of a bale at the stern. Another shell took a bale off 
the top and cut a heavy chain in two. 

On board the gun-boat not a voice was heard except that of the 
executive officer. She had to feel her way along by the flashes of 
lightning and of the Confederate guns, and her progress was not 
more than half-speed. Had she touched the bottom to hang for 
only ten minutes the time would have been long enough to concen- 
trate such a fire as would have sunk her. 

I was lately conversing with a Confederate officer who was in the 
torpedo service during the war, and he gave it as his opinion that 
the channel at Island No. 10 offered the best chance the Confed- 



HOW THE GUN-BOATS PASSED ISLAND NO. 10. 215 

erates ever had of disaliliiig a fleet of gun-boats, but the torpedo 
was then an experiment and none were to be had. At one spot, for 
a period of twenty days, the channel was not over eighty feet wide, 
and four or five torpedoes pUinted in that narrow space wouki Iiave 
meant destruction to anything attempting to pass. There was talk 
of obstructing tlie channel with rafts and nets, but nothing was 
ever done about it. 

A night or two after the first boat passed down a second followed. 
There was no storm this time, and the night was starlit, but she 
escaped with small injury, althongh the Confederates were watch- 
ing for her and worked every gun which would bear. In the flrst 
instance, the guns were elevated too much ; in the second, she was 
expected to follow in the path of the first, which she did not, and 
the guns were depressed too much. 

As soon as two of the gun-boats had reached Pope he began a. 
movement which made the Kentucky shore untenable for the Con- 
federates, and their camps were broken up and several regiments 
made prisoners. 

This left General MeCall on the island with a garrison so small 
and so hemmed in that further resistance was useless. The mortar 
fire of the Federals seemed to impi-ove all at once, and more 
damage was done by it in twenty-four hours tlian had occurred 
before in any week. One bomb which exploded in the midst of a 
field battery nearly destroyed tlie whole of it, and several of the 
great guns were dismounted or destroyed in one nigiit's bombard- 
ment. 

There were about sixty cannon, twelve or fifteen field-pieces, con- 
siderable fixed ammunition and thirty or forty horses on both island 
and shore. No small arms were captured except as prisoners 
were taken. What tents and provisions fell into Federal hands 
were not worth removal. 

Finding that he could no longer hold the position even against the 
fleet, and that he was liable to be attacked by infantry in boats, 
General McCall surrendered the small renmant of his forces and 
all the public property in his charge. This opened sixty miles more 
of the Mississippi to Foote, and he steamed down to flnd 'another 
obstruction at Forts Wright and Pillow. 



Cl]f Career of the 1\ain ^rluiiisns. 




^ERHAPS the construction of the ram Arkansas, together 
witli lier brief but astonishing career, furnishes one of 
the most curious incidents in tlie history of the Confed- 
erate navy. The construction of tlie ram was begun at 
Memphis, but lier hull had scarcely been launched 
when it was found necessary to tow it away to a place offering 
greater security. One Federal fleet had sailed up the Mississippi 
almost to Vicksburg, while another was pounding away at Fort 
Pillow, above Memphis, and the skeleton of the Arkansas was 
towed down the great river and up the Yazoo to be finished. The 
Yazoo was, for some months, a safe retreat for a considerable num- 
ber of vessels, Confederate and private, but the Arkansas was the 
only one which the Federal fleet was troubled about. 

After the upper Federal fleet had captured Memphis and the 
lower one had reached Vicksburg, the Confederates began the work 
of locking up the Yazoo Eiver. It is a lazy, sluggish stream, its 
banks low, its bottom a bed of mud and snags, and at that period, 
when the few jDlantations up as far as Yazoo City were being 
deserted and all traffic on the river had ceased, no locality could 
have presented a more desolate aspect. 

The Federals would soon know what was going on up the slug- 
gish stream, and the most active precautions were taken to prevent 
a visit. Gangs of men were detailed to fell ti'ees and construct 
rafts at various points, little camps of scouts and sharpshooters were 
established along the banks, and -vhen the work was declared 
finished it had been so well done that a Federal gun-boat could not 
have made her way from the Mississippi to Yazoo City in two 
weeks' time if allowed to pass unmolested. 

The Yazoo being narrow, the Confederates had a gi'eat advantage 
to begin with. There was no rapid current to contend with in 
placing their rafts, and when one was secured in position it could 
be depended upon to remain there. In one place in the river, near 

[2161 



THE CAREEK OF THE RAM ARKANSAS. 217 

its mouth, was an almost solid raft half a mile long, and so secured 
that a hundred locomotives could not have pulled it apart. All the 
rafts were of green timber, thus baffling any attempt to burn them 
out, and the sharpshooters in the woods could have easily picked off 
any men landing from a ci'aft trying to make its way up the river. 
The Yazoo was securely locked up, but tlie Federals consoled them- 
selves with the idea that they held the key. They could blockade 
its mouth, and, if they could not go up the Confederates could not 
come down. The Arkansas was powerless as long as she was hid- 
den away up the stream, and if she came down she would find a 
welcome duly prepared for her. 

The men in the camps scattered along the river were sorely tried. 
There was a weirdness and desolation that cheeked any enthusiasm. 
The stream was full of alligators — great, slimy reptiles, which slept 
in the summer sun by day and fought and bellowed along the banks 
by night. The chirp of a bird was a rare thing. In place of it 
was the lonesome scream of the crane as it sailed above the trees, 
and the angry hiss of the cotton-mouth and mocassin as they found 
their haunts invaded. The mosquitoes were a plague that at times 
threatened to drive every camp from the river. Under the dense 
shade of the banks the pests gave no rest, but swarmed in great clouds 
and bit with remorseless fierceness. Men who could stand marching 
and fighting were exhausted by these pests and had to be relieved 
from their posts. It was expected that the Federals would make 
attempts to get up the river, but the only expeditions sent out con- 
sisted of scout-boats to report on the obstructions. 

All things considered, the further completion of the Arkansas 
was a matter of wonder. A ship-yard had to be improvised, and 
every spike, bolt, rope, clamp or piece of iron of any sort must be 
eent away for. The nearest point where any of these things could 
be obtained was Yicksbura:, and the nearest railroad was at least 
thirty miles away. To finish the ram required nails from one point, 
bolts from another, iron plates from another, and indeed the whole 
Confederacy may be said to have contributed. 

Had the Arkansas been built at Charleston or !New Orleans, and 
the designs of the draughtsmen carried out, she would have been a 
much more formidable craft than the Merrimac, and at least the 
equal of the Tennessee. It was designed to provide her with pow- 
erful engines, but after she had been hurried up the Yazoo, Com- 
modore Lynch could find nothing better than the engines belonging 
to a river steamer. While these would drive the steamer ten 



218 THE CAEEER OF THE RAM ARKAJSTSAS. 

miles an liour, they would not push the Arkansas over four. Her 
first weak point was in her speed ; the second in her roof and 
plating. There were a dozen vulnerable spots, and those who 
looked her over carefully when she was ready to sail declared that 
she would be sent to the bottom by the first Federal gun-boat 
which came within range. The ram Avas provided with ten guns, 
manned by a volunteer crew, and about the middle of July, 1862, 
was ready to run down the river and make the attempt to reach 
Yieksburg. She was placed in charge of Lieutenant-Commodore 
Brown, and he gave the crew to understand that the i-am should go 
to the bottom before hauling down her flag. The crew was then 
culled over, and such as did not take kindly to this desperate propo- 
sition were replaced by others. 

Scouts, deserters and negroes had kept the Federal fleet posted in 
regard to the progress of the Arkansas, and when she was ready to 
drop down the river her reception was likewise ready. An iron- 
clad and two rums had run up the Yazoo about a mile to have the 
first dash at the Confederate, and just below the month of the 
stream the entire Federal fleet, consisting of ten or twelve crafts,, 
was drawn up in a double line. If the Arkansas got into the Mis- 
sissippi she must run the gauntlet through this fleet, exposed to the 
full broadside of eacii ship at short range. There was a determi- 
nation to destroy her at every hazard, and no one doubted that she 
woiild be blown out of water by the terrible fire that could be con- 
centrated upon her. 

The iron-clad Carondelet, assisted by the Tyler and the Queen 
of the West, was waiting in the Yazoo when one morning the 
Arkansas was suddenly sighted coming down. She had passed the 
big raft in the Tiight, and the heavy timber along the banks had 
concealed her smoke until she was close upon the Federals. The 
fight opened at once and with great vigor. The Cai'ondelet moved 
up to meet the ram, firing as she advanced, and her two companion 
crafts opened fire from their bow guns and began a fire of musketry 
at the port shutters of the ram. 

The Carondelet had not fired above four shots when a solid shot 
from the Arkansas disabled her engines. A second entered one of 
her ports and killed five men, and in less than ten minutes she had 
fourteen men killed and wounded and was aground on the bank. 
It is claimed by the Confederates aboai-d the ram, and by others 
watching the fight from the shore, that the Carondelet struck her 
flag. This issue is avoided by some Federal historians and denied 



THE CAEEEE OF THE EAM ARKANSAS. 219 

by otliers. She was certainly crippled and run ashore, and her two 
companions were driven down into the Mississippi. Had the trio 
pulled down their flags in token of surrender, the Arkansas would 
not have gained a point. Her destination was Vicksburg, and she 
must reach that point to be of any benefit to the Confederacy. She 
passed the disabled Carondelet within twenty feet, steaming as fast 
as she could, and yet not making over five miles an hour, and when 
she reached the Mississippi she was in plain sight of ten thousand 
spectators on the bluffs at Vicksburg. 

The Federal fleet was ready for her, and the Arkansas was to I'un 
such a gauntlet as was never before prepared for a vessel. Orders 
were given the engineer to give her all speed possible, and the ram 
took the center of the river and steamed ahead. 

The moment the Confederate appeared every Federal gun which 
could be brought to bear ojiened fire, and the ram was liit five or 
six times before entering the lines. When the broadsides were 
brought to bear the effect was tremendous. It seemed to the crew 
of the ram as if she was being lifted bodily out of water by the 
heavy concussions. Her speed was so slow that she was retained 
under the fire much longer than an ordinary vessel would have 
been, and the striking shot and shell had every advantage. 

When it was seen that the Ai-kansas was likely to pass through 
the lines unscathed, her way was blocked, but she did not deviate 
from her course an inch. The vessels in her path had to move 
aside or take the chances of a collision with her iron beak. When 
the ram finally opened fire she had plenty of targets all around her, 
and her guns were worked rapidly and with telling effect. She 
entirely disabled another gun-boat, beat off two of EUet's rams, and 
paid her compliments to almost every vessel in the lines. The fire 
upon her never slackened for a moment, and even after she had run 
the gauntlet she was followed and fired upon until safe under the 
guns of Vicksburg. 

Her escape was a bitter disappointment. She was ungainly, slow, 
lander fire for the first time, and there were not twenty men aboard 
who had ever before assisted to fire a cannon. Members of the 
crew were repeatedly knocked down by the concussions, and in two 
instances became so terrified that they fell down and remained help- 
less throughout the affair. 

The Arkansas was moored to the banks by chains and ropes, her 
crew reinforced, damages repaired, and then she was ready to take 
part in the defense of the city. She had run the gauntlet with 



220 THE CAKEEB OF THE EAJI AKKANSAS. 

three killed and two wounded, and had been penetrated by five or 
six solid shot, but not materially damaged. 

The two Federal fleets — the one above and tlie other below the 
city — now ]jlanned to destroy the Arkansas at the bank. The one 
moved down and the other up in the night, and suddenly opened a 
terrific bombardment against the Confederate batteries, the object 
being to silence them nntil the ram could be destroyed. Neither 
purpose was accomplished. The city was shaken as by an earth- 
quake, and tons of metal were hurled back and forth, but the fleet 
ultimately withdrew without having accomplished anything. Three 
or four vessels hurled shot and shell at the ram for more than an 
hour, and she replied with every gun which would bear, but the 
conflict added only three or four to her list of killed and wounded, 
and nothing of account to her damages. 

Again, on the night of the twenty-second, the fleets engaged the 
batteries as before, and Porter made for the Arkansas with the 
Essex, believing he could strike her a blow which would crush in 
her side. He approached with a full head of steam on, made a dash 
for the monster, and struck a glancing blow which run the Essex 
ashore and secured her a terrific pounding before she got off. 

The Essex, however, was to be revenged at a later date. When 
it was realized what the Arkansas had accomplished, the Confeder- 
ates determined to use her to recover possession of Baton Kouge. 
A land force moved to cooperate with her, but from the hour the 
ram left Vicksburg she was the subject of disaster. First one part 
and then another of her engines gave out and had to be repaired in 
a rude way. She ran aground several times, sprung a leak twice, 
and was once on fire. Just above Baton Rouge her engines were 
again disabled, and she had to make fast to the bank. While in 
this condition, the Essex and other crafts advanced upon her and 
opened a hot fire. The career of the ram was ended. She was at 
once abandoned, several fires started to consume her, and when the 
flames were well under way she was turned adrift to go to destruc- 
tion. The Essex had the credit of her destruction, and the monster 
which had caused so much anxiety for long months was finally out 
of tlie way. 




O 



a 

o 
« 






Stuart's (!5rrat Hai^. 




r AD General J. E. B. Stuart lived to witness the close of 
the war he would have been the Sheridan of the South. 
The two men were alike in that personal magnetism 
which draws brave men to their standai'ds — alike in their 
courage — alike in their humanity. Both realized that war 
meant kill, but both sorrowed at sight of brave men lying dead. 

Stuart was a born leader of cavalry. Handsome, gallant, brave — 
he rallied around him a legion of men each one lit to be an officer. 
Early in the war as liis death occurred it carried mourning to the 
hearts of thousands in the Confederacy. 

On the twelfth of June, while McClellan was facing Lee before 
Richmond, Stuart left the Confederate lines for a raid which was 
not to be paralleled during the war. The plan was his own, and the 
consent of the Confederate commander was obtained only after 
much pressure had been brought to bear. 

The intention was to pass to McClellan's rear and destroy his 
stores of supplies at White House Landing, and if this could be 
accomplished the Confederates might also count something on the 
demoralizing effects on the Federal army. 

Stuart selected fifteen hundred of the best mounted cavalry apd 
a battery of four field-pieces and left Richmond just before day- 
break. He knew every highway, creek, bridge, river and forest on 
the Peninsula, and he had reasons for believing that he would not 
encounter any Federal force much larger than his own before 
accomplishing his object. 

Taking the Charlottesville pike, the command rode at a leisurely 
gait all day along the Federal flank, and that night encamped near 
Ashland. At daylight next morning the Federal pickets in front 
of Hanover Court House were driven in upon the reserve, and the 
few companies were scattered after a ten-minute fight. Quite a 
number of prisoners were captured here, with about seventy-five 

1221] 



222 STUAET'S GREAT EAID. 

horses, and a number of wagons and a lot of camp-equipage suf- 
fered destruction. 

Stuart must move swiftly now, and lie pushed on to the Pamun- 
key at a gallop. At Putney's Landing he burned two vessels 
loaded with Federal commissary stores, and then put the torch to 
two hundred wagons and a million dollars worth of forage and 
clothing stored in buildings. 

The column then headed for the York River Railroad, and 
struck it at Tunstall's Station. Preparations were at once made to 
capture the train expected from the Soutli, in order to prevent the 
alarm from being carried on to White House Landing, the objective 
point. The train came up, but the pluck of the engineer carried 
it through. 

As Stuart approached White House he found his path olistructed 
by a hastily collected force nearly equal to his own in strength, 
and he was prevented from carrying out his designs, although he 
destroyed stores of considerable value there. Such a hornets' nest 
had been stirred up over the roads he had ti-avelled that to return 
by the same route was to fall into Federal hands. 

Stuart proved his great nerve in that emergency. He had made 
a half of the circuit of the Federal army ; he would make the 
other half — thus making the entire ride a complete circle. 
Federals were coming up behind, and Federals were gathering in 
his front, but he had no sooner decided on his course than he swept 
his path clear and headed for New Kent. From the Wliite House 
to the Chickahominy he was harassed continually, and signal-flags 
and signal-cannon kept reminding him of his perilous position. 

Li moving to the Chickahominy the whole command passed 
within three miles of McClellan's headquartei's, and barely escaped 
two Federal forces strong enough to have captured or annihilated it. 
One company crossed the deep river in the darkness by swimming 
the horses, but rather than abandon his artillery, captured live stock, 
and prisoners, Stuart delayed several hours in the face of danger 
and repaired a bridge over which to cross dry shod. Before daylight 
the whole command was across the Chickahominy, and after picking 
up the Federal picket on the Cliarles City Road it entered Rich- 
mond without firing another shot, reaching the capitol on the third 
day of raid. 

The captures included one hundred and seventy prisoners, mostly 
officers ; two hundi-ed and sixty fine horses and mules ; three Fed- 
eral flags ; about one hundred fine sabres and revolvers, and a lot of 



STUAET S IJKKAT KAIU. 



223 



drugs and medicines niucli needed witliin the Confederate lines. 
Tile destruction footed up three or four million dollars, and the 
" scare " to the Federal arm}' was something to he remembered for 
long weeks. 




lai^ouTii's C|argt 



-"••tj^^JlkN- O war ever furnished more terrific battles — more daring 

^J«|b] expeditions — more instances of dash and daring than 

^iV^toJ^Sfe the conflict in America. Chief among tlie gallant 

exploits which will live in history is that of Zagonyi's 

chai'ge near Springfi.eld, Missouri. 

Zagonyi was a Hungarian who had been forced to flee from his 
own country for political reasons. He reached the United States 
as the war was breaking out, and offered his services to Fremont 
to recruit and command a body-guard. He was given all authority 
in the matter, and he personally selected one hundred and tift}' 
men, nearly all of them under forty years of age. He mounted 
them on the best horses, and each man was armed with a revolving 
rifle, a keen sabre and two revolvers, and all were soon well drilled 
in tactics and the use of the sabre. 

In the last days of October, 1861, Fremont and his army were 
within three days march of Springfield. Zagonyi was ordered to 
take the guard and a company of rangers and scout the country as 
far as Springfield, to see what Confederate force might be uncov- 
ered in that direction. 

A few miles from Springfield the rangers were detached to scout 
in another direction, leaving only one hundred and fifty men to 
push on to the town, which they were soon informed was held by 
a Confederate force numbering at least fifteen hundred men. 

The approach of the gnard had been discovered, and as it entered 
the suburbs of the town the Confederates were ready for what was 
to come. The}' had taken their position on a hill, and to reach 
them the guard must advance up a long lane, ford a creek, and 
throw down a strong fence which had just been erected as an 
obstruction. 

Zagonyi had not had a fair opportunity to test the mettle of his 
men. The hour had come. As a body-guard they had been sneered 
at. As heroes he would oblige all to admire them. 

[924] 



ZAGONTl's CHARGE. 



225. 



At the further end of the lane was a body of cavalry. To the 
right and left, and all along the fences, were infantry. With a few 
words of encouragement to his little troop, Zagonyi drew sabre and 
led the way straight up the lane. The Confederates at once opened 
fire, but not a shot is returned by the guard. It passes the brook — 
halts to throw down the fence — gallops straight up the hill, and, 
separating into three squadrons, falls upon the Confederates with 
sabre and revolver. 

In twenty minutes the Confederates are routed. In another half 
hour the last one of them has been driven out of Springfield and 
the stars and stripes are flying over the town. Of the one hundred 
and fifty men who rode to the charge over eighty were killed, 
wounded or made prisoners, but Zagonyi had dispersed fifteen hun- 
dred men, captured a battle flag, forty-two horses, many small arms, 
and held the town for several hours before setting out at a leisurely 
pace to rejoin the army. 




Vol. I.-15 



Cl]^ Sthrd ^lorlv'dko of tljc Mar. 




r'2 F the business of blockade-running had its perils and ad- 
ventures, that of the blockaders was scarcely less exciting. 
For three long years the blockading fleet was one of the 
chief weapons in the hands of the Federal government, 
but it was a weapon which every historian has treated in 
a manner bordering on contempt. Where one has given naval 
operations a single page he has devoted thirty to the armies. Take 
all the Federal histories yet wi'itten, select from each what has been 
said of the navy and its labors, and the extracts would not make a 
book of four hundred pages. Why this is so I know not, but so it is. 
When President Lincoln issued his blockade proclamation it 
seemed like an empty threat. There was not naval power enough 
at that date to blockade one Southern port. Those were the days 
when ship-owners reaped a harvest. The proclamation must be 
enforced, vessels must be had at any price, and government agents 
bought recklessly. Ships, brigs, barques, schooners, steamers, and 
propellers were purchased at any price, fitted up in almost any 
way, and when the time fixed by the proclamation had arrived, the 
blockade went into effect. The fleet was a make-shift until other 
crafts could be built and armed, and while it answered very well to 
keep up an appearance of blockade, naval officers now laugh at the 
ridiculous situation. During: the first six months of the blockade 
at Charleston an average of six runners came in and out for every 
one captured, and it was about the same at other ports. Army 
operations for the first few months seemed like boys' play, and no 
great deeds could be expected of a navy so suddenly created and 
given such a line of coast to watch. 

The real blockade may be said to have begun in the spring of 
1862. By this time the navy was thoroughly organized for work, 
many new vessels had appeared, and considerable valuable experi- 
ence had been gained by numerous oSicers. From that date to the 
close of the war there were never less than six Federal blockaders 

12261 



THE FEDERAL BLOCKADEES OF THE WAK. 227 

off Charleston bar, and sometimes the number was increased to 
fifteen. One day Wihnington might be guarded by two or three 
vessels, and the next by five or six, and it was the same at Smith- 
ville, Georgetown, Savannah and Galveston. 

When a blockader arrived on the station, her first care was to dis- 
cover what forts or batteries defended the harbor, and the range of 
their guns. The next was to survey the coast and map out the 
banks, shoals, channels, and to locate beacons and bearings. The 
Confederates had of course removed all buoys, abandoned all light- 
houses, and in many cases had cut down trees which had been 
familiar landmarks for years. Where it was possible to secure a 
negro who knew anything of the coast he was paid well and kept 
aboai'd. 

When a blockader had done all this, her real work had only 
begun. Plenty of pilots who knew all about Charleston bar in 1860 
could tell nothing about it in 1862. New channels had been cut, 
old ones filled up, and the sea was making changes every month. 

The Confederates were not to be shut up without exhausting 
every effort to prevent such a calamity. Forts and batteries mount- 
ing guns of the longest range were erected at the mouths of harbors 
and rivers, and the blockaders were forced as far off the coast as a 
cannon-ball would reach. During the day they would remain out 
of reach of the forts, but as night came on they would creep in and 
close up to watch for the daring runners. 

Each blockader was a sentinel on post. Blow high or low, hot or 
cold, she must remain until relieved by fresh orders. It happened 
at least twenty times during the war that the entire fleet off Charles- 
ton had to cut loose and run to sea to ride out the terrible gales. 
There were few days without adventure, and few nights without 
peril. 

As the blockade-runners seldom ventured to make their appear- 
ance by daylight, the blockaders would either run in and have a 
brush with tiie batteries, or dispatch scout-boats up creeks and rivers. 
Again, they would stand out to sea to watch for incoming runners, 
and with them it was eternal vigilance without much liberty to 
speak of. There was ever a fear of submarine torpedoes or " devils," 
and after the Confederate cruisers were afloat no one could say at 
what hour one of them might appear among the fleet. It was 
known that the Confederates were building rams and iron-clads, 
and their appearance might be looked for any day. 

With the coming of night the vigilance must be increased, and 



228 THE FEDERAL BLOCKADEES OF THE WAR. 

the dangers were by no means diminished. Every runner tliat 
slipped in or out left a stain on the fleet, but men could have done 
no more than was done. A Confederate captain told me that he 
made Wilmington one night in a terrible snow-storm, and the night 
was so bitterly cold that all his crew were frost-bitten. He went into 
the harbor without sighting a blockader, but there in the channel 
was a Fedei'al gim-boat at anchor. She could not be passed to port, 
and on the starboard side the distance from her rail to the beach 
was scarcely a hundred feet. The Confederate had a light-draught 
steamer, and he edged up at quarter speed to squeeze through. He 
passed the gun-boat within twelve feet, and as he passed he saw a 
look-out with his arms on the rail looking square at him. The Con- 
federate expected an alarm, but it did not come. His craft crej)t 
forward like a snail, one of her paddle-wheels almost on the beach, 
and by and by was out of sight and safe in harbor. As was after- 
wards learned in Wilmington, the look-out who seemed to be gazing 
with wide open eyes was a dead man — dead at his post of duty. 

While the blockade runners trusted to speed and dodging instead 
of fighting, there was danger to be apprehended from the desperate 
daring of nine-tenths of the captains. They often made a dash for 
it when discovered, and several times off Charleston they rubbed 
against blockaders in a way to make the splinters fly. A wooden 
steamer buzzing along at the rate of twelve miles an hour would 
have sunk the largest iron-clad in the navy if she struck her right. 

There were some blockade runners who were thoroughly deter- 
mined not to be captured, and to fight if cornered. One captain 
had a spar and a torpedo attached to the bow of his craft, and both 
were in position whenever he ran in or out of Charleston. His in- 
tention was, in case a blockader barred his path, to push straight at 
her and give her the benefits of the torpedo. Curiously enough, 
he made seven or eight trips without even being hailed by a 
blockader. 

The first aim of the runners was to get safely in or out. When 
it was realized that this was impossible, the object was to prevent 
vessel or cargo from being of any benefit to the Federals. The 
runner would be headed for the beach, three or four fires kindled 
on board, and, in the majority of instances, the crews escaped and 
vessel and cargo were consumed. When the war closed the hulls 
of at least thirty runners could be counted within ten miles of the 
mouth of Charleston Harbor. 



THE FEDERAL BLOCK ADERS OF THE WAR. 229 

When a runner headed for the shore, it was out boats and pull 
for her. Now and then one was overhauled and the flames sub- 
dued, but in many cases the boats' crews were driven off by the 
infantry sent to the spot from the nearest fort. » 

There was never a single moment in the twenty-four lumrs that 
a watch was not maintained. One man, provided with the best of 
glasses, was sufficient by day, but at night from two to four were 
on duty, according to the weather. During the first year the run- 
ners selected dark or stormy nights for their trips, but later on they 
could be looked for on any sort of night. Every runner going out 
halted off Fort Sumter to get the report of the look-out who was 
maintained there. Every evening before dark tins lookout, having 
the best telescope gold could buy in Ein'ope, noted the position of 
every blockader. He saw whether they had steam up, took notice 
of all signals, and if one or more were to leave during the night 
the look-out generally noticed something to give him the cue. 
Sometimes the blockaders would change their stations as soon as 
night fell, but the look-out could often tell what positions they 
would take, being guided by the tides, currents, and look of the 
weather. 

No soldier on outpost used his eyes and ears more keenly than 
the look-out on board the blockaders. On a pleasant iiiglit the duty 
was not onerous, but in wild weather, and particularly during the 
winter months, much suffering was necessarily endured. No man 
aboard could turn in at night with a feeling of security. He 
realized that he was likely to be turned out at any moment, and 
once out there might be hot work with the guns, a pull in the 
boats, or a chase lasting for hours. 

One night in December, 1863, a runner was ci'eeping along 
down the harbor, in hopes to dodge through the fleet of eight or 
ten vessels, when all at once an alarm was given in the Federal 
fleet, quickly followed by the bang ! bang ! of the great guns. 
The excitement continued for full twenty minutes, drawing some 
of the Federals a mile from their first positions, and the runner 
took advantage of the furore to escape to sea. Aboard of her it 
was believed that some craft, bound in, had been captured, but such 
was not the case. About eleven o'clock strange fogs began to 
rise from the water and sail around. Some of the look-outs took 
the curious shapes for what they were, but aboard of one block- 
ader a fog-bank took the shape of a steamer slowly moving over 
the water, and an alarm was the natural consequence. 



230 THE FEDERAL BLOCKADERS OF THE WAR. 

All sorts of scliemes were worked to draw the bloekaders ofE the 
station or give them a scare, and many of these inventions were 
BHCcessful. One night the hnll of a vessel was drifted down with 
the tide and produced the greatest consternation for a time. It 
drifted down upon a blockader, being almost aboard before it was 
discovered. All hands were called np to repel boarders, the guns 
turned loose, and as the "dreaded monster" drifted away the whole 
fleet took a hand in and finally sent her to the bottom "with 
every soul on board." It was believed for many houi's that a 
"rebel Merrimac" had been done for, but during the next fore- 
noon a negro made his escape to the fleet in a skiff, and not only 
revealed the true character of the "monster" but stated tliat two 
runners' got out during the excitement. 

Another plan was to drift a raft down after having set up a 
couple of sticks for masts; and in one case at least it was so 
arranged that smoke and sparks issued from a smoke-stack. As 
soon as the raft was sighted the fun began, and runners were 
always on hand to take advantage of a change of position by the 
fleet. 

It is doubtful if any blockade ever recognized by the world was 
more strictly enforced or of more damage to the blockaded. ISTo 
one expected that it could be made so stringent that nothing 
could slip through. That was the aim, of course, but the Federals 
labored under many burdens. In the first place, the Confederates 
purchased the very fastest crafts afloat. In the next, bad weather 
■was an advantage to them. Again, they would take such desper- 
ate chances as dumbfounded brave men. In a dozen instances they 
came down the harbor at a speed of fourteen or fifteen miles an 
hour, and plunged straight through the fleet and took the chances. 
Some were not even hit by the hot fire instantly opened, while 
others took from three to six cannon-balls into Nassau as relics. 
Federal history fawns upon the admirals, puffs the commodores, 
and pats the commanders on the back, but it stops there. There 
is never a word of pj-aise for the thousands who endured the hard- 
ships and braved the dangers of the blockading stations. Indeed, 
but for an occasional magazine article or a newspaper sketch, the 
country would have forgotten that we had anything afloat except a 
few iron-clads. 

News having reached the fleet off the mouth of the Chattahoocbe 
River that a schooner up the stream had loaded with cotton and 
was waiting a favorable opportunity to run the blockade, a fleet of 



THE FEDERAL BLOCKADEES OF THE WAK. 231 

eight or nine launches was made up and sent np the river, and not 
only was the valuable scJiooner captured with a valuable cargo on 
board, but much damage was caused by burning and destroying. 
So near had the launches approached the schooner when discovered, 
that the men who were below were captured. Those on deck had 
to move lively, and two or three who leaped into the water in their 
excitement would have been drowned had not the boats picked 
them up. 

In August, 1863, a negro paddled off to the blockader Shocko- 
kou, stationed off Wilmington, and gave information that a schooner 
was lying in Topsail Jnlet, seven or eight miles from the sea. It 
turned out that this was the blockade-runner Cooper, which had 
slipped in and out three or four times, and would have got to sea 
again within three or four days had not her presence been betrayed. 
An expedition from the blockader started out to advance up the 
inlet from the sea, but was driven back by a battery, the presence 
of which was entirely unsuspected. 

After taking a few dnys to survey the situation the commander 
of the blockader one night ran up the coast to a point beyond the 
spot at which the schooner was lying to load. Between the sea and 
the inlet was a neck of land a mile wide. Two boats crews were 
sent ashore, and while one boat was left on the beach, the men 
carried the other across the neck and launched it, and then seven 
men started down the inlet to capture the schooner. The Confed- 
erates did not dream of such a Yankee trick as this, and apjjre- 
hended danger only from the opposite direction. The boat's crew 
of seven approached without discovery, charged and carried the 
Confederate camp on shore, and in ten minutes had possession of 
schooner and all, without having a man wounded. 

The number of Confederates was about twenty-five, most of them 
being engaged in the manufacture of salt. There was an infantry 
camp about two miles away, in which were about one hundred and 
fifty soldiers, but none of these came up to take a part. The salt 
works and wharf were given to the flames, and as it was found 
impossible to get the schooner out she was also fired. The artillery 
was spiked and the carriages destroyed, and when it came to dis- 
posing of the ten prisoners captured a ludicrous incident occurred. 
Not one of the prisoners would give his rank, and as all were dressed 
alike the Federal officer selected three of the best looking, whom he 
thought must be ofiicers, and took them away in his boat, after 
paroling the others. These three turned out to be privates. At 



232 THE FEDERAL BLOCKADEES OF THE WAB. 

Savannah I met one of the ten men captured there, and he said that 
after the boat had departed the paroled men sat down among the 
smoking ruins and liad a good hiugh over the trick tliey had played. 
The infantry stationed on the neck were in fault for the misfortune. 
Although pretending to maintain a patrol, they were all in camp 
and asleep when the schooner was attacked. 

It may be a bitter truth for certain people to swallow, but it is 
nevertheless a solemn fact, that this same schooner ran at least three 
cargoes direct from New York and Philadelphia into blockaded 
ports, each time being furnished a cargo by men who were making 
themselves hoarse by hurrahing for the glorious Union and against 
traitors. 




C^e ^mbama itn^ tlje gcitteras. 




'HE career of every Confederate privateer which escaped 
to sea was full of romance and daring. The idea of 
privateering came witli the outbreak of the war, but it 
was long months before the Confederate flag was 
hoisted at sea by a craft designed to prey upon Federal 
-commerce. No sentiment beyond that of adventure encouraged 
enlistments on board these vessels. A bond given by a captured 
craft was not worth the paper it was written on. Prizes could not 
be taken into port and condemned, and the privateer could not load 
herself down with any of the cargo. Now and then a few thousand 
dollars in cash may have been captured in the cabin, but it is not 
on record that the crews profited by it. They were clothed and fed 
and paid off in mone}' worth ten or fifteen cents on the dollar at 
home and representing so much blank paper abroad. Tlie natural 
desire to injure an enemy, coupled with a knowledge that a pri- 
vateering ci'aft would meet with many strange adventures, kept full 
crews aboard of ail. The loss inflicted on Federal commerce 
amounted to millions of dollars, and yet it may be argued that the 
money paid out by the Confederates to inflict this loss would have 
secured them more benefits in some other direction. 

The terror inspired by the famous Confederate cruiser Alabama 
was well founded. She was not only very fast, but well armed, 
well found, and commanded by a man who did not know what fear 
was. Semmes has been slandei'ed and abused because he was a 
Confederate. He was a gentleman in social life, a competent com- 
mander on board his ship, and those who refer to him as a pirate 
take a silly way of venting tlieir spleen. JefEerson Davis' commissions 
were as good in the eyes of nations at that date as Abraham Lin- 
•coln's, belligerency having been recognized, and the Federal gov- 
ernment was one of the powers recognizing this fact. Semmes has 
been called a coward for . capturing unarmed merchantmen. That 
was the object of his cruising, and he did not make a dollar out of 

[2331 



234: THE ALABAMA AND THE HATTEEAS. 

it where Paul Jones and other naval heroes of our own and other 
nations made hundreds. If Semmes had not been a brave man, 
and if there had been any of the skulk in his composition, he would 
not have challenged the Ivearsage to sail outside of Cherbourg and 
give him a fair fight. He did this calculating on a hard battle, 
and he fought until the Alabama went down. 

One of the quickest and hottest naval tigiits of the world was 
that which took place on January 11, 1863, off Galveston, between 
the Alabama and the Hatteras, the latter being one of the blockad- 
ing fleet. The statements of three different members of the crew 
of the Alabama agree in all particulars, and full particulars on the 
Federal side are given in official reports. The Alabama appeared 
off Galveston not to run the blockade, as Federal historians hastily 
conclude, but to attack anything offering her a chance of success. 
She had a full supply of provisions and ammunition, a large ci'ew, 
and could have no excuse for desiring to run into port. The hope 
aboard was to be able to destroy Federal transports, or to come up 
with a single Federal man of-war. 

There were six or eight men-of-war off the bar at Galveston on 
the eleventh, having previously been engaged in bombarding the 
Confederate works. The Alabama arrived within sight in the 
afternoon, her intention being to carefully locate each Federal ves- 
sel, and then stand off- till dark. It was known all through the 
ship that when night came down Semmes intended to run in and 
have a tilt at the entire fleet, but the Alabama had crept in so close 
that she had been sighted by several of the vessels. Taking her 
for some blockade-runner which could be easily overhauled, the 
flagship ordered tlie Hatteras to chase her. 

Nothing could have pleased Semmes more than this movement. 
He knew the Alabama had more speed than any of the block- 
aders, and he believed her armament to be equal to any. His 
object, therefore, was to entice the Hatteras out to sea beyond the 
aid of the fleet and then have it out with hei'. A pirate would not 
have shown his ship to that fleet, and a coward would have avoided 
a fight. 

When it was seen that the Aialiaina could steam faster than 
the Hatteras, her engines were slowed down, and tar was con- 
sumed to create smoke and give an impression that she was using 
every effort to make steam and get away. In his official report the 
commander of the Hatteras said that his suspicions were aroused 
long enough before he closed in ; but, if so, he acted in a very 



THE ALABAMA AND TUK HATTERAS. 235 

reckless manner in closing up within two hundred feet of the 
stranger before hailing, and likewise occupying a position in which 
he could be raked by her fire. 

Having drawn the Hatteras at least twenty miles away from the 
fleet, and darkness being ready to fall, the Alabama stopped her 
engines and waited. She had been lying in this position twenty 
minutes when the Hatteras steamed up within a hundred yards and 
hailed. The answer stands against Semmes as seeking to secure 
some unfair advantage at the start. The reply was that the Ala- 
bama was the British ship Vixen. In the gloom of the evening, 
and having never set eyes on the Alabama, the commander of the 
Hatteras could not dispute the information. He called out that he 
would send a boat aboard, and the boat was piped away, but before 
it touched the water the Alabama gave her true name and oj^ened 
fire. 

The advantage, from first to last, was with the Confederate. 
He was at quarters long before the Hatteras came up, had his 
broadside ready, with shells timed and men at the guns, and his first 
fire was a surprise. The Alabama had nine guns — the Hatteras 
eight, and the advantage of metal was with the Alabama. The 
first shot from the cruiser, being that from the one-hundred-and- 
five-pounder rifle-gun, peeled six feet of iron plating off the Hat- 
teras as a man might roll up a map, and went through her side and 
lodged in the hold. Every one of the first broadside shots took 
effect somewhere, as the vessels were scarce two hundred feet apart. 

Before the Alabama's shots had found resting places the Hatteras 
was steaming straight at her, determined to come to close quarters 
and board her. She was not speedy enough to accomplish this 
movement. The best she could do was to pi-event the cruiser from 
securing a raking fii-e and fight her broadside on. After the second 
broadside the vessels drifted so close that muskets and pistols could 
be used, and the gunners yelled taunts at each other across the water. 
In fifty-five seconds from the time she was fired on the Hatteras 
was replying. Inside of two minutes she had increased her broad- 
side by shifting ovee another gun. In three minutes it had settled 
down to a hard fight between two men-of-war so close together 
that a good shot with a revolver could have killed his man every 
time. 

In five minutes from the opening of the fight a shell from the 
Alabama started a fire in the hold of the Hatteras, and three shells 
had passed entirely through both sides of the vessel leaving holes 



236 THE ALABARLA. AND THE HATTERAS. 



throush which a man coukl ciawL From tliree to five shells had 
crashed into the Alabama, one of them ripping open her side, and 
another tearing up six feet of decking. 

In eight minutes the Hatteras was on fire in two places, and the 
Alabama had been struck ten times, and the ships were so close 
together at this moment, that one could have tossed an apple from 
the Hatteras to the Alabama. 

Within ten minutes a shot struck the cylinder of the Hatteras 
and filled her with steam, and the very next missile demolished her 
walkingbeam. She was still fighting, when the carpenter reported 
that she could not float ten minutes longer. She was already wal- 
lowing from side to side with the water in her hold, and the fight 
was over. A gun fired to leeward was the signal that she had sur- 
rendered, and even before the Alabama had ap^iroached, the Hat- 
teras had thrown several of her guns overboard to prevent her 
going down like a stone. 

The Alabama worked rapidly to save the crew of the blockader, 
and she had scarcely taken the last man off, when the Hatteras went 
down. Only thirteen or fourteen minutes had elapsed from the 
firing of the first gun to the surrender, thus making it next to the 
quickest naval battle on record. 

Nothing but shells were fired by either ship, and the damage 
inflicted in that brief time was appalling. The Alabama was 
struck twenty-four times, and had from ten to twelve ugly holes in 
her hull. Over one hundred musket and revolver-shots were fired 
at her, but not a man was hit. Indeed, she had but one man wounded, 
and that by an iron splinter from a shell. The shell which ripped 
up her deck threw two men in the air without disabling them, 
and a sailor who was knocked overboard by concussion was on deck 
again within two minutes. One of the last shots fired by the Hat- 
teras struck a gun full in the mouth, tearing off one side of it and 
shoving the gun and truck ten feet backwards by the force. A 
shell which exploded among her coal scattered the stuff from end to 
end of the craft and knocked down fireman and engineers without 
wounding them. Semmes was ever free to assert that for a vessel 
caught as the Hatteras was, she made a fight which will ever stand 
a credit to the American navy. It was the belief on board the 
Alabama that the first broadside would end the fight. 

Never was a ship left in a worse state than the Hatteras. Not a 
single shot had missed her. Three minutes before the surrender 



THE ALABAMA AND THE HATTEKAS. 237 

she had not enough standing rigging left for a sailor to shin up on. 
Scarcely a whole iron plate was left on her broadside. Some were 
splintered like pine shingles, and others hung by a rivet or two and 
trailed in the water. There was one spot above the water-line 
where a horse could have been led aboard. Her engine-room was 
a complete wreck, her coal-bunkers torn open and the contents 
heaved about, and every j^'i^'t of tliG vessel had been searched by 
pieces of shell. She struck with her engines disabled, two fires in 
her hold, her sails useless, her rudder gone, her magazine flooded, 
three guns overboard and seven feet of water in her hold. The 
aimals of naval warfare for the last hundred years do not furnish 
a parallel case. 

There was no more excitement on board the vessels than if 
two excursion boats had been approaching each other. Every man 
was at his station, and he remained there, unless disabled. The fires 
in the hold of the Hatteras were reported to the commanding 
oSicer : " Fire in the hold amidships, sir ! " as coolly as if speaking 
of a boat coming alongside. When the engine room was knocked 
into pieces and filled with kindling wood, the engineer gravely 
reported: "Engines disabled, sir! " Even when the Hatteras had 
less than five minutes to float, orders were issued and obeyed with 
the utmost coolness. 

The same cool conduct was observed on board the Alabama, 
although the gunners were more inclined to cheer and hurrah. Not 
a man flinched from his post, and the excitement was far greater 
after the fight was over. In olden days heroes did not hesitate to 
lay two sailing vessels broadside to broadside and fire away until one 
or the other was disabled. In those fights shells were unknown or 
scarcely ever used, and a sixty-four-pounder was considered very 
heavy ordnance. This was a fight between two vessels moved by 
steam, having a dozen vital points, and the projectiles used would 
have dumb-founded Paul Jones or any other old-time fighter. 
These monster shells could not be turned aside by a beam less than 
a foot square. Four and six-inch braces were cut square in two, 
six inches of solid planking pierced as if it were paper, and iron 
plates three inches thick were rent into strips or i-olled up like a 
manuscript. So close was the fighting that shells went through 
both crafts with the fuse still burning and exploded on the surface 
of the sea beyond. 

As stated before, the Alabama had only one man wounded, but 



238 



THE ALABAMA AND THE UATTERAS. 



the Hatteras had two firemen killed by the same-shell, and seven 
other men more or less severely wounded. Five or six more were 
reported missing, and it could not be determined wliether they leaped 
overboard or were in some manner detained on board until the vessel 
went down. 




^ome Jamaiis Cciiffkrate Cruisers^ 




HE first and last fights of the Confederate cruiser 
Alabama were full of such incidents as will be pre- 
served in naval i-ecords for long years to come. The 
manner in which she sunk the Hatteras off Galveston, 
has placed the affair second only to the quickest naval 
engagement on I'ecord, and her fight with the Kearsarge has been 
called the fairest fight ever made between men-of-war moved by 
steam. 

The Alabama began her career in June, 1862, and it was closed 
in August, 186i. Counting out the time spent in ports and for 
necessary repairs, she did not see over eighteen months of active 
service. In this time she sailed into every known sea and captured 
nearly seventy Federal vessels. Out of this number a dozen or so 
were bonded and released, but the others were given to the flames. 
It has ever seemed a curious interpretation of the laws of war 
that while the government itself recognized the Confederacy as a 
power, entitled to the rights of belligerents so far as the land forces 
were concerned, it called the Confederate cruisers pirates. It called 
them pirates, and yet did not dare try them on the charge, paroling 
and exchanging them as other belligerents. Again, Europe would 
give shelter to a Confederate privateer, and 3'et would not permit 
one of her prizes to enter a port. England would build the priva- 
teers, put the guns and a share of the men aboard, and still refuse 
to give them shelter in any of her ports, unless in dire distress. 

Federal historians have not given Semmes the credit due him in 
the fight off Cherbourg. He ran into Cherbourg to refit and 
repair, and the Alabama would have been in dock in twenty-four 
hours but for the appearance of the Kearsarge. Frenchmen tell 
this, and Frenchmen, too, who afterwards fought on the Federal 
side. Semmes says he was short-handed, and a French official who 
inspected his powder six hours before the fight, told him that he 
could not depend on it. The bulk of it had been on board five or 

[239] 



240 SOME FAMOUS C(JNFEDEEATE CRUISERS. 

six months. Semnies knew the Kearsarge as a stout, well armed 
ship, couimanded by a man who would fight to the last. He was 
told that her crew numbered one hundred and sixty- two, while his 
was only one hundred and forty-nine. The Kearsarge could throw 
more metal at a broadside, and more than a dozen different people 
warned the Confederate that the Kearsarge had been overlaid with 
chains to protect her vulnerable parts. 

Under these circumstances it would have been no slur on Semmes 
to have gone ahead with his work of refitting and treated the 
presence of the Kearsarge with silent contempt. All the advice 
received was to that effect, and yet he sent Winslow a challenge. 
He sought no advantages, but realized that all the disadvantages 
were with the Alabama. It has been written in history that a 
spirit of braggadocio induced him to send the challenge. Brag- 
garts don't challenge their equal match. If they do, they do not go 
out to fight. Semmes had been charged with running away from 
Federal cruisers, and here was the opportunity to give the lie to 
the story. 

So far as the vessels going out to sail round and round and fire 
into each other until one was sent to the bottom, it was a fair fight. 
In some things the advantage was with the Kearsarge, Had not 
the English carried Semmes and others away in the yacht the real 
merits of the fight would not have been lost sight of in the desire 
to hurt somebody's feelings. Semmes' friends say he drew the 
Hatteras out to sea for a fight without knowing her sti-ength, and 
that he challenged the Kearsarge knowing that the chances were 
against him. It is silly to deny that he had plenty of bravery, and 
the title of " pirate " belongs no more to him than to any privateer 
of the Revolution. 

On the other hand, Winslow deserves all praise for his conduct. 
When he started to cruise for the Alabama he meant to find her. 
Only a week before entering Cherbourg he had been told that she 
had a crew of one hundred and eighty men — that she carried four 
more guns than the Kearsarge — that she had been partly armored, 
and that she could sink him in a five-minute fight. When he fol- 
lowed her into Cherbourg he was determined to bring on a fight. 
It came much sooner than he expected, but he was ready. The 
perfect discipline on the Kearsarge was a great aid in the fight. 
The first two shots were lost in getting the range ; after that every 
gun was so coolly aimed and :''red that every missile struck. On 
board the Alabama the ^rew ver'^ excited, fired rapidly and wildly, 



SUME FAMOUS CONFEDERATE CEUISER8. 241 

and most of the shot passed entirely over. Outside of the destruction 
of the Hatteras, wliich was a loss of five liundred thousand dollars 
to the government, the Alabama created damage to the amount of 
seven million dollars. 

The Florida was likewise built of English oak, in an English port, 
and paid for with Confederate gold. She came out early in 1862, 
under the name of Oreto. The Federal government made every 
effort to detain her, suspecting from her build that she was intended 
as a cruiser. The Oreto was detained for weeks at Nassau, even 
without a musket or a marine on board, and when released, left for 
a rendezvous where a sailing vessel was in waiting with crew and 
armament. The Florida had both steam and sail, and her first 
commander, a naval Lieutenant named Stribbling, was a perfect 
dare-devil. He left Havana with only two guns in position and a 
crew of eight or ten roustabouts, and laid his course for Mobile. 
He had information that four or five Federal gnii-boats were on 
that station, but he steamed boldly on and reached the coast to find 
that his arrival had been expected. The entire fleet at once. set 
upon her, but by crowding on all steam and holding her course with 
shells whistling all around her the privateer made the harbor. She 
was struck eight times in the hull, her masts were chipped by five 
different shots and twenty ropes were cut by as many different mis- 
siles. Of the crew nearly all were prostrate with some epidemic 
when the Florida reached the coast, and she dashed through the 
fleet with only three men working her, and her commander too ill 
to leave his berth. 

At Mobile the Florida was thoroughly equipped for the work 
intended, and Stribbling having died, she was given a new com- 
mander. Having missed her as she ran in, the Federals were deter- 
mined to catch her as she came out, and orders were issued from 
Washington to strain every nerve to capture or destroy her. At 
least two expeditions were planned to cut her out, but for some 
reason they were not sent off. The fleet was increased, and at 
night the vessels stood in so close as to be within rifle shot of Fort 
Morgan. It did not seem as if a skiff could pass through the line 
of investment, and for two or three weeks after the Florida was 
entirely ready she did not dare attempt the passage. 

The coining of winter brought a gale which obliged the block- 
aders to haul off and open their ranks, and one dark night the 
Florida stood out. Sparks from the smoke-stack betrayed the 
privateer, but so rough was the sea and so dark the night, that she 

Vol. I.— 16 



242 SOME FAMOUS CONFEDERATE CEUISERS. 

escaped the fire unharmed. Four vessels at once followed in pursuit 
and maintained it until morning. Two then returned, and the 
others followed on until night, the storm not having abated in the 
least. After dark the Florida changed her course and thus threw 
the pursuers off the track. 

The Florida twice ran within thirty miles of New York, and her 
tender made captures within cannon-shot of Sandy Hook. It was 
this tender, commanded by Lieutenant Head, which captured the 
revenue cutter Gushing in Portland harbor, and was in turn cap- 
tured while getting out to sea. The Florida destroyed about sixty 
Federal vessels, worth five million dollars, and bonded six or eight. 
Her capture was just such an act as was played on the American 
man-of-war in 1813 by a British vessel — an act which has never been 
excused nor forgotten. The Confedei-ate had run into Bahia for 
repairs and supplies, when the United States man-of-war Waehusetts 
entered the port. This craft had been on the track of the Florida 
for weeks, and was now determined to capture her at any cost. 
Instead of waiting outside or sending a challenge for the priva- 
teer to come out and make a fight, the Waehusetts took advantage 
of night and the absence of part of the crew of the Florida and 
ran her aboard even in the harbor. It has been asserted in English, 
French and Brazilian newspapers that both commanders had given 
the Brazilian government their solemn pledge to respect the 
neutrality of the harbor, and yet the Waehusetts called to quarters 
without noise, slipped upon her prey in the darkness, and the 
moment she was sighted she discharged three guns into the priva- 
teer. During the excitement which followed, the privateer was run 
to sea with her captor. 

The affair created a great disturbance in official circles, and was 
settled in a curious manner. The American Consul at Bahia, was 
dismissed on the gi-ounds that he advised the disgraceful act, 
although upon his i-eturn to the United States he asserted that he 
advised against the movement. 

The Florida was "fixed " to sink at her anchorage so that she 
could not be returned, and the commander of the Waehusetts was 
tried by court-martial and recommended for promotion. Had 
Brazil been a power like England or France, Uncle Sam would not 
have thought of jilaying such a trick. 

The Shenandoah was another purchase fi-om John Bull, and it 
being well-known that she was destined for a Confederate privateer, 
every effort was made to prevent such a consummation. She got 



SOME FAMOUS CONFEDERATE CEUISEES. 243 

away from England, at last, under the guise of a merchantman, and 
having been fitted out at an appointed rendezvous, she began a cruise 
in searcli of whalers. Her cruising was confined to the cold seas, 
where the Confederate flag had never appeared before, and every 
capture was an important one. Inside of three hours she one day 
captured five whalers, four of which were burned and the fifth 
bonded that she might be loaded with the prisoners. Her captures 
footed up about seven million dollars, and several of them were 
made long after the war was closed. While the war closed in April, 
the Shenandoah received no tidings of it till midsummer. Her 
commander should have then laid his course for the nearest United 
States navy yard and surrendered everything, but he did not do so, 
much to his discredit as an honorable commander. He headed for 
England, and the Shenandoah i-an into Liverijool with the Confed- 
erate flag flying and surrendered to the English authorities. Of 
course the craft was at once transferred to the Federal government. 

The Shenandoah was twice disabled at sea and in great peril, and 
on one occasion some captured whalers set fire to her in two places 
at once and came near causing her destruction. She was chased 
over four thousand miles by different Federal cruisers, but always 
had luck with her, and escaped. 

Tlie Tallahassee was a double-screw propeller which had run the 
blockade, and was one of the last privateers out. She was fitted out 
at Wilmington in 1864, and the Confederate Secretary of the Navy 
was ridiculed on all sides for his purchase. When altered to 
a privateer and provided with guns she was compared to an old 
woman carrying a musket. One broadside from the smallest 
Federal gun-boat would have sent her to the bottom, and there was 
fear that if she fired all her guns at once she would be shaken to 
pieces. 

In this instance the race was to the swift. It was known that the 
Tallaliassee was in Wilmington and making ready to come out, and 
the blockaders were on the watch to capture her. When ready 
to go out she headed for sea and showed such a rate of speed as to 
astonish everybody. She escaped under a heavy fire and a narrow 
chance, and within twelve hours made her first capture. As she had 
only steam-power, and must depend on the coal she could carry, her 
career was a dash of a few weeks. She destroyed twenty-four Fed- 
eral crafts during the cruise. 

The Chickamauga was the twin of the Tallahassee, and was also 
fitted out at Wilmington. She was of English build, and ran the 



244 SOME FAMOUS CONFEDERATE CEUISEES. 

blockade from Nassau witli a crew of eleven men. When she 
approached Wilmington she found seven blockaders on that station. 
It was just at daylight, and the propeller put back to sea to wait for 
night or a change of weather. She ran back until out of sight of 
the blockaders, and up to noon nothing occurred to give her anxiety. 
Then a brisk gale and a stiff sea set in, and owing to the careless- 
ness of the lookouts two Federal gun-boats, on their way to join 
the blockaders, were allowed to approach within three miles of the 
runner and to cut off her escape to sea. In this emergency she 
headed for Wilmington, and though the alarm was given and she 
found herself almost surrounded, her speed and the recklessness of 
her captain carried her into port, though she was hit five times. 
One Federal shell struck her amidships, crashed through the planks, 
scattered a box of muskets, passed through the other side and 
exploded a hundred feet away. Out of the fifty nniskets in tlip 
box, forty-two were rendered useless beyond repair, by the shell. 

When the Chickamauga was ready to run out, having been fitted 
as a privateer, there were eight or nine Federal vessels on the station. 
They naturally reasoned that the Confederates would wait for a 
dark and stormy night to run out, but instead of this the privateer 
selected a still night, with the stars shining and the water as quiet 
as a mill-pond, and she ran to sea without a rocket being fired. 
In two cases she ran within five hundred feet of gun-boats which 
could have sunk her with one broadside. Her cruise was the brief- 
est of all, but she destroyed seven Federal vessels and added new 
flame to the excitement among ship-owners. 

The Georgia was the only vessel which the French nation sold to 
tlie Confederate government during the war, and this was a bad 
bargain. She was slow, weak and entirely unfit for the work laid 
out, and was sold after a brief cruise, in which she destroyed eight 
or nine Federal crafts. 

The Nashville, which was no more than a passenger steamer, was 
the first craft to show the Confederate flag in England. She made 
one voyage to Liverpool as a privateer and l)lockade-runncr com- 
bined, destroying three or four vessels and bringing home a cargo of 
arras and munitions. 



llolu tijf Coiifciicratts JTost |5ilton '§ut 




^ORT ROYAL will be attacked early in September!" 
So wrote a Confederate spy in Washington in 
August, 1861. 

It was an early date in the great struggle which 
made a continent shake, and the Confederate gov- 
ernment was scarcely settled down to the momentous work in 
hand. While it should have strained every nerve to prepare Port 
Royal for a successful defense, that same apatliy which lost New 
Orleans a year later seemed to sit heavily on the responsible officials. 
Port Royal was not attacked until November, and yet during the 
two months of warning scarcely a spade was used, and not a single 
extra gun mounted. 

On Hilton Head, at the entrance of Port Royal Sound, were 
Forts Beauregard and Walker. One who visits the sites to-day will 
lind tilings but little changed since the war, and he can see for 
himself that, aside from location, the forts stood no chance at all 
against such a fleet as might have been expected to attack, and 
which finally sailed past each fortification as if they did not exist. 

Fort Walker had only twenty guns in all when the attack came, 
and of these only fourteen would bear on the fleet. A ten-inch 
Cohimbiad was the heaviest gun in the fort. Fort Beauregai-d had 
twenty guns, the largest of which was a forty-two pounder. In 
both forts great annoyance was experienced with the powder, and 
when the fight began much of the fixed ammunition was found to 
be too large or too small, and was therefore worthless. Neither 
fort had been completed, especially in regard to shelters for the 
men, and requisitions for ordnance and munitions had been pigeon- 
holed by the officials at Richmond. 

Any attacking force must take tlie channel between the two 
forts, wiiich were about two miles apart. At that time the Federal 
navy had nothing but wooden walls to show against walls of brick 
and stone and earth. Such guns as Fort Sumter had, and such as 



246 HOW THE CONFEDERATES LOST HILTON HEAD. 

could have been easily secured for Port Eoyal, would have had a 
vessel under fire for thirty minutes. At the distance of a mile 
heavy ordnance would have bored wooden vessels through and 
through. 

Aside from the forts, Port Royal was defended by a Confederate 
"fleet" of six or eight nondescript craft, on which guns had been 
mounted, and which were, for convenience sake, called gun-boats. 
This fleet was under command of Commodore Tatnall. While 
his title of "commodore" was never justified by circumstances 
or surroundings, no one could question his bravery nor point to 
one single instance where he could have done bettei-. 

On the fourth of November most of the Federal fleet had gath- 
ered in the sound, and Tatnall moved boldly down with his tugs 
and river steamers and gave battle. Diipont's flagsliip, the old 
Wabash, could, alone and unaided, have sunk every one of them in 
fifteen minutes, to say nothing of the other seven or eight men-of- 
war which had reached the rendezvous. Tatnall fired a few rounds, 
received a dozen shots in exchange, and concluded not to sink the 
Federal fleet that day. Again on the fifth he moved down, opened 
fire, and this time had splinters knocked about his ears before he 
retreated. After he was chased behind the forts he was not again 
thought of until after Hilton Head was in Federal possession. Had 
his fleet been in the way it would have been sent to the bottom to 
save sailing through it. 

Dupont was then a captain and Sherman a brigadier-general, and 
the latter had his infantry on transports ready to be landed as soon 
as the former's work was done. The Sound was crowded with the 
great fleet, and when the hour of attack came fifteen men-of-war 
and gun-boats moved forward in procession. 

On the morning of the seventh of November the Wabash, carry- 
ing sixty guns and steaming along like a moving mountain, took the 
head of the line and fired a shell at Foi-t Walker as a signal for 
the attack. Confederate oflicials had inspected the forts and 
asserted that they could siidc any vessel attempting to sail between. 
Now came the test. The Confederates were at their guns, reliefs 
sheltered as well as possible, and infantry stationed at various 
points along the beach to prevent Sherman from throwing any 
of his troojjs ashore. 

An elbow of the Sound swept around Fort Walker in such a 
manner that an engineer had pointed out the possibility of an 
enfilading fire from a fleet. The possibility was realized but not 



HOW TIIK CONFEDEKATES LOST HILTON HEAD. 247 

provided for. Not one single serviceable gun was mounted to 
return such a fire, and this was the weak spot speedily taken advan- 
tage of by Dupoiit. He stationed two or three of his light-draught 
gun-boats in the elbow, and before the fleet had come up to the 
forts the Confederates were already under two fires. 

Confederate oflficers who stood with glass in hand and watched 
the advance of the fleet never saw a grander sight in war. There 
was a deep channel, plenty of room, and after the signal was given 
each ship kept her course and speed without reference to the fire 
of the forts. Each craft used her bow guns until she was broad- 
side on, and then there was a crash and a roar which made the 
whole island tremble. The gimson one broadside paid their regards 
to Fort Walker, and those on the other landed their missiles phimp 
into Beauregard. Tiiere was no lagging or swerving until the forts 
had been passed. Then the flagship swept around for the return, 
followed by the entire line, and when they had made the Sound 
again the forts were as good as won. 

Special orders had been given in the forts for the men to fire 
coolly and deliberately, and for a time the Confederate guns were 
splendidly served. Then several things happened to distract and 
discourage the men. Their guns were too light to have any imjiort- 
ant effect on the fleet. Had there been but one gun-boat, and had 
every one of the guns been trained upon her, it is doubtful if she 
would have lost a man. The few shot which fell among the fleet 
were aimed too high for any serious damage. Two guns in Walker 
and one in Beauregard dismounted themselves, injuring a dozen 
men, and tlie flrst broadside of the fleet dismounted two or three 
more. Almost immediately thereafter it was found tliat the shells 
were too large for the Parrotts, and out of every dozen shells fired 
from either fort five would burst short, owing to defective fuses. 

The Wabash and other vessels had ordnance which would throw 
grape-shot as far as the guns in the forts could throw shells, and as 
the ships delivered their broadsides the Confederate guimers had to 
fall flat to escape the iron hail. Time and again the entire garrisons 
were driven to cover, and a number were wounded while behind 
the best shelters afforded in the fortifications. For every twenty 
minutes in which Fort Walker was engaged, it had a gun disabled 
or entirely destroyed, and out of the nineteen or twenty guns in 
Beauregard, ten were found useless when the Federals took posses- 
sion. In this latter work eleven men were wounded by one shell 
from the Wabash. 



248 HOW THE CONFEDERATES LOST HILTON HEAD. 

The fire from the gun-boats in the elbow soon began to tell. 
There being no sea on and the distance short, every shot was fired 
with perfect aim. Men working the guns on the channel side were 
killed and wounded by this enfilade, and it had the effect to throw 
tiie whole garrison into a panic. One shell thrown from the elbow 
dismounted a sea-face gun, wounded three men, and flung gun and 
carriage together off the wall. The thirty-eight guns in the two 
forts had been i-educed to thirty in the first half hour, and of these 
only twenty-two could be trained on the fleet, from which seventy- 
five guns pitched shot, shell and grajjo with a vengeance that left 
innumerable sears. 

From the time the first gun was fired there was no cessation on the 
part of the fleet. Foi' about four hours the vessels sailed in an almost 
true circle, giving one fort a broadside on the way np and the other 
a broadside on the way down. At half-past one o'clock it was deter- 
mined to evacuate Fort Walker. Every part of the work, even to 
the jiowder magazine, was exposed to the Federal fire, and not more 
than five guns were in working condition. The decision to evacu- 
ate produced something of a scare, and the men were hurried out 
so fast that not a gun was spiked nor a thing destroyed. On the 
wharf near by was a lot of ordnance and quartermaster's stores 
which could either have been removed or dumped into the water. 
All were left for the Federals. One of the last shots received from 
the fleet before the evacuation blow up tlie hot-shot furnace of the 
fort. 

Dupont's attack was made just in time to cut off a large reinforce- 
ment for this fort, and as a consequence the garrison was too weak 
to handle the guns at their best and keep it np. While there was 
no enfilading fire, the dii-ect fire of the fleet soon began to knock 
things to pieces, dismount guns, and drive the garrison to shelter. 
Before the vessels had made the third circuit it was i-ealized in Fort 
Beauregard that evacuation or surrender was a question of only two 
or three hours. 

At a proper crisis in the fight, Sherman began feinting as if he 
intended to land troops, ami this settled the question with the Con- 
federates. There were not over three thousand available troops to 
oppose a Federal infantry demonstration, and the i-espective com- 
manders of the forts were afterwards officially congratulated on 
their generalship in saving the garrisons, both of which, with the 
exception of a few prisoners, were safely landed on the main-land. 

It was a curious contest in all points. There was no excuse why 



HOW THE CONFEDKEATES LOST UILTuN HEAD. 



249 



the forts were not completed. There was no excuse why heavier 
guns were not mounted. Nothing but shiftlessness prevented both 
being fully garrisoned and provided with proper shelters. Not 
more than one missile out of ever}' fifteen hurled from the forts 
came within ten feet of a vessel. An eiBcient commander would 
not have been caught with shells too large for his best guns, nor 
with fuses which would not ignite. 

On the other hand, while the Wabash alone could have whipped 
both forts, a grand Armada was sent down. Sherman could have 
landed and captured every Confederate, and yet his orders were 
against it. A few hulks would have obstructed the channel, and a 
few torpedoes added would have kept the fleet out; but neither hulk 
nor torpedo was thought of. 




€\t f anic at las^HIU. 




F a whole brigade of a veteran soldiers lose their courage 
and rush for the rear in a panic because of a change of 
position by a battery, what can be expected of the citizens 
of a town who feel themselves at the mercy of an advanc- 
ing army ? 

When the Confederate army fell back from Bowling Green to 
Nashville, and was immediately forced to continue the retreat to 
Mui-freesboro, the capital of Tennessee was left defenseless. Had 
the state and city officials been men of nerve and less fearful of fall- 
ing into Federal hands, a citizen patrol would have been oiganized 
as soon as the Confederate rear-guard left, and order could have 
been preserved until the hour came for a surrender to the approach- 
ing Federals. 

Instead of taking any such steps, everybody lost their wits. Gov- 
ernor Harris was among the first to go. Instead of remaining at his 
post to enforce law and order and protect the women and children 
from violence and robbery, he hurried away in hot haste after the 
Confederate army, and advised all others to follow. 

The Legislature was in session and all courts open, but everybody 
was panic-stricken within an hour, and such a reign of terror, con- 
fusion and plunder was initiated as no other Southern city passed 
through during the war. Before either branch of the Legislature 
could adjourn in a formal way, members were travelling at a rapid 
gait for the depots and steamboat landings. 

Lawyers who were pleading cases clapped on their hats and 
walked out of the court-rooms, to be closely followed by judges, jurors 
and clerks, and within a few hours not an official, state, county, or city 
could be found in the place. The flight of the officials set afloat the 
most exaggerated stories of what would happen when the Federals 
arrived, and common sense soon deserted the people. Such as had 
conveyances of their own liurried away with such valuables as they 
could easily pack up, and others hired vehicles at the most extor- 

[250] 



THE PANIC AT NASHVILLE. 251 

tionate prices to convey tliein a few miles into the country. Those 
who could not afford to hire started off on foot, singly or in squads, 
leaving everything behind and glad to escape with their lives. 

Along towards night, General Floyd, with a few thousand men, 
sneaked into Nashville under the supposition that it was still in the 
hands of the Confederates. When he discovered that it was 
deserted, he halted only long enough to rest and refresli his men, 
and then pushed on again. No sooner had he left than the lawless 
element took possession of the place and held high carnival. Stores 
and shops were broken open and plundered, incendiary fires started, 
and from the disreputable neighborhoods there was a rush of both 
sexes into the heart of the city to riot and loot. 

For several hours the city was in tlie hands of the lawless and 
was given up to plunder. It made no difference to them to whom 
the property belonged, and when the plunder of private shops and 
houses was finished, they turned upon tJie Confederate government 
stores and stole and destroyed to the extent of two or three million 
dollars. 

Many citizens defended their property witli rifles in their hands, 
and many of the half-drunken, half-crazed plunderers fought among 
themselves, and thus it occurred that more tlian a score of dead were 
lying in the streets when the Federal advance rode in. The first 
move was to rescue the city from the mob, and as almost every man 
showed fight and was determined to hold on to what he had got, the 
orders to the cavalry were to ride them down and use the sabre. In 
half an hour after they began work the streets were cleared and the 
city quiet. Plad their coming been delayed two hours more, the city 
would have been given up to the flames, as preparations were 
making in half a dozen localities to stai't destructive fires. 




CJf ^trii of an %xmi.. 




th N the summer of 1862, as Bragg advanced into Kentucky 
and the Federal forces were pushed back, a Federal army 
of ten thousand men was left uncovered at Cumberland 
Grap. 
The position had been captured several months pre- 
viously, with the design of using it as a base from which to advance 
on several Confederate strongholds, and its great natural strength 
was added to by fortifications and heavy cannon. 

When Bragg began his advance General Morgan, in command at 
the Gap, had plenty of ammunition and a fair supply of forage and 
provisions, but one of tiie iirst moves made was to cut him off from 
his base of supplies. The Confederate plan was to force him to 
evacuate the place, but when it was seen that he was in no haste to 
take this step it was resolved to capture his entire force. 

As soon as his lines of supplies were severed, Morgan asked Hal- 
leck, then commandei'-in-chief, for instructions, adding his own views 
of the importance of holding the Gap, and promising to hold out 
against any force if he could be provisioned. Halleck ordered liim 
to hold on, but it cannot be found on record that he ever raised a 
finger to get provisions to the Gap, nor did he send instructions to 
be obeyed in certain contingencies. 

By the latter part of August, Morgan had scraped the country for 
twenty miles around clean of forage and provisions, and had been 
obliged to put his army on half-rations. He had a Confederate 
force on either side of him, but his mail-carriers still readied the 
outer world. Halleck knew just the situation, but he sent no 
orders. He knew of the forces closing in on that little army, and 
he knew that it must surrender if not ordered to fall back or if it 
was not reinforced, but Morgan was left to work out the problem 
alone. 

When the daily press of the North learned the situation and 
raised a storm of indignation, Halleck sought to exonerate himself, 
but at the same time left Morgan in the trap. It was then too late 

[352] 



THE PEKIL OF AN ARMY. 253 

to instruct liirn in any movement except surrender, and it seemed as 
if Morgan's fate was sealed. 

" I have the Federal General Morgan and his army safely bagged 
in Cumberland Gap, and will make prisoners of the entire crowd." 

So telegrapJied Bragg to the Confederate capital, and there was 
only one who doubted that the boast would be made good. That 
man was General Morgan. Fully realizing that Halleck's incom- 
petency was offering him up as a sacrifice, he determined that sur- 
render should never come. 

For thirty days his troops had little besides flour and meat, while 
forage was so scarce that the horses and mules constantly gave voice 
to their hunger. Early in September every man realized that either 
surrender or retreat must sfieedily come. He then had a Confeder- 
ate army on either side of the Gap, a third moving to cut off what 
seemed his only line of retreat, and various detached commands 
moving to complete a circle around him. Front and rear and fiank 
he was being hammered at night and day, and almost every day he 
was being summoned to surrender and end the helpless struggle 
against fate. 

The hour came when Morgan had to answer the query : " Sur- 
render or retreat ! " He decided on i-etreat. The route to the 
north was menaced by detached commands, and it was one hundred 
and ninety miles to the Ohio Kiver by the shortest route, but it was 
the only way out. The men could not take even half-rations of 
such provisions as they had, and the way to the north was over 
hills and mountains and stony fields— a country which could not 
yield enough for the wants of a single regiment. 

On the sixteenth of September the first trains were sent away, 
the wagons being empty. Morgan had decided that nothing should 
be left which could benefit the Confederates. As soon as the train 
was under way men began to mine into the sides of the Gap at 
various points, and all the clothing, s^jare arms, and ammunition 
were gathered together and so placed that fire and explosion must 
destroy them. 

The siege guns which had been hauled up the mountain, by tre- 
mendous labor, were spiked and dismounted, the mines loaded for 
explosion, and trains run from storehouses to magazines. All the 
field-pieces were to go with the army as far as the skeleton horses 
could drag them. 

By night of the seventeenth the entire army had left the Gap, a 
single company only remaining behind to carry out tlie work of 



254 THE PERIL OF AN AEMY. 

destruction. While the Confederates had no suspicions of what 
was occurring, they were impatient to possess the place, and the 
Pederal pickets were withdrawn under a hot hre. When the torch 
was applied to the store-houses and the various mines and magazines 
exploded, Cumberland Gap was such a wreck of war as human eye 
has seldom looked upon. Overhanging cliffs were toppled down 
into the narrow highway, completely blocking it up at several 
points, while the country for miles around was lighted by the 
roaring flames. 

The main magazine contained six tons of gunpowder. When the 
explosion came the whole mountain shook and trembled as no 
earthquake will ever cause it to do, and Confederates a mile away 
were flung down in their tracks. Some of the pickets had crept up 
to see what the flames meant and the explosion lifted them off their 
feet and dashed them senseless on the ground. Large pieces of 
rock were hurled a distance of a mile, and quite a number of 
Confederates were killed by the flying debris. It was evening of 
the next day before it was safe to apj^i'oach the spot, and even two 
days later men were killed there by exploding shells. 

From the seventeenth of September to tlie third of October that 
little Federal army was pressing on to the north, its rear harassed 
every mile of the way — its flanks attacked at every cross-road. 
There was not an hour in the day when its path was clear of cavalry 
and bands of guerrillas, and hardly an hour in all the long days 
that death was not reducing its numbers. Men were reduced to 
live on parched corn and roasted potatoes — horses and mules to forage 
on the under-growth. There were marches of twenty miles at a time 
when water was not to be had, and Morgan was constantly delayed 
by the obstructions placed in his path by detachments who hoped to 
hold him until the Confederate armies could come up and close in. 

Strangely as it may read, that brave and indomitable man 
brought his army to the Ohio with the loss of less than one hundred 
men, while he did not leave beliind him a piece of artillery or a 
single wagon, nor did the Confedei-ates reap one dollar's profit from 
his evacuation of the Gap. The North greeted him as a hero — 
Bragg spoke of him as a brave and gallant soldier. It was left to Hal- 
leck alone to insult him. He ordered an investigation, and bestowed 
censure where others lavished praise. However, when Morgan 
demanded a coui't of inquiry Halleck dared not grant it, but covered 
it uj) and smoothed it over until the public let the subject drop to 
■discuss the further exciting events of war. 



Cl]^ Slimglitcr-I'nt at Corint|, 




OSECRANS bad fought Price at luka and then fallen 
back on Corinth. In the last days of September, 1862, 
Price, Van Dorn, and Lovell joined Confederate forces, 
and Rosecrans realized that the combined force meant 
to attack him. 

Pie was helpless to hold his lines of communication, and the Con- 
federates were moving with such celerity that a battle would be 
brought on before Federal reinforcements could come to his aid. 
Kosecrans' strength was but little above twenty thousand men — 
that of the Confederates above thirty thousand. 

The Federals had two or three days to prepare for the coming 
struggle, and the time was employed in throwing up earth-works 
and taking the positions assigned. Beauregard had fortified exten- 
sively while in possession of Corinth, and now his earth-works, or 
a considerable portion of them, were used by Eosecrans in making 
his position impregnable. 

Why the Confederate commander should have marched in on 
Corinth from the direction he did has never been explained. He 
approached from the right quarter to find the strongest works in 
his front, and instead of separating his force and attacking from 
three different points, as could easily have been done, with the 
promise of certain disaster to the Federals, he massed the entire 
army on Posecrans' front. 

On the third of October, as the Confederates approached Corinth, 
Posecrans threw forward a force of infantry and maintained heavy 
skirmish fighting during the day, in which the loss on both sides 
was quite severe, but at night-fall tlie entire Federal force was 
penned up in Corhith. During the night the Confederates massed 
along the whole front, and commanders received orders to have 
their men ready for desperate work at daylight. 

The Federal center rested on the highway running from Corinth 
to Pittsburg Landing and Shiloh, with the right resting on a ridge 

[355] 



256 THE SLAUGHTER-PEN AT COEINTH. 

commanding this and the Purdy roads. The left rested on newly 
erected batteries, with natural cover to baffle any flank movement. 
The entire front for a space of from a quarter to half a mile was 
practically open ground. 

The fighting on the third must have betrayed to Van Dorn the 
exact disposition of the Federal force, with the number of earth- 
works and their I'elative strength. He was pretty thoroughly posted 
as to Kosecrans' strength, and he was also well satisfied that he 
could not be reinforced within twenty-four hours. 

No reason has ever been advanced for not making a detour with 
one of the commands and seizing the highways in rear of the Fed- 
eral position and making a rear attack. Van Dorn had the men to 
spare, knew every rod of the country, and the Federal commander 
expected just such a a movement to be made. 

Day is just breaking. 

There is an ominous silence in the woods in front of Kosecrans, 
and the men within his lines speak in low tones and move -about in 
a nervous way. Horses and mules have been given their feed, but 
they stand with heads high in the air, ears working nervously, and 
their eyes betraying a feeling of apprehension and peril. 

From daylight to sunrise Van Dorn is massing. As the railroads 
from Memphis and from Columl)us enter Corinth they form an 
angle in which ten thousand troops can lie massed and have the 
shelter of the forest to hide them from Rosecrans' center. Van 
Dorn here masses a living wedge to drive against one of the strong- 
est positions ever seen in war. 

It takes time to get these men in position, and it is after eight 
O'clock when the commands of Van Dorn and Price move out of 
the woods. 

They are coming in columns of divisions, guns at the right- 
shoulder shift, and the step the same as if marching on or off 
parade. 

There are four redoubts in front of the Federal center — a line of 
rifle-pits — an abattis to halt men in the face of death. No sooner 
is the first gray line clear of the woods than the Federal artillery 
opens. It is scarcely rifle-range, and the dense columns ofiEer targets 
which the gunners cannot miss. 

Crash — crash — shot and shell and grape eat gaps in the gray 
lines — shatter heads of columns — burden the earth with dead and 
wounded, but tlie Confederate bugle continues to sound the " For- 
ward!" and the lines to advance. 



THE SLAUGHTER-PEN AT CORINTH. 257 

It seems as if every Confederate bad his eyes on that one point 
held by Davies' thin division, and, though scores must die, no one 
will halt or turn back. It is on — on ; and now the Federal infantry 
have them within range. Gaps are opened again — lines are almost 
annihilated — officers are left standing alone, but the living rally with 
cheers and dash straiglit at Davies and over him. 

That rolling wave, which even death could not stop, wipes Davies 
out in a moment, and in five more has possession of Rosecrans' 
head -quarters. If this gap cannot be closed and held the battle is 
lost. 

Hamilton brings up his division, every man of whom has smelled 
powder in battle before, but they are hurled to the right and left, 
and the Confederates rush upon Eichardson's guns. These guns 
are the key to the Federal center. Once — twice the gray wedge 
is beaten back — shattered — almost annihilated, but the living 
rush up as if death had no terrors, and a third charge carries them 
over the guns. 

For five minutes Rosecrans sees defeat and disaster. Then one 
single regiment saves him. The Fifty-sixth Illinois, numbering 
about eight hundred men, has been posted in the bed of a dry creek 
to prevent Richardson being flanked. Its colonel is the man for 
the emerffencv. Picking up his resriment he hurls it to Richard- 
son's rescue. There is a terrific shock — a mob of blue and gray 
whirling round and round, and the Confederates are pressed back 
broken — routed. 

It was murder to lead them against that Federal center — it was a 
cool sacrifice of a thousand lives to push them over Davies while 
Van Dorn's command had not yet approached near enough to dis- 
tract Federal attention from that one spot. 

Van Dorn had moved down on the Federal left, intending to 
attack simultaneously with Price. Owing to the broken nature of 
the ground his troops could not move with the same speed, and it 
was only after Price had been hurled back in disorder that he was 
readj to strike his blow. 

It was to fall upon a rock. He had the strongest of all the Fed- 
eral earth-works in his front, and another on his flank, and there 
were tlie same murderous rifle-pits — the same terrible abattis to be 
encountered. Had he withdrawn his command after seeing Price 
hurled back, his fame as an old soldier would not have been tar- 
nished. But he would not turn back. 

It was the same as in the center. As soon as the heads of col- 

VOL. I.— 17 



'■ioS THE SLAUGHTER-FEN AT CORINTH. 

umns broke cover every Federal cannon poured in its murderous 
fire, and added to that in front was an enfilade which could not be 
escaped. 

And, as in the center, it was forward — forward — over the abattis 
— up to the rifle-pits— up to the blazing cannon — hundreds falling — 
hundreds living to press on. 

At the ditch before Fort Robinette the Confederates paused for a 
moment to close up and take breath, and as they made a rush over 
the ditch at the slope the Federal infantry rose up and fired a volley 
which mortal man could not face. But, as the Texans were swept 
away, seven out of every ten men dead or wounded, a second com- 
mand moved up to take the same fire — to cross the same ditch, and 
to fight with bayonet and clubbed musket on the walls of the fort. 

Rosecrans could spare troops from his center, and they had to 
move less than two hundred yards to enfilade the frenzied, desperate 
mob seeking to enter the fort. Riven, shattered, decimated twice 
over, the Confederates were swept back to the woods, and the hur- 
ricane had passed. 

The battle had lasted hardly more than an hour, but the whirl- 
wind of death had left its path strewn with more dead than war 
had ever seen on such a short front. The Federal loss, sheltered as 
all the troops had been, was above fifteen hundred, while in front 
of the lines five thousand Confederates lay wounded or dead — the 
greater portion dead. In addition to this, the Federals captured 
above two thousand prisoners, fourteen battle-flags, and a large 
number of muskets. 

War will never record an instance where soldiers more willingly 
pressed forward to slaughter, or where the repulse was more 
emphatic and bloody. The Confederate army was nearly paralyzed 
by the blow. Its escape from destruction, as McPiierson took up 
the pursuit next day, would not have been accomplished, but for 
the nerve and strategy of Van Dorn. 




Cljc ilorlrak ""^Ittitiim of tlje ^lar. 




HE great majority of Northern people treated the 
blockade-running business during the war as a matter 
aii'ecting only private individuals, and had no idea of 
its perilous risks and immense losses and gains. As a 
matter of fact, the Southern Confederacy could not 
have existed two years but for its blockade-runners. While private 
enterprise kept these ships afloat, the Confederate government was 
the backer, inasmuch as it stood ready to purchase whatever it could 
use, and that at prices which could hardly be credited were they not 
matters of historical record. 

The South made two serioiis blunders in the very beginning of 
the war. The first was in contending that sea-ports like Charleston 
could not be successfully blockaded, and the second was in not run- 
ning everything out of the Confederacy which could be spared, and 
which would bring money, before the blockade was a iixed fact. 

It seems incomprehensible that the two sections did not better 
understand each other when the war broke out. The North did 
not believe the South could raise one man where it raised six. 
It did not believe they could feed armies, build war-ships, 
manufacture arms, or do much they did do. On their part, 
Southerners did not believe that Northerners would seek a battle. 
It was the idea up to the very last day before Bull Pain that the 
Federal government would back down. It was well known that it 
had no navy of importance, and Lincoln's blockading proclamation 
was greeted with derision. Some of the "supposed wisest men in 
the South declared that a blockade was simply impossible, owing to 
natural causes, while others clung to the belief that Europe would 
prevent it. The general idea of landsmen was that a blockading 
fleet must be anchored in line across a channel, the vessels so close 
together that nothing could pass, and as a conserpience public speak- 
ers talked about fire-rafts, powder-ships, and other absurd plans of 
driving the blockaders away. It was even figured that it would 

[259] 



260 THE BLOCKADE ETJNNEES OF THE WAK. 

take one hundred and twenty-eiglit Federal craft to blockade Cliarles- 
ton. One speakei", at a public meeting in Wilmington, admitted 
that a blockading fleet might be of some service in the day time, 
but when nigiit came the sailors might go to bed for all the good 
they could do. He offered to keep Wilmington Harbor clear of 
them if his fellow-citizens would furnish the pine-knots to make 
fire-rafts. It was only when too late that the Confederacy saw its 
mistakes. The blockade closed in upon its ports with millions of 
dollars' worth of corn, sugar, cotton, and tobacco locked up. After 
that it must take its chances of running the blockade. 

The headquarters of the blockade-running business was at Charles- 
ton. During the war ten vessels ran in and out of Charleston to 
one entering any other port. A score of ricli firms in that city 
entered into the business simultaneously, attracted by the large 
profits and encouraged by the government ; and it was at Charleston 
that Major E. Willis was stationed as purchasing agent of the Con- 
federate government. 

The war began in April. By September every Southern mer- 
chant had sold out his old stock, and must henceforth depend on 
Europe. It was then that prices leaped to sucli figures as astonished 
everybody,- and were quoted at the North as evidence that the Con- 
federacy was staggering. And yet Lee was in his glory as a suc- 
cessful general when those prices had advanced from five hundred 
to one thousand times. Any woman who bought a paper of pins in 
the fall of 1864 remembers that they cost from one hundred to one 
hundred and twenty-five dollars in Confederate money. 

The South liad very few vessels fit for blockade-running, but she 
had money to buy with, and agents were kept in Europe to pick up 
the sort of craft wanted. Some of the most successful vessels were 
sailing craft, but after 1862 the great majority were side-wheel 
steamers and propellers. Where the latter approached the speed of 
the former she was taken in preference. After the first year the 
business was reduced to something like a science. In the first place, 
all the steamers were provided with smokeless coal, and this was 
alwaj's a great point in their favor. In the next place, the color of 
the craft was found to be a very important matter. After many 
experiments it was found that a white tinged with blue was the 
best that could be adopted. Runners thus painted have approached 
within a thousand feet of a blockader at night without being seen, 
and have rested half a day within a few miles of an entire fleet. 
Everything was painted this one color, so that there was nothing for 



THE BLOCKADE KUNNERS OF THE WAK. 261 

tlie eye of the look-out to catch. If he saw the steamer at all, she 
was simply a haze or blur in his eyes. After it was found that the 
water churned up by the wheels sometimes betrayed the craft by its 
phosphorescent gleam, arrangements were made to prevent it, gener- 
ally by floating a sail behind the wheel. Men even carae to count 
the chances of capture and escape as coolly as they figured the cost 
of cloth. 

The profits were enormous. A suitable craft could be pur- 
chased in Europe for sixty thousand to one hundred and twenty 
thousand dollars, and as a rule one successful trip would clear her 
cost. To show what the profits were. Major "Willis once sent out a 
bale of cotton worth four hundred dollars in Confederate money. 
At Nassau it was exchanged for a barrel of borax, which he sold in 
Charleston for four thousand dollars in the satiie currency. Again, 
he sent out a bale of Sea Island worth six hundred dollars, and 
received a bale of women's veils, which brought him thirteen thou- 
sand dollars. Merchants who bought English cloth at fifty cents 
per yard had no trouble in disposing of it at home for seven and 
eight dollars. A pair of boots costing two dollars, brought ten and 
twelve dollars in Charleston. Tea which could be had in Nassau 
for forty cents per pound, brought from fourteen to twenty dollars 
in the South. 

If the owners made well, the men who assumed the perils were 
by no means neglected. The wages of the common sailors were 
doubled and more, and paid in gold. Many captains bargained by 
the trip. If successful in making the round trip, they received 
from three thousand five hundred to five thousand dollars in good 
English gold. Outside of this sum, each captain was permitted to 
carry one bale of cotton each trip on his own account. As nothing 
was said about weight, they had two and three ordinai-y bales com- 
pressed into one, and often made fifteen thousand dollars out of 
their speculation. 

Whatever the Confederate government needed had to come this 
way, and it paid the same prices as individuals. The runners 
brought in cannon, muskets, ammunition, boots and shoes, cloth, 
uniforms, equipments, tents, sabres, medicines, etc., and it was only 
in this way that the Confederate armies were kept in the field. The 
same number of states, geographically situated like Ohio, Indiana, 
Illinois, and Wisconsin, would not have held out so long. Stringent 
as was the blockade, it was never close enough to entirely stop the 
business. With twenty-four Federal vessels off the bar at Charles- 



26'2 . THE BLOCKADE RUNNEKS OF THE WAK. 

ton, a Confederate steamer made that port without receiving a shot> 
A pilot to be depended on, and a night such as the runners prayed 
for, would take a vessel out or in, no matter how alert the block- 
aders. 

Necessity and avarice were the main inducements to carry on the 
trade, but in making up the crew of the vessel many a man volun- 
teered his services more for the love of adventure than any other 
reason. It was a business in which every man took his life in his 
hand, and he so understood it. An ordinarily brave man had no busi- 
ness on a blockade runner. He who made a success of it must have 
the cunning of a fox, the patience of a Job, and the bravery of an 
Spartan warrior. Uncle Sara wanted at first to treat them as pirates, 
and was never satisfied to consider them contrabandists. The run- 
ners must not be armed, and must not resist. The only privilege 
accorded them when discovered was to outrun pursuit if they could, 
and scores of them were remarkably successful in making the most 
of this privilege. In a stay of ten da3'S in Charleston, I had the 
good fortune to meet a round dozen ex-captains of blockade-runners, 
and was thus put in possession of many particulars never given the 
public in print. The history of the business, written alone and de- 
tailing the adventures, perils, escapes, and mishaps of the five hun- 
dred vessels engaged from first to last, would be the most interest- 
ing volume of the war. 

When Uncle Sara realized that England was willing to sell what- 
ever the Confederacy would buy, a sharp watch was kept upon 
everything landed or loaded at Nassau. In some cases the Federal 
agents were bribed with gold, and in othei-s the goods wanted were 
passed under their very noses without being suspected. Four weeks 
previous to the battle of Shiloh, tlie steamer Kate ran the blockade 
at Charleston and arrived safely at Nassau. Twenty thousand Eng- 
lish muskets, already paid for, had arrived, and a part of them were 
unloaded. The boxes were marked "hardware," and two liundred 
dollars so blinded the customs ofiicer that he saw spades and shovels 
where he might have seen gun-barrels and stocks. Scarcely any 
effort was made at secrecy, and the Kate sailed away unquestioned ; 
landed the arras in the Confederacy, and they were speedily in the 
hands of the Confederates confronting Grant. That supply of arms 
brought about that battle. One cannon-ball from a Federal cruiser 
fired into the Kate would have had a mighty bearing upon the cam- 
paign in the "West. 

There never was a time from first to last, no matter how thick 



THE BLOCKADE RUNNERS OF THE WAR. 263 

the Federal spies, that the Confederates could not obtain full cargoes 
at Nassau. It was a trick of the Federal cruisers to lie in wait for 
the runners coining out, so that the craft practical!)' had to run two 
blockades to reach a Southern port, and from the moment of leaving 
Nassau the dangers thickened. 

Just before leaving Nassau, one evening in 1863, the captain of 
the blockade-running steamer Southern Cross received information 
that two Federal cruisers were lying in wait for him about twenty 
miles off the coast. In consequence of this news he ran to the 
right of the usual track about ten miles to avoid them. The Fed- 
eral commander suspected that their presence would be known ia 
Nassau, and therefore ran to the left of the track. 

The runner was fifteen miles at sea when night fell. Every light 
was put out, the speed was slowed down, and every man aboard was 
cautioned to be absolutely quiet, no matter what occurred. The 
firemen opened barrels of tar to be prepared for a sudden call for 
increased speed, and the steamer crept forward in the darkness. 
Owing to her color, she could not be seen a quarter of a mile away 
on that night, and there was enough wind and sea to drown the 
noise of her paddles. All of a sudden, as the runner crept forward, 
the look-outs sighted one of the cruisers dead ahead and advancing. 
The steamer sheered to port, but in five minutes the other cruiser 
was sighted, and she found herself between the two. Her engines 
were stopped, and the vessel floated quietly before the wind. The 
chances were that she would not be discovered, when an Irish deck- 
hand, who had been without a smoke as long as he could stand it, 
filled his pipe and struck a match. The flame, tiny as it was, be- 
trayed the steamer. The cruisers signaled each other and at once 
opened fire. The shooting was guess-work under the circumstances, 
but it was good guessing. The very first cannon-ball carried away 
the ornament on top of the pilot-house, and the second smashed ten 
feet of deck railing. Tlie blockade-runner at once started ahead at 
full speed, all the time under fire, and as she ran away she passed 
within a hundred feet of one of the Federal ships. A solid shot, 
fired from this distance, passed througli the runner just above the 
main deck, and another grazed her bow, and the Federal commander 
hailed : " Heave to or I'll sink you ! " There was every show that 
he had it in his power to do so, but the ninner steamed ahead, and 
after an hour's chase, accompanied bj' a constant fire from the big 
guns, she gave the cruisers the slip. 

One' of the most valuable cargoes ever reaching a Southern port 



264 THE BLOCKADE RUNNEKS OF THE WAR. 

was that of the steamer Sumter. She was well known to the Fed- 
eral i)lockaciers at Charleston, and npon receiving this cargo she 
made direct for Wilmington. There was a blockading fleet of five 
or six vessels there, and the Sumter came in sight of it in the morn- 
ing. Paying not the least attention to their signals or movements, 
the steamer hoisted the American flag and ran steadily in. The 
boldness of the movement so astonished the fleet that not a gun was 
fired until the runner was out of range. It was the first and only 
time that such a bold trick was put in practice, but the blockaders 
felt sore over it for years. 

The cargo consisted of arms, aranmnition, clothing, cloths and 
medicines, and not the least important articles were two monster 
Blakely guns. These guns were so large and unwieldy that they 
were loaded with their muzzles sticking up through the hatchways. 
The great blockade-running house of John Frazer & Co. purchased 
the cannon in England and jirescnted them to the Confederate gov- 
ernment. The work of unloading them at Wilmington and convey- 
ing the monsters to Charleston by rail and placing them in battery 
on the esplanade, was accomplished by Major Willis, then Beaure- 
gard's quartermaster. Had the fleet captured the Sumter, and 
nothing would have been easier had her true character been sus- 
pected, the South would have been the loser of at least eight mil- 
lion dollars, and a whole army corps would have lost the guns, 
tent.s, batteries and ammunition intended for it. 

As to the encouragement given by the Confederate government, 
it will be made plain by the statement that it purchased from first 
to last, perhaps two hundred million dollars worth of goods. Major 
Willis made one purchase in 1SG3 amounting to seven million five 
hundred thousand dollars, and it was no uncommon transaction to 
pay a bill footing up from three million to five million dollars. 

Below is given the name of nearly every vessel which ran in or 
out of Charleston, together with the name of the captain and owner. 
From this list it will be'seen that an immense capital was invested 
in the business, and to what an extent the Confederacy was bene- 
fitted : 

NAMES. OWNERS. CAPTAINS. 

Steamer Gordon J, Fraser & Co T. J. Lockwood. 

Steamer Antonica J. Fraser & Co L. M. Co.\eUer. 

Steamer Margaret and Jessie J. Fraser & Co R. W. Lockwood. 

Steamer Pet A. R. Cliisolm and others . Foley. 

Steamer Calypso Consolidated Co Black. 

Steamer Ella and Annie Bee Co Carlin. 



THE BLOCKADE EtJNNEES OF THE WAK. 265 

NAMES. OWNERS. CAPTAENS. 

Steamer General Moultrie Ravenel & Co Tilton. 

Steamer Hattie. Collie & Co H. S. Lebby. 

Steamer Fox J- Fraser & Co Brown. 

Steamer Badger J. Fraser & Co D. Martin. 

Steamer Leopard J. Fraser & Co Peck. 

Steamer Lynx J. Fraser & Co E. C. Reed. 

Steamer Presto J- Fraser &. Co J. Horsey. 

Steamer Sumter J. Fraser & Co E. C. Reed. 

Steamer Rattlesnake W. G. Crenshaw Vzini. 

Steamer Wm. Lamb J. Fraser & Co T.J. Lockwood. 

Steamer Hope J- Fraser & Co Wm. Hammer. 

Steamer Ruby Collie Co A. Swasey. 

Steamer Let Her Be Chicora Co H. Holgate. 

Steamer Let Her Rip Chicora Co C. A. Stone. 

Steamer Republic J. Fraser & Co F. M. Harris. 

Steamer Nina Ravenel & Co Relyea. 

Steamer Emily Bee Co Egan. 

Steamer Lsabel J. Fraser & Co A. Swasey. 

Sailing ship Emily St. Pierre J. Fraser & Co Wilson. 

Schooner Savannah C. S. Privateer Baker. 

Pilot boat Petrel Perry and others Perry. 

Sloop Swallow Adams & Willis C. Gould. 

Steamer Elizabeth J. Fraser & Co T. J. Lockwood. 

Steamer .luno C. S. Government Parcher. 

Steamer General Whiting Consolidated Co S. Adkins. 

Steamer Syren Cobia & Co J. Johnson. 

Steamer Nashville J. Fraser & Co Pegram. 

Steamer Theodora J. Fraser & Co Maffett. 

Steamer Kate J. Fraser & Co T. J. Lockwood. 

Steamer Beauregard J. Fraser & Co H. Holgate. 

Steamer Fanny Bee Co D. Dunning. 

Steamer Alice Bee Co Kennedy. 

Steamer Caroline Bee Co C. Barkley. 

Steamer Dixie T. Moore. 

Bark Echo, known as Jeff Davis. . Hall & Co Coxetter. 

Steamer Dream Collie Co Lockwood. 

Steamer Secret Collie Co I. Davis. 

Steamer Druid Palmetto Co Tilton. 

Schooner Ben. 

Pilot boat Charleston Wm. Hone Wm. Hone 

Pilot boat Chicora, afterwards Chace. 
Pilot boat Leitch. 

Pilot boat Pride Street & West T. Bennett. 

Schooner Major E. Willis W. M. Hale W. M. Hale. 

Barque Etiwan .' J. Fraser & Co J- Stephens. 

Steamer Emma Hutchin. 

Steamer Raccoon J. Fraser & Co F. M. Harris. 

Steamer Banshee Collie & Co Capt. Speed. 

Steamer Herald Collie* Co Randall. 

Steamer Maryland Combs. 



266 THE BI-OCKADE RUNNERS OF THE WAR. 

NAMES. OWNBKS. CAPTAINS. 

Steamer Pauny T. Moore. 

Steamer Britannic Zacbison. 

Steamer Stonewall Jackson Peck. 

Steamer Thistle Mike Murray. 

Steamer Julia Cobia Co Swan. 

Steamer Gem Cobia Co J. Johnson. 

Schooner Kent W. M. Hale W. M. Hale. 

Steamer Prince Albert. 

Steamer Lillian D. Martin. 

Steamer Columbia Hutchinson. 

Schooner Palmetto A. Swasey. 

Steamer Coquette Coombs. 

Steamer Big Scotia Swan. 

Steamer Little Scotia. Swan. 

Schooner J. W. Ladsden Mordecai & Co Stone. 

Schooner Etiwan J. Hertz & Co O. A. Stone. 

Steamer Little Hattie. 

Steamboat Gen. Clinch Murphy. 

Steamer Cecile Carlin. 

Steamer Stag D. Vincent. 

Steamer Pearl, 

Steamer Plorine. 

Steamer Steno. 

Steamer Nimoo. 

Steamer Owl C. S. G. W Maffett. 

Vessels which ran the blockade in and out of Georgetown, S. C, 
during the war : 

NAMES. OWNERS. CAPTAINS. 

Steamer Caroline Bee Co Hudson. 

Schooner Helen Smith. 

Privateer Dixie Benton. 

Pilot boat Pride Street & West. 

The following ran through " Murrell's Inlet : " 

NAMES. OWNERS. CAPTAINS. 

Schooner Henrietta Jones & Lock wood Jones. 

Schooner Louisa Gordon & Leland Gordon. 

Schooner Goldminer Robert & Ireland Robert. 

Schooner Antoinette Sawyer & Macedey Rumley. 

Schooner Rover McCord & others Tole. 

Schooner Gus Chisolm Street & West Johnson. 

Schooner Lucy Street & West. 

Schooner Wave Street & West. 

Schooner Rutherford Street & West. 



THiE BLOCKADE EUNNEES OF THE WAE. 2C7 

VESSELS WHICH EAN INTO WILMINGTON, N. C. 

Messrs. Atkins, Murray, and Reed, are the only three owners 
whose names could be secured of the dozen or two at this port. 
The blockade-runners were: Bendigo, Vesta, Ella, Night Hawk 
Pet, Owl, Lucy, Petersburg, Old Dominion, Kate, Little Kate, 
Little Bee, Tallahassee, A. E. Fry, Gordon, Beauregard, Fanny 
Venus, Eagle, P. E. Lee, Atlanta, Old Charleston, Petrel, Eanger, 
Antonica, G. H. McCall, Banshee, Banshee No. 2, Gov. Vance, 
Spunky, Gem, Alice, North East, Let-Her-Rip, Condor, Col. Lamb, 
Agnes Louise, Emma Henry, ILittie, Little Hattie, Margaret and 
Jessie, Vulture, Ella and Annie, Elizabeth, Conubia, Gen. Whitney 
Coquette, Modern Greece, Lady Sterling, Rattlesiuike, Vermions, 
Vulture, Big Flora, Little Flora, Annie and John, The Dream, 
Phantom, Little Kate, Lynx, Flora, Ruby, Nashville, Thistle, 
Hansa, Bat, Deer, Wild Rover, Sumter, Venice, Star, Merrimac, 
Flamingo, Eugenie, Perrency, North Heath, Index, Syren, Mary 
Celeste, Hope, Armstrong, Gibraltar, Virginia. 

It will be seen that some of the runners entered both the ports 
of Charleston and Wilmington. If the blockade was found too 
strict at one port the other was resorted to. 

VESSELS WHICH EAN INTO SMITHVILLE, N. 0. 

Bendigo, Vesper, Ella, Night Hawk, Pet, Owl, Lucy, Petersburg, 
Old Dominion, Kate, Little Kate, Little Bee, Tallahassee, Agnes 
Fry, Gordon, Beauregard, Fanny, Eagle, R. E. Lee, Gen. Whiting, 
Elizabeth, Columbia, Ruby, Flora, Hansa, Lady Sterling, Coquette, 
Modern Greece, Vulture, Rattlesnake, Virnioris, Big Flora, Annie 
and John, Little Flora, The Dream, Phantom, Nashville, Thistle, 
Atlanta, Charleston, Petrel, Ranger, Anteinega, McCall, Banshee, 
Banshee No. 2, Vance, Spunky, Gem, Alice, North East, Let-Her- 
Rip, Condor, Col. Lamb, Louise, Little Hattie, Margaret and Jessie, 
Ella and Annie, Wild Rover, Bat, Deer, Stag, Sumter, Venice, 
Eugenie, Merrimac, Flamingo, India, Perrency, North Heath, Hope, 
Syren, Mary Celeste, Virginia, Armstrong. 

Every one of the seventy-six vessels named above was a steamer 
or propeller, and many of them the staunchest crafts that gold 
could bay in Europe. Smithville was a dodging-place, merely, none 
of the vessels being owned there. 



568 THE BLOCKADE EUNNEKS OF THE WAB. 

VESSELS WHICH KAiJ INTO SAVANNAH IN 1863. 

Steamer Nashville — Full cargo into Ogeecbie. 

Steamer Nashville — Full cargo out and burnt, 

Steamer Fingall — Full cargo into Savannah. 

Pilot-boat Lamar — Never heard of again ; Captain Titeombe. 

Pilot-boat Wilder — To Nassau and returned to Savannah ; Captain 
King. 

Pilot-boat Emily — To St. Thomas and returned ; Captain Ten- 
brook. 

Steamer St. John — To Nassau and captured sailing to Wilming- 
ton. 

Steamboat Charleston — To Nassau ; arrived safely. 

Steamer Resolute. 

Sloop Governor Brown — Captain King. 

Schooner Uncle Sam — To Nassau. 

Sloop James Grubbs. 

Schooner Lucy R. Waring — Nassau j arrived safely; captured on 
return. 

Sloop Rebecca Hertz — Nassau ; arrived safely ; returned to Savan- 
nah after surrender. 

VESSELS WHICH RAN INTO GALVESTON. 

Steamers — Harriet Lane, California, Atlantic, Zephyr, Rusk, Isa- 
liella, Susan, Banshee, Darby, Lash, Wren, Will-o'-the-wisp, Fox, 
Arcadia, Imogene, Victoria, Pelican, Flamingo, Termagant, Badger, 
Janetto, Francis, Lulu. 

Sail craft — Susan, Mary Lee, Frolic, Russel, Zach Saball, Flush, 
Sam Slick, Rawhide, Foam, Uncle Bill, Leader, Louisa, Davis, 
Emma, Lolo, Columbus, Annie Taylor, Sarah Jordon, Blazer, Sam 
Williams, Stingaree, Callahan, Velocity, Waterwitch, Belle Creole, 
Venus, Martha Jane, Two Sisters, Belle, Eliza Fathmore. 

The only names which could be secured at Mobile were those of 
the steamers Red Gauntlet and Mary. The list of New Orleans 
shows only the Vanderbilt, Victoria, and Calham. 

The list counts up three hundred and twenty runners altogether, 
"which is probably seventy-five or one hundred short of the actual 
number engaged. A more complete and accurate list will never be 
made out. The fate of these vessels may be readily inferred. 
Probably not more than twenty were afloat when the Federals took pos- 
session of Charleston, but the Federal fleets had by no means captured 
the rest. Some succumbed to the perils of the deep, full}' two dozen 



THE BLOCKADE EUNNEKS OF THE WAR. 269* 

were run ashore aud wrecked, and not over one hundred and fifty 
became prizes. It will be seen that some of the vessels ra,n into 
four dififerent ports, and it may be added that a number of them 
made from six to fifteen voyages. It was rare that a craft was cap- 
tured on her first voyage, and it could be pretty safely figured that 
she would make two trips. If she did she had paid for herself and 
made a handsome sum in addition. 

" I never expect to see such flush times again in my life," said 
the captain of a successful blockade-runner in speaking of Nassau. 
" Money was almost as plenty as dirt. I have seen a man toss up a 
twenty dollar gold-piece on ' head or tail,' and it would be followed 
by a score of the yellow-boys in five seconds. There were times 
when the bank vaults would not hold all the gold, and the coins 
were dumped down by the bushel and guarded by soldiers. Men 
wagered, gambled, drank and seemed crazy to get rid of their money. 
I once saw two captains put up five hundred dollars each on the 
length of a certain porch. Again I saw a wager of eight hundred 
dollars a side as to how many would be at the dinner table of a 
certain hotel. The Confederates were paying the English big prices 
for goods, but multiplj'ing the figures by five, seven and ten as soon 
as the goods were landed at Charleston. Ten dollars invested in 
quinine in Nassau would bring from four hundred to six hundred 
dollars in Charleston. A pair of four dollar boots would bring 
fourteen or sixteen dollars. A two dollar hat would bring eight 
dollars, and so on all through the entire list of goods brought in. 
Every successful captain might have made a fortune in a year, but it 
is not believed that five out of the whole number had a thousand 
dollars on hand when the war closed. It was " come easy, go easy." 

The steamer Margaret and Jessie will be found as having run the 
blockade of two or three ports, although she belonged to Charles- 
ton. She was an iron-built steamer, double engines and cost one 
hundred thousand dollars in gold. Her carrying capacity was eight 
hundred bales of cotton, and she could make the trip from Charles- 
ton to Nassau in forty-four hours. She was one of the most suc- 
cessful runners of the war and paid her owners ten times over. 
One night in May, 1863, having a valuable cargo of arms and 
munitions sadly needed by the Confederacy, she laid a straight 
course for Charleston. There were five Federal blockaders oS the 
bar and the night was fine. The steamer ran straight in for the 
fleet, and as soon as her character was known every blockader opened 
fire. It was estimated that one hundred and fifty shots were fired, 



270 THE BLOCKADE EUNNEES OF THE WAR. 

some from a distance of less than five hundred feet, and yet strange 
to say the steamer went into port without having a man wounded. 
She was struck in five or six places, but with no serious results. 

On the eleventh of November, of the same year, the Margaret 
and Jessie attempted the same bold dodge at Wilmington. She 
was here beset by three blockaders, shot through both wheels and 
hit in a dozen other spots, but managed to turn about and get to sea 
and led five Federal vessels a chase of twenty hours before she 
surrendered. It is doubtful if she would have been taken then, 
but for the fact that three or four lady passengers aboard i-aised 
such an uproar when the Federals began firing from their bow guns 
that the captain was quite unnerved and listened to their pleadings 
to surrender. 

The steamer Hattie was the last runner in or out of Charleston. 
She was a small vessel, Clj'de-built, furnished with powerful engines, 
and she made more trips than any other vessel engaged in the busi- 
ness. I asked men in Charleston who knew all about her to 
estimate the value of the cargoes taken out and brought in by this 
one vessel, and their figures were fifty million dollars. On several 
occasions she brought such munitions of war as the Confederacy 
was in pressing need of, and at least three battles were brought on 
by the munitions for which the Confederates waited, and which she 
landed safely in their hands. Plot after plot was formed at Nassau 
to get hold of the Hattie, but none of them were successful. Slie 
slipped in and out like a phantom, taking the most desperate risks 
and being attended by a spirit of good luck quite extraordinary. 

The last entrance of the Hattie into Charleston occurred one 
night in February, 1865. The Confederacy was then in its last 
throes, and the Federal fieet off Charleston numbered eighteen or 
twenty sail. It was a starlight night and at an early hour that the 
Hattie crept forward among the fleet. She had been freshly 
painted a blue white, her tires made no smoke and not a light was 
permitted to shine on board. With her engines moving slowly, 
she let the wind drive her forward. Thei'e were eight or ten vessels 
outside the bar, and as many within. Those outside were success- 
fully passed without an alarm being raised. The Hattie ran within 
a few hundred feet of two different blockaders without her presence 
being detected. To the naked eye of the lookouts she must have 
seemed a haze or mist moving slowly along. 

The little steamer was quietly approaching the inner line of 



THE BLOCKADE EUNNEKS OF THE WAB. 271 

blockaders when a sudden fire was opened on her from a gun-boat 
not five hundred feet distant, and the air was at the same time tilled 
with rockets to announce the runner's presence. At that time the 
Federals had the whole of Morris Island, and Fort Sumter had 
been so battered to pieces that monitors took up their stations 
ahnost within pistol-shot of it. As soon as the Hattie was discov- 
ered she was given all steam and headed straight for the channel. 
She ran a terrible gauntlet of shot and shell for ten minutes, but 
escaped untouched. Then came the real peril. Just below Sum- 
ter, in the narrowest part of the channel, the Hattie encountered 
two barge loads of men stationed there on picket. Her extraordi- 
nary speed saved her from being boarded, but the vollej's fired after 
her wounded two or three men and cut three fingers off the hand 
of the pilot resting on the spokes of the wheel. 

Two hundred yards ahead lay a monitor, and she at once opened 
fire and kept her guns going as long as the Hattie could be seen, 
but not a missile struck. It was wonderful, too, considering that 
the steamer ran so close that she could hear the orders given on the 
monitor. 

Charleston was being bombarded ; many of the business houses 
closed, and all could see that the end was drawing near. The Hattie 
was in as much danger lying at the wharf as she would be outside, 
and a cargo was made up for her as quickly as possible and she was 
made ready for her last trip. Just before dark the sentinels on 
'Fort Sumter counted twenty-six Fedei'al blockaders off Charleston 
harbor, and yet the Hattie coolly made her prepai'ations to run out. 
Just before midnight, with a starless night and a smooth sea, the - 
lucky little craft picked her way throngh all that fleet without 
being hailed or a gim fired, and she was lying at Nassau when the 
news of Lee's surrender was received. 

Every now and then, after the blockade was fairly organized, this 
or that Federal admiral was wont to boast of the number of cap- 
tures he had made and his success in shutting np the port. While 
some captures were made, there was never a time from first to last 
that any port was so carefully watched that blockade running was 
not carried on as a regular business. 

Stonewall Jackson and other Confederates captured from the 
Federal armies in the first two years of the war enough material to 
completely equip seventy-five thousand men, and up to the spring 
of 1864 not a battle was fought in Virginia in which Federal 



272 



THE BLOCKADE EUNNEE8 OF THE WAE. 



ammunition was not used against Federals. Add to these facts, the 
fact that Europe furnished the Confederacy with its best ordnance, 
best muskets, best ammunition, and nearly all its uniforms, and 
that, too, in spite of blockades, and we begin to see how it was 
possible for the South to hold out in the manner she did. 




'(i\t Jigljt '^)tUu SUm|l]is. 




SFTER the evacuation of Fort Pillow by the Confeder- 
ates there was nothing to prevent the' Federal fleet 
steaming down to the city. Then the only defense 
which Memphis could make was with her fleet of eight 
gun-boats and rams. The total number of guns was 
eighteen. The Federal fleet consisted of Ave gun-boats, carrying 
over one hundred and sixty guns, several mortar boats, and a fleet 
of rams. The mortar boats took no part in the action, but remained 
at anchor above the city. 

Commodore Montgomery was in command of the Confederate 
fleet. He knew exactly the strength of the Federals, and he could 
not have been censured had he taken his vessels oil' down the river 
without firing a gun. When it was known that the Federal fleet 
was approaching, it was generally supposed that Montgomery would 
get out of the way, saving his boats to fight under more favorable 
circumstances. At a council of ofiicers called aboard of his flag- 
ship at dusk, captains who expected to receive instructions in regard 
to placing their vessels beyond the reach of the big fleet were 
astonished to hear the Commodoi'e say : 

" Gefitlemen, we shall remain here and fight them !" 

His recklessness in exposing the fleet to certain destruction has 
been severely censured. Any two of the Federal iron-clads were a 
match for the eight Confederates. 

The Federal fleet came down so near Memphis that their anchor 
lights were in view all night long. General Jeff Thompson, in 
command of the city, had far less faith than Commodore Mont- 
gomery, and all night long he was busy sending away troops and 
stores. If the Federals were driven back he could i-eturn his 
forces; if the Confederate fleet was annihilated he would have 
nothing to do but ride away from Memphis to a place of safety. 

After the council broke up the officers retired to their respective 
vessels and began preparations for the coming fight. The machin- 

12731 
Vol. I— 18 



274 THE FIGHT BEFORE MEMPHIS. 

ery aud other parts of the boats were given additional protection, 
the sick sent ashore, a number of new men taken aboard, and then 
they waited for the morning. The order was to attack as soon as 
the Federal fleet appeared, and to attack in any mannei- that prom- 
ised success. It has been asserted that a telegram from the Con- 
federate Secretary of tiie Navy was received in the evening, ordering 
the Commodore to steam down the river and save his fleet, but if 
so the dispatch was pocketed and preparations continued. 

Every vessel in tlie Federal fleet was in perfect readiness, and 
there was nothing to do but to wait for daybreak. The presence 
of the Confederate fleet at Memphis was known, but it was the 
general impression that it would sail away during the night. 

At an early morning hour, just as the crews were being piped 
to breakfast, the fleet began moving down. The levees were 
deserted and the city asleep. Not a battery could be sighted and 
not a gun roared defiance. The foremost vessel had passed the 
center of the city before anyone caught sight of Montgomery's 
little fleet over in the bend on the Arkansas shore. It was there, 
and its presence meant fight. The leading Federal vessels, there- 
fore, turned about and started back up stream, with the two-fold 
object of allowing the men to finish their meal and to draw the Con- 
federates out into the river. 

It has been written that the Confederates construed this move- 
ment into a sign of running away. Commodore Montgomery was 
not so simple as that. He gave the signal to advance, because so 
long as his fleet could fight bows on to the current he would have 
an advantage. 

The first gun of the fight was fired by the Little Rebel. She 
was then within fair range of the Cairo, but the shot flew far above 
her, and landed near the shore. The Cairo yawed and returned the 
compliment with four or five shot, none of which took effect. The 
Federal fleet now prepared for action, and hundreds of citizens 
began crowding the river bank to witness what none of them had 
ever seen before. Tlie Little Kubel steamed ahead, flring i-apidly, 
and grazing the Cairo twice, but in the course of fifteen minutes 
she was struck four times, had three or four men killed and several 
wounded, and another shot so disabled her that she was deserted by 
her crew. One of the shot she received passed entirely through 
her, cutting beams in two, and making match-wood of heavy oak 
planks. Not one of her shot struck a Federal vessel. 

The Confederate gun-boat Lovell moved up to engage the Caron- 



THE FIGHT BEFORE MEMPHIS. 275 

delet, but had to sheer out of the course of a Federal ram and engage 
with the Benton. The first few shots on both sides were wasted. 
Then the Benton was hit three times in succession, but without 
damage, and she in return put four sliots into the Lovell, every 
one of which counted with terrible effect. Tlie Lovell had two 
guns — the Benton twelve or fourteen, and the wonder is, that the 
former was not blown out of water in five minutes. Not only did 
the Benton open on her, but two or three other Fedei-al craft 
also, but she kept her place and hung on until she was reported to 
be sinking. A solid shot had bored a hole through her at the 
water-line large enough for a man to crawl in, and the water gushed 
in so fast that she was settling down when the first cry was raised. 
Her last gun was fired while she was staggering from side to side, 
and the ball had scarcely left the gun when the craft went to the 
bottom. About half her crew were saved by their own efforts, 
but the rest were either carried down with the vessel or were 
drowned with the roar of battle in their ears. 

The Confederates had fitted the Beauregard out as a ram, but she 
bore no comparison with others launched at a later day in the war. 
She pushed her way to the front to ram at one of the gun-boats, 
but was met by the Federal ram, Queen of the West. The Beau- 
regard gave her two heavy shot in succession, and though no 
great damage was inflicted, the Queen sheered off. The Confeder- 
ate ram Price now advanced, and the Queen was reinforced by the 
Monarch. For a few minutes the gun-boat firing was almost entirely 
suspended to witness the contest between the strange monsters. 
They churned the river to foam as they dashed and dodged under 
a full head of steam, and their guns were not idle for a single 
moment. 

The Queen ran for the Beauregard again, scraped her stern by a 
miss, and continued on and struck the Price a death-blow which 
was heard far away. The people on shore heard the shivering 
and grinding and splintering of timbers, and knew that the Price 
must have been terribly damaged. The Queen not only tore away 
one of her side-wheels, but crushed in everything beyond it, and the 
Price had scarcely time to reacli the shore, a few hundred feet away, 
when she became water-logged and useless. One of her guns was 
upset by the shock of the collision, and the other was under water 
as the craft touched the bank, so that she was thereafter entirely 
out of the fight. 

Meanwhile the Beauregard and Monarch had been battering away 



276 THE FIGHT BEFORE MEMPHIS. 

at each other and watching for a good opening to ram. They sud- 
denly started for each other with full heads of steam and about a 
quarter of a mile to go, and both firing as they advanced. At this 
point the Queen returned from her conflict with the Price, and the 
Beauregard altered her course and took the new arrival. The 
attack was so sudden that it could not be avoided, and the Queen 
received a blow which disabled her and sent her adrift on the cur-, 
rent. Hardly had the Beauregard backed off when the Monai-ch 
bore down upon her at full speed and went crashing into her bows 
with a force that almost sheared six feet of the stem of the boat 
completely off. The Beauregard was sinking before the ram had 
backed out, and in five minutes was at the bottom. 

The Van Dorn, Sumter, Thompson, and Bragg were yet left to 
the Confederates. All of these had received more or less damage 
from shot and shell, and the four would not have been a match for 
the poorest gun-boat in the Federal fleet. As soon as the rams were 
disposed of, the entire fleet moved down to crush the four vessels, 
and they made quick work of it. The Van Dorn, which was the 
Confederate flag-ship, and of good speed, turned around and ran 
away, the other three were run ashore and deserted. 

Memphis had thus fallen, and a Confederate fleet been blotted 
out. The loss in men aboard the latter was from one hundred and 
fifty to one hundred and seventy-five, while the Federals had but 
three or four men wounded. General Thompson, as stated, bad 
removed his forces and the public stores, and as the fight on the 
river ended the last train of cars pulled out of the city and left it 
to be surrendered by the civil authorities. The rivers had brought 
bad luck to the Confederates. One after another. Fort Henry, Fort 
Donelson, Island No. 10, Shiloli, Fort Randolph, and Corinth had 
fallen, and now Memphis was in the hands of the Federals and the 
river fleet annihilated. 

Among the spectators on the blufl^s at Memphis were scores of 
women. During most of the engagement the crowd was as silent 
as death. Many of the huge missiles thrown by friend or foe 
passed over their heads into the streets, and in some cases into the 
houses, but not a woman left the crowd, and not an eye was turned 
from the thrilling drama being enacted on the bosom of the muddy 
river at their feet. When it was all over a groan of despair passed 
through the crowd, and in ten minutes the bluffs were deserted. 



Cji^ fast liQljt of tljc Pointer. 




HERE was no way to Richmond which was not tried 
during the war, and one of tlie earher ways was up the 
James River. Afterwards, when the world looked on 
while one hundred thousand men battered at the gates 
of the Confederate capital for months and months with- 
out gaining an inch, the movement up the James was the subject of 
much ridicule, and yet it was made in all seriousness and with great 
hopes of success. Norfolk had been evacuated by the Confedei'ates, 
the dreaded Merriinac had been blown up, and it is said that the 
Federal Secretary of the Navy was the man who believed that three 
or four gun-boats could make their way to the wharves at Richmond 
without encountering serious opposition. 

The Galena was sent on ahead to pilot the way, and after a few 
hours was followed by the Naugatuck, the Monitor, the Port Royal 
and the Aroostook. The sight of this single gun-boat making her 
way up the stream tilled the Confederates with astonishment, 
and at every rod of her progress she was greeted with the tire of 
musketry. Field batteries were hastily ordered to points from 
which she could be assailed, and in some instances parts of infantry 
regiments took cover and kept up a hot fire as long as the boat was 
within range. The Galena was struck by over nine hundred bullets 
within twelve hours, and yet so well was her crew sheltered that she 
had only one man sliglitly wounded by this fire. 

Three miles below Williamsburg tlie Galena found a Confederate 
infantry company of about seventy men drawn up in line on tlie 
bank. A farmer on horseback had brought the news that the boat 
was coming up, and the Ciiptain of the company realized that some- 
thing must be done. Forming his men in two ranks, and placing 
himself at their head with drawn sword, he waited until the gun- 
'boat came within half a mile, and tlien called out: 
"Stop that boat and suri-ender ! " 



278 THE LAST FIGHT OF THE MONITOR. 

Greatly to his surprise, the Galena did not stop, and he hailed her 
again witii : 

" Surrender, or I'll have to fire upon and sink you!" 

This was followed by a fusilade of musketry, but a shell from the 
gun-boat sent the whole company traveling inland at the top of 
their speed. At Williamsbui-g the Galena was joined by the rest of 
the fleet, and all steamed forward with the expectation of going to 
Richmond. 

About seven miles and a half below the city of Richmond, where 
the James takes a bold bend, one could, in 1880, find Fort Darling 
almost as it appeared the day the adventurous Federal fleet appeared 
in sight. The walls have sunk, grass and bushes have grown up in 
great plenty, but one can still see where every gun was placed and 
note what a plunging fire was had from that elevation. 

That road to Richmond had not been forgotten. In addition to 
the fort and its heavy ordnance, a line of piles had been driven 
across the river, leaving only an opening in the center wide enough 
for a single vessel to pass. There were rifle-pits along the banks, 
and perfect shelter for the garrison, and the Federal fleet advanced 
to find its coming provided for. 

Up to this time the Federal gun-boats had been victorious in 
almost every contest, and the appearance of the fleet in the James 
caused the Confederates no little anxiety. It was supposed that the 
boats could take any position and maintain it despite any fire, but 
this engagement was to prove the contrary'. 

Owing to the narrow channel, the gun-boats must fight at a dis- 
advantage. The Galena led the fieet to within a few rods of the 
obstruction, and then swung her broadside to the fort, and dropped 
her anchor. The Monitor came next, closely followed by the others, 
and not a shot was fired until the fieet was in position. The dis- 
tance was not above eight hundred yards, when the fight began, and 
every movement aboard the boats could be plainly seen from the 
fort. At eigiit o'clock of a beautiful summer morning the Galena 
opened the bombardment by hurling a ponderous shell plump 
against the fort. 

That shell was answered from every gun which would bear on the 
fleet, and within ten minutes the fleet realized its mistake in anchor- 
ing so near. None of the guns could lie elevated sufficiently to 
damage the fort, while the guns of the latter had a plunging fire, 
terrific in effect. 

The first half dozen shots fell into the river, sending showers 



THE LAST FIGHT OF THE MONITOR. 279 

clear over the targets aimed at, and then a solid shot crashed through 
the Galena and dropped into the water. A second ripped open the 
deck of the Aroostook, and the Confederates cheered again and 
again and settled down for a steady fight. 

Had every iron-clad which the Federals built during the war been 
stationed in the James below Fort Darling that day, the road to 
Kichmond could not have been opened. The stream was too narrow 
for the boats to keep in motion, and the elevation was too great to 
enable them to injure the fort. He who looks over the ground will 
find that most of the shot and shell entered the bluffs fifty feet 
below the fort. Such as struck higher inflicted no damage. 

Never was greater pluck displayed than on board the Galena. 
For an hour and forty minutes she was within long rifle-range of 
the fort and under the fire of twelve guns, and the wonder was that 
she ever got out of the trap. The water around was kept white 
with the shot falling about her, and once every five minutes she was 
fairly hit. She carried five cannon-bails out of the fight with her, 
and showed scars to prove that she was hit twenty-three times. 
Five solid shot passed completely through her, and three shells ex- 
ploded in her hold. One sol-id shot tore tlirougii three bulk-heads 
and wounded four men, and one shell which exploded on deck 
killed two men and wounded five others. The carpenter reported 
six leaks before the fight was half over, and once she was on fire in 
two places, but she was held right there until it was realized that 
further fighting was simply throwing human life away. When she 
dropped out of the fight she did not liave one hundred pounds of 
powder left, and thirty of her crew had been killed or wounded. 

This was the only time the Monitor was ever engaged at such 
short range against a fort, and it was also her last fight. She took 
position close to the Galena, but as soon as struck on the turret by 
a solid shot she dropped down the stream. During the fight she 
was struck four times. When she returned to Norfolk the greatest 
care was taken to prevent the public from learning the extent of 
her injuries, and reports were circulated that the shot did not even 
dent her plates. This was intended for the benefit of the Confed- 
erates. As a matter of fact, vouched for by the men aboard of her 
in that fight, the first shot so jarred her turret that a second one 
would have drifted her out of the fight. The other shot did not 
penetrate, none of them striking squarely, but they cracked and 
bulged her plates in a manner to prove that if she came under' the 
fire of an eleven-inch gun she would be riddled like a sieve. She 



280 THE LAST FIGHT OF THE MONITOE. 

fired at intervals during the two hours' contest, but might as well 
have saved her ammunition. While the Galena, entirely un- 
armored, remained stationary for almost two hours and took the fire 
as it came, the Monitor was constantly shifting about to destroy the 
aim. This saved her from going to the bottom. She had been the 
subject of so much boasting that her commander did not want the 
mortification of seeing her go to the bottom of the James River. 
Stories were set afloat about the Confederate gunners fleeing from 
tiieir posts when they caught sight of her, and of the little iron- 
clad boldly replying to the concentrated fire of seven or eight guns, 
but they were canards. The position she occupied is marked on a 
tree, and tiie fact that she was badly hurt by the missiles which 
struck her was proven by her future idleness until she went to the 
bottom of the Atlantic in a storm. 

The Naugatuck was armed with only one gun — a one hundred 
pounder, and at the fourth or fifth round it burst and wounded five 
or six of the crew. Not one of the shells from this gun struck 
within fifty feet of the fort, but all were buried in the bluffs. A 
company of riflemen were on their way to open fire upon her from 
the river bank when she drifted out of the fight, having been struck 
twice, but receiving no particular damage. 

The fire of the Port Royal was accurate and steady, eliciting the 
praise of the Confederate gunners, and some of them wonder to 
this day why she was not sent to the bottom. She was a fair target, 
but was only hit three or four times and only had two or three men 
wounded by splinters. The shot falling about her kept her decks 
wet with water, and as many as twenty missiles passed by or over her 
so close that their wind was plainly felt. One solid shot which 
howled over her blew the caps from the heads of three men and 
blinded a gunner so that he could distinguish nothing for hours. 

The Aroostook fired about forty rounds and was hit four or five 
times, but had only two or three men slightly wounded. Having a 
position below the rest of the fleet slie had a better chance to elevate 
her guns, and yet every shot was wasted. In the heat of the fight, 
both fort and fleet being hidden by the smoke, a Confederate soldier 
started to swim out to the Aroostock and disable her by cutting her 
rudder chains, but he was killed before reaching the vessel by a 
shot from the fort. 

The location of the fort gave it an advantage in long range and a 
pluniring fire, but without the obstructions in the river the gun- 
boats would liave swept past without checking speed. Over two 



THE LAST FIGHT OF THE MoNITOK. 



281 



hundred shot and shell were hred at it during the bombardment, 
and yet only two or three men were wounded, and those in the rifle- 
pits. The damage to the fort was too trifling to be noticed in 
official z'eports. It was one of the first instances where obstructions 
were used to hold a fleet under fire, and the advantage was so clearly 
apparent in this instance that channel obstructions were at once 
made a part of the Confederate war programme. 




poto tljf I'ciifrals %tMi ,f art f ulaskl 




ERHAPS the whole war record of America does not 
offer another snch circumstance as the long siege and 
final capture of Fort Pulaski, inasmuch as the loss of 
life on the Federal side was simply one single man 
killed by Confederate missiles. The Federals did not 
deem it prudent to attempt to pass the fort to attack Savannah, 
and after studying over the position of affairs, it was discovered 
that it could be flanked by passing light-draught boats through the 
marsh channels, and by way of a tortuous channel from Hilton 
Head. 

It was naturally believed that when Fort Pulaski found itself 
cut oif from communication with the Confederacy, with no possible 
chance of obtaining either reinforcements or provisions, a demand 
for surrender would not have to be enforced. But Sherman was 
mistaken in his man. The commander. Colonel Olmstead, replied 
that he should hold the fort as- long as he had a gun left in 
position, and he made good his assertion. 

Opposite the fort was Tybee Island, a spot of ground composed 
of marsh, sand, quick-sand, with some scrub forest. It was hardly 
passable, and Pulaski had never dreamed of danger from this quar- 
ter. That was the weakest side of the fort, and but few of its 
guns bore in that direction. For long weeks Sherman was content 
witii cutting off communication, believing that the garrison would 
soon be starved into surrender, but about the time he was relieved 
and Hunter sent to that department, Gilmore appeared on the 
scene, and here it was that he gave evidence of his genius for over- 
coming difficulties which seemed insurmountable to other men. It 
was his idea to take possession of Tybee Island and mount upon it 
sueii ordnance as would knock the masonry of the fort to pieces. 
When told that the ground was hardly firm enough to sustain the 
weight of a man, and that in localities where it was, the sand was 
leg-deep, he merely replied that he could plant a colurabiad on any 

[282] 



HOW THE FEDERALS KETOOK FOET PULASKI. 283 

spot where a soldier could stand. In after years he improved on 
that, and could plant one wherever a frog could find a resting 
place. 

Before the sudden appearance of the Federals, the fort was in 
daily communication with Savannah, and for this reason was not 
supplied with provisions and ammunition for a siege. When com- 
munication was cut off, there was a careful overhauling of stores to 
see what was on hand and how long it could be made to last. The 
garrison was at once put on half-rations. Even at that date, when 
the war was only nine or ten months old, half-rations in a Confed- 
erate fort meant such meager supplies as the besiegers would have 
starved on. 

There were some three hundred and fifty men in the fort, and 
in addition to shoi't rations they were harassed by feints and attacks 
almost daily for long months. Hunger sharpened the wits of the 
besieged, and it is a fact vouched for by officers in the fort that 
for weeks and weeks the men spliced out their rations by devices 
worthy of Yankee ingenuity. Fish-lines were soon as plenty as 
muskets, and every soldier off duty became a fisherman. When 
fish were scarce frogs were plenty, and the hungry soldier not only 
ate the hind legs but all the rest of the animal. 

Scouts were made by small parties in all directions for stray cattle 
and pigs, and in one way and another the provisions were made to 
hold out until the Federals grew weary of the attempt to starve the 
garrison into surrender. It was then that Gilmore stepped to the 
front with his plan to bombard the fort from Tybee Island. That 
part of the island not composed of sand and marsh was thicket and 
forest, and it was no small task to make a clearing for a landing- 
place. 

The spot selected for the first battery was about a mile and a half 
from the fort, and the nearest landing-place was almost as distant 
in the opposite direction. Landing the heavy siege-guns was a 
task to tax both brain and muscle. No boat could run in except 
when the tide was up, and there was a dead lift of about six feet 
on each gun to swing it over the bank. One piece fell as it was 
being lifted, and crashed through the deck into the hold, injuring 
three or four men ; and another was dropped into the water in a 
perpendicular manner, and such was the nature of the bottom that it 
disappeared muzzle foremost and was never recovered. 

The guns once landed, and there were over thirty of them, the 
real task was onl}' begun. A soil in which a soldier would sink 



284: HOW THE FEDERALS BETOOK F(JRT PULASKI. 

deep at every step would uot, of course, support a "un. The iirst 
one attempted to be moved was mounted on trucks and live hun- 
dred men put at the drag-rope, but the wlieels of the truck sunk 
almost out of sight without an inch of progress being made. 

Then Gilmore set a thousand men at work to make a corduroy 
road from the landing to the battery, the remains of which could 
be distinctly traced a year ago. Every bush, sapling, and tree up 
to the size of a man's leg were cut in proper lengths and carried a 
mile or more on the soldiers' backs, mostly between darkness and 
dawn. The ridges were levelled and the hollows filled up, and he 
laid out his road and bedded it with his poles and logs. In par- 
ticularly bad spots large logs were used, and after days and nights 
of hard work a jjrett}' firm roadway was secured. The cannon 
were then mounted on trucks one after another and drawn to the 
battery, the heavier ones requiring the united strength of a 
regiment. 

Reports reached the Confederate commander from time to time 
of what the Federals were doing on the island, but knowing the 
nature of the soil, lie deemed the landing and mounting of heavy 
guns an impossibility. Had a sortie been made from the fort at a 
proper moment, possession of the island could have been recovered 
up to the making of the roadway. 

So craftily did Gilmore work that four or five guns were in bat- 
tery before the Confederates suspected anything. There was 
abundance of sand for earth-works, but such was the fire from the 
fort that the guns might as well have been worked on the open 
ground. Scarcely a missile was fired which fell within a quarter 
of a mile of them. 

No sooner were three or four guns in position than new and 
advanced works were begun. When they came within range of 
the fort there was more or less firing, but always to the detriment 
of Pulaski. There are on Tybee Island at this date at least two 
car-loads of rusty, unexploded shells and cannon balls, and nineteen 
out of every twenty unexploded shells were fired from the fort. Its 
Bolid shot in some cases passed over the Federal guns, but in the 
great majority they fell far short and were buried quite out of 
sight in the soil. In the spring of 1884 the negroes were prodding 
the sand and mire for these mi.ssiles, and numbers of them had 
from three to eight balls and shells. 

On tlie other hand, the fire on the fort told from the very start. 
It was almost the first time in our civil war that long-range guns 



HOW THE FEDERALS BETOOK FOKT PULASKI. 285 

were used against masonry, and tlie result astonished thousands. At 
the range of two miles, the guns carrying thirteen-inch shells sent 
them against the stone and brick with a bang plainly heard by the 
men at the guns. Where one struck fairly, it not only created a 
deep and ragged cavity, but cracked the walls for six or eigiit feet 
in several directions. It was the result of that lire and its damages 
which caused the Confederates to heap sand-bags in front of the 
brick walls of Fort Sumter. 

While it was realized before fifty shots were fired that the fort 
must surrender or be knocked to pieces around tlie heads of the 
garrison, there was a determination to hold it to the last, and such 
gnns as could be brought to bear upon the Federals were never 
silent. As a specimen of what Gilmore had in store for a future 
day, he sent one shell through a breach in the wall which dis- 
mounted a gun and killed four of its men, and in its explosion a 
second later wounded eight men and rendered another cannon use- 
less for two or three days. One shell from a mortar killed three 
men and wounded seven, and a second buried itself in the ground 
and excavated a hole into which a yoke of oxen could have been 
dumped. Most of the mortar shots passed over, but the tire of the 
guns was terribly accurate. 

On the tenth of April, 1862, Gilmore was ready for a bombard- 
ment, and he opened a tire the like of which had not previously 
been directed against a fort of that character. Guns had been 
taken from other positions and mounted in the breaches he had al- 
ready made, but tlie calibre was too light. While Pulaski made a 
respectable show of defense so far as noise went, its missiles might 
as well have been buried in the parade ground. Every shot from 
the batteries brought down the bricks, and the men were repeatedly 
driven to seek shelter from the fire. All day and far into the night 
Gilmore continued his bombardment without a rest, and he was at 
work bright and early next day. On the eleventh, a Federal artil- 
lerist, who recklessly exposed himself outside the works, was struck 
and killed by a fragment of a shell, and strangely enough his was 
the only life sacrificed on that side in the whole undertaking. 

Before noon of the second day many of the guns in the fort were 
dismounted, its walls were rent and riven and knocked about, and 
the garrison realized the hopelessness of further defense of a work 
never intended to withstand an attack from that side. The flag 
was, therefore, hauled down and the Federals invited to take posses- 
sion. Six hours more of the heavy fire would have left nothing but 



286 



HOW THE FEDKBALS BETOOK FOET PULASKI. 



a heap of ruins, aud during the last two hours of the bombardment 
the garrison was momentarily exposed to destruction by the danger 
to the magazine. One shell penetrated within two feet of the 
powder before exploding, and the concussion upset kegs of powder 
standing on end. Another exploded in the midst of a large quan- 
tity of fixed ammunition, but fortunately without igniting any of 
it. It is given as a curious incident of war that, by the explosion 
of the same shell, two brothers lost an arm each — one the right and 
the other the left. One thirteen-inch shell made a cavity in the 
wall four feet deep, throwing out at least four wagon-loads of brick, 
and shattering the wall for a distance of nine feet one way, thirteen 
another, and twenty-seven another. The surrender was sharply 
criticised by the Confederate press, but it is doubted if there was a 
braver struggle, all things considered, during the entire war. 




€^t Biqt an^ Capture of f irksburg* 




' HEEE were, beginning from the hour when McClellan 
was attacked on the Chickahouiiny, half a dozen 
periods dui-ing the war when Richmond was open to 
capture by the Federals, and yet it was held until 
events necessitated its evacuation. There never was an 
hour, from the time Vicksburg was first invested, until Pemberton's 
surrender, when there was the least chance for its capture, and yet the 
Federal government made no count of life or treasure in seeking 
to bring it about. All military men saw, after the war, how Rich- 
mond could have been taken and wondered that it was not, but no 
one has asserted that Vicksburg should have fallen an hour before 
it did. The iron-clad fleet could run the batteries, but with the 
blufEs lined with guns for miles, and field batteries posted all along 
the banks, a boat could eifect no more at one point than another. 
The country back offered every advantage to an army of defense, 
being broken and timbered and easily fortified, and when Sherman 
let go of the undertaking it was in the belief that nothing but a 
long siege could ever give a Federal general possession of the place. 
Other points along the river fell into Federal hands at the first 
attack, but Vicksburg was a Gibraltar which the Confederates were 
determined to hold at any cost. 

A few families out of tlie many sought safety in the interior, or 
left the state altogether when it was realized that Vicksburg was to 
be attacked and defended with desperate energy, but the majority 
remained. Indeed, they were not prepared to go. A siege offered 
scarcely more anxiety than a hurried removal to a locality among 
strangers who had enough to endure without further burdens. As 
the city faces the river tlie only danger to be feared was from the 
fleet. To escape this almost every household had its cave in the 
bluffs. These were tunnels, having their openings on the far side 
of the bluffs, and generally ending in a chamber after running in 
ten or twelve feet. Having from fifty to five hundred feet of solid 

[2871 



288 THE SIEGE AJ^JD CAPTDKE OF TICKS15UKU. 

hill between them and the river, the people sheltered in these eaves 
were perfectly safe from missiles, but the danger was in getting to 
them. The Federal fleet did not send word in advance when a 
bombardment was to begin, and the fire was as likely to open at 
midnight as any hour in the day. At the first gun everybody 
would start up. At the second or third the non-combatants wonld 
prepare to rush to shelter, and the rush must be made with solid 
shot and bursting shell sounding their fearful warnings to make 
haste. Women and children were at times half buried or knocked 
down as they ran, but the deaths were few and far between. 
Probably the entire list would not count up a dozen names. 

A man would hardly dare attempt to compute the weight of 
Federal metal hurled into Vicksburg, from first to last, but he who 
visits the place, and looks for what he may consider legitimate 
results, will be greatly disappointed. There are six buildings in the 
city showing scars of the bombardment. Not more than two or 
three buildings were fired and destroyed, and the citizens do not 
remember a case where any one was killed in a house. Cannon- 
balls and pieces of sliell and grape-shot were thick enough in the 
streets, and bullets could be picked up everywhere, yet tlie fire 
from the river, from first to last, amounted to little more than throw- 
ing away ammunition. Upon one occasion an iron-clad steamed 
slowly along for a distance of two miles, throwing gi'ape into the 
town as fast as her guns could be fired, yet only one house was hit 
hard enough to leave scars. That house is there to-day, and so are 
hundreds of people who passed through it all, and dodged death so 
often and in so many different forms that they came to consider 
themselves bullet-proof. 

The cut-off which General "Williams first began across the Penin- 
sula opposite Vicksburg and about five miles from the city was 
intended to isolate the post and render its defenses worthless. The 
length of the cut was only a mile, and had things worked as intended, 
Vicksburg must have surrendered or been evacuated within a week. 
Williams could not get the waters of the Mississippi to run into his 
ditch. He had the advice of the best civil engineers, but however 
well they understood survejnng a line of defense, they did not 
understand the nature of the big river. The angle at which they 
struck the river was incorrect. It was correct from an engineer's 
standpoint, but the erratic nature of the current had not been con- 
sidered. Therefore the diggers had the strange spectacle before 
them of a great river rushing past the open mouth of a ditch 



THE SIEGE ANU CAPTUltE OF VICUS13UKG. 289 

lower than the drift-wood hurrying by and yet without enough 
water tlowing into tlie cut to float a skitf. It was a matter of annov- 
ance-and chagrin, and tlie job was finally aljandoned in disgust. 

The two fleets had bombarded Vieksburg without serious eft'ect. 
and Sherman had lost two thousand men by attacking fi-om the land 
side. Grant now concentrated at Young's Point to try his hand on 
the canal. He had determined to capture Vicksi)urg, and this was 
the easiest way. Thousands of soldiers went to work with pick, 
wheelbarrow and spade, and a powerful dredge boat was also 
brought into operation at the lower end of the ditch. A bulkhead 
was constructed across the mouth of the cut, and it was hopefully 
believed that when the spring floods came the canal would prove a 
grand success. 

The work was begun in January and vigorously pushed until near 
the middle of March. At that time the bed of the canal was down 
at least eight feet in the shallowest spot, while in others it was three 
or four feet lower. The hard work had sent hundreds of men to the 
hospital and the grave, but a few more days would see the ironclads 
and transports floating across the peninsula and flanking Vieksburg. 
Then came disaster. The flood in the Mississippi suddenly increased, 
the bulkhead was driven in with a terrible crash, and seven feet of 
water went booming through the ditch with such speed that a num- 
ber of diggers were overwhelmed and all the tools lost. It was 
hoped that the current would scour out a deeper channel, but it 
simply caused a removal of all the camps in the neighborhood, 
filled up the swamps and then ceased running. Grant had failed 
just as Williams had failed. The Mississippi would run past the 
canal instead of into it. 

Years after, when gun-boat and battery were no more, and the 
soldier slept in his grave or tilled the soil, the great river was seized 
with a sudden whim, and alone and unaided it cut its way across 
that neck of land in the most vigorous manner. 

Grant turned from the canal to find another I'oute. He went 
seventy-five miles above Vieksburg to Lake Providence, intending 
to work down into Swan Lake, Black River, Red River, and so on 
down into the Mississippi. This would flank Vieksburg just the 
same, and he went at his task with a determination to win. If 
Captain Eads were asked to-day how much time and money he 
would demand to open that route and send ten steamboats down, he 
would place the sum at hundreds of thousands, and the time at 
months. At the very outset five thousand men were set at work to 

Vol. I.— 19 



290 THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF yiCKSEL'RG. 

deepen a sluggisli creek six or seven miles long. It was the stoi-y 
of the cutoff at Island No. 10 over again. Trees, stumps, snags, 
and roots were the constant and troublesome obstructions, and the 
men working in the mud and water and malaria were soon made 
sick. There was scarcely a mile of the long route free from ob- 
structions, and Grant was beaten again. He succeeded in passing 
a few craft as far as Lake Providence, and then he gave up the 
task. It was a route which could not float a barge unless the Mis- 
sissippi remained at a high stage to furnish water. 

Grant was disgusted, but not disheartened. He at once prepared 
for a third attempt. Striking north of Vicksburg about one hun- 
dred and forty miles, he began operations at Moon Lake. From 
the river he cut a canal to enable his boats to enter the lake. The 
lake discharged into Yazoo Pass, the pass into the Coldwater, the 
latter into the Tallahatchie, and this stream emptied into the Yazoo. 
Grant could flank everything by this route, and the North now 
looked upon Vicksburg as good as captured. The Mississippi 
poured into Moon Lake and created a heavy current along the 
entire route, and the adjacent country was overflowed, so that the 
Confederates had little opportunity to prevent the complete success 
of this grand scheme. 

But if they could not prevent Grant from opening the route and 
using it, they were not to remain passive spectators. The day that 
the Federals began operations at Moon Lake, the Confederates 
began work on the Tallahatchie, eight or ten miles above the Yallo- 
busha. Here, at a sharp bend in the river, Fort Pemberton was 
erected. While the fort was hurriedly constructed, and was noth- 
ing to boast of as a work of strength, its location and the nature of 
the ground on all sides, made it impregnable and brought disaster 
to Grant's scheme. 

The iron-clads were leading the way down the Tallahatchie, and 
nothing more serious than f usilades by concealed sharpshooters had 
been encountered when Fort Pemberton suddenly made its pres- 
ence known. The Chillicothe, a heavily armed and thick-plated 
iron-clad, moved boldly down and opened fire, supposing it to be 
some field work thrown up in a hurry to protect two or three light 
STuns. In the course of half an hour the iron-clad backed out of 
range of the heavy guns of the fort, and later on a second gun-boat 
also found the fire of the fort too much for her. 

A force of infantry was then landed, a battery constructed as 
near the fort as possible, and when all was ready the gun-boats and 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBUKG. 291 

battery opened fire and continuud it for lioiirs, sometimes silciu-ing 
the Confederate guns for a time, and again having plenty to do to 
hold their own. The gun-boats were considerably damaged by the 
accurate fire, and as the infantry had no show of carrying the fort 
by a land attack, the expedition was abandoned, and Grant had to 
score another failure. 

There was just one more cliance. Above the mouth of the Yazoo 
was a creek running from the Mississippi Kiver, to Steele's Bayou. 
This bayou was connected with others, and finally with the Sun- 
flower River. If a way could be opened, Ilaines' Bluff could be 
flanked. The soldiers were again set at work to dig and saw and 
clear away, and Porter led the way with his gun-boats and Sherman 
followed with a force of infantry. Between the bayous the streams 
were only wide enough to pass a steamer, and for miles the trees 
had to be cut away or trimmed up to get overhanging limbs out of 
the way. The flood had now subsided, and the woods -were full of 
Confederate sharpshooters, while every negro who could be fonnd 
was set to felling trees across the streams and otherwise obstructing 
them. Some days the boats did not advance forty rods, and one 
obstruction was no sooner removed than another was encountered. 
Sherman's infantry could do no more than protect the force engaged 
in clearing the way, and finally it could not even do that. As the 
expedition approached the Sunflower River, the Confederates began 
obstructing the line of retreat with the intention of capturing the 
entire force. Success might have attended the design had not Sher- 
man been reinforced and the expedition ordered to return. It had 
consumed weeks of time, lost many men, accomplished an immense 
amount of labor, and without return. Haines' Bluff was still 
crowned with guns, and Vicksburg was still safe and defiant. Grant 
had tried every way but one. That was to move u]) against Pem- 
berton's fortifications and hang there and fight him until Vicksburg 
was starved into surrender. He had sought in every way to avoid 
the loss of life sure to attend this plan, and to save the time that a 
siege would consume, but he had been liaffled. He now prepared 
to adopt the figliting plan, and Vicksburg made ready for what was 
to come. 

While Grant was making his preparations to attack Vicksburg 
from the direction of the Big Black River — the only route open 
and that full of difficulties, the Confederate commander made haste 
to prepare himself for what must come. He knew that Grant 
would succeed in reaching his defenses by that route. He knew 



292 THE siEGK Axn captiirk of vicksburg. 

that he wonld liring an overwhelming force. Witli a Federal tleet 
before and a Federal army behind Vicksburg, there was no use 
hoping for reinforcements, except in small parties. Gi'ant was 
stroug enough to turn upon and defeat any army sent to the relief 
of Vicksburg, and he covered the country for sueli a distance and 
with such care, that weeks before the real investment began three 
out of every five Confederate couriers sent out in any direction 
were sure of capture. 

The C!on federates were not to let go of Vicksburc; until the last 
hour. Up to the time that Grant took the Big Black route it was 
easy to secure provisions of all sorts. After that it was realized 
that unless the most extraordinary exertions were put forth Vicks- 
burg would have to stand a siege backed by hunger. A difficulty 
at once arose. Hundreds of men were speculating on their own 
account, buying bacon, corn, and j)otatoes West and shipping them 
to Virginia and securing falnilous prices, or reselling to the govern- 
ment at a great protit. Nearly all the steamboats available to the 
commander at Vicksburg were controlled by speculators, and the 
attempt to impress them was met by vigorous opposition. Where 
provisions could be had at fair prices there was no way to bring 
them out, and where transportation was easy and safe the specula- 
tors refused to stand aside. 

But the hand of the military proved the strongest, and Vicks- 
burg was fairly provisioned with certain kinds of food. The work 
was not in right hands, however. Cargo after cargo was lost by 
cai-elessness, and even when the boats had unloaded at Vicksburg, 
provisions were allowed to lie in the sun and rain until no longer 
fit to eat. Again, in a dozen instances, where boat-loads of bacon 
had been obtained far up the country at great cost and trouble, and 
were almost under the guus of Vicksburg, an attack by sharpshoot-' 
ers, or the false report of the near presence of an iron-clad, would 
be followed by the order to burn the boat and cargo. Towards 
the last the government impressed steamboats, supplies, and 
vehicles, and cattle and hogs were driven long distances and made 
to swim rivers and flounder tlirough swamps, but there was a lack 
of snap and energy and a great waste at every point. The high- 
ways were at their woi'st, the I'ailroads in bad condition and not 
willing to submit to military jiower, and Port Hudson must be 
supplied at the same time with Vicksburg. It was a greater under- 
taking to supply the latter place with provisions for a three 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTCKE OF TICKSBUKG. 293 

montlis' siege than to have marched a great uriny from Richiiiond 
to the Mississippi. 

When it became evident that Vicksburg would be isolated and 
must stand a siege, strict orders were issued regarding ammunition. 
A majority of the Confederate troops were armed with muskets 
requiring caps, and some companies liad the shot-guns and ritlcs 
brought from home. Percussion caps had to run the blockade by 
sea or land, and those which reached Vicksburg were brought in 
by single couriers. They were handled as carefully as gold dollars 
and doled out as gingerly as precious w^ine. One courier who got 
in with sixteen thousand caps on Iiis person was nine days traveling 
a distance of thirteen miles thi-ough the swamps, and was fired upon 
more than a score of times. Another, with his valuable load, 
entered the lines with three serious wounds, and all others had 
perilous adventures and narrow escapes. The Federals captured 
numbers of these couriers, and secured over five hundred thousand 
of the caps so badly needed inside the Confederate lines. 

Details of men, acting under orders from headquarters made it 
a business to gather up every cannon-ball and unexploded shell 
thrown from the fleet, and the defective shell was re-fused or 
re-capped and sent to the gun it would tit. Thousands of Federal 
missiles were thus hurled back against those who fired them. 
Field batteries were cautioned not to fire a shot unless in repelling 
an attack, and the infantry pickets had orders to refrain from wast- 
ing a bullet, no matter what course the Federal pickets took. 

From the last days of April to the eighteenth day of May, Grant 
was advancing upon Vicksburg mile by mile, meeting with an 
obstinate resistance at evei-y point, and fighting and winning at least 
three great battles. On the eighteenth, Sherman took possession of 
Walnut Hills, and the other Federal corps came up one after 
another and completed the line of investment. 

The best military men on both sides have declared that Pember- 
ton was in no condition to match Gi-ant, and but for direct orders 
from Richmond he would probably have evacuated Vicksbui-g as 
soon as he found that Johnston could not strike a blow to relieve 
him. Between his desire to hold to the last, as a good genera! 
should, and his hopes that Johnston might draw Grant off, Pem- 
berton at length found himself closely invested in Vicksburg, his 
army more or less demoralized from the several recent defeats, and 
the city crowded with women and children and other non-combat- 
ants. Had it been possible to follow him closely, his situation 



294 THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VIOKSBDEG. 

must have been dangerous, but he fell back rapidly and obstructed 
his route so thoroughly, that he had time to restore the personnel 
of his troops aud post them at every point menaced. From that 
May day, when the Federal host swung into position, to the Fourth 
oF July, when the surrender took place, Vicksburg scarcely had an 
hour of rest from such a bombardment as no other city but Charles- 
ton received. 

Pemberton had, according to his official report, only about 
eighteen thousand available men. A portion of these were detached 
as a reserve and centrally posted, that they might be hastened for- 
ward to any threatened point, thus leaving him for fort and trendies 
only about fifteen thousand men. He, however, had the short line 
and a great advantage in the lay of the ground. The line was easy 
to fortify, difficult of approach, and was held long after the Con- 
federacy had any hope that Pemberton could save himself. 

Meanwhile the fleet was not idle an hour, though not able to cope 
with the batteries on the Vicksburg bluffs. Two or three rains and 
gun-boats had run the batteries above and below, but only under 
cover of darkness. One of Porter's officers estimated that the 
fastest craft in the fleet would have at least a thousand shots 
fired at her in running the batteries. 

In February the Queen of the West and the De Soto crept past in 
a dark night and scouted up the Red and Atchafalaya Rivers, captur- 
ing two or three vessels and destroying considerable public property. 
In the Red River the Queen moved boldly forward to attack a fort 
whose location had been made known by refugees, but not knowing 
the channel, slie run hard aground and was abandoned to the Con- 
federates. The De Soto subsequently struck a snag and was aban- 
doned in a sinking condition, and the Federals were hurrying down 
the river on a small cotton steamer when they met the Indianola. 
This was a new iron-clad, fast and powerful and heavily armed, and 
she had crept past Vicksburg in the night to scour the rivers for 
prey. On the twenty -fourth, as she was near Grand Gulf, she was 
attacked by the Confederate ram Webb and the Queen of the West, 
and disabled and surrendered. 

Serious as was the capture of the entire expedition sent out, the 
tragedy ended with a roaring farce. In order to secure an accurate 
estimate of the number of guns in the Confederate batteries and to 
note the drift of the current, Porter let fall a hint which " the 
boys " were not slow to act iipon. A buoyant scow was fitted up to 
resemble an iron-clad and turned adrift at night to float past the 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG. 295 

city. At a distance she looked more formidable than any craft 
on the river, and it was no wonder, when the Confederates caught 
sight of her floating past the city, that every gun liurled its wel- 
come. 

The " scare-crow " could not be sunk, and though under the lire 
for more than an hour she was not badly knocked to pieces. 

It has been claimed by several Federal historians that when the 
guns on the bluffs failed to sink the sham iron-clad, word was sent 
down the river to destroy the Indianola to prevent her from recap- 
ture. It is also asserted that the commander of the Queen of the 
West got his vessel under weigh and hurried her off to a safer local- 
ity. So far from this being the case he stood boldly up the river 
to meet and engage any craft coming down. As to the Indianola a 
survey had been made of her damages and it was found that the 
Confederates could not repair her. They could not get her to a 
shipyard, had neither plates nor bolts nor rivets, and the broken 
portions of her machinery could not have been replaced in the 
whole South. She was being stripped of whatever could be got at, 
and the work was about finished when the order came to blow her 
up to prevent the Federals from getting her guns. Confederates 
who assisted to dismantle the Indianola say that her entire stern 
was shattered, plates and beams broken, engines wrecked, and 
boilers disabled, and she could not have been raised and floated had 
the whole Federal fleet been permitted to work on her for a week. 

All histories speak of the bonflres lighted by the Confederates 
along the river as if they were along the Vieksburg banks. This 
was not the case. On the peninsula opposite the city was the ham- 
let of De Soto, consisting of forty to fifty houses, scattered for a 
distance of a mile up and down. This peninsula was held l)y Con- 
federate infantry and conmianded by the guns on the bluff's. Day 
and night scouts were posted as near the fleet as possible, a system 
of signals arranged, and whenever a vessel made a move it was soon 
known all along the peninsula. The deserted houses were filled 
with combustibles, and whenever a Federal craft started out at night 
to run the batteries she was signalled, allowed to reach a cei-tain 
position, and then a house was fired. As she rounded the peninsula 
she was brought between the guns and the bonfire and of course, 
stood out a plain target. The one bonfire would show her up for 
three miles. 

While the fearful gauntlet could be run, the hazard was so great 
that it seemed like sending a vessel and her crew to certain death. 



296 iHE blEGE AND CAPTUKE OF VICKSBUKG. 

The ram Queen of the West passed the batteries twice, being struck 
about ninety times, but receiving no serious damage and having only 
three men wounded. In addition to cliains and cables stretched 
over her vuhierable parts, more than two hundred pounds of 
doubly-compressed cotton were piled up as a further protection. 
She carried away with her more than one hundred solid shot whicli 
had lodged in tlie cotton. 

When the Indianola passed down she had more or less extra pro- 
tection, and the night being dark she was well on her way before 
she was discovered. She was hit about one hundred and tifty times, 
but not more than ten shots dented her plates. She passed down 
with ports closed and neither lights nor men visible, but the ujJroar 
caused by her presence was plainly heard by the imprisoned crew. 
Hundreds of shots fell around her, throwing sheets of water clear 
over her pilot-house and into tlie smoke stacks, and whenever a solid 
shot struck her hull the reverberation was heard through the whole 
ship. 

Porter ran the batteries in April, with six gun-boats and three 
transports. Bales of hay and cotton were brought into use, partic- 
ularly about tlie machinery', and orders were issued to the men on 
the transports as to keeping behind shelter. The gun-boats went 
tirst, keeping well over toward the Mississippi shore, so as to let the 
transports have the Louisiana channel. Keeping at equal distances, 
and maintaining an average rate of speed, the gun-boats opened a 
tremendous fire and the transports pushed on under cover of the 
smoke. 

But the Confederates saw through the game. They realized that 
there was little show to disable one of the gun-boats and their 
fire was concentrated upon the transports. One of the transports 
got through with nine shots in her hull and the scars of twenty 
others on her sides. A second was hit seventeen times, her 
machinery disabled, and but for being taken in tow, she would have 
been sent to tlie bottom. The tiiird had a dozen shots sent into her 
before the voyage was half accomplished, and an incendiary shell 
set her ablaze and accomplisiied her destruction. Her crew escaped 
in boats and by floating away on tlie bales, but the only loss of life 
was upon the leading gun-boat. 

These incidents occurred before Sherman had entered upon the 
Big Black route. We left him confronting Pemberton's field 
defenses and searching for a vulneralile point of attack. 

The situation at Vicksburir, when Pemherton juid been driven 



THE SIEGE AND (JAPTUKE OF VICKSBUEG. 297 

witliin his lines, was one in which he who struck the first blow 
would secure all the advantage. Johnston was at Canton, making 
every effort to secure reinforcements, and if he could get a respect- 
able army together and attack Grant's rear, while Pemberton 
dashed at his front, it would put the Federals in a critical situation. 
If Grant could carry Vicksburg before Johnston was ready, then 
he would turn upon and crush the latter. It was a situation well 
understood on both sides, but Grant proposed to strike first. 

The Federal troops were coming up and taking position all day 
on the eigliteenth, and an assault was ordered for two o'clock next 
day. Grant did not know how Vicksburg was defended on that 
side. He might have known of the marshes and swamps and 
sunken roads, but he could not have realized that stout breastworks, 
with terrilile abattis, would confront him at every point, and be 
defended by men who had entirely recovered from the demoralizing 
effects of defeat and retreat. He could not have known that there 
were points where Pemberton would mass guns and enfilade and 
massacre charging columns, and that the approach to the lines was 
over ground in which every hollow was a man-trap and everj' hill 
was to be plowed with shot and shell until the earth grew hot. 

History has said that Grant did not know what was before him 
but had he known it all, the assault would have taken place just 
the same. Never before and never after in his career was he so 
thoroughly justified in fiinging his army at a desperate position. 
The step was demanded by military policy, and justified by all 
officers. 

On the highway running to Jackson, and well out in the suburbs, 
the Confederates had erected Forts Hill and Beauregard. To ap- 
proach by the road, under the fire of those two works was out of 
the question. The approach across fields and ravines and patches 
of forest offered cover, but would certainly break up formations, 
and leave gaps, and prevent a general concert of action if a golden 
opportunity wei'e discovered. Sherman was to move up, engage, 
assault and carry if he could, and under cover of his movenient the 
other troops were to advance as near as possible and hold their 
ground. 

It was a little after two o'clock when the brigades of General 
Blair's division massed in front of their position for the assault. 
They were to lead, and another division of the same corps was to 
support. Why Sherman did not advance his whole command — 
why all the corps did not move to the assault — why a few skeleton 



298 THE SIEGE AND CAPTUKE OF VICKSBUKG. 

regiments, worn out with constant iigliting and marching, should 
have been hurled at impregnable points, are questions not to be 
asked or answered. One of the very strongest points on the whole 
Confederate line was selected for the assault, and the result was but 
a natural consequence. 

The assault had been looked for all the forenoon by Pemberton. 
As far out as his pickets extended he had slashed down the trees 
and otherwise obstructed the way, and an hour before the assault 
came he knew where the blow would fall, and was prepared for it. 
Fort Hill was defended by a Louisiana brigade, with supports near 
at hand, and every man behind the works knew that an assault 
could not be successful. 

"When the Eighty-third Indiana moved out there was an under- 
standing among the men that the assault was to be a general one. 
Before the regiment advanced it was rumored that only a part of 
Sherman's corps was to move. The men surveyed the distance, noted 
the nature of the ground and the obstructions, and a captain drew 
his belt a notch tighter, turned upon two or three men who were 
growling, and said : 

"No talking in the ranks! Right dress and bid good-bye to old 
Indiana ! " 

Long enough before the lines advanced each man came to realize 
that it was a sort of forlorn hope — a desperate rush with not one 
chance in twenty of success. And yet when the order came each 
company breasted forward like a moving wall. It is a brave man 
who faces the danger he knows. Only scattering troops — -just 
enough to form moving targets to distract the Confederate fire — 
took the highway. One column moved to the right to make a solid 
attack upon one of the forts — the other moved to the left to make 
a feint against the other. 

Illinois, Indiana, and the Thirteenth regulars took the lead. 
Within four hundred feet of their starting point regiments lost 
their alignment from the broken nature of the s> round. Chasms 
had to be crossed, hollows descended and slopes climbed, and 
directly they encountered the felled trees, and then it looked to the 
Confederates behind the works as if a great mob in blue was push- 
ing ahead. jSTow they come under fire, and the fight opens. The 
monster guns of the forts, aided by the field-pieces, put in position, 
sweep the ci-ests of ridges as with brooms of fire, and men demoral- 
ized for the instant crowd into raivines for cover only to find that 
there is no hiding-place safe from shot and shell. Two or three 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBUEG. 299 

times the blue mass pauses and wavers and seems to circle around, 
but each time it gathers strength for a rush that carries it nearer the 
belching cannon and flaming muskets. 

"I could look over the smoke," said an officer of Shoup's brigade, 
"and see the ground blue with Federal dead, and I wondered if we 
would come to close fighting at all. Three or four times I felt sure 
that the columns were being recoiled, but a fresh start brought 
them closer each time, and finally we saw that they were deter- 
mined to make a rush at the fort. Grant could not have massed 
enough men there to carry the slope. We could have beaten back 
ten times our number." 

Slowly, steadily, and with a determination which commanded the 
admiration of friend and foe, the advance finally gained the ditch 
in front of Fort Hill. Here the broken Twenty-seventh Illinois 
halted on the open ground, within half-pistol shot of five thousand 
hostile muskets, formed their lines anew, and with the first cheer of 
the assault, dashed at the ditch and over it. The Eighty-third Indiana 
followed, and the Thirteenth regulars came up on the flank. The 
ditch was passed, the slope gained, and they could go no further. 
The slope was too steep to be surmounted, and to hold the position 
was to be fired down upon and exterminated, while Federal bullets 
cleared the crest and dropped to the ground far in the rear. Lighted 
shells were rolled down the slope to play terrible havoc, and the 
Federal flags planted in the earth were shot to shreds in less than 
ten minutes. 

Fort Beauregard was being attacked on the other side of the 
highway, and there was more or less fighting all around the crescent 
as Federal divisions advanced to new positions, but Pemberton did 
not allow these feints to distract his attention from Fort Hill. 
That was the point aimed at and that was the point to be defended. 
Thus, while there was a constant boom of cannon and a continuous 
rattle of musketry along the entire front, the burden of battle 
rested upon a dozen Federal regiments which had pushed their -way 
right up to the works. 

The assaulting ci)lumns could not carry the slope, and yet they 
would not retreat. Until the recall came they could do nothing 
but take tlie steady fire poured down upon them The wonder is 
that a single man was left alive. The regulars lost one-third of 
their total number, and the volunteers suffered such slaughter as 
few regiments were ever called upon to stand. Says the Confed- 
erate officer previously quoted : 



300 THE SIEGE AND CAPTUBE OF VICKSBUEG. 

" During the entire time the Federal troops were in that desperate 
position they kept banging away at the parapet, but I do not believe 
we lost a man killed from their wild firing. The air above us was 
cut by bullets, and dirt and dust were showered upon vis from those 
striking the parapet, but all the advantage was with us. It was a 
shameful thing to hold men there as they were held, and it seems 
a miracle that a single one escaped. The shells made horrible work 
amons: them, and aftei' the fiij-ht was over and the smoke hud blown 
away, the sight was such ;is I had never looked upon before or 
thought possible in war." 

The recall came at dusk, and the remnants of butchered com- 
jjanies rallied and moved buck to the Federal lines, which had been 
advanced some distance during the afternoon. The attack on Fort 
Hill had been made with a desperation never excelled in war, but 
there was no such thing as winning a victory there. Grant might 
have ordered it simply to cover a general advance along the lines. 
If he had any idea that a single division, supported at long distances 
by three or four skeleton brigades, could penetrate the Confederate 
lines, he little know what Pemberton had been doing. A constant 
fire was maintained upon the troops as they fell back, adding con- 
siderably to the list of killed and wounded, and the roll-call of the 
regiments who had borne the brunt of the affair showed how terri- 
bly each company had suffered. 

While lying on the slope of Fort Hill a shell rolled down by the 
Confederates killed six and wounded four of the regulars. A sec- 
ond shell, coming upon the same troops at another point almost at 
the same time, exploded right in the midst of the men, and yet 
inflicted no injury upon any one, except to scorch hair and clothing. 

A captain in the Illinois regiment whose company numbered 
about sixty men was determined to charge the parapet. Three 
times he led the comjjany up, and three times it was hurled back to 
the foot of the slope. Standing a fair target for the muskets above 
he called out to his men to make one more attempt. 

" It's no use, captain ! " called out one of the men. 

"You can doit — you must do it! Once more. Now for the 
glory of old Illinois ! " 

"Old Illinois glory be hanged!" yelled the same voice. "If she 
had expected one company of her boys to lick Pemberton's whole 
army, some of the Chicago papers would have said so before tliis:'" 

There were plenty of men who received three or four wounds 
each, and yet limped back to the Federal lines. None but the griev- 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF A'lCKSBURG. 301 

ously wounded and dead remained behind. A member of the 
regulars of the name of WiUiam Adams was shot in the left arm, 
in the left slioulder, in the right ankle, received a bad scalp wound 
and had a bad wound in the calf of the Ipg from a piece of shell. 
The Confederates found him alive and able to converse, but one of 
them remarked : 

" It's no use to move this man ; he'll be dead inside of an hour."' 

"Bet you an even ten dollars I don't die at all !" replied the reg- 
iilar, and his pluck secured his removal to the hospital. Before 
Vicksburg surrendered he was able to walk the streets. 

The Federals did not make a dash at Beauregard, but contented 
themselves with creeping to positions within musket range and 
maintaining a hot and continuous fire, assisted by such field-pieces 
as could be brought into position. The Confederate infantry re- 
plied in a vigorous manner, and being well sheltered sustained but 
little loss. Almost every one killed or wounded in either fort 
received the missile in tiie head, hands or arms. Seven out of every 
ten reported wounded were hit in the hands as they raised their 
muskets to fire. 

The Federal infantry paid particular attention to the Confederate 
artillerists, and several times cleared away the entire crews of guns, 
but such trifling advantages were not worth the lives being sacri- 
ficed to gain them. After the fight men counted on some of the 
cannon the scars left by as many as three hundred and forty bullets, 
and the slope was raked as if an iron comb had been di-awn back 
and forth. 

On one spot of ground, not more than one hundred feet square, 
a quarter of a mile in rear of Fort Hill and in the line of the Fed- 
eral fire, over two thousand spent bullets were picked up after the 
fight, and they were to be gathered by the pound at the bottom of 
the ravines and on the broken ground. 

The assault, if meant as an assault, had failed, but the Federal 
lines had advanced to better positions, all tlie army was up, and 
Grant was to try again. This time every Federal on the crescent 
was to move forward at the signal, and Porter was to open such a 
fire on the front of Vicksburg as would drive every living thing to 
shelter. Even as the limp and bleeding regiments fell back from 
the first assault cannon were being planted and other preparations 
made for the far more bloody struggle to come. 

Grant's first assault upon Pemberton's lines was made under the 
impression that the Confederate troops were demoralized and that 



302 THE SIEGE AND CAPTUEE OF VICKSBURG. 

a rush would break the line at some point. The assault was repulsed. 
Then Grant made ready for one of the most desperate and bloody 
struss'les of the whole war. He had failed in the assault with a 
corps; he would now assault with his whole army. 

After the repulse of Sherman the Confederates became jubilant. 
Previous to the assault there was a feeling of despondency that bade 
fair to settle the fate of Vicksburg within a week. The defenses 
had been tested, an assault resisted, and hope returned. Even if 
Johnston made no diversion in favor of Vicksburg, it was to be 
defended to the last. 

Therefore, as Grant made his preparations for the second assault, 
Pemberton made liis for the second defense, and with equal enthu- 
siasm. All along the Federal lines batteries were posted for con- 
centric fii-e, sharpshooters pushed to the front, and every effort 
made by scouts to secure information concerning the Confederate 
defenses. The fleet in the river was to co-operate, and Porter 
promised Grant such a fire as Vicksburg had never felt. 

Pemberton made ready at every point. He knew that an assault 
en masse was coming, and he knew that every Confederate in Vicks- 
burg must stand up for a hard fight or the line would be broken 
at some point. He did not issue an address ; he issued rations 
and ammunition instead. 

Grant's order was for a general assault at ten o'clock on the morn- 
ing of the twenty-second. Three hours before the bugles sounded, 
every preparation had been made and every detail carefully looked 
to. Every piece of artillery which was to take part was in position. 
Every corps, division, brigade and regiment bad received instruc- 
tions for the assault. The commands which were to carry planks 
and ladders for crossing the ditches and scaling parapets had been 
drafted and their materials secured, and there was not a soldier in 
that whole Federal army who had not been instructed in regard to 
emergencies. They were told how ditches were to be crossed — how 
to burrow into parapets and slopes to hold their positions — how to 
conduct themselves in front of abattis — liow to shelter themselves 
in the ravines and liollows, and while brigades wei'e to act inde- 
pendently of eacli other to a certain extent, the whole assault was to 
be in harmony. The testimony of all general ofiicers shows that it 
was one of the most carefully planned assaults in modern warfare, 
and. the reports of regimental commanders prove that there was less 
confusion in the midst of repulse and disaster than was instanced 
before or after in our civil war. 



THE SIEGE AND OAPTUEE OF VICKSBCEG. 303 

Pemberton had the advantage of position, but an earth-woik 
would be no obstruction unless defended. He must make one man 
count for two along every yard of his lines. His preparations were 
also made in detail, and were as perfect as could be under the cir- 
cumstances. No Confederate had less than forty rounds of ammu- 
nition, and they were instructed over and over again to hold their 
fire for close fighting and to take deliberate aim and tire with cool- 
ness. That these instructions were followed is shown by the terri- 
ble death-rolls accompanying Federal reports. Confederates behind 
the stone-walls at Fredericksburg had a dead rest and a certain 
target every time they tired. It was the same at almost every point 
on Pemberton's lines. Men had but to pull the trigger on living 
targets so close to them that the color of hair and eyes could be 
plainly made out. 

At exactly ten o'clock the whole Federal army was transformed 
into a monster serpent, which began to writhe and twist and turn 
and undulate. From right to left— from left to right — from the 
sharpshooters in the hollows and behind the rocks to the double 
ranks sheltered in the valleys and woods, there was a movement. 
Brigades broke off and advanced right or left-oblique — divisions 
moved up squarely to the front — cannon began to thunder — the 
hoarse shouts of officers were echoed along the lines — coluinns 
closed up — the earth began to shake and tremble — the curtain had 
gone up on the tragedy of war. 

The van of Sherman's assault was composed of a thin line of 
skirmishers, followed by the men detailed to carry planks and lad- 
ders and pick-axes and shovels. Then came the solid lines. The 
Confederates who were watching every movement say that a grander 
sight was never seen during the war. Every movement was exe- 
cuted with a coolness that spoke of determination, and the Federal 
batteries fired slowly and wasted but little ammunition. 

The orders inside of Pemberton's lines were to remain concealed ^ 
until the Federal infantry reached the ditches. This resulted in a 
mighty advance upon forts and breastworks giving out no signs of 
life. As Slierman's van swept along after his skirmishers the Con- 
federate works appeared to have been deserted, and hundreds of 
men grasped at the delusive hope that the men had become panic- 
stricken and retired. Sherman concentrated the fire of twenty- 
eight guns upon Fort Hill alone, and it seemed to the troops as if 
the place was being torn to pieces. The Confederate sharpshooters 
ran in as soon as pressed by the skirmish lines, and in such haste 



304 THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBURG. ' 

that more than one Federal oiEcer encouraged his men in the belief 
that no resistance was to be met with. 

With a steady trainp, and with ranks as solid as the earth over 
which they moved, Sherman's first brigades had reached within a 
stone's throw of Fort Hill before a bullet fell among them. Then 
death came with the rush of an avalanche. At the word, a thousand 
Confederates sprang up on the crest of the parapet, and a thousand 
muskets flamed and cracked and sent their bullets right down into 
the crowded ranks. 

It was a sudden and terrible check. In three minutes more the 
Federals would have been pouring into the fort. There was a 
moment of confusion, and then one brigade dashed to the right and 
another to the left, and the third rushed to the crest of a hill on a 
level with the parapet and there hugged the ground and opened 
such a fire that a ramrod held in the air above the fort would have 
been cut in two on the instant. Sherman's troops were in the same 
position as during the first assault. They had crossed the ditches, 
reached the slopes, planted their flags, and burrowed into the ground 
like foxes, but they could advance no further. Pemberton had not 
concentrated against the one corps this time. Every man in that 
Federal army was marching to the grand assaiilt, and Porter was 
raining such a storm of shot and shell upon the city as bade fair to 
wipe it off the hills. 

The Federal artillery was playing upon Fort Hill with a terrible 
fire, keeping many of its guns silent and clearing the parapet of in- 
fantry, but it became plain after awhile that the only way to take 
the place was by a rush of the infantry lying all around it. Two 
brigades formed for this purpose and dashed at the parapet with 
cheers that were heard a mile away above the roar of battle. The 
lines struggled up the slopes under a hot fire, and as they braced for 
a dash over the parapet, tlie Confederate infantry rose up and sent 
their volleys into ranks so close that the powder burned men's faces. 
It was butchery to hurl men against such defenses. It was death to 
remain there — it was death to retreat. Thus through long hours 
the brigades of Sherman's corps bearing the brunt of the fight 
were penned up and waiting their turn to be picked off. The loss 
ill the fort was not one in fifteen, and, compared to the loss of the 
regiments directlj' assailing it in front, it was not one in thirty. 

McPherson had the center, lapping Sherman on one hand and 
McClernand on the other, though the flanks were not looked after 
as they would have been if the army had been advancing against 



THE SIEGE A^D CAl'TUKE OF VlCKaBLKC. 305 

troops instead of defenses. Ransom's brigade of McPlierson's 
corps joined in Slierman's assault upon Fort Hill, and Steele's 
brigades did some terrific fighting fui'tlier uj) tlie line, but it was 
the dash of a wave against a rock. Had tiie defenders along that 
front been reduced one-half, and the assaulting force increased fifty 
per cent., the general result would have been the same. 

That portion of McPherson's corps which wns hurled against the 
strong lines along the Jackson railroad had no more show of car- 
rying theni than Porter had of running his fleet over the house-tops 
of the city, and the several desperate assaults m;ide resulted in ter- 
rible losses. In front of one hundred feet of Confederate line more 
than four hundred Federals lay dead or wounded at sunset that 
day, while inside the line for that distance two men had been killed 
and five wounded. 

" We were perfectly safe from the Federal ai'tillery fire," says a 
Confederate, "and as for the infantry in front we paid no heed to 
them except when they assaulted. We waited until they were close 
at hand, and then sprang up and withered them with a single volley. 
Long enough before we had a wounded man in my regiment we 
could count the dead on our front by the score." 

The day was to wither the laurels which a brave general had mod 
over and over again on other hard-fought fields. McClernand took 
the left with a determination to carr\' his corps into the Confederate 
works. The ground on his front was less ditheult to advance over, 
and there was unmistakable enthusiasm among his men as they 
moved out. They were advancing uiion fort and redonbt, ditch 
and bastion, but the movement was made in fine spirits, and at the 
first rush the advance brigades were carried across the ditches and 
half way up the slopes of everything on the front. It seemed as if 
they must walk right into the forts, and troops in the rear were 
raising cheers of victory, when the Confederate infantry rose up 
and delivered that terrible volley at short range. The effect was 
the same along the whole line. Such a volley killed every third 
man in the ranks moving up. Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana had their 
flags planted on tlie Confederate works, and the men took cover 
and hung right there, determined to win a victory. Pieces of artil- 
lery were hauled up by hand and fired into embrasures, and in 
several instances small detachments of Federals crossed the parapets 
or forced their way into forts, but only to be shot down or taken 
prisoners. 

It seemed to McClernand as if he had gained a decided advan- 

VoL. I. 20 



306 THE SIEGE AND CAPTDEE OF VICKSBtJEG. 

tage. His front was all u\), advance brigades were lying right 
under the Confederate works, and he had silenced many of the 
guns above him. It was impossible for him to know that Sherman 
and McPherson had gained just such positions, only to find them 
of no advantage. He therefore reported to Grant his success and 
his belief that reinforcements would bring hi in victory. It must 
have looked that way to him. There were evidences that the Con- 
federates had all they could do to hold him at the foot of their 
works. Let reinforcements come and the scale would turn in his 
favor. He therefore held on and waited. 

Grant was ready by noon to recall his army from the assault. He 
could see that neither Sherman nor McPherson had gained any 
advantage, while their losses had been terrible. Then came McCler- 
nand's reports of success, one following the other, and finally, much 
against his better judgment. Grant acquiesced, in the hope that 
victory might come from it. Reinforcements were ordered to 
McClernand, and Sherman and McPherson were instructed to make 
fresh assaults along their fronts as a diversion. 

McClernand was too sanguine. He counted too much on the 
endui-ance of his troops. He expected the sight of reinforcements 
hastening up would dishearten the Confederates. He fully and 
earnestly believed that five thousand more men would enable him to 
carry everything in his front. Grant was mistaken in thinking he 
could cai-ry Vicksburg by assault, but a subordinate must not err. 
McClernand hurled his corps against the rock time after time, but 
only to leave his dead and wounded along the ditches. Sherman 
was hurled back — McPherson M^as hurled back — the great assault 
was a defeat along every yard of the line. McClernand had fought 
with the greatest valor, and his men had come the nearest to vic- 
tory, but he had been too enthusiastic, and the result was the loss 
of prestige and position. 

When night came down the Federal army had been beaten back 
at every point. Porter's tremendous bombardment had failed to 
silence a single battery, and the dead and wounded were lying in 
front of the lines in such numbers as to appall those who had come 
safely out of the horrible tornado of death. Yicksburg could not 
be taken by assault; Grant would now enter upon a regular siege. 

After the failure of the second assault on Vicksburg, Grant made 
up his mind to a siege which he knew would be dragged through 
many weeks. It was neither the lack of good generalship nor 
desperate fighting that had beaten the Federals back. Vicksburg 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBUEG. 307 

was impregnable. Pemberton could hold his lines against infantry, 
and Porter might hurl shot and shell all day long at the bluffs with- 
out doing enough damage to pay for the powder. 

When the real investment began, a cat could not have crej)t out 
of Vicksburg without being discovered. Every yard of river and 
foot of land were watched and guarded, and the horrors of a siege 
were felt alike in the streets of the city and the trenches at the 
front. 

Grant learned here what he afterwards put in practice at Peters- 
burg. If he could not hurl Pemberton from his works he could 
wear him out. Sharpshooters were advanced as close as possible at 
every point, artillery pushed forward, new pieces mounted, and 
every arrangement made to keep the Confederates filled with anxi- 
ety. The crack of the rifles of the sharpshooters was never hushed, 
even at night, and scarcely a day passed that some demonstration 
was not made to create apprehension. A regiment would make an 
advance at some point on the lines as if an assault were intended, 
and the Confederates would be stirred up on a front a mile long. 
At night some bold Federal would creep forward among the Con- 
federate rifle-pits and raise an alarm that would extend to a thou- 
sand men. There was not an hour in the twenty-four that the 
besieged felt safe in resting, and anything like sound sleep was out 
of the question. 

While a constant artillery fire was maintained on both sides, most 
of the loss was occasioned by the sharpshooters. The Federals 
were in rifle-pits or behind rocks, and in some cases near enough to 
have killed a sparrow resting on the Confederate works. One of 
their objects was to silence the big guns by picking off artillerists, 
and in a few instances they were quite successful. There were 
cannon in the Confederate forts which were struck by as many as 
sixty bullets. A wooden shield in use to protect the men at one of 
the guns was, in eight hours, hit by forty-four balls. A Confeder- 
ate soldier had only to raise his hat above the works to have it 
punctured by bullets, and the man reckless enough to expose him- 
self at any point was certain to be hit on the instant. 

On the other hand, the Federals suffered even more from the 
Confederate sharpshooters, because less sheltered and almost con- 
stantly making new movements and taking new positions. A 
Louisiana rifleman who had dug a hole for himself in front of Fort 
Hill and rendered himself a dangerous object, made a long shot one 
day and killed or wounded an officer. Within five minutes, as he 



308 THE SIEGE AND CAPITEE OF TICKSBrRG. 

relates, five or six pieces of light artillery were turned upon the 
spot where he was concealed, and a score oi Federal sharpshooters 
likewise gave him their attention. For thirty minutes he was 
doubled up in a hole just deep enough to shelter him, and over and 
around him swept shot, sliell and bullet in a way that left the 
ground a sight to see. While he was not hurt, a piece of shell and 
two spent bullets rolled into his door, and he was almost buried 
alive by the dirt flung into the rifle pit. 

One who looks over the battle-lields of Vicksburg will wonder 
that the peninsula (now an island) opposite the city was not cap- 
tured long before the event took place. Porter's mortars were so 
far up stream that they were of little service, and whenever he 
came down with his gun-boats to run past or engage tiie batteries, 
the distance he had to make was so great that the Confederates had 
warning and were fully prepared for his coming. The Confederate 
force holding the peninsula was always weak in numbers, and could 
have been routed weeks before it was. "When the Federals finally 
took possession of tlie ground, the mortar scows were brought down 
within rifle range of the city. The wooded peninsula hid them 
from sight and served as a protection, while they had but to elevate 
their pieces to clear the tree-tops and their missiles would carry to the 
Vicksburg banks. After the siege began, and after Porter secured 
the new position, the Confederates could never look forward to an 
hour of rest. 

Porter's fire against the batteries along the blufEs was steady and 
annoying, but attended with far less loss of life than one would an- 
ticipate. It was indeed a rare thing when a man was killed in one 
of the forts. The missiles from the iron-clads and the gun-boats 
buried themselves in walls of earth from twelve to twenty feet 
thick, and the descending bombs were not particularly dangerous, 
generally falling beyond the works. A Confederate relates that he 
counted thirty-two bombs which fell and exploded without injury 
to life, and that only two out of one hundred and eight created any 
destruction whatever. Nevertheless, the bombardment was a ter- 
rible thing to bear, and though so many shells were thrown awa}', 
no one was safe from being torn to pieces at any moment. 

Here it was demonstrated that an iron clad whicli could be kept 
moving could be hit only by ciiance. Tiiose which attacked Fort 
Sumter made a square stand-up fight, bow or broadside on, and sta- 
tionary. These at Vicksburg fought while under motion, and 
though one vessel was often a target for fifty guns, the damage was 



THE SIEGE AND OAPTUKE UF VICKSBUKG. 309 

never serious. The Cincinnati, in advancing to a position within 
pistol-shot of a battery located at the water's edge, was tired at over 
forty times without being hit. She was then sunk by a single shot 
and about twenty of her crew were either killed or drowned. 

It was not until near the close of tiie siege that the Federals 
knew of the existence of the caves in Vicksburg. During the day, 
when a lively bombardment was in progress, the hill-sides would be 
covered with women and children. Suddenly they would dis- 
appear, but in five minutes they were back again. Women learnetl 
to distinguish one missile from another by sound, and to anticipate 
the points against which the heaviest Federal fire would be con- 
centrated. Seated on the hillsides, with umbrellas held up to shade 
them, they would watch the bombardment with deep interest until 
a shell came too close. Then there would be a scattering, generally 
accompanied by a frolic, and in a short time all would return. The 
caves were resorted to at first upon the firing of a single gun, but 
during the last two weeks of the siege, when the fire was hottest, 
many families remained in their bouses and trusted to good luck to 
escape death. 

In June the rations of the soldiers were again decreased, and 
citizens were brought face to face with the fact that nothing must 
be wasted. There was little or nothing for sale, the city was 
entirely cut off by river and land, and the women who could invent 
some new dish from the crumbs of a former meal fared the best. 
It was not until the last week that mule meat was resorted to, and 
it was still later on tliat rats came to be looked upon as good eating. 
A negro woman told me that she killed and ate a dog, and never 
tasted better meat, and another made soup of a piece of rawhide 
and found it very palatable. The mule meat was tolerably good eat- 
ing, though tough and stringy, and soldiers ate it in preference to 
some of the pork and bacon issued with their rations. 

Although the troops in Vicksburg were cut down to the lowest 
possible point in issuing rations, it was not so much from lack of 
supplies as from seeking to carry out Pemberton's ideas. His first 
was to take the garrison out in case Johnston came to his relief by 
an attack. The second was to protract the siege to the last hour. 
If he escaped with his garrison his army must have rations. If he 
could not get out, every day that he held Vicksburg held Grant's 
army there, and was an advantage to the Confederacy. In his 
official report he says he had in store on the day of surrender, forty 
thousand pounds of pork and bacon, fifty thousand pounds of rice. 



310 THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBUKG. 

five tliousand bushels of peas, two thousand pounds of sugai", four 
hundred tliousand pounds of salt, and various otlier commissary 
stores. Thus it came about that the garrison turned to rats and 
roots while the store-houses at their backs contained plenty of 
good rations. 

Grant was impatient at delay, and when neither assault nor bom- 
bardment would bring victory, he began to approach the Confede- 
rate works at various points by sap and mine. The most impor- 
tant mines were driven under Fort Hill, and late in June there were 
two explosions there which nearly shook the fort to pieces. With 
each explosion there was a rush of Federals to get in, and a i-ally of 
the Confederates to keep them out, and no material advantage was 
gained. The explosion caught about a dozen Confederates in a 
counter-mine outside. Four of the men were blown so high into 
space that their bodies were almost lost siglit of, and those who 
saw them after they had descended could find no resemblance to 
human beings. They were simply blackened balls of pulp. 

It became certain after awhile that Grant would get into Vicks- 
burg if he had to tunnel under every hill, and Fate sat down with 
Pemberton whenever he rested, and glided along beside him when- 
ever he rode. Johnston could not gather force enough to warrant 
an attack upon Grant. He was a menace, but not a danger. 

It was the same with Taylor. The only chance promising suc- 
cess was an attack by Johnston in conjunction with a sortie by Pem- 
berton. This plan would certainly have been tried could the 
details have been perfected. The Confederate couriers were inter- 
cepted going or coming, and Pemberton could not arrange the 
details. Without a perfect understanding as to the hour and point 
it was useless to attack. 

In the last days of June, Pemberton fully realized his position. 
He might repulse another assault upon his lines, and the river bat- 
teries might now and then disable a gun-boat, but the end must 
come. Grant was determined, and Porter full of courage. Neither 
Johnston nor Taylor could furnish aid, and the Confederate troops 
were beginning to weaken under the rule of short rations and con- 
stant vigilance. From the twentieth of June to the second of July 
no Confederate let go of his musket, and no man slept for an hour 
at a time. Every foot of the lines was under fire, and every fort 
was being approached by a mine. In the city it was still worse. 
Porter had opened with a vengeance, ammunition was giving out in 



THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF VICKSBUKG. 



311 



the batteries, and men who had been under call for over forty days 
and nights were at last wearing out. 

Grant never exhibited better generalship and greater pluck. Por- 
ter never showed his lieet to better advantage than he did there- 
Then let history, no matter by whom written, add that the Confed- 
erates had done all that brave men could do. 

On the third of July, having given up all hopes of outside aid, 
and feeling that further defense was but useless slaughter, Pember- 
ton raised the white flag of surrender, and next day Vicksburg was 
in possession of those who had fought so long and well to win it. 
It has been charged that Pemberton was a man of great personal 
vanity. If so, he was also a good fighter. It has been changed that 
he disobeyed the orders of Johnston to evacuate Vicksburg. If 
so, where are the charges and the courts-martial ? It has been writ- 
ten that he defended Vicksburg by the positive order of President 
Davis. If true, the President had the right to make the order, and 
he must have felt tliat Pemberton made the best possible fight 
under the circumstances. 




f |e Capture of |]ort Hudson. 




/3RT HUDSON is on a high bluff on the east bank of 
the Mississippi. Ten years ago it was in a sharp bend 
of the stream. To-day it is virtually an inland town. 
Where the Federal gun-boats found twenty feet of 
water in the last days of the war, one now finds marsh 
and bog. 

To 'hold Vicksburg it was deemed necessary to hold Port Hudson. 
Pemberton provisioned both for a siege, and the earth-works at the 
latter place were in some respects stronger than at Vicksburg. 

The investment of Port Hudson was deemed complete on May 
24, 1863. Banks was up with his whole army, and Farragut's fleet 
of ten vessels had taken positions from which they could pitch 
shot and shell into the Confederate fortifications. 

General Gardner, the Confederate commander, had that same 
personal determination whicli characterized Pembert.on, and when 
the Federal army and navy approached, tiie defenses were complete, 
the place provisioned and the garrison in good spirits. 

From the twenty-fourth to the twenty-seventh, the Federal fleet 
maintained an almost continuous bombardment, and from the 
eleventh or twelfth to the same date there was more or less skir- 
mishing between the infanty. 

On the twenty-seventh a hot fire was opened on the Confederate 
works from every piece of Federal artillery which could be brought 
to bear, whether on land or water. This was the prelude to a gen- 
eral assault. Banks reasoned the same as Grant. An assault before 
the Confederates had time to settle down for a siege was more likely 
to break tiirongh the lines. After the artillery fire had continued 
for several hours, the Federal right advanced. Banks contended 
that his orders were for both wings and center to advance at the 
same time, but through some misunderstanding only the right 
moved out. The Confederates were posted on strong ground and 
behind field-works, and where breastworks were not otherwise de- 

1313] 



THE CAPTUKE OF POET HUDSON. 313 

fended, an abattis had been prepared. The Federal advance was 
obstructed by swamp, thicket, ravine and creek, and every foot of 
ground was hotly contested. For tliree or four hours the right of 
Banks was in a situation to bo opposed by the entire Confederate 
army, and its advance had been cliecked when the left and center 
finally moved up and assaulted. 

The orders from General Gardner were to hold the field-works at 
every cost, and they were closely obeyed. At Vicksburg every 
yard of the lines had to be approached by direct assault. At Port 
Hudson certain positions could be, and were flanked and taken, but 
always at terrible cost. Confederates lying safely behind eai-th- 
works coolly waited until tlie assaulting colunm reached the abattis, 
and then each man liad only to select his target. Again, when the 
colored troops charged upon the batteries, flanked by rifle-pits and 
supported by choice troops, companies were cut to pieces at a single 
volley. 

" To show 3'ou what cool and desperate fighting it was," says a 
Confederate, "' I had at least twenty-tive shots at Federals not over 
two hundred feet away. In one instance I fired upon a Federal 
lieutenant who was encouraging his men to tear away the abattis. 
I wounded him in the left arm. He fired at me with liis revolver 
and sent a bullet through my cap. Next time I hit him in the hip 
and he fell, but while I was reloading he raised himself up and shot 
the man next to me on the left through the head. The officer was 
so close to me that I could tell the color of his eyes and detect a 
small scar on his face. After the fight I saw him taken away by 
the Federals to be buried. He had been struck by seven or eight 
bullets. A negro, who escaped the volley that shattered his com- 
mand, drove right in among us at charge bayonets, and he not only 
refused to surrender, but pricked two of our men and broke his gun 
over the head of a third before we downed him.' 

As the Federal left and center moved to the attack, Farragnt re- 
doubled his fire against the river side of the main fortifications. 
One feeling such a bombardment as he gave Poi-t Hudson would 
feel obliged to believe that walls of earth thirty feet thick must be 
battered down, and that troops in garrison would 1)6 lilotted out to 
the last man. If one military genius brings forth a new engine of 
destruction, another military genius brings forth a defense to offset 
it. Walls of earth render shot and shell less dangerous than bullets. 
Bomb-proofs offset the work of mortars. And so it was that while 
Farragut pitched his heaviest missiles into the works, and seemed 



314: THE CAPTURE OF POET HUDSON. 

to be wiping them off the face of the earth, the damage inflicted was 
trifling. A gun or two was dismounted, half a dozen men killed or 
wounded, and the works needed slight repairs. It is the bullet 
which tells in war. It seeks its tai'get on the picket-post — on the 
skirmish line — on the raid — along the rifle-pits and breastworks. 
The musket is never silent. It is a slow cancer eating away at the 
life of an enemy. It seeks him out in tlie I'avine — it discovers 
him in the thicket — it gives him no rest on the plain. Artillery 
roars and flashes, and its missiles scream and terrify, but the pon- 
derous shot falls wide of its target or digs its own grave in the soil. 

Step by step the Confederates were forced back, and as night 
came the entire garrison was within the defenses proper. Every 
field defense had been captured, and the Federal army had won a 
victory. In the excitement of the last charge the front lines were 
carried almost to the ditches, and desperate individuals even crossed 
them and were killed as they pulled themselves up the slopes. 
Banks was too strong for Gardiiei- in the field. Now it was to be 
shown that Gardner, driven within his shell, was too strong for 
Banks. He had the short line, and an assault upon his interior 
works meant repulse every time. lie ])roved this before dark by a 
sally and an artillery fire which caught the Federal left wing in 
flank and whirled it back a mile. 

From the twenty-seventh of May to the eleventh of June, Banks 
was preparing for a siege, or continuing a siege practically begun 
with his flrst assault. Day after day, and night after night, Port 
Hudson was under the tire of fleet and land force, and so close was 
the investment that only one courier out of seven sent out passed 
the Federal lines, and he with a bullet in his shoulder. Says a 
member of the garrison : 

" One can get used to almost anything. After the first two or 
three days we took the bombardment as part of the regular routine. 
Pieces of shell were continually flying about, and it was the regular 
thing for a bomb to drop down amongst us at intervals. I have 
seen them come down within fifty feet of a sentinel and throw 
up a wagon-load of dirt without his even turning his head. We 
had but few men hurt by the artillery fire. I do not believe we 
averaged one man hit for every thousand pounds of metal thrown. 
I remember that I one day counted thirteen shells and bombs hurled 
at the spot where I was posted before we had a man hurt, and he 
was only slightly wounded. On the contrary, our best marksmen 
were called to the front as sharpshooters, and I have known one 



THE CAPTUKE OF POKT HUDSON. 



315 



man to kill or disable four or five Federals witliout having wasted 
a bullet. I would sooner be penned up in a fort and bombarded 
than stand vidette." 

Banks determined upon a second assault in order to intrench him- 
self nearer the Confederate works and be able to sap and mine. 
The enterprise was kept a profound secret in order that the attack 
might be a surprise, and when, at one o'clock in the morning the 
various troops were quietly roused out of their sleep and prepara- 
tions entered into for the assault, but few suspected what was to 



come. 



The assault was made just as night was giving way to daybreak, 
and it caught hundreds of Confederates sound asleep. For the first 
quarter of an hour success seemed certain, but then the works were 
fully manned and such squads of Federals as had entered them were 
made prisoners or wiped out. There were mutterings about mis- 
takes, and blunders, and delays in bringing forward supports, but 
no charges were ever made and no one was officially censured. 

Banks has been censured for the third assault, made upon the 
fourteenth. Events proved that he had no accurate knowledge of 
the ground along most of his front, and that he was greatly deceived 
in his estimate of the strength of the Confederate works. His 
defenders, however, point to Grant's approval of the course taken. 
The preparations necessary for a general assault betrayed the move- 
ment to the Confederates, and when the blow came they were pre- 
pared for it. 

The plan of assault was carefully arranged and all the details 
sharply looked to. There was not a regiment or company wlncli 
did not understand exactly what would be expected of it under all 
circumstances. 

The point selected for the attack was an angle nearest the fed- 
eral lines. The approach to it was sheltered to a point within about 
eight hundred yards, and the plan was for a sudden dash across the 
open ground. When the time came for this, the ground was found 
to be broken and rocky, full of holes and ravines, and much of the 
surface covered with creeping blackberry vines. The plan called 
for an assault to the right and left of the angle as well, but success 
was expected only in the center. Acting under the belief that the 
ditches could be gained without trouble, a regiment was detailed to 
carry ba<^s of cotton to fill them up and make a way over. Another 
was supplied with haud-greuades, to be thrown over the parapet, 



316 THE CAPT0RE OF POET HUDSON. 

and two or three others were to act as sharp-shooters and prevent 
the Confederate artillerists from working their gnns. 

"We were called np about two o'clock in the morning to make ready 
for the expected attack," explained a Confederate officer. " We 
knew the point aimed at, and long enough before a move was made 
we were ready for it." 

The Federals found this to be the case when they broke cover in 
the gray of morn and rushed to the assault. A desolating fire was 
opened as soon as the first man appeared in sight, and this action 
resulted in more or less confusion. More tlian half the skirmisliers 
were wiped out as they went forward at a run, and when the colunms 
came up it was rendered plain in a moment that success was simply 
impossible. The ditches were deeper than anticipated, and not 
more than two thirds of the hand-grenades were brought np. Of 
those thrown not one in ten exploded as desired. The Confederate 
officer quoted above said of the rush : 

" They were brave men to come on as they did. They must have 
realized that it was death to rush at the angle, prepared as we were, 
and yet they pressed forward without urging. Such of the hand- 
grenades as came into our works were picked up and tossed back, 
and I believe they created as much destruction as our bullets. The 
Federals seemed to have reasoned that once in the ditches they 
would be safe, but we had prepared them with a view of an 
enfilading fire, and it was a slaughter-pen for such as took up the 
position." 

There was desperate fighting before the Federals would give 
back. The attacks to right and left met with the same obstinate 
resistance, and at length the fight ended in tlie repulse of tlie assail- 
ants. The Federal lines had been advanced, but that advantage was 
offset by the slaughter of nearly a thousand men. 

On the right and right-center the ground was open, and after the 
fight any wounded man who raised a hand was sure to receive a 
bullet. Indeed many of them were killed where they lay, and some 
were almost riddled. Those lying in the old cotton field were 
forced to remain on their backs in the broiling hot sun for seven or 
eight hours, the bullets plowing the earth around them and their suf- 
ferings so great that numbers of them, rendered frantic, rose to 
their feet and wevTt shot down. Every wounded man who lay there 
was fly-blown, and when darkness came there was no attempt to 
i-emove any but those nearest the Federal lines. During the first 
night the Confederates could not sleep for the wails and groans of 



THE CAPTrRE OF PORT HUDSON. 317 

the badly-wounded still lying there. At the end of the third day 
the dead still covering the ground, General Gardner asked Banks to 
remove thein. Banks passed the matter over to Augur, and Augur 
carried away nearly three hundred putrifying bodies. At other 
points the bodies of Federal soldiers remained where they fell, and 
were buried only after the suri-ender. Attempts have been made to 
excuse this horrible neglect on the ground that the Confederates 
maintained a malicious fire across the fields where the dead and 
wounded lay, bnt it will be remembered that it was General Gard- 
ner who sent the first flag of truce and the first request that the vic- 
tims should be taken care of. 

The third assault was the last made. Banks was now satisfied 
that Port Hudson would yield only to a siege, and he erected new 
batteries and began a steady pounding away which had its expected 
results. He put his miners and sappers at work as well, turned a 
part of his army into sharpshooters, and long enough before July 
was ushered in General Gardner's situation was worse than Pember- 
ton's. 

In the last days of June rations became scarce, and mule meat 
and rat-soup were luxuries. The fire of the fleet had dismounted 
gun after gun, and the supply of ammunition for all arms had run 
so low that one could figure to a certainty when the last round 
would be fired. By the first of July the Federal works were not above 
twenty feet away at some points, and lighted shells were tossed 
from either side by hand. Mining and counter-mining were going 
on, and sorties by small bands of desperate men were of frequent 
occurrence. 

Gardner, like Bemberton, was holding out in liopes of some 
movement by Johnston or Taylor, but it was a vain hope. On the 
night of the seventh, news was received of the surrender of Vicks- 
burg. This was the death blow to Gardner's hopes, and on the 
ninth a full surrender was made and Port Hudson occupied by the 
Federals. 




f itnisiiic's Crossing at Jfrfkrirlislnirg, 




ip'ALK out oil the toll-bridge which crosses the Rappa- 
1 „ hannock at Fredericksburg, and which has been built 
l^ since the war, and you are within eighty rods of the 
spot where the brave Seventh Michigan made its 
crossing, and where one of the pontoons was after- 
wards laid for the center of the army to cross. On Falmouth 
Heights, at the farther end of the bridge, Burnside had one hundred 
and seventy-nine cannon massed against the town, and for miles up 
and down the river the earth trembled under the tread of a mighty 
army getting into position for battle. 

Burnside had pushed for Fredericksburg immediately upon 
assuming command of the army. If he reached it first, Lee must 
give battle in the open field against superior numbers. It was a 
race between corps and divisions and brigades in blue and gray. 
Blue would have won but for the broad, deep river. The river 
might have been crossed before Lee had three brigades in Freder- 
icksburg but for Halleck. Hallcck knew Bnrnside's plans, and he 
knew that the river would stop him. He promised that pontoons 
should be at Falmouth Heights with the advance of the army, but 
it was three weeks before a single section was on the ground. Call 
it what yon will, but that delay soaked the streets and lanes of 
Fredericksburg with Federal blood. Lee swung into position, 
intrenched, and was ready for battle fifteen days before it came. 

December had come, the country was impatient, and Burnside 
had scarcely fired a gun since succeeding McClellan. He felt that 
he must strike a blow before going into winter quarters, and the 
only chance was to strike it here. And yet what a chance! Over 
beyond the town Lee's army was hidden behind breastworks and 
stone walls and ridges, and to reach it the river must be crossed, 
the town carried, and the battle lines must reform under a fire of 
grape and canister, and advance across open fields and up highways 
under such a fire as was met only at Malvern Hill and Gettysburg. 

1318] 




R . E . LEE 



buenside's crossing at feedeeicksbukg. 319 

A man who never heard a musket fired or saw a soldier in uniform 
would stand on that bi'idge and say that five hundred thousand men 
could not carry Lee's position. Hooker flanked it above, and the 
death of Stonewall Jackson saved his army from capture. Frank- 
lin's corps tried it below, and found itself cooped up in the woods 
and held there by two or three brigades. Burnside droye straight 
at and through the town, and he left nine thousand dead and 
wounded in the streets and on the fields. General Burnside must 
have realized the desperate chances as he looked across from the 
Heights, but he was forced to take them. The country demanded a 
battle, and the authorities at Washington would have decapitated 
him had he asserted what everybody has since willingly admitted. 

Walk up and down the streets these long years after, and you 
will find what it means to turn one hundred and seventy-nine guns 
loose on a town for a whole day and more. Peace and progress 
have not hidden a tenth part of the scars made that day. Half a 
century hence men will see the shattered walls, splintered cornices, 
defaced chimneys, and bullet-chipped bricks as I saw them yester- 
day. Shot and shell fell into the town as hail falls upon the I'oof 
of the farm-house, and men and women who passed through it all 
describe that Thursday as a day to be forever remembered. Inva- 
lids were blown to fragments with their beds and houses — roofs 
crashed in — walls were thrown down, and shells crashed through 
roof and floor to the cellar, and in their explosion left, in some 
cases, only a single wall standing. This was not a battle — it was 
only the prologue. Burnside was driving Barksdale's Mississippians 
out of the town so that he could lay his pontoons. 

One hundred and seventy-nine cannon, worked rapidly for twenty- 
four hours, will fire — how many tons of round shot and shell? 
Ten — thirty — fifty tons of war's howling missiles — a third of the 
town knocked to pieces — streets blockaded with falling walls — and 
yet the sharpshooters were not driven out. They had dug rifle-pits 
along the river, and scarcely a dozen were killed by the terrible 
bombardment. Every attempt to lay the pontoons brought such a 
fire from these hornets in ambush that the work had to be aban- 
doned. When the Seventh Michigan asked the privilege of cross- 
ing in boats, then Burnside realized that this should have been the 
plan from the first. In company with the Nineteenth Massachu- 
setts, under a hot fire, and contending with a strong current, the 
men of the Seventh made a slow crossing, but a quarter of an hour 
after they had touched the opposite bank the town was cleared of 



320 bubnside's ceossixg at feedericksburg. 

Confederates. Then the pontoons were laid and the grand army 
made Its crossing. Lee and Jackson and Longstreet smiled grimly. 
Burnside was where they wanted hini. The dullest ])rivate soldier 
in the Confederate ranks knew that an attack meant defeat. 

Franklin had crossed three miles below the city with hardly the 
firing of a gun. He was expected to sweep through the woods, 
seize the Little Mine Koad, and, by advancing along that road, 
turn Lee's position at Maiye's Hill. If Lee's army had had no 
right wing to cover that road, the plan would have been a success. 
Franklin was only well across when he found Jackson in his front; 
and Jackson remained there. Franklin's whole command might as 
well have been in Washington for all the good they were to Burn- 
side on that bleak thirteenth of December — aye ! better to have 
been there and avoided the useless slaughter. 

Take your stand on Dead Horse Hill, and you are where Jackson 
massed his artillery that morning to sweep the plain, over which 
Meade's command moved as it burst out of the fog and the shelter 
of the woods. Five thousand men had been sent to seize a position 
which thirty thousand could not have carried. The center of both 
armies could see every maneuver as the fog suddenly lifted and the 
December sun shone clear and bright. It is the same plain to-day, 
with fences restored. It is the same hill, with its slopes half-hidden 
by underbrush. To gain and hold that hill would be to turn Lee's 
right. There was almost dead silence as Meade's men marched 
across the open fields with steady tramp. Not a man lagged — not 
a line was broken. They were almost within pistol-shot of the foot 
of the hill, when all at once, with a crash as if heaven and earth 
had come together, Jackson's artillery opened. Only a rush could 
carry the hill, and a rush did carry it. The Federals were seen to 
spring forward — the smoke hid them — and the next moment they 
were at the crest and had rolled Jackson's first line back on his 
second. Thirty thousand men cheered to the echo, but the cheers 
died away in groans. Jackson's second line opened to let the 
broken regiments through, and then followed up their volleys with 
the bayonet. His third line never fired a shot. Meade's poor few 
thousands were broken, scattered, and hurled back, and a third of 
those who charged the hill were left dead upon it. That ended the 
fight on Burnside's left and Lee's right. 

Sumner was on Burnside's right — Longstreet faced him on Lee's 
left. Franklin was no sooner repulsed on the left than Sumner was 
ordered to attack on the right. The key of the Confederate right 



buknside's ceossing at fkedekicksbueg. 321 

was a hill which could be defended against the world. The ksy of 
the Confederate left was just such another place. Jackson held the 
one — Longstreet the other. From the battle lines formed under 
cover of the houses and walls, men looked across the open commons 
to Maryc's Hill, and realized that perhaps not one out of five would 
live to cross the space, but when the order came every man was 
ready. It was a terrible blunder to push those legions against such 
a position. The Confederates charged Round Top at Gettysburg in 
the desperation of despair. It was gain all, or lose all, by that one 
charge. The Federals charged Marye's Hill when they could have 
flanked it — when defeat was assured before a man moved. The 
Confederate artillery had a direct fire from sixteen different points, 
and at the foot and at the slopes of the hill there were enough 
infantry to hold it against the grandest army ever marshaled. 

Look there to-day and you can find every point and particular. 
Over tlie crest of the hill or ridge runs the old plank road to Salem 
Church and Chancellorsville. At the base of the hill, and bearing 
around it to the left, is the Telegraph Eoad. Along this latter road 
is a stone wall four feet high, built against the base of the hill. If 
that wall had not been there the hill was yet too steep for soldiers 
to climb. But the wall was there, and behind it was a brigade of 
Confederate infantry. I walked slowly along the length of this 
wall and counted the " chips " made by eight hundred and sixty-six 
bullets which struck the stones. Above it, on the hill-side, the boys 
from the town were digging out bullets where thousands had been 
fcund before. Had the wall been carried the hill could not have 
been, but Sumner dashed his men at both as if a single rush would 
rout Lee's left wing. One historian locates this stone wall " mid- 
way up the hill," and puts " hosts of the enemy behind it." It is at 
the base of the hill, and hardly long enough to cover one brigade. 
Hooker thought there were thirty thousand behind it. Lee had 
only about fifty tliousand men all told to defend his entire lines. 
Less than two thousand Confederates held the wall, and two thous- 
and men can hold it to-day against ten thousand. 

Marye's Hill and this stone wall were the object of Sumner's 
dash, but his men got no nearer than two hundred feet to the wall. 
The artillery on the Heights created the most terrible slaughter as 
the troops rushed across the open space, and as they came within 
stone's throw of the wall the musketry swept whole companies 
away. At the center of the wall is a street a hundred feet wide 
leading up from the town. Up this street, affording no cover what- 

VoL. I— 21 



322 liURNSIDE's CEOSSING AT FEEDEKICKSBTJEG. 

ever, the Federals charged in column of brigades. They could not 
go forward and they would not go back, and while the artillery 
above had a jjlunging fire on them the infantry behind the wall 
mowed them down with the scythe of death. In ten minutes Sum- 
ner was hurled back ; but he cliarged again, and it was now that 
the Irish Brigade made its heroic charges. With bayonets fixed 
they dashed at the stone wall again and again, but never to reach 
it. That night when the roll was called only one man out of three 
answered to his name. The rest were lying dead in the dusty lane. 
Along this lane, nearest to that stone wall, j'ou can sit on your horse 
to-day and count over two hundred bullet holes in sheds and houses. 

" I was sergeant of a gun which was stationed just there," said 
an ex-Confederate to me as we faced the Height. " "We did not 
believe the Federals would charge the hill, and when they came the 
second time we cheered them. Such bravery I never saw on a 
battle field. Some of the men who were hit way down the street 
hobbled and limped forward and were struck down within two hun- 
(h-ed feet of the wall. This road was the worst spectacle of the 
whole war. Our artillery created horrible slaughter on tlie heavy 
lines of men at such close range. That tree down there at the cor- 
ner of the garden stood in an open field then, and just beyond it 
was a slight swell. As Sumner's troops came over that swell in 
their second charge, I fired into the lines just to the right of the 
tree, and the shell killed or wounded nearly every man in one com- 
pany. I saw grape and canister open lanes through the ranks, and 
yet the blue lines closed up again and dashed at the base of the hill. 
We thought they were madmen. 

" Down where the old shed stands I saw a curious thing that day. 
When Sumner was driven back the second time, a single Federal 
soldier was left on his feet among the dead there. Instead of fall- 
ing back with the rest, he stood there and loaded and fired as coolly 
as if at target practice. He wounded one man in my company, 
killed a corporal further up the hill, and shot a lieutenant there 
where the wall curves. He fired as many as six shots, being fired 
at in return iiy a thousand men ; but as he turned and walked away, 
our men ceased firing and gave him cheer after cheer." 

Hooker, who had not yet ci'ossed the river, was now ordered for- 
ward to attack, but after a survey of the Confederate position, he 
remonstrated. The order was repeated. The blood of the bravest 
men in the army had been poured out in the desperate charges, but 
Burnside insisted. Then for long hours every piece of Federal 



buknside's crossing at fkedeeicksbubg. 323 

artillerj^ which had crossed the river bellowed and thundered in a 
concentrated fire against wall and hill. Lee's position was as safe 
from it as if it had been at Salem Church, with all the hills between. 
Marye's Hill could not be battered down. Had the stone wall been 
powdered to dust, the hill would have remained, and two thousand 
infantry on its crest, without the support of a single cannon, could 
have held it against ten thousand veterans. But shot and shell 
shrieked and screamed and battered away as if every discharge 
swept ten Confederates to death and at length, half an hour before 
sunset, the curtain went up on the last act of the tragedy. 

The Federals were to depend on the bayonet alone. The veter- 
ans saw the ground blue with corpses, and they muttered and mur- 
mured, but did not lag. When the column of assault moved out, 
every man was there. With a cheer they dashed through the 
smoke — struck straight for the wall with bayonets at a charge. 
Again shot and shell tore through tiie ranks, heads of columns were 
swept away, the muskets behind the walls blazed forth, and the 
number of dead was added to. That was all. For the sixth, 
seventh, eighth time it was demonstrated that Lee's position could 
not be carried. And yet, but for the protests of the corps com- 
manders, there would have been still another assault, led by the 
frantic Burnside in person. 

There are fifty people in the town who walked over the plains 
after the battle. In no other battle of the war did the dead lie 
so thickly. More horrible still was the work of the solid shot and 
bursting shells. When the dead had been carried away there still 
remained a heap of bloody fragments. • Fredericksburg, or what 
had been spared of it, was turned into a hospital, and the wounded 
filled every house. 

Every detail of that battle can be picked up by the visitor to 
Fredericksburg. The spot on Falmouth Heights where Burnside's 
Parrott guns were massed is barren as on that day. The fatal wall 
is there — rude earth- works yet crown the hills — the bloody plains 
are before the eye — everything is there but the roar of cannon, the 
crash of musketry, the struggling hosts of the living and wounded — 
and the dead. These have been swallowed up by the earth and 
time, and the quaint old "town sleeps on the hill-side as if war had 
never been known. 

As night fell upon that scene of slaughter, the Federal ti'oops 
were withdrawn out of musket-range, and th& roar and crash died 
away until an almost dead silence settled down upon town, and 



324 



BUENSIDE 8 CROSSING AT FEEDERIOKSBUEG. 



highway, and hill and plain. Fifteen thousand Federals had been 
killed or wounded or placed on the list of the missing, while Lee 
had not lost a third of the number. 

Burnside would have continued the slaughter next day with that 
fearful list of dead before his eyes, but his corps commanders were 
a unit in dissuading him. On the evening of the fifteenth the 
army recrossed the river to its camps, the pontoons were taken up, 
and the country demanded that some one should be held respon- 
sible for that useless slaughter of brave men. 




5toiif f\ito. 




' HEEE will be a great battle to-morrow ! " 

Those words were uttered by Hosecraus on the 
night of December 30, 1862. 

After weeks of waiting and preparation he had 
marched out of Nashville to give battle to Bragg. 
For three days he had pushed him back on this road and that, and 
now knew that Bragg was massed at Stone River. There had been 
sharp fighting here and there as divisions swung into position, but 
it was only the warning note of what was to come. It was cold, 
rainy and cheerless, and on that bleak night fifty thousand men lay 
down in the muddy fields or under the wet trees to sleep if they 
could — to wonder over the morrow if they could not sleep. 

" Attack at daylight." Those were the words spoken by Gen. 
Bragg at the same hour on that same evening. He had fallen 
back to draw Rosecrans clear of the fortifications of Nashville, and 
he now had him where he felt certain that he could crush him. Wet, 
hungry and knowing that the morrow would be red with blood, the 
Confederates bivouacked in battle-line and thousands slept their last 
night's sleep. 

McCook was to hold the right, not advancing, but repulsing any 
attack and holding his ground to the last ; Crittenden was to swing 
the left wing around and crush Bragg's right and hurl it beyond 
Murfreesboro, while Thomas held the center. 

Hardee had the left of Bragg's army, and was thus opposite 
McCook ; Polk came next, and Breckenridge had the right. It 
cannot be said that there was any choice of position. In some 
spots the Federals had it — in others the Confederates. It was a 
battle-ground of field, hill and forest — the fields soft with the rain 
— the forests of cedar and oak. Divisions advanced, retreated and 
maneuvered over ground where a horseman can hardly make his 
way. The cedars hid whole lines of battle, and batteries were con- 
cealed among the oaks. In numbers the two armies were about 

[325] 



326 STONE EIVEE. 

equal, and the battle opened with a determination on eitlier side to 
win. Rosecrans knew what the North expected of him ; Bragg 
had assured the South that it should celebi'ate a victory. 

No war of modern days can point to a battle in which there were 
so many death-grapples between regiments and brigades, nor in 
which so many men and officers were specially named for gallant 
conduct. It was a battle so full of incidents that one must divide 
the army and write of the corps in detail. Let us follow McCook 
now and write of the others afterwards. 

It was not quite half past six o'clock, and the morning was raw 
and chilly. It was the last day of the old year, and it was to pass 
away with its gray hairs spattered with blood. Johnson's division 
was on McCook's right — Willich's brigade on Johnson's right. 
Then came Kirk, then Baldwin, then Edgarton's battery. The 
knoll on which this battery was planted was then covered with 
shrubs. In front of the battery was an old pasture. The night 
had been without alarm. The Federal pickets were stationed 
within five hundred yards of the Confederates, and they heard 
nothing to cause alarm. At day-break there was no move. At six 
o'clock camp-tires were kindled and pre^iarations made for break- 
fast. Kirk's brigade lay along the pike leading to Franklin, with 
cultivated tields at its back. While busy with its preparations for 
breakfast, and before a single skirmisher had fired his musket, Gen. 
Kirk himself saw the Confederates advancing aei'oss the open fields. 
They were moving in lines four deep, arms at right shoulder shift, 
and with a tramp as steady as if on parade. There were ten thou- 
sand men in this advance, and they came on so quietly and steadily 
that the Federal skirmishers stood and stared at them in amazement. 
Not a shot was fired — not a shout uttered — not a man broke step. 

" It was the finest sight I ever saw on a battle field," said Kirk, 
"and for a moment I was dumbfounded. Then I ordered the 
Thirty-fourth Illinois down as a support for the skirmishers, and got 
ready to hold my position." Thei-e were half a dozen fences 
dividing the fields, but they were leveled without a halt being made. 
On — on — and the lines of gray were hardly pistol-shot away when 
the skirmishers opened fire. It was like throwing chips at a rolling 
wave. Then the Thirty-fourth opened a hot fire, but the smoke 
had not risen over the heads of the men before that mighty wave 
rolled over them and flung them before it or swallowed them up. 
Then Kirk's whole brigade came into action, pouring in such volleys 
as should have checked a division. A tremor ran along the gray 



STONE KIVEK. 



327 



lines, and the advance halted just long enough to fire in return. 
Then the wave surged forward, and Kirk was hurled out of its 
path as if his men were bundles of straw. It had not been ten 
minutes since the Confederate advance was first discovered. Eose- 
crans had planned to swing his left. Bragg had planned the same. 
Both armies were slowly swinging around as if the center rested on 
a pivot. Kirk had under him the Thirty-fourth and Seventy-ninth 
Illinois, Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Indiana, Seventy-seventh 
Pennsylvania, and the battery before mentioned. The brigade was 
fianked on both sides before it had fired a third volloy, and retreat 
at a run was the only expedient left. The battery had scarcely 
opened fire when the Confederates rushed upon it and in a moment 
had captured all the guns and killed fifteen of the men. 

Willich's brigade was composed of the Fifteentli and Forty-ninth 
Ohio, Thirtv-second and Thirty-ninth Indiana, Eighty-ninth Illinois 
and Battery " A " of the First Ohio. The position was stronger 
than Kirk's, but was no better held. The Confederate advance 
passed its flank, and a terrific fire was poured into its front, and in 
a few minutes it was hurled aside and part of the battery captured. 
Then Johnson had lost nearly a mile of his front, and there was 
every prospect of a panic. Willich had been captured, hundreds 
of oSicers killed or scattered, and as the two beaten brigades fell 
back the stragglers rushed towards tlie rear to spread the news. 
Then it was that Johnson exhibited his mettle. He advanced the 
First Ohio, Sixth and Thirtieth Indiana and a Kentucky regi- 
ment, and shouted orders for them to hug the ground and fire low. 
For ten minutes there was a grapple which made the woods scream 
with terror. A Confederate oflicer who was in this advance against 
Jolmson, ill rehiting some of the particulars, said : 

"Although we walked over Kirk and Willicli, we lost heavily, 
and wlien Johnson threw forward his last troops the fire was the 
hottest I ever saw. We still had four lines of battle, and lieavy 
supports were behind us, but for some time we had all we could do 
to hold our own. A perfect wall of fire rose from the ground all 
along our front, and the air was so full of bullets that we seemed 
to breathe them. I had thirteen men killed almost as fast as I 
could count, and at one time our lines had to fall back." 

Held in check by that awful fire until thoroughly desperate, the 
Confederate wave fell back a little to close up, and then, with cheers 
and shouts, it rolled forward with a momentum that crashed over 
everything. There is a shock, a clash of bayonets, and Johnson's 



328 STONE EIVEE. 

lines are broken and sent whirling. The two batteries with them 
have had their horses shot down and cannot be removed, and the 
gunners continue to tire until the eneui}' are auaong them with the 
bayonet. The cowards and stragglers now fill the woods and fields, 
racing to the rear to shout the direful news that McCook's right 
has been turned ; but the brave men retreat only to take new posi- 
tions and check the Confederate advance as long as they can. 
Regiments mingle, company organizations are lost, but the fight 
goes on. The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania suddenly closes up, 
fixes bayonets, and, with cheers of defiance, sweep across a field 
and recapture four guns which had been playing on them. There 
are no horses to draw them off, and after holding them five minutes 
and spiking two of the pieces, the regiment falls back, leaving a 
dead man to mark every rod of its path. 

Every regiment and battery in Johnson's division is now in 
retreat, but they turn and fight at every step. A hundred men 
drop down behind a rail fence and hold their position under com- 
mand of a colonel or sergeant, as the case may be, until the lines of 
gray are only three rods away. Every oak tree hides a man 
determined to revenge defeat, and the cedars, with their low-hanging 
branches, give out volleys of fiame and smoke and death. 

Just in front of the troops commanded by the Confederate Gen- 
eral Rains, Colonel Dodge is fighting a part of Kirk's brigade. A 
portion of the Thirty-ninth Indiana are holding a short ridge cov- 
ered with oaks and cedars, every man flat on the earth and every 
musket barrel hot. Dodge rides in behind and cheers them, and 
the volleys are sent so fast that they merge into a continuous roar. 
The Confederates in front of this spot are checked. Rains dashes 
up and urges them to advance, crying out : 

"Forward with the bayonet and drive them out! They can't 
stand the cold steel." 

He had scarcely ceased speaking when he was struck down, but 
the lines were already advancing. They cross the open space with 
a rush and a cheer, and some of the Indianians are captured before 
they can get out of the cedars. It is fall back in a mob and rally 
on a new line. The Federals are beaten and driven and routed and 
decimated, but they turn and fight at every rod. From the first it 
has been a fight at half-pistol-shot. Men have been killed with the 
bayonet at every point held by Johnson's division — the flame of 
cannon has jumped right into men's faces as they advanced. Such 



STONE KIVEE. 329 

pluck in advancing — such desperation in falling back, had no par- 
allel in the four years of blood. 

When Willich's brigade was struck and swept away in a mob, the 
men did not scatter. They could have been excused for straggling, 
for all organization was lost ; but to their glory be it said that not 
fifty men took advantage of the confusion to skulk away. They 
rallied by tens, twenties, and companies — a major in command 
here, a corporal shouting order there — and as Kirk was finally 
driven to the Murfreesboro pike, Colonel Gibson rallied Willich's 
Brigade in battle lines and tlirew them in front of the advancing 
Confederates. Wheeler's cavalry charges them in flank as they are 
swinging into position. The Fifteenth Ohio stands squarely up and 
lets the yelling horsemen almost reach them with the sabre before 
it gives them a volley, which turns the charge into a bloody roiit. 
The Eighty-ninth Illinois clears its front with the bayonet, and the 
Tliirty -second Indiana refuses to fall back until it has been flanked 
and is receiving a flre from three different directions. The Forty- 
ninth Ohio sees the enemy completing a circle around it, and the 
men rise up, fix bayonets, and fight their way out. The blue lines 
are driven, but they yield the ground foot by foot. 

When Kirk gave way it uncovered Davis, but he would not fall 
back. Every man in his lines could see the heavy columns of gray 
moving down to the attack, and it seemed a forlorn hope to wait 
for it. They had seen the guns of Belding's battery drawn off by 
hand, and they knew that a whole division had been shattered and 
driven. With a long and steady tramp the gray lines moved for- 
ward as if death would spare them. They were the men of Cle- 
burne and McCown, and those who lived were to have the post of 
honor in other battles. 

Davis reinforced his skirmish line as Johnson had done, and it 
was absorbed in the same manner. The advancing Confederates 
did not i-eturn its fire, but drove it as the wind drives straws. 

There was a crash which shook the heavens as the Federal division 
opened fire, and it was echoed by the Confederates an instant later. 
Then the crash became a roar whicli made the oaks tremble and the 
earth quiver as if wounded. Sheridan, farther down the line, list- 
ened to it and cried out : 

"Flesh and blood can't stand that fire five minutes!" 

He spoke truly. The Confederates had surged forward until 
only a few yards separated the lines in some places, but they were 
men of flesh, and flesli could not stay there. Their lines wavered — 



330 STONE EITER. 

fluttered — bent back, and gave way. That fire in their faces, so 
rapidly delivered, in some cases put tliree and four bullets into 
men before they could fall. It split fence-rails into kindling wood. 
It filled the air with bark and twigs cut from the trees. It cut 
the air until there was a sound as if millions of bees were passing 
over. Pickett's Virginians faced just such a fire at Gettysburg, 
and they withered away. Burnside's men faced sxich a fire at 
Marye's Hill, and the plain was piled with dead. A colonel under 
Cleburne said of it: 

" No soldier will live through a hotter fire ! I saw dozens of 
men struck twice and three times. The bullets tore up the ground 
like a drag, cut the bushes off by piecemeal, and filled the air like 
flakes in a snow-storm. No war ever furnished troops who could 
stand up against it." 

Cleburne and McCown had been repulsed, but, under a fire which 
left the living marching over the dead and wounded, where their 
lines were reformed. They extended beyond Davis' right, and tliey 
saw the opportunity. With a wild cheer, the heads of columns swept 
down on his flank. Would he fall back? No! A few hundred 
poor men faced to the right to form a new front, and the One 
Hundred and First Ohio takes the shock. The wave passes over 
them, and now it is no longer war but murder. It is the bayonet — 
the butts of muskets — the pistol and knife. No man asks quarter — 
no man will surrender. Three Fedei-al batteries pour grape and 
canister into those masses of gray, every gun cutting its swath 
clear tlirough the rear line, but nothing stays that advance. There 
is something terrible in the way it breasts that storm of deaths 
something awe-inspiring in the manner in which it survives such a 
fire. Now it is before the guns — now among them — now pressing ■ 
on as if bullets were peas. Carlin's brigade rises up without orders, 
and while a dozen oflicers are shouting for them to lie down again, 
they fix bayonets and advance three hundred feet, but only to be 
hiirled back in a mob. Some of the artillery is pulled away by 
hand — some left to the Confederates. The Twenty-first Illinois is 
flanked, but it will not retreat until orders are thrice repeated. The 
Twenty-second Indiana has no one to command it, but the men 
want no orders to load and fire. The Twenty-fiftli Illinois fights a 
whole brigade — fights and falls back — fights and is broken — fights 
and is struck in flank and turned half-way round. Its colors go 
down again and again — its colonel is dead — companies are without 
officers, and yet the men fall back with their faces to the foe. 



STONE EIVEE. 331 

Davis is goue. Those Confederate divisions might have wilted 
and withered and wasted, but the survivors would have pressed on. 
Enemies though they were, every Federal who fought them has 
given them credit for such pluck as men have seldom witnessed on 
a field of battle. 

It was like following up the links of a great chain. Johnson 
was the first link, and he was broken. Davis was the second, and 
one mighty wrench tore him from the line. Next came Sheridan. 
He knew that the links above him were gone, and that his flank 
was exposed, but he rode down to Sill's brigade and shouted : 

"Hold fast, boys— we can whip hell out of the whole batch 
of 'em!" 

Sill's brigade was posted on a ridge covered with cedars and 
young oaks. The ground in front had a slope down into the 
cleared fields, and he had three batteries posted along his lines. It 
was a terribly strong position — a stronger one than Hancock had at 
Gettysburg- — and the Fedei-als laughed in grim defiance as the first 
line of gray swept into the field a quarter of a mile away. Now the 
batteries open ! Eighteen guns break into a roar which makes the 
chimneys in Murfreesboro tremble. Not a shot or shell is used — 
nothing but the murderous iron slugs and bullets which grind and 
tear through flesh like the teeth of a wild beast. Wide swaths 
are cut through the Confederate lines, and whole regiments 
are seen to drop down to escape the fire. Then the infantry added 
its fire, and the jaws of hell were wide open. Then followed the 
most singular sight ever witnessed upon a field of battle. Whole 
regiments of Confederates crawled fortoard on hands and knees! 
They crept through the soft soil of the old cotton field and up the 
slope covered with leafless shrubs and dead grass — crept almost 
under the thundering cannon, and there they fought with the flames 
from Sill's muskets burning their clothing. It is only when the 
brigade rushes upon them with the bayonet that they give way and 
are hurled in a mighty mass down the slope — over the scattered 
piles of rails where fences had stood, and through the field where 
the cotton-stalks were dead with time and spattered with blood. 

When Sill gave the order to fix bayonets and charge he placed 
himself in front to lead the advance. With wild cheers his men 
sprang after him. With sword flashing through the smoke of 
battle, the gallant brigadier cut his way down the slope and had 
reached its foot, when a bullet struck him full in the face. He did 
not live three seconds after being hit, and a dozen Confederates 



332 STONE EIVEE. 

were within ten feet of him when he went down. It was not 
known until the Federal charge had been repulsed and the lines 
hurled back that poor Sill was gone. His body was then in the 
hands of the Confederates. It was by them taken to Murfreesboro 
and buried, and the assertions then made and since repeated that it 
was treated with indignity, have no foundation in fact. 

After Sill's death, Colonel Nicholas Grensel, of the Thirty-sixth 
Illinois — old veterans from Pea Ridge and other fields — took com- 
mand of the brigade and reformed it just in time to meet a new 
assault. The cotton field and the slope were covered with dead, 
but the gray lines massed for a fresh charge and came on at a run. 
Three of Sheridan's brigades had faced round to make a new 
front. In front of them was Cheatham. He first struck Roberts, 
and a terrific volley hurled him back. He rallied and came again, 
and this time he clung until pressed back with the bayonet. The 
living could hardly move for the dead under their feet, but a third 
time they rushed upon the Federal position, and, after a hand-to- 
hand fight, they hurled Roberts' brigade into the woods, and Rob- 
erts himself lay dead under the cedars. Then Shaeffer had to go, 
the musket-barrels of his men so hot that the hand could not touch 
them. Then the advancing lines struck Greusel. His men did not 
have seven rounds of ammunition left to the cartridge-box, but 
they would not give way. The Thirty-sixth Illinois cleared its 
front twice. The Twenty-first Michigan, green troops, that had 
never had a brigade drill, and which counted two hundred men 
who had been in camp less than twenty days, retired in solid lines, 
firing their last cartridges and robbing the dead for more. The 
Twenty-fourth Wisconsin reformed in the face of a hot fire, and 
would not budge until three lines of battle were close upon them. 
The Eighty-eightli Illinois fired its last cartridge, and its com- 
mandant saluted Colonel Greusel and reported : 

"Not another cartridge left, sir! We must hold our position 
with the bayonet ! " 

But that grim, desperate, heroic advance rolled on. It struck 
regiment after regiment and battery after battery — it poured on 
and on — over fields — over ridges — througli the woods, like the 
mighty river of lava from a volcano. Rousseau hurried over from 
the left-center with his division, but it reeled away as it felt the 
blow of the hammer, and now the whole right wing was gone — 
not routed and panic stricken, but crushed back and doubled up 
and limp and bleeding. 



STONE EIVEE. 333 

Rosecrans had swung his left, and had his right shattered. 
Bragg had swung his left, and his right had scarcely heard a 
bullet. Wlieu noon came Rosecrans had reformed the right on a 
new line, but he had been beaten. To save that army from square 
defeat from right to left, would demand the nerve and strategy of 
a Napoleon. But he meant to do more. He meant to win that 
fight. 

Two hours before noon McCook had been doubled back on the 
center, and Rosecrans had lost the battle of Stone River. He must 
now depend on the center and left to prevent a complete rout. 
Sheridan was the last of the right to yield, and how well he fought 
is told in his loss of one thousand eight hundred men out of six 
thousand five hundred. When he had been crushed back and his 
lines turned half-way round, there were not a hundred cartridges 
in his whole division. 

Thomas held the center, having the division of Rousseau, num- 
bering eighteen regiments and a battery, and the division of Neg- 
ley, numbering ten regiments and three batteries. The center had 
ample warning of what was coming, and was as well prepared as a 
corps could be in such a position. It was scattered over fields and 
through the woods, regiments separated by impassable thickets, 
batteries plunging along blind roads in search of positions, and the 
advantage of ground entirely with the advancing foe. 

Bragg's plan of attack was simple and successful. He had ad- 
vanced until striking McCook's extreme right, and then followed 
the Federal line towards the left, taking every brigade in flank in 
turn. When Slieridan's last brigade was struck the flame of fire 
also rolled along in front of Negley. Stanley's brigade, consisting 
of the Eighteenth and Sixty-ninth Ohio, Eleventh Michigan and 
Nineteenth Illinois, had good cover, and the Confederate wave 
rolled against them to be beaten back. Next to them was Miller's 
brigade, consisting of the Twenty-first and Seventy-fourth Ohio, 
Thirty-seventh Indiana and Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania. The 
two Tennessee regiments belonging to this division were held on 
the pike. The first assault of the Confederates was weak and easily 
repulsed. The second was fiercer, the gray lines surging forward 
as if pushed by some mighty power. The batteries thunder — the 
muskets crash — ten thousand men scream and shout — the earth 
quivers, and then a thousand voices cry out : 

"We have beaten them back again — hurrah! hurrah I" 



334: STONE EIVEE. 

It was a false hope. The second assault was to keep Negley 
busy while Sheridan's last brigade was being annihilated. It fought 
to the last — fought until it was tla-ee-quarters surrounded — and 
then it fell back and left Stanley's flank exposed. In five minutes 
he was being fired upon from three different directions. In another 
five the Confederates were in front, on flank and in rear. Negley 
has been struck by the same hammer which shattered the other 
divisions and he is falling back in the same way. The Confederate 
artillery is cutting down the tree-tops over his men — bullets whiz 
everywhere — the wave is pressing on, and Negley must go. 

But he will not be driven pell-mell. The Nineteenth Illinois 
and Eleventh Michigan swing out in front of the cover they have 
been holding, right dress under fire, fix bayonets with a menacing 
clatter, and before the order can be given to advance they rush for- 
ward with wild yells and drive the gray wall back, and return with 
their bayonets covered with blood. The enemy press forward 
again, and the Nineteenth Illinois and Twenty-first Ohio wheel 
about with fixed bayonets and charge with a cheer. But it is vain 
to attempt to stay that advance. It creeps forward like a mighty 
fog, absorbing and enveloping position after position — gun after 
gun — regiment after regiment. Batteries tear great gaps, but the 
fog closes up the rents. Musketry shivers and burns and hisses, 
but the fog smothers the red flames. 

■ When Negley had yielded a mile of ground he found Eousseau 
at his back, and he found the best position on the whole battle 
field. Three miles out of Mui-freesboro, on the Nashville Pike, 
the river sweeps in and runs parallel with the road. For some dis- 
tance the railroad runs between the two, both turnpike and rail- 
road cutting through ridges, and the railroad having several heavy 
fills on its grade. All about this locality was open ground on that 
day, and the years have brought no change, except a few shade 
trees and three or four more farm-houses. The hills were the 
spots for artillery — the fills, cuts, and fences the cover for infantry. 
As Negley fell back, showing his teeth from every thicket and bit- 
ing savagely whenever he could plant a battery, Eousseau reformed 
the shattered command in this chosen position. At last he was 
clear of the jungle — at last he had positions for his batteries. 
One who rides down that pike to-day, be he civilian or soldier, will 
note the strength of that position and see how every soldier was 
doubly armed. 



STONE EIVEE. 335 

As Negley's remnants limped out of the forest Rousseau was 
posting his artillery. Loomis, of the Michigan battery, galloped to 
the crest of one hill, Stokes, of Chicago, to another, and Gnenther 
to a third, while regiments and brigades settled down behind cover. 
Scribner's brigade took the left of the line, Beatty's brigade the 
right, and the regulars supported the batteries. The last Federal 
troops to limp oat of the cedars were the regulars — parts of four 
different regiments, under Shepherd. They were literally walked 
over by the Confederates. They rallied again and again, but always 
to be rolled over and over by the advancing wave, and as they came 
out of the woods in knots and groups and broken lines they had 
lost none of their pluck. Out of less than three thousand men 
this command lost nearly live hundred in killed and wounded in 
thirty minutes' lighting. Even the bloody jaws of war should have 
been satisfied with this, but they were not. When the Confederates 
discovered that Negley had joined Rousseau, and that the com- 
bined command had secured a defensive position, there came a 
halt in the advance and a lull in the battle. • 

Stand there to-day and you will see the picture as twenty thou- 
sand men saw it on the bleak winter's day — only it will look 
brighter to you. The fields stretch away to the green cedars just 
as they did when that lull came. Eighteen guns were massed and 
ready. Two divisions of infantry were under cover and waiting. 
Rousseau's keen eye had taken in every detail, and Negley's men 
panted for revenge. Thus they waited — all eyes turned towards 
the cedars. It was from that green fringe skirting the fields and 
losing itself in the forest, that the wave would come. 

The waiting tried men's nerves. Men who would not retreat 
from the cedars until they had fired their last cartridge now 
trembled and turned pale. The artillery horses, sheltered beyond 
the gnns, held their heads high in air and kept their eyes on 
the woods. The relief from the roar and din of battle was painful, 
apd when a soldier raised his voice to shout to some comrade a 
hundred men reproved him by their looks. What was it coming? 
The right was gone — the center forced back — the crack of musketry 
was creeping down to the last brigade on the left. If that mighty 
fog rolled over Rousseau, the Federal army would be cut in two. 
Then good-bye to Rosecrans ! 

" There they come ! " Ten thousand men speak the words. They 
have caught sight of a long, thin line of gray breaking cover from 
the cedars. They are the Confederate skirmishers — men sent out 



336 STONE EIVEE. 

in advance to rouse the tiger out of his hiding-place in the jungle. 
Not one in ten will be living five minutes hence, but they look 
straight into the eyes of death and never falter. Now they are 
clear of the cedars — now in the open field, and then the gray lines 
of battle come into view. Soldiers will see such a spectacle again, 
but it will not be often. Four solid lines of battle — muskets catch- 
ing the Sim and sending silver waves from right to left and back — 
every foot keeping common time — every company presenting a 
parade front — it was a spectacle never to be forgotten in war's 
annals. Not a Confederate historian has named one single brigade 
in that advance. Even Bragg's report did not name a regiment. It 
has been left to the wearers of the blue to name them and to give them 
credit for such valor as Napoleon dreamed of but rarely ever saw. 
He who calls his foe a coward can secure no praise for victory. 
Men who seek to rob the Confederates of that gallantry displayed 
on so many fields of carnage write themselves down as winning 
victories not worth recording. In just such solid phalanx the blue 
marched against the hills at Fredericksburg and the Horseshoe at 
Spottsylvania, and Confederate history has sent their praises down 
the trail of history for the next hundred years. Say, then, of that 
advance on Rousseau that the men in gray knew its strength and 
halted not ! — realized the horror which the next ten minutes would 
bring forth, and yet advanced into its open jaws! They were men 
from Arkansas, and Missouri, and Louisiana, and South Carolina, 
and Georgia, and nearly every other state in the South, and they 
must have known the hopelessness of that advance. 

"Now open on them!" Loomis' battery jumped clear of the 
ground as the double-shotted guns belched forth their grape and 
canister square into those solid masses, and Stokes and Guenther 
joined in the crash until there was a roar which seemed to rend 
the arch of heaven. For half a mile up and down, the railroad iron 
stretched along the ties jumped and quivered and set the musket 
barrels to bounding. Bushes and trees on the banks of Stone River 
were caved into the stream by the vibrations, and the whiz and hiss 
of the death-dealing missiles were horrible to hear — were terrific 1 

The fire of those three batteries at such close range was simply 
murderous. In front of them were four hundred yards of open 
field, over which a rabbit could not have scampered without being 
seen. The close-packed lines of battle offered a fair target, and 
grape and canister were hurled into them by the bushel. 

" It was the most terrible fire soldiers ever met," said an Arkansas 



STONE RIVER. 337 

lieutenant in describing the figbt. " The air above our heads fairly 
screamed, while the ground in front seemed to be rolling towards 
us as the missiles plowed it up. Our advance was checked, then it 
was rolled back into the cedars to secure cover. The sights around 
me were horrible. Mon were not hit to be wounded, but to be 
torn to pieces and ths bloody fragments hurled over the living. It 
was as dangerous to lie down as to stand up, for the ground was 
literally harrowed with grajje-shot. There was an oak log about a 
foot thick and rifteen feet long directly in front of me, and the 
splinters frorj the log were hurled over our heads in a perfect 
storm. The grape-shot struck it with a thud ! thud ! thud ! as 
rapid as tha ticking of a clock. "We did not breast the fire over 
five minutes, and yet it seemed to us that we had been there a 
long hoar." 

Davis has written of politics where he should have named the 
brigade which cut loose from the center as it fell back and advanced 
straigiit upon Looniis' battery. The Thirtieth Arkansas was one of 
the regiments — the others no one has named. In double line of 
battle, without a skirmisher in advance, this brigade pushed down 
across the open tields with six pieces of artillery playing full upon 
it. Its track was cumbered with dead ; but men working those 
guns will tell you that there was no halt. The ranks closed up to 
fill the horrible gaps cut through them, and the brigade scarcely 
lost its step. It was not over forty rods from the guns when it 
halted, wavered, and marched to the right to seek the cover of 
that spot known to history as "Hell's Half- Acre." It might have 
furnished safe quarters for a dozen sharpshooters, but when that 
brigade rushed into it the men outnumbered the trees and bushes. 
Loomis at once turned his six pieces on that bit of cover. A few 
musket-shots replied. Galled to desperation by the awful situation, 
the Twenty-third Arkansas fixed bayonets and rushed for the bat- 
tery, but only to be piled in heaps on the open ground. Its colors 
went down again and again, and at last there was no hand to lift 
them up. The flag lay there on the bloody ground in plain view of 
thousands, and tiie regiment was wiped out of existence — literally 
blotted off the roster of the division. 

Ask those Michigan men who were with Loomis that day, and 
they will tell you that as his guns were trained upon that hell on 
earth the air beyond it was darkened with grass, earth, limbs, twigs, 
and splinters. It was mowed, raked, burned, and harrowed. Those 
larger trees which lived through the storm could not survive the 

Vol. I— 22 



338 STONE EIVER. 

next season. It is a cleared spot now — but the earth will ever smell 
of carnage. When Rosecruiis in person led the men of Rousseau 
and Negley in the charge which cleared tlie ground, the remnant 
of that brigade came out of that hell-spot and surrendered to hira. 
Was there a regiment left ? No ; not a company — not a dozen — 
not half a score — and at least half of these had been wounded ! It 
was over such men as these that Rosecrans won his victory, and yet 
bigots seek to slur that victory by disparaging that bravery. 

The artillery had checked the Confederate advance in the center, 
but the right and left wings left the center behind them — cut loose 
from it — and marched straight on. Van Cleve was there with his 
division on the right, and the Confederates moved down upon him 
with a momentum meant to double him up. It might have done 
so in the cedars, but it did not here. Beatty was there with his 
Seventeenth Brigade, and he took the first shock, with the Federal 
batteries jslaying over the heads of his men. Here, on the Con- 
federate left, the lines of battle were four deep again, and they 
broke cover with a yell, which was heard by every man in Rous- 
seau's lines. Skirmishers ran on before them and leveled the 
fences, paying not the slightest heed to the hot and steady fire 
maintained by the Federal skirmish line. With flags proudly 
waving and every foot keeping the step, the wave rolled down upon 
Beatty, not a man taking his musket off his shoulder until within 
pistol-sliot of the Federal linos. Then down came the guns, and 
the Confederate officers were heard shouting: "Forward on the 
double-quick ! " 

Tliat wave struck a wall of fii'e and a flame of death. It surged 
forward again and again, but it could not pass a certain point. The 
dead and wounded were heaped and piled, and it was only when 
regiments had been decimated over and over again that the wave 
rolled back into the cedars with a crash. Had there been ten lines 
of battle there, the result would have been the same. There was 
the key of the center. An army could have wrested it away by 
flanking, but Bragg had only a corps to throw at it, aud they must 
take it in front. The first assault was a blow from a sledge-hammer, 
struck to kill. The Confederate left moved out of the cedars, 
down across the fields, and rushed upon the Federals like a whirl- 
wind. They rushed to destruction. Every Federal cannon had 
them under range — so had every Federal musket in the assaulted 
line. The assault was repulsed with terrible vengeance. Broken 
regiments and companies were flung back into the cedars faster 



STONE EIVEE. 



339 



than they had come out, and no man on the right believed that the 
charo-e would be repeated. But it was. The Confederate reserves 
moved up, the broken lines reformed, and this time as they left 
cover it was on the double-quick. There was the same wall of fire — 
the same horrible crash and roar — the same yells of defiance and 
cheers of victory. The second assault had ended like the first — 
the third resulted as the second. 

"Even after the third repulse the men could have been rallied 
again," said a Confederate colonel, "but it was no use. We had 
piled up a thousand dead in front of the Federals, and that was all. 
We could not have carried the position had we been five times as 
strong. Looking across the fields from the cedars after that last 
repulse, the ground seemed to have turned gray with our dead 
and wounded. In some places they lay in windrows — in others they 
were in groups, as if grape or canister had struck a dozen at once." 

It was the regulars who received the first shock, and as a conse- 
quence they suffered most. Their regular and precise firing was 
heard everywhere on the field above the crash of battle, and it was 
terribly destructive to the foe. Out of less than sixteen hundred men, 
nearly seven hundred lay dead and wounded after the last repulse. 
Was that war or murder ? In front of their lines were over one 
thousand dead and wounded Confederates. Was that murder or 
butchery? 

Palmer was on Rousseau's left, having the brigades of Cruft, 
Hazen, Grrose, Hascall, and some of the troops from Rosecrans' left 
wing. Here, too, the Confederate advance was in four lines, the 
brigades of Chabner and Donelson leading. The attack was made 
with a rush, but it was repulsed in less than ten minutes. That 
assault was a feeler, meant to test the strength of the Federal posi- 
tion. As the gray lines reached cover they reformed under a hot 
fire of shell, and officers passed along the lines to say to the men : 

"Hold your fire until you can see the color of their eyes; then 
deliver a volley and walk over them with the bayonet. It is a strong 
position, but we must carry it ! " 

There was something grand in the sight of that solid mass of 
gray breaking cover — flags rippling, muskets gleaming, lines dressed. 
Artillery could not halt it; musketry checked it only when blue 
and gray looked into each other's eyes. And for twenty minutes 
lines surged back and forth, advanced and retreated, wavered and 
rallied, and then aU was over. Soldiers had never done more, but 



340 STONE EIVEE. 

there is a limit even to desperation. Confederate reg-iinents lost 
thirty, forty, and even fifty per cent, of their strength in that 
advance. Companies numbering forty men went back to tlie woods 
with ten and twelve. Did the veterans at Waterloo fight better 
or lose more ? 

Later in the day, when word reached Bragg that Rousseau Lad 
fallen back to shorten the Federal line, he ordered another 
advance. That advance found Rousseau still there, waiting and 
ready, and it retired without an assault. The right had been 
driven and broken. The center had been driven to be rallied in 
a stronghold. There were fighters and heroes on the left as well, 
and the flame of battle had rolled down its front to stain the 
cold, bleak earth with brave men's blood. 

We have seen the right of the Federal army in the first day's 
fight at Stone River driven back on the center and defeated — the 
center driven back and rallied and saved by the gallant Rousseau — 
now what of the left ? 

Bear in mind the plan of battle. McCook on the right was a 
pivot. He was to hold his ground, and the center and left were to 
advance — the left sweeping througli Murfreesboro. Hold fast to 
one end of the stick and sweep the other over the gi'ound and you 
have Rosecrans' plan. But Bragg had exactly the same plan, only 
on his other flank. Breckenridge, on his right, was the end of the 
stick to be lield down, while his center and left were to make tlie 
sweep. Bragg had the greater momentum, and success was his. 

The left began its advance early in the morning, and. a part of 
the troops had already crossed Stone River and begun skirmisliing 
when the battle on the right opened. The disaster to McCook 
checked all further advance on the left. With tlie right gone and 
the center going, tiie left would be lucky in holding its own. 
Indeed, it must reinforce the liard-pressed right. It was holding its 
ground under the fire of clouds of sharpshooters and dozens of 
pieces of artillery when the mighty avalanche which rolled against 
Rousseau in the new center was beaten back. When that avalanche 
struck the Federal wall and was broken it slid down along the lines 
until it reached the left, and there it rallied for a new move. Rose- 
crans was there in person. He saw it coming and he prepared for 
it. No private soldier was more exposed that day. He rode where 
batteries had found it too hot to stay. He dashed into and out of 
showers of bullets unhurt, while scores fell to rise no more. When 



STOAii lilVEE. 3il 

the storm burst upon the left it came with a roar and a scream and 
a rush which carried the Confederates past its liank and into the 
rear. Then brigades could have fallen back without stigma, and 
companies might have run over each ether without reproach. The 
left was assailed from front and right, and a tremendous effort was 
making to burst through the spot where it joined the center. But 
there was no falling back — no confusion. When it was known that 
the Confederates had passed the flank tlie Federals simply swung 
back and faced to the left and fought o;i. 

General Hazen with his Second Brigade had a position behind 
what some Federal writers have termed the " Burnt House." It 
was a brick farm-house which had been knocked to pieces by Loomis' 
battery to clear a sweep for its guns. His lines ran mostly in the 
cover of the woods, with an old cotton field in front, and the last 
regiment rested on the Nashville Eailroad. Some of the companies 
had the rail fences for cover, while others were flat on their faces 
behind the oaks and cedars. 

The Confederates soon appeared on his front, their artillery posted 
in the edge of the woods and Airing too high to do injury to the men 
hugging the ground. First came a thin line of skirmishers, and 
then a division broke cover and advanced in splendid order, flags 
flying and the ground trembling under their tread. They marched 
straight down on Hazen's thin front, but they never reached it. As 
they halted to fire their first volley the Federals poured in such a 
hail of lead that further advance was impossible. In five minutes 
they were falling back to reform and try it again, but again the 
result was the same. The fire of the Confederates was so high 
that the lines a quarter of a mile in rear of Hazen lost three men 
to his one. 

Criift had moved up with Hazen. He had a more desperate foe 
in his front, while his lines did not have as good cover. After 
some sharp fighting he gained the fence which then and yet skirts 
the edge of ilm cotton field, and here he waited for what he knew 
would not long be delayed. When the Confederates came out of 
the woods it was with a determination to crush him. Had they 
pierced his lines Grose's Brigade must have surrendered, for it was 
already fighting on front and flank. Standart's battery was on the 
knoll just in rear of Cruft's center, and the moment the gray lines 
hroke cover they were in point-blank range of grape and canister. 
It was hurled into them with awful vengeance. The flags of three 
or four regiments went down time after time, and every discharge 



342 STONE EIVEE. 

opened great lanes through which the Federal infantry could see 
the cedars behind, but the one battery was not sufficient to check 
them. The ranks spread out to lessen tlie effects of the fire, and 
with a yell from every living man the mass charged the fence. 

Under instructions from the officers the soldiers held their fire 
until the line was hardly a stone's throw away. Then it was deliv- 
ered with such effect that every fourth man went down. There 
was a momentary panic, but tlie living leaped over the dead, to 
close up, shoulder to shoulder, and in the rush the fence was gained. 
Here for five or six minutes, took place a combat seen but once 
again during the entire war. The Federals held one side of the 
fence for half a mile, the Confederates the other. Guns were 
rested on the i-ails and discharged at men little more than a foot 
from the muzzles, and the bayonet was used over and over again 
on both sides all along the line. 

" We tried to tear the fence down," said a Confederate officer to 
me, " but your men jabbed us with the bayonet and struck us with 
clubbed muskets. I had that left hand on a rail, in the act of 
climbing over, when a Federal smashed it out of shape with the 
butt of his musket, and at the same moment the man next to him 
jabbed his bayonet at my head and took my hat off. The smoke 
settled down like a fog, and of all the screaming, yelling and curs- 
ing I ever heard in a charge that figlit for the fence beat it. Some 
of our men who mounted the fence were pulled over and made pris- 
oners, and men were shot at such close range that their clothing 
was set on fire. It seemed to me as if we had been there an hour 
when the recall blew, but I afterwards ascertained that it had not 
been fifteen minutes since we left the woods. We could not carry 
the fence, and we had to fall back." 

Cruft joined the center with his right. If he could be routed, 
the center could be flanked and driven. He realized this, and he 
prepared for a second onslaught. While the Confederates were 
reforming, his regiments replenished their cartridge-boxes, some of 
them were advanced or retired to secure better cover, and hundreds 
of soldiers protected their front with logs and sods. In twenty 
minutes they were ready. So were the Confederates. 

Driven back to tlie cover of the woods by Graft's terrific fire, 
with General Chalmers wounded, and a dozen lesser officers killed 
or out of the fight, the Confederates massed for a second attack. 
They knew that the right had been driven and the center was hang- 
ing by its teeth. They were told that if they could break Cruft 



STONE RIVER. 343 

the fight would be won, and they were told that one desperate dash 
would break his lines. This inforniatiou was answered with cheers. 
Hundreds of men threw off their overcoats and hats to make ready. 
Scores who had been slightly wounded took their places in the 
ranks for another advance. The fire of the battery was to be 
avoided this time by a rush. Looking down over the muddy and 
blood-stained field from the edge of the cedars, the spectacle 
was appalling. Hundreds of dead lay as they had fallen, and a 
great number of wounded were crawling to and fro to seek safety 
in the depressions. Beyond them was the fence and its blue-coated 
defenders — beyond the fence the battery which had created such 
havoc. The men could be seen standing at the loaded guns and 
making ready for the coming advance. 

"Forward !" At the boom of a single field-piece from the cedars, 
every piece of Confederate artillery on that front opened fire for about 
five minutes, and then the gray lines moved forward with a rush. The 
Federal battery opened on them, but they advanced so swiftly that 
they were soon out of the lire, and then the second terrific struggle 
for the possession of the fence began. Volley after volley crashed 
into the advancing lines, but the lines broke np into groups and 
mobs and pressed forward. The fence was flanked again and again, 
but the flankers had scarcely passed it when they were destroj-ed. 
In spots it was torn down almost to tlie ground, but not a Confed- 
erate passed through the gaps. Right there, face to face, bayonet 
to bayonet — the one would not retreat — tiie other could not ad- 
vance. It was a fierce riot of blood and carnage. Not a prisoner 
was taken on this line in that second advance. The bayonet and 
the clubbed musket took the place of powder and bullet, and the 
cry for quarter was answered by a tJirust or a Idow. Whenever 
the Confederates wavered they were encouraged by fi-esli troops, 
but that simple fence, laughed to scorn by engineers as a defense, 
was a bulwark which perhaps saved Ilosecrans on that day. After 
nearly half an hour of close and deadly fighting the Confederates 
failed to carry it in one single spot, and were rolled back to the 
woods. The two Federal regiments had fired an average of fifty- 
five rounds per man, and during the lull were sent to the rear to 
replenish their cartridge-boxes. 

It was the Nineteenth Ohio and the First Kentucky which now 
moved to the front. The ground in front was covered with skir- 
mishers and sharpshooters, and the regiments had scarcely swung 
into position before they were ordered forward with the bayonet. 



344 STONE KIVER. 

It was a gallant but an ill-advised movement. With a jell and a 
rush, Kentucky leading and Ohio supporting, the Federals dashed 
across the field at a charge bayonets, and would not obey the recall 
until they had swept clear into the woods. Here they came under 
the Confederate lire, and suddenly were charged in turn and 
hurled back in great disorder and with heavy loss. The Confeder- 
ate body which swept these regiments back secured a foot-hold be- 
tween Cruft and Hazen, and opened such a cross-fire on both as 
obliged them to fall back. In this movement both brigades were 
severely handled, and one of the batteries would have been cap- 
tured, so great was the loss of horses, had the retiring men not 
drawn the guns off by hand. Cruft and Hazen, after such figliting as 
is never seen twice in a campaign, were crushed back to the pike in 
a mob, but to rally again and renew the fight with all their former 
desperation. 

When Breckenridge struck the Federal left he found Grose there 
with the Forty-first Olno, One Hundred and Tenth Illinois, Ninth 
Indiana, and Sixth Kentucky. They were under cover of the 
fences and cedars just beyond the cleared ground. It was just such 
a position as Cruft held, except better cover for the Federals. The 
Forty-first Ohio was down in front along the fence, and when the 
attack ran down the lines the Buckeyes were in for it at once. A 
whole brigade advanced straight upon them ; and here, too, there 
was a fight over the fence — a conflict which did not end until the 
cartridge-boxes of the Forty-first were half empty. Some of the 
men had fired thirty rounds in twenty-five minutes. Help was 
coming, but before it came tliere was another rush at the fence, 
beaten back as the first had been, and yet it left the Ohioans with- 
out ammunition. Then for the second time in that tight, as on the 
first dav with Greusel's brigade, was seen the curious spectacle of a 
regiment holding its ground without a cartridge to fire. The Con- 
federates could not he rolled back to the woods at this point. They 
could be flung back a few hundred feet, just outside of the cloud 
of smoke, but there tliey would rally and push forward again. Be- 
yond them was the One Hundred and'Tenth Illinois, similarly situ- 
ated, and a courier went back to Grose with the information that 
the two regiments were out of ammunition. The Kinth Indiana 
was in reserve. It was ordered down to relieve the front, and 
it Tnoved on the run, cheering and yelling, under a Confederate 
artillery fire which killed thirteen men while the regiment moved 
across a space of thirty rods. 



STONE EIVEE. 345 

But Grose had to go. When Cruf t was pushed back Grose had 
to follow to save his flank. In this retrograde movement the Sixth 
Kentucky (Confederate) swept across the field to push them with 
the bayonet. The Sixth Kentucky (Federal) was in the rear. The 
lines were dressed, and then came the commands : 

" Halt — about face — fix bayonets ! " 

It was Kentucky against Kentucky. Both sides knew it. The 
Sixth Confederate also halted and dressed and fixed bayonets, and 
the charge was made by both at the same time. They met under 
the oaks — in the cedars — in the glades, and for five minutes a 
bloody whirlpool sailed round and round, carrying life after life 
with it. Then the mob fell into lines, the lines drew away from 
each other, and one hundred and fifty dead men were left in the 
woods to attest the ferocity of the grapple. 

When Grose fell back he had to change front to prevent the 
Confederates from sweeping around to his rear. He had charac- 
terized the previous fighting as tei'rific, but the climax was to 
come. Throwing the Thirty-sixth Indiana forward into the dark 
woods to protect his flank, followed by the One Hundred and 
Tenth Illinois, he found the forest literally swarming with Confed- 
erates. The Federals broke their lines and took to trees, Indian 
fashion, and for ten minutes the conflict in this spot raged with 
such fury that Rousseau in the center heard it above the roar of his 
cannonade. Of the nearly seven hundred men lost by Grose in 
that battle, the greater part were killed in that spot of woods 
inside of ten minutes. Of the seventy-four oificers in that total, 
forty were killed or wounded right there. One companj' in the 
Indiana regiment was commanded by three different olBcers in fifteen 
minutes. The Federals were gradually pushed back out of the 
woods, but this was their salvation. As soon as they had retreated 
beyond the batteries, waiting for the movement, the artillery 
opened with such effect that the Confederate advance was cheeked 
right there, nor did it ever recover sufficiently to pass it. 

More than nineteen years after that battle I looked over that 
piece of forest to note the destructiveness of the artillery fire. The 
Federal battery at that point consisted of fourteen guns, some of 
them of large calibre, and they were massed to cover a front of 
about half a mile. Round shot, shell, grape, and canister were 
freely used, and the range was not beyond what a navy revolver 
would carry and kill a man. Imagine, if you can, the effect of 
fourteen pieces of artillery turned loose on the strip of forest, hurl- 



34:6 STONE EIVEE. 

ing into it every missile of death used in war. At least one hun- 
dred and fifty pounds of metal per live seconds, or eighteen hundred 
pounds per minute, were hurled into those woods for twenty 
minutes — say thirty-five tons in all. Cedars as large as a man's leg 
and twenty feet high were torn up and hurled along. Oaks as large 
as a man's body were splintered as if struck by lightning, and many 
of them were cut completely off just above the ground. The fire 
which Magruder's men received from the gunboats in Turkey Bend 
at the battle of Malvern Hill was no comparison to it. 

" I was over the ground two days after the fight," said a farmer 
living in the neighborhood, " and it was the most awful sight man 
ever saw. All the dead were torn to pieces, and scores of the 
pieces were resting in the tree tops. That tree over there lost 
nearly all its branches, and I myself have taken half a dozen grape 
shot from the trunk. In that crotch up there, full fifteen feet 
from the ground, rested a mass of pulp and cloth which had once 
been a man. The tree was besmeared with clots of blood and dabs 
of burnt flesh, and the stench in tliis piece of woods was simply 
unendurable — horrible ! I could have picked up a hundred heads, 
arms, and legs between here and that cedar, and in spots it looked 
as if a dozen men had been torn to pieces in a body." 

The Confederate advance was checked, but yet they remained in 
such close proximity that a part of the Federal line had to be 
retired. It was noon now. Overhead the dark clouds were sailing 
away and the sun was shining down on the dark and bloody woods — 
the carnage of the cotton field — the dead on their backs on the cold 
earth, and the living also were drawing a long breath for the next 
onslaught. Tlie Federals were throwing up bi'eastworks of rails, 
logs, and brush — refilling their cartridge boxes — moving to the 
right or left to close gaps. The Confederates were massing under 
cover of the woods. Bragg's whole front was piled with dead 
and soaked with blood, but he had driven the Federal right and 
center, and he was now preparing to roll a wave against the plucky 
left which should overwhelm it at the first dash. Was this possi- 
ble? Let us look at this stormy panoi-nma a few minutes. We 
shall see ! 

Rolling down the Federal line from right to left, the brigades on 
the extreme left caught tlie last desperate fighting, rendered more 
desperate'by the fact that McCook had rallied, Eousseau had beaten 
them back, and only the tenacity of this left wing prevented the 
complete defeat of Rosecrans. 



STONE KIVEE. 347 

It has been a source of wonder through all these long years why 
that Federal right was caught up and flung back as it was. Its 
position was as advantageous as tliat of the Confederates — the men 
were good fighters- — they were not outnumbered. What, then, was 
the cause ? Why was it that for a full hour after the fight opened 
Rosecrans could not be made to believe that McCook was yielding 
ground ? Did McCook have more whisky than sense in his head 
tliat morning ? I can put ray hand on oflicers who believe it, and 
they are brave men, too. Did Johnson, whose division formed the 
extreme right, spend part of the night drinking whisky punch, or 
in trying to discover what force was in his front? There are those 
who are of the opinion that he was upset, and the opinions come 
from sources that are worthy of all credence. How was it that a 
little creek over which a man could spring was mistaken for a river? 
Who was it that blurted out : 

" D — n the rebs ! Let 'em cross if they want too ! Haven't we 
got as many guns as they have ? " 

And, too, how curious that some of the brigade commanders were 
absent when the fight opened — at headquarters to have their orders 
repeated. Men were in bivouac when they should have been in 
line. Artillery horses were oflE to water when they should have 
been hitched to the guns. That right wing was there to fight — 
had orders to fight — knew that the enemy were in front and on the 
alert, and yet when the Confederates appeared they walked right 
over two Federal brigades who were cooking breakfast. Some 
one was to blame for that. A thousand men in that right wing 
were uselessly slaughtered. Was it whisky or incapacity which 
left the dead piled in heaps on this field so bravely fought on ? 

The last attack on Hazen was made as the sun was going down. 
He was ready and expecting it. His line had been shortened a 
little, one or two regiments thrown behind the railroad embank- 
ment, and the others covered by slight breastworks of rails. His 
position, as Confederates state to-day, was plainly visible from their 
cover in the woods, and when they advanced their battle-lines were 
long enough to swing in on his flank. When the gray lines broke 
cover and it was seen how they were disposed, every man in that 
Federal brigade knew that the pinch had come. Two things saved 
it. The Confederate right, in the excitement of advance, advanced 
faster than the centei- and left. Hazen rode along behind the men 
on his left and warned them to hold their fire and take steady aim. 



348 STONE KIVEE. 

When the word came every man had a target, and the fire was so 
deadly that the entire right of the advance was broken and shat- 
tered. The center was forced to halt in the open ground within 
pistol-shot, and it, too, was repulsed as the left swung in to Hank the 
Federal right. This left the whole brigade free to attend to the 
flankers. The Ninth Indiana made a half-face and cheered as it 
poured in a volley. The One Hundred and Tenth Illinois cleared its 
front with one volley. The Sixth and Twenty-fourth Ohio 
advanced to a new line under fire and drove the enemy out of cover. 
The Thirty-sixth Indiana, Twenty-third Kentucky and Eighty-fourth 
Illinois let the gray lines walk right up to them and then opened 
such a fire that Hazen thought reinforcements had reached him. 
The Sixth Kentucky was charged in its position, and after repulsing 
the attack, fixed bayonets and drove the enemy pell-mell into the 
woods. 

When Breckenridge, who was on Bragg's right, began his for- 
ward movement late in the afternoon, it was the plan to double the 
Federal left back on Rousseau's stronghold. The Federals would 
have then been in a cm/ de sac, instead of an impregnable position. 
Scores of Confederate scouts in Federal uniforms had passed through 
Eosecrans' position and up and down the lines. Bragg knew the 
exact position of every Federal brigade, and Breckenridge could 
almost have named every Union regiment and battery in his front. 
They were in strong positions, but he depended on the general 
demoralization to aid him. Demoralization took the fight out of 
some of Pope's brigades at Second Bull Run — out of some of 
Hooker's men in the Wilderness — out of all the Federal regiments 
when Jackson struck Miles at Harper's Ferry — but at Stone River 
demoralization meant desperation. No man can point to another 
battle of the war where a repulse meant another attack — where 
defeat meant another rally. 

Hascall's position was not as good as that of the brigades on either 
side, having less cover, but when it was suggested that he retire his 
lines a short distance to a stronger position he replied : 

"Not an inch, sir — not an inch! I shall wait for them right 
here ! " 

He was waiting when the assault came. There was hot fighting 
on either side of him, and his front was suddenly darkened by a 
swarm of Confederates, flags waving and bugles sounding the 
assault. The Eighth Indiana battery opened with grape, but 
unmindful of the slaughter the Confederates pushed on until the 



STONE EIVEB. 349 

smoke cloud hid friend and foe alike. Then, for a quarter of an 
hour, it was the same reckless, desperate assault, and the same grim, 
determined defense which had been witnessed on every brigade 
front of the center and left. The Twenty -sixth Ohio and Third 
Kentucky felt the first shock, and for five minutes men fought on 
either side of fences, breastworks, logs, bushes and whatever else 
gave the least protection. A sergeant in the Third Kentucky said 
of the melee: 

" The rebs walked right at us as if they meant to climb over us. 
I hadn't reloaded after my first fire before I saw their legs under 
the smoke. I was then lying down behind a slight breastwork of 
rails. Jumping up, I was hardly on my feet before a Confederate 
had his foot on the rails. He had fired his gun, and no\» it was a fight 
with the bayonet between us. He thrust at me and his bayonet 
went through my coat on the left side and shoved me over. My 
fall brought him forward on his face, and before he could get up I 
had him by the hair. He kicked and struck out, and even tried to 
bite me, and we had a regular rough and tumble, but I was too 
much for him and he went to the rear a prisoner. I believe he was 
the only Confederate captured by my regiment that day." 

The Colonel of the Third was killed within two minutes after 
the firing began, and in ten minutes the regiment lost one hundred 
and fifty men and every officer, excepting two or three. It was the 
same with tlie Twenty-sixth. They would not be pushed back, and 
the Confederates advanced until they could use the bayonet. It 
would not have taken another ten minutes to have wiped both regi- 
ments o£E the rolls to the last man, when the advance of three 
Union regiments brought about a cross-fire which drove the Con- 
federates back. 

" They will come again ! " So shouted Hascall as he galloped up 
and down his lines and made a new disposition of his troops. 

So they would. They had been beaten back to rally again. 
Hardly had a quarter of an hour slipped away before the lines of 
gray, composed chiefly of men from Mississippi and Arkansas, again 
appeared. Hascall had not moved an inch. He had a hundred 
heroes with him who had been wounded, and yet they were deter- 
mined to " see it out." The dead lay thickly all about, and directly 
in front of the lines the ground was almost hidden from sight by 
the number of dead Confederates. Many of the wounded took ad- 
vantage of the lull to crawl into the Federal lines, realizing that the 
next advance would be their death. 



350 STONE EIVEE. 

" Here they come — steady, now ! " ran down the Federal lines as 
the Confederates broke cover half a mile away. The smoke had 
floated away, the sun was shining brightly, and the sight was a 
grand one. From five to six thousand men were keeping the same 
step, flags streamed back over the Hues, and half a dozen mounted 
ofiicers rode along the lines and shouted their orders. The Federal 
batteries with Hascall waited for a moment, as if to give every man 
a chance to witness the grand advance, and then the slaughter be- 
gan. For three or four minutes the work was left entirely to the 
artillery. Almost at the first fire three of the advancing flags went 
down, and next day one of them was found witli its staff splintered 
to match-wood and the banner so shot to pieces that one could liardly 
secure a piece three inches square. It was one of the terrible siglits 
of war, and brief as was the view, hundreds of men turned their 
heads away that they might not see more. 

The advance was checked, but only for the moment. Rallying 
over the dead and wounded, the Confederates made a rush for the 
Federal lines, striking the Twenty-sixth and Sixth Ohio and Fifty- 
eighth Indiana squarely in front. " Fire low ! Fire low ! " was the 
order all along the line, and the consequences were both appalling 
and curious. More than three liundred Confederates were killed or 
wounded on that front by shots below the Avaist, while nine-tenths 
of the wounded were hit about the legs. The center of tlie advance 
bore directly upon tlie Fifty-eighth, which had the cover of a 
breastwork. The Hoosiers held tlieir fire until the first line was 
hardly fifty feet away, and then every musket blazed at once. The 
center was literally swej^t out of the fight by that one regiment, 
leaving the wings standing alone. It was perhaps the deadliest 
volley delivered on that field, but not over five minutes had elapsed 
before fresli regiments moved down from the woods, and the fight 
then settled down to a steady crash of musketry at short range. 

No man could have exhibited more nerve and coolness on a field 
of battle than Rosecrans' chief of staff — Garesche. He rallied 
broken regiments, stationed batteries, encouraged the lines, and a 
dozen times rode over ground on which it did not seem as if a fox 
could have lived. His horse was twice hit, his saddle struck by 
three bullets, his scabbard by two more, and a grape-shot whizzed 
over his shoulder and tore up the blue cloth until the padding could 
be seen. I have never seen a Federal account which stated furtlier 
than that he was hit in the head by a cannon-ball or shell, but there 



STONE BIVEE. 351 

were several Confederates who saw him die. One who served 
under Chalmers gave me the particulars as follows : 

"We had assaulted and been repulsed, and in falling back to 
cover I received a bullet in the calf of my right leg, I fell flat, but 
after a minute or two, knowing that I should be killed where I was, 
I crept along over a slight ridge to be out of the way of the Fed- 
eral bullets. The pain was now so great that I could go no further, 
and I had just got my back against a small tree when Eosecrans 
galloped across the edge of the open to my right. Our batteries 
were playing across this spot with a terrible fire, and I expected to 
see the general killed. He was closely followed by Garesche. 
When in plain view of me and not two hundred feet away, his 
horse jumped aside at something and Garesche lost his right stirrup. 
He had it in a second and was just straightening up when a shell 
tore through the top of a cedar behind me, passed over my head, 
and I saw it strike the poor fellow as plainly' as I see you. There 
was a sort of puff when it struck, but it did not explode until far 
beyond. Garesche's arms went up, his sword fell, and after reeling 
to and fro in the saddle, the body fell to the ground." 

Would Rosecrans' plan of battle have succeeded but for the dis- 
aster to McCook? A dozen generals have answered yes. The 
Federal left was stronger than tlie Confederate right. Tt was in 
position to swing. Its flank passed beyond Breckenridge's line. 
Two or three divisions had quietly stolen up to within gun-shot of 
that general's lines witliout his dreaming of their presence. A 
sudden rush upon him would have rolled him over. McCook was 
not expected to drive the Confederate left, but to hold his ground 
and keep Hardee too busy to reinforce Breckenridge. 

When Rosecrans foimd his right being driven and the shadow of 
defeat settling down upon him, he was no longer Rosecrans. He 
could scarcely be recognized by his aides. Nerve and coolness and 
contempt of personal danger sent him into the thick of the tight. 
He was here — everywhere. He pushed ammunition trains out of 
the way — hurried up batteries — spoke kindly to the wounded 
going to the rear — encouraged those being rallied, and by his own 
heroic demeanor he no doubt prevented a complete rout. A dozen 
men died beside him that day — a thousand bullets whistled about 
his head — a hundred shot and shell sought him out for a victim, 
and yet he was preserved through all. 

As the center was being rolled back, Rosecrans and staff rode 
across the whole front under a most terrific fire and halted for a 



352 STONE RIVEE. 

few minutes on the pike, near the brick house which was soon to be 
battered down. The fight here was just opening with a bitter vin- 
dictiveuess. A Confederate skirmisher, now a resident of Nash- 
ville, who had been shot in the side a few minutes before, and was 
now lying within the Federal lines, says of this incident : 

"As the stafE came up, the horses of one of the aides almost 
walked over me. Rosecrans was at times so near me that I could 
hear every word he said. The fire began to grow hot as he came 
up, and I fully expected to see every one of them killed. Our 
folks must have been sweeping this place with a score of guns, and 
the sharpshooters kept the air full of bullets. A round shot struck 
the fence fifty feet away and knocked out a whole section, and I 
saw a big splinter break both fore legs of a horse. The shells came 
as fast as you could count. A splinter from one, which struck the 
ground about fifty feet away, whizzed right through the group with 
a zur-r-r-r! and dug its way into the ground so near me that I could 
have put my hand on it. Rosecrans was speaking short and quick 
to those around him, but he did not even notice that he was in the 
hottest place a general ever rode into and got out alive." 

The last assault on Rousseau in the center was like the movement 
of a mountain across a valley to strike another. Looniis', Guen- 
ther's, and three other batteries had full play on the advancing 
lines of battle, and yet they could not check them. Ten thousand 
muskets had them at short range, and yet they closed up and 
pressed on. Before Rousseau fell back out of the cedars, Shoe- 
maker's Thirteenth Michigan cleared its fi-ont three times in suc- 
cession, and then seeing Bi-adley leave two guns for the want of 
horses to draw them off, the regiment dashed out, some with fixed 
bayonets and some with empty guns held for a blow. Down they 
went at a run, sweeping over the guns which were being dragged 
off, and in a minute they had them and sixty or seventy prisoners 
besides. 

It was the moment when the Confederates had breasted up to 
within a hundred feet of some parts of the blue lines, and were 
wavering under the hot fire, that the whole Federal center moved 
forward with cheers plainly heard at Bragg's headquarters. The 
advance was led by Rosecrans in person. His right had been 
driven and his left rolled back, but now the tide was turning. 
Right into the cloud of smoke — over the dead — over the dying — 
far ahead of the lines, rode Rosecrans, and that advance swept 
everything clear back to the woods — this time to stay. Grant has 



STONE EIVEE. 353 

had no praise for some of tlie bravest fighters of the war — Rose- 
crans and Tlionius among the number. The verdict is not witli 
Grant, but with the country. Wliat Grant won by numbers Rose- 
crans won by personal magnetism and the nerve of a iiero. Wliat 
Grant gained by i-cckless slaughter, Thomas won by strategy. 

During this first day's fight, when Colonel Greusel, commanding 
Sill's brigade, was handling his regiments in a way to win praise 
from ever}- quarter, a bayonet charge by one of them resulted in 
the capture of half a hundred prisoners, one of whom was carrying 
a sword captured from General Sill in a minor engagement in 
Kentucky several months before. Poor Sill ! His lifeless body 
was at that moment in the hands of the Confederates. It is stated 
in a former sketch that his body at once fell into the hands of the 
Confederates. Colonel Greusel writes that he saw it immediately 
after death, and detailed men to convey it to the rear. He saw 
them pick it up and move away, but in the excitement of the 
immediate advance by the Confederates they must have laid it 
down and run away. It was then discovered by the Confederates 
and taken to the rear. 

Has a single man who fought at Stone River ever denied that 
the Federal army was whipped in that first day's fight? If so, he 
took no part in it. It was a defeat, and yet in no way a rout. 
Four-fifths of an army had been pushed back over fields and 
tlirough woods, and yet the nerve of a commander had prevented 
a panic. Not three brigades had held their original ground, and 
yet at night the position was impregnable. Rosecrans had been 
defeated, and yet in that defeat he had preserved his plan of 
battle. The fight had not yet died away when he began to swing 
his left, and the results of the next three days proved his wisdom 
as a general. Those after days had no horrors like the first. Bragg 
had done his best as an assailant, and he was now satisfied with 
doing his best as a defendant. He had beaten Rosecrans, and yet 
he had only put more fight into him. He had driven him back, but 
he could not hold the ground he had won. McCook's blunder or 
incapacity had been matched by Breckenridge, and the Confeder- 
ates were not as well oif when night closed in as when they first 
assaulted Johnson. That same nerve which sustained " Old Rosy " 
as he saw his army rolling back incited him to persevere, and from 
defeat he plucked victory. Neither Bragg nor Polk nor Brecken- 
ridge nor Hardee — the men who fought him and felt his mettle — 
have traduced him. It wag left to the Union general who had 

Vol. L-23 



354 STONE EITER. 

never fought a battle in whicli he did not outnumber the Confed- 
erates from two, or four to one, in men and guns. 

Eosecrans knew just wliat ought to be done when tliat first day's 
figlit closed, and he set about doing it. Bragg was in a quandar}'. 
He had defeated the Federal army, and yet it still confronted him. 
He could not drive it further, and he dared not walk away from it. 
It was Rosecrans who now began to push forward. The tirst was 
spent in reorganizing his divisions and in advancing his lines. 
There was angry growl all along the lines, but no battle. On the 
morning of the second, after Rosecrans again crossed the river and 
began pushing the Confederate right, Bragg saw the plan and set 
out to thwart it. There was a climax coming, and every man felt it. 
Each Federal regiment threw up such cover as it could and hugged 
the ground to escape the artillery fire. There was a constant rattle 
of musketry along the front, and a stead}' tiro between batteries, 
but no great harm was done on either side. It was brain against 
brain, general against general. Bragg was massing to hurl an ava- 
lanche against the left ; Rosecrans was bringing up gun after gun 
to hold what ground he liad gained and to stop that avalanche in 
its wild rush. 

At three o'clock the Confederate artillery ceased its roar, and then 
came the climax. In plain sight of every Federal on a mile front 
the gray lines moved out of the woods and rushed, and every can- 
non which could bear on the Federal position was let loose. In 
regimental front, and six lines deep, with bugles sounding, flags fly- 
ing and every man cheering, that avalanche of war made its rush. 

Directly in the path of that rush were the Eighty-fourth Illinois, 
the Sixth and Twenty-fourth Ohio and the Thirty-sixth Indiana. 
The}' had a slight breastwork, and they hugged down behind it 
and waited. Five to one were rushing down upon them, but not a 
man moved. Tlie Third Wisconsin Battery behind then began to roar, 
but not a musket was discharged. It was only when the "C. S." on 
the belt-plates of the advancing Confederates could be plainly seen 
that the brigade sent forth its volleys. Five hundred men toppled 
over dead along the front, but the avalanche would not halt or be 
turned. In five minutes the Federal brigade was rolling back and 
carrying with it the reserve. A Federal division rushes down — 
brigade after brigade comes forward on the double-quick, but each 
and every regiment is rolled back or flung to the right or left. 
Hardee rolled McCook back the same way, but this time it is Rose- 
crans behind the broken wing. As the last regiment falls back he 



STONE EIVEE. 355 

opens on that advance with sixty cannon massed for just such an 
emergency. Fourteen Federal batteries, and all using shell and 
grape! Sixty pieces of artillery roaring and flaming together! 
More tliau half a hundred guns pointed directly into a dense mass 
of human beings ! Men said tiiat hell had broken loose. Earth 
hatli no terrors like such an assault and defense. It is a maelstrom 
of horror. Every circle is made up of liuman bodies battered and 
sliattered to masses of pulp. Every sweep echoes shrieks and 
groans and oatlis and clieers. The vortex is tlie blood of brave men. 
Tiie whirlpool of war is unlike tliat of the ocean. It gives up its 
dead and wounded at nightfall. It flings back upon field and forest 
the gory fragments — the dead with their agonized look — the dying 
with their prayers and groans. 

The Confederate avalanche was halted. Then it was whirled 
about. Then, as two scores of Federal regiments rushed back into 
the fight with yells of defiance, that mighty mass turned back on its 
path and was swept away. The fight had not lasted over thirty 
minutes, but three thousand men lay dead on the front and the Con- 
federate right was broken and routed. The repulse decided the 
battle of Stone River. From that hour Bragg began preparing for 
retreat. 

Rosecrans fought that battle with forty-three thousand men, and 
his losses footed up twelve thousand. Bragg officially reported 
Ilosecrans' force at sixty-five thousand and his own at thirty-five 
thousand. Confederate militarj' writers give him forty thousand. 
His losses footed up over nine thousand men, of whom about one thou- 
sand were taken prisoners. He captured six tliousand two hundred 
prisoners, thirty-three pieces of artillery, five thousand stands of arms, 
three hundred wagons and their teams, twenty-one wagons with 
ammunition, thirty-eight ambulances, nine battle-fiags, and burned 
seven hundred or eiglit hundred wagons on the various pikes. 

The force on either side was nearly the same, crediting the best 
authorities, but as the Confederates were constantly assaulting, they 
w^'re in superior numbers in every attack. In some assaults they 
numbered five to one. When Breckenridge assaulted the Federal 
left he flung at least eight thousand men at less than two thousand 
five hundred. Taken as a whole, it was one of the best matched 
battles of the war, and no other field equaled it for desperate and 
terrific fighting between man and man. Let him who hath "Stone 
River" engraved upon his shield keep the letters bright. 



t figlt at yaircrpt 




NLY one or two Federal historians have even made 
mention of the sharp little light at Lavergne, which 
occurred at the time of the battle of Stone Hiver, 
and if the Confederate historian has touched upon 
the matter it is only to dismiss it in three or four 
lines. I have taken considerable pains to investigate both sides, and 
the many facts and incidents which the dignified historian has 
refused to meddle with will certainly interest a large constituency 
to-day. 

Lavergne is a small town between Nashville and Murfreesboro, 
and, as Rosecrans left Nashville farther and farther behind him, he 
detailed various bodies to protect his lines of communication with 
the city. In many cases these details were picked up — indeed, it 
was from capturing so many of them that Bragg was able to show 
such a large list of prisoners. Wlieeler, "Wharton, Pegram and 
other Confederate cavalry leaders did not have a hand in the big 
liglit at all, but worked around on the various pikes and highways, 
killing, capturing and burning. They captured train after train, 
and such wagons as they could not run off were burned as they 
stood. Colonel Innes, having with him less than four hundred of 
the Michigan Regiment of Mechanics and Engineers — men who 
did not profess to do any fighting — was detailed to take position 
at Lavergne and keep the road open. He had no artillery, but the 
boys had a full supply of cartridges and were rather proud of being 
called to take a part in the grand movement. 

There is just one spot around the village where a small body of 
men could take position to successfully tight a larger body, and 
Innes at once seized upon it. On the range back of the town he 
posted his little command and hastily sheltered it with a breast- 
work of logs, stones, rails and cedar trees cut down and dragged to 
the spot. He had no reason to expect a fight, and yet he took all 
precautions. 



THE FIGHT AT LAVEKGNE. 



357 



The sounds of the battle between McCook and Hardee caaie to 
the men all the forenoon, and once in a while a straggler gave them 
news of how the fight was going, but it was not until afternoon that 
it was known that the Confederate cavalry were cutting and slash- 
ing up and down the roads without check. Wheeler, having about 
two thousand six hundred men in his command, suddenly appeared 
from the direction of Murfreesboro, and he gathered up everything 
on the road. Army wagons, sutler stores, ambulances and ammujii- 
tion wagons blocked tlie highway, and he had only to gallop along to 
seize everything. He meant to press on, but he found Innes there 
and dared not leave him in his rear. "We had made a big haul,"' 
explained one of his lieutenants, "and the boys were in the spirit 
for reckless fighting. Several different citizens of Lavergne had 
counted the Michiganders to a man, and when they came and 
told .us that Innes had only about four hundred muskets we reck- 
oned on capturing the whole crowd without firing a shot. Wheeler 
sent in a flag of truce and demanded a surrender, but what do you 
suppose that cheeky Colonel replied ? " 

He refused, I believe. 

" Refused ! Why, he told Wheeler to go to h — 11 ! There we 
were, six to one, and he could see it before his eyes, and he meant 
to fight ! Wheeler was astonished and amazed, but we had no time 
to fool away, and in ten minutes we were ready to drive those Wol- 
verines out of their nest. A part of our men dismounted, the 
artillery was brought up, and then Wheeler fiung a column of 
attack at the breastwork. I was one of that column, and I didn't 
expect to hear a dozen muskets pop before seeing a white flag run 
up." 

But you didn't see one. 

" No, I didn't ! We went in with a yell and I know I got within 
five feet of the breastwork, but we came out singing a different 
song. Why, sir, they opened on us so hot and kept it up so con- 
tiimally that we heard the bugles blow recall within five minutes. 
We were beautifully licked in no time at all, and I don't believe we 
killed one of 'em in that charge. I got so near that I could look 
over the breastwork and see the men, and my horse carried two 
Yankee bullets away with him." 

The man was correct. When Innes saw he was to be attacked 
he ordered his men to lie down and fire slowly and coolly, and 
they obeyed to the letter. The two pieces of Confederate artillery 
flung the brush and rails ten feet high at every discharge, but 



358 THE FIGHT AT LAVEEGNE. 

whenever a gap was opened men flung down their muskets and 
closed it. After the repulse Wlieeler sent in a second flag of truce, 
stating that lie had flve to one and wanted to prevent further blood- 
shed. 

What did Innes say to that? I asked of my informant. 

" I heard the report of t!ie oflicer as lie returned. He rode iip to 
Wlieeler, saluted and said : "General Wheeler, Colonel Innes says 

he will see you d d before he'll surrender! He says you must 

take him if you want him ! " 

" At that Wheeler got boiling mad. The idea that we were being 
held there by four hundred men made him figliting hot. The 
second attack was made with over twelve hundred men, and our 
artillery blazed away until the air was full of limbs and splinters. 
I had procured another horse, and again I was with the column." 

How did the Michiganders behave wlien you moved out ? 

" Cool as ice. As a rule, in such cases, there is a sputtering of 
musketry long enough before any one can be hit, but those fellows 
waited. I didn't hear a bullet until we were within pistol-shot. We 
went for 'em with a yell, and this time a hundred of us crowded 
our horses right against the breastwork. I tried twice to leap it, and 
when I couldn't I sat there and fired three shots at a captain with- 
out touching him. A Yank then fired at me over the brush, and 
while I was not hit the powder in his gun singed my whiskers and 
the bullet made a liole in the man behind me as large as a lien's egg. 
I thought we were getting the best of it, but presently the bugles 
blew and back we went — licked again. Think of it, sir — four hun- 
dred men licking twelve hundred as coolly as if tliey had always 
fought that way ! It made us hopping mad, and you ought to have 
heard Wheeler take on. He's a little bit of a foxy-looking eliap, 
you know, but all vim and fight, and he'd never struck a snag like 
that before. He was so mad that his stirrups wouldn't hold him." 

Innes was as cool as January. A man who has his back to a 
wall can fight three men in front, but yet tliere is a limit to the 
endurance of men in the best position. He had beaten Wheeler 
back twice, and he could beat him again. But if Wheeler wielded 
the hammer long enoufirh he must shatter the target. When Lee 
could raise no more men, he knew to a week when the climax 
would come. He could figure to a certainty when five men would 
be able to overpower one. Innes had a strong position, but Wheeler 
could lose two men to his one and beat him in the end. Therefore, 
when he saw that it was to be a succession of assaults, he sent for 



THE FIGHT AT LAVEKGNK. 359 

reinforcements and made ready for the next grapple. He passed 
along every foot of his lines, suggesting changes here and there 
and encouraging the men, and as he saw the Confederates move out 
for a third assault he said to his veterans : 

"Fire low and don't waste a bullet ! Drive them back this time 
and we'll have reinforcements before tliey can come again ! " 

"I did not take part in that third assault," continued my inform- 
ant, "but I watched it closely. We had from twelve to tiftccn 
hundred men, and they were all fighting mad. It was the same as 
before with your men. They Iield their fire until every bullet 
would hit. There was a crash — a cloud of smoke — cheers and 
yells, and then I lost sight of the fight for five minutes. Some of 
our men got over the breastwork this time, but were killed there, 
and it wasn't ten minutes before the bugles rang out, and back the 
lines came. By this time the ground was covered with dead and 
wounded along Innes' front, and with my spy-glass I saw some of 
his men rolling dead horses against the breastwork to make it 
stronger. It's a dead shame the way we were rolled back by that 
little crowd of Yanks, but it 's no use denying what actually hap- 
pened. The road beyond Lavergne was blocked full of Federal 
wagons, but we couldn't get at 'em for these paltry four hundred 
blue-coats, and they were tree-cutters and bridge-builders at that ! 
That scrimmage has always made me ashamed, and I guess 
Wiieeler will always feel sore over it." 

Between the third and fourth assaults Wheeler waited to see if 
the Wolverines would not run up the white flag. His mission that 
day was to capture Federal trains and secure plunder, and he did 
not relish this obstruction. He did not want his men killed off, 
and yet that Federal force was a menace which he dai-ed not pass 
unheeded. It would be no glory to whip them, for he had six to 
one, and as for prisoners, Hardee was capturing Federals by the 
hundred on the right at Stone Biver. After that third repulse, 
Wheeler would have abandoned the game as not worth the powder, 
only that he found himself in a bad situation. To pass Lavergne 
he must whip Innes. To fall back would be a disgrace. Therefore 
he prepared for a fourth assault. A good part of the force was 
dismoutited to act as infantry, the artillery advanced until the s])ent 
bullets of the Federals dropped before the guns, and when all was 
ready the lines advanced. 

Meanwhile Innes had backed some wagons into his breastwork for 
further cover, and as many as a dozen dead iiorses were rolled over 



360 THE FIGHT AT LAVEEGNE. 

to help strengthen it. When Wheeler opened with his cannon two 
laughable incidents occurred to put the Federals in good humor. 
A shell struck one of the dead horses and exploded inside the 
beast. The result was that a score of men were covered with the 
pulpy masses, and a captain was knocked down by a large "hunk" 
of ineat and rendered unconscious for full five minutes. His first 
words on regaining consciousness were : 

"Boys, are we in heaven, or have we given the rebs fits again !" 

One of the wagons contained clothing and rations. A shell 
passed through the end-board, burst with deafening sound, and 
pieces of overcoats and blankets kept company with hard-tack as 
they sailed over the encampment. A button from a demolished 
overcoat struck a Federal on the ear and fell to the ground, and as 
he picked it up with one hand and held his bleeding ear with the 
other, he called out : 

"Boys, we've got 'era licked for sure! They're out of bullets 
and are shooting buttons at us!" 

That fourth assault was cool and desperate, but it was met in the 
same manner. Not a dozen Federal muskets were fired until the 
rush was made. Then such a fire was poured in that the center 
was checked, and as the wings reached the breastwork, friend and 
foe fired deliberately at each other from a distance of ten feet. 

" I was with that fourth assaulting column," said the Confederate 
narrator, " and again I reached the breastwork. This time I was 
on foot. We got hold of a wagon to pull it out, and I had three 
men hit in the legs by the fire under the brush. I saw over a hun- 
dred Federals through and over the breastwork, and could hear 
evei-y order given by the officers. A man near me, who was tear- 
ing out the cedars, had the top of his head blown off, and the blood 
was spattered over a dozen men behind. A lot of us got down and 
tried to shoot through the breastwork, and I saw dozens of men 
trying to climb over, but it was no use. We were losing four to 
one, and the bugles called us back for the fourth time. Then there 
was a regular row among the officers, and Wheeler was so mad that 
he was as white as a clean shirt. We had wasted a heap of time, 
and the racket had sent all the Federal wagons beyond Lavergne off 
on a gallop. It was cutting us both ways, and I never heard so 
ranch growling in all my born days." 

Then Wheeler sent another flag of truce. He had Innes boxed 
up, and had only been fooling around a little to give him time to 
change his raind. He would now offer him one more chance to 



THE FIGHT AT LAVEEGNE. 361 

surrender, and if he refused he must take the bloody conse- 
quences. 

" Hang the consequences and Wheeler, too," replied Innes ; 
" and if you send in another white rag I'll shoot the man who car- 
ries it ! " 

" Then Wheeler bobbed up and down in his saddle and swore by 
the great horn spoon that he'd have Innes' sword in less than half 
an hour. He could take four successive lickings as a matter of 
military courtesy, but when it came to sass he wouldn't stand it." 
His entii'e force was called in, his artillery advanced still further, 
and the men were told that if this assault failed they must retreat. 

From another Confederate who participated in the fight I am 
indebted for the following particulars : 

" We meant business that last time, for the men were all mad 
and the officers had been giving us blazes for gigging back. Some 
one now spread the report that there were only two hundred instead 
of four hundred Federals behind the breastwork, and we meant to 
walk over 'era in a hurry. We made as pretty an advance as you 
ever saw, though some of the boys looked mighty solemn at the 
sight of so many dead men in our way. The artillery kept blazing 
away until we were ready, and then we rushed. I was in the front 
line, and I calculate we were within a stone's throw of the breast- 
work before a gun was fired. Then — blim — blaze — whirr! It 
was like a vivid flash of lightning crackling along the brush, and it 
was so bright that I shut my eyes for two or three seconds." 

" Were you hit ? " 

" No, but the men on either side were killed stone dead. Indeed, 
I believe I saw forty men fall under that fire. We kept pusjiing 
on, firing at will, and firing without seeing a head to shoot at, and 
as the smoke thickened we kept stumbling over the bodies on the 
ground. When I reached the breastwork I fired over it, and was 
reloading wlien a bullet tore along this left leg like a red-hot iron, 
and keeled me over. Now, then, if you want to know what sort of 
fighters tliem Yanks were I can tell you. I lay close to the breast- 
work, and I heard 'em laughing and cheering as if it was only a 
dog-fight. I heard one officer call out : ' Keep down. Give it to 
'em in their legs ! ' The Yank who fired over me dropped two 
men inside of two minutes, and I heard him say to the chap beside 
him : ' Bill, there goes another Johnny to the bone-yard.' Two 
bullets tore my sleeve without drawing blood, and the first intima- 
tion I had how the fight was going was hearing a Federal officer 



362 THE FIGHT AT LAVEEGNE. 

yell out: 'Keep it up, boys — give 'em more h — 11, for they arc 
gigging back on the riglit ! ' In three minutes after that our folks 
were on the skip, and fifty of them tarnal Michigauders stood up 
up and crowed like roosters ! " 

That was the last assault, and it was the worst whipjjing Wheeler 
ever got during whole war. He was a ready and a steady lighter, 
and he had some of the best fiehting; stock of the South in his 
command, but less than four hundred Federals defeated him in 
that contest. If Innes had the best position, Wheeler liad six 
men to one, and he had also two pieces of artillery, well served. 
Once or twice the Confederates had just such a fight against a 
superior Federal force and came out victorious, but a four-years' war 
will not witness many such instances. On that same pike, an hour 
before this fight, ten of Wheeler's men captured seventy Federals 
and twenty-one wagons. And, further, six of Pegram's men cap- 
tured seventeen Federal cavalrymen and four ammunition wagons 
without a man being killed. 

Lavergne was a tally on the other side, and a long mark at that. 
Had Innes surrendered after the first assault, he would have been 
called a brave man who had to yield to an overpowering force. 
Had he surrendered after the second, he would have been a hero. 
The hero of Altoona had twice the chances that Innes had, and 
poets have sung his praise. Wheeler set out to capture Innes and 
was whipped. The Confederate force which assaulted Altoona had 
orders simply to feel the strength of the place, and in retreating 
were only obeying orders. That defense of Lavergne was one of 
the most heroic fights of tlie war. If Federal bards have refused 
to sing of it. Confederates who fought there have been more liberal. 




ITiiufllii — QDiuaiuiptifliu 




T is doubted if Abraham Lincoln gave the subject of 
slavery any serious thought previous to his election to 
the Presidency, and the manner in which he tui-ned to it 
afterwards seems to tliis day to be widely misunderstood. 
It is the commonly accepted belief tliat his Emancipation 
Proclamation was issued from force of sentiment, personal and 
public. The facts do not justify this belief. 

In his first annual message he recommended Congress to adopt 
the following : 

" Besulved by tlie Senate and House of Bepreseniaiims of ilie United States of Amer- 
ica ill Congress iissemhled (two-thirds of both Houses concurring.) Tliat tlie fol- 
lowing articles be proposed to the legislatures (or conventions) of the several 
states, as amendments to the constitution of the United States, all or any of 
which articles, when ratilied by three-fourths of the said legislatures (or conven- 
tions), to be valid as part or parts of the said constitution, namely: 

Article — . Every state, wherein slavery now exists, which shall abolish the 
same therein, at any time, or times, before the first day of January, in the year 
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred, shall receive compensation from the 
United States as follows, to wit: 

The President of the United States shall deliver to every such state, bonds of 

the United States, bearing interest at the rate of per cent, per annum, to 

an amount equal to the aggregate sum of for each slave shown to have 

been therein, by the eighth census of the United States, said bonds to be delivered 
to such states by instalments, or in one parcel, at the completion of the abolish- 
ment, accordingly as the same shall have been gradual, or at one time, within 
such state; and interest shall begin to run upon any such bond only from the 
proper time of its delivery as aforesaid. Any state having received bonds as 
aforesaid, and afterwards reintroducing or tolerating slavery therein, shall refund 
to the United States, the bonds so received, or the value thereof, and all interest 
paid thereon. 

Article — . All slaves who shall have enjoyed actual freedom by the chances 
of the war, at any time before the end of the rebellion, shall lie forever free; but 
all owners of such, who shall not have been disloyal, shall be compensated for 
them, at the same rates as is provided for states adopting abolishment of slavery, 
but in such way that no slave shall be twice accounted for. 

Article — . Congress may appropriate money, and otherwise provide for 



364: LINCOLN EMANCIPATION. 

colonizing free colored persons, with their own consent, at any place or places 
without the United States." 

This plan is recommended as a means, not in exclusion of, but additional to 
all others, for restoring and preserving the national authority Ihrougliout the 
Union. The subject is presented exclusively in its economical aspect. The plan 
would, I am contident, secure peace more speedilj', and maintain it more perma- 
nently, than can be done by force alone; while all it would cost, considering 
amounts, and manner of payment, and times of payment, would be easier paid, 
than will be the additional cost of the war, if we rely solely upon force. It is 
much, very much, that it would cost no blood at all. 

The plan is proposed as permanent constitutional law. It cannot become such 
without the concurrence of, first, two-thirds of Congress, and afterwards, three- 
fourtlis of the states. The requisite three-fourths of the states will necessarily 
include seven of the slave states. Their concurrence, if obtained, will give 
assurance of their severally adopting emancipation at no very distant day, upon 
the new constitutional terms. This assurance would end the struggle now, and 
save the Union forever. 

He spoke thus not only for himself, but as the head of his party 
and of a nation. He looked upon slavery as an evil, but advocated 
no harsh measures for its abolition. Although Congress refused to 
act upon his suggestions, he issued a proclamation, saying : 

" It is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again 
recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary 
aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the slave states, so 
called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the 
United States, and which states may have then vohtntarily adopted, 
or thereafter may voluntarily adopt the immediate or gradual 
abolishment of slavery within their limits." 

He continued that it was the intention to colonize the slaves, and 
that his succeeding proclamation would be issued only with the 
intent to strike a blow at such slave states as would not accept 
pecuniary recompense. The closing paragraph of the proclamation 
reads : 

And the executive will in due time recommend that all citizens of the United 
States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall 
(upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and 
their respective states and people, if the relations shall have been suspended or 
disturbed), be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including 
the loss of slaves. 

On the first of January, 1803, lie followed the above by the 
celebrated Emancipation Proclamation which took its place among 
the famous records of the world's history. In it he excluded from 
the effects and operations of the Proclamation thirteen counties in 
Louisiana and the city of New Orleans, all of West Virginia, and 



LINCOLN EMANCIPATION. 365 

several counties in old Virginia. The Proclamation then con- 
tinued : 

And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and 
declare, that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of 
states are, and henceforward shall be, free; and that the executive government 
of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will 
recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons. 

And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free, to abstain from all 
violence, unless in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that in all 
cases, when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages. 

And I further declare and make known, that such persons, of suitable con- 
dition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison 
forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said 
service. 

And upon this act. sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the 
constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of man- 
kind and the gracious favor of Almighty God. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the 
United States to be affl.xed. 

Done at the city of Washington this first day of January, in the year of our 
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the Independence of 
the United States of America the eighty-seventh. 

ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

By the President: 

William H Seward, Secretary of State. 

Both tlie message and the proclamations are wholly silent as to 
the evils of slavery and contain no hint of sympathy for the en- 
slaved. The suggestions and recommendations they contain spring, 
so far as the language shows, from motives of policy, and from 
these only. He had argued and advocated pecuniary recompense ; 
Congress had refused to entertain the idea, and he then, as an 
act of military necessity, gave the blacks their freedom, or, at 
least, such portion as had Confederate owners. Had it been an 
act oi justice, it would not have e.xeluded territory in wiiich there 
were thousands of slaves who must still bo held in servitude. 

The query is every day asked : " If war had not come would 
slavery still exist?" In all human judgment, no! The public feel- 
ing at iiome and abroad was growing in antagonism daily, and 
every closing month would have brought a stronger pressure to 
bear against the evil. With Lincoln at the head of the govern- 
ment, and with his holding steadfast to the ideas he had promul- 
gated. Congress would have doubtless taken some decided step in 
the matter of emancipation by purchase. 



rClellittt — lurnsik — looker. 




)T is doubtful if war in any country at any time ever 
witnessed sucli a state of affairs as surrounded General 
McClellan during his conitnand of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

He took command of troops who had just suffered 
defeat and were thoroughly demoralized. The army had plenty to 
throw away in certain supplies, while there was a woeful lack of 
others. The administration had no experience in war, and was 
swayed, or driven, or led by public clamor. An army had not only 
to be created from an enthusiastic mob, but contracts had to be 
made and filled for everything wanted. Contractors had to have 
time and experience, railroads must get used to the new situation 
of affairs, and everything was in confusion. 

McClellan had practically to create an army and supply it with 
artillery, muskets, ammunition, uniforms and accoutrements, and it 
took time. He found, too, that the army was little better than a 
mob so far as drill was concerned, and he went to work to make 
soldiers of them. In addition to this there were a thousand 
cowardly, incompetent and totally unfit officers who had to go, and 
new ones must take their places. 

The labor of oi'ganizing this vast body of men and bring- 
ing it up to the standard demanded, and then equipping it for 
battle, was truly herculean. It took time, and every day of that 
time made McClellan scores of enemies in the North. The popular 
cry was: "On to Richmond!" And in shouting that cry the 
people entirely forgot Bull Run and its shameful memories. 

McClellan started for the Peninsula deficient in many army sup- 
plies, but the administration would brook no further delay. He 
must get in the field, ready or not, in order to stop the popular 
clamor. Deputations of merchants, bankers, clergymen and ].oli- 
ticians waited upon the President and gave it as their solemn opinion 

[3661 



McCLELLAN — BUENSIDE HOOKER. 367 

that McClellan ought to move, and the President was more or less 
influenced. 

McClellan had witnessed war in Europe. Moreover, he gave Lee, 
Johnston and Jackson credit for their military genius, and the great 
Confederate army behind thera for courage. Between Williams- 
burg and Fair Oaks his advances and disposition of troops were 
made according to military science, and with a view of giving his 
army a fair chance to take care of itself if suddenly attacked. 

The people who cried out that he was a " pick and spade " general, 
were singularly silent when Grant dug up half the soil of Virginia, 
and Sherman left a track of breastworks forty miles wide across 
the state of Georgia, even when pursuing a retreating army. 

During the brief campaign ending with Antietam, the country 
swung its cap for McClellan and was ready to bow down to his 
genius, but when Lee had crossed the river without being annihi- 
lated or the rebellion ended, the critics suddenly came to the front 
again. Whatever may have been written by American historians, 
Antietam (Sharpsburg), is recorded as a drawn battle in all the his- 
tories ontside of tliis republic. Lee's lines were not broken nor a 
single regiment demoralized. He had the defensive, and he took 
his time about leaving the field. 

An army can withdraw faster than one can pursue, because the 
highways are clear of enemies and obstructions. Lee had but to 
leave a rear-guard behind the troops marching at will to feel per- 
fectly safe. McClellan had the dead and wounded of Antietam to 
care for, supplies and stores to bring up, and some of his com- 
mands were sadly shattered. There were corps, divisions, brigades, 
regiments and companies without a head, and in the one corps of 
Hooker more than five thousand men had stampeded over the 
country. 

The correspondence between McClellan and Halleck, and McClel- 
lan and Lincoln, directly after the battle was the chief cause of the 
commander's retirement. His dead had not been buried when he 
was hounded by the old cry; "move on!" He moved a division 
across the river and took Lee's trail, and the result was such a 
slaughter as no history has dared to fully detail. 

In a great battle soldiers lose clothing, arms and accoutrements. 
They must be resupplied to make them soldiers again. Artillery 
must be replaced or repaired, commands reorganized, and what has 
been destroyed must be replaced again. McClellan had taken 
Pope's beaten and demoralized army and fought three battles and 



368 McCLELLAN BCENSIDE — HOOKEE. 

driven Lee out of Maryland. Even as tliat array passed up the 
Potomac to Hud Lee and give him battle there was sad need of 
materials left behind on the plains of Virginia. 

McClellan was wise in his determination to rest and refit his army 
before facing Lee again. He demanded time, and was answered ; 
" Lee is badly demoralized — can't you follow and attack ? " He 
demanded supplies, and Halleck retorted with insinuations and 
insults. 

" The country is impatient for you to move ! " 
" You must take advantage of tiiis weather to advance!" 
" Tlie President desires you to move while the roads are good ! " 
Think of such dispatches being sent to General Grant when he 
came to face tlie same Confederate army ! 

McCIelhin finally moved, and he was marching to find Lee and 
tight him when the blow fell, and Burnside was given the command. 
During the hot blood of war and the years of succeeding rancor 
men had but little time to reflect. "When the years of peace came, 
and tlie searcher after truth delved into the records of the earlj- 
years of war he traced McClellan's career from first day to last and 
did iiini full justice. 

ifoble, brave, patriotic, forgiving! In war prudent and humane. 
In civil life pure and uprigiit. His enemies are a score of fanatics 
— his friends the whole republic ! 

Burnside had been rewarded for his failure to turn Lee's right at 
Antietam. Nobody had heard of him as a fighter, and no one could 
say that he had the ability to command an army. He took com- 
mand of a grand army in perfect discipline and lacking in nothing, 
and instead of marching to find Lee lie started for Fredericksburg. 
His intention was to cross the river at once and get possession of 
the town. He did not cross at once, nor yet for twenty-five days. 
He had forgotten that pontoons were necessary where bridges had 
been burned. Necessary delays cost McClellan his head. Burnside 
held that great army on the hills looking down upon Fredericksburg 
for nearly four weeks, and the critics were silent. When, at last, 
he did move, it was to fling men at stone- walls crowned by muskets 
— at hills covered by artillery — at field-works counted impreg- 
nable. He was beaten — shattered — saved from annihilation onl}' by 
Providence. He would have tried it agafn, but the country forbade 
it, and no sooner had he settled down in winter quarters than the 
personnel of his army almost sunk out of sight, while men deserted 
by the hundreds and officer's lost self-respect in their carousing. 



MoCLELLAM — BUKKSIDE HOOKER. 



369 



From McClellan to Pope : Manassas — Groveton — Chantilly — exit ! 
From McClellan to Burnside : Delay — -defeat — destruction — exit ! 
Burnside must go. 

General Hooker, whom Burnside had entreated the President to 
ignouiiniously dismiss from the service, was promoted to the com- 
mand ! 

Verily, there are queer things in war. 

Vol. I.-24 




^ 



Coitftkratf Scouts antr %te0. 




^ lilLE the term " Spy " has ever carried a military 
IL odium with it, and its application to a person in civil 
'f-i life is expressive of the utmost contempt, the suc- 
cessful spy must be a person of the strongest nerve 
and coolest courage. Why it should be thought 
more despicable, in a military sense, to penetrate an enemy's camp 
and discover his strength than to ambush a command on the high- 
way and shoot soldiers down in cold blood, one fails to understand ; 
but ever since men went to war the spy has been the object of 
hatred and contempt, and his identity has no sooner been estab- 
lished than rope or bullet has been brought forwai-d to end his 
life. 

From the very outset the Southern Confederacy was singularly 
favored with channels through which to secure early and trust- 
worthy information of what was passing in military and civil circles 
at Washington and other places. Outside of the many citizens in 
Washington, Baltimore, Louisville, and St. Louis who were of 
Southern birth and secretly sympathized with tli'e Confederacy and 
were willing to act as informants, there were professional paid 
spies who reported every movement. These people were, in almost 
every case, employes of the Federal government, and some wore 
the Federal uniform. 

There was not a military movement of any consequence directed 
from Washington that was not reported to tiie Davis government 
within three or four days, and but few matters were talked over in 
Federal cabinet sessions without being more or less fully reported. 
These things went to prove that officials in authorit}' were either 
acting for the Confederacy or could be pumped by others who 
were. 

From 1861 to the close of the war, there was not an hour when 
the national capital was clear of Confederate spies, and the same 
may be said of other border cities. The professionals resorted to 

[3701 





^72k. 



MAJ.-CE>T. G-EOP'".'-' 



n.- r> \,fi M y\ ,1 AK 



OONFEDEKATE SCUUTS AND SPIES. 371 

various shifts and disguises. Tlicy were in various departments as 
clerks or janitors. Tiiere was at least one at every navy yard and 
arsenal. Three or four were in business, and others were in the 
employ of army contractors, or hung about the Federal camps as 
discliarged soldiers who were trying to make a living by selling- 
songs, postage-stamps, and the many little articles needed by 
soldiers. 

That spies were present in Washington was fully and continually 
realized by the administration, but it was only at rare intervals that 
proofs could be obtained to warrant an arrest. The efforts put 
forth to prevent news from passing to Kichmond through any 
source never closed all the channels. There were Confederates 
wearing the blue in every army organized to suppress rebellion, 
and the women of the border would brave any danger to act as 
news bearers. 

Perhaps fifty times in the course of the war Confederate messen- 
gers entered Baltimore, Washington, Louisville, Cincinnati, and St. 
Louis, and purchased quinine, percussion-caps, calomel, and other 
things much desired, and made a safe return with their goods. Any 
one of these messengers, had he been identified for what he was, 
would have suffered death by hanging. 

The harsh course pursued by Seward and Stanton and their 
subordinates toward such citizens of Maryland, Kentucky, Tennes- 
see, and Missouri as would not prove by deeds their adherence to 
the Union may have reaped some few benefits, but there is certain 
knowledge that it was of immense help to the Confederacy. The 
idea with Stanton was to terrify civilians who might be inclined to 
sympathize with the South, while Seward paid his respects to 
higher personages. Where Stanton caused the arrest of a border 
citizen as a " suspect," it was not one time in twenty that he had 
proofs to convict him of any treasonable act. If the prisoner was 
convicted, it put one man out of the way; if he was not, he at 
once became embittered and was an enemy to the administration, 
together with all his friends. If the "suspect" was innocent, his 
neutrality was at once laid aside, and he became an active agent 
for the Confederacy. If guilty, the experience taught him to be 
more crafty in future. 

One of the coolest things ever attempted from the Confederate 
side occurred at Franklin, Tennessee, in June, 1863. One evening 
two men dressed in Federal uniforms rode up to the head-quarters 
of the colonel commanding the post, and were introduced as Colonel 



372 CONFEDERATE SCOUTS AKD SPIES. 

Auton and Major Dunlap. Both were dressed in the proper 
uniform and accoutred as officers of those grades, and their bear- 
ing was dignified and self-possessed. Colonel Anton stated that 
he was an inspector of federal outposts, with the Major for 
assistant, and at once began inquiring about the defenses and 
strength of the post, and to seek information of surround hig posts. 

The colonel stated that he was en route to Nashville, and had he 
played his part a little better no suspicion would have been created. 
Inspectors were often detailed for such service, and such a visit was 
nothing to create surprise or distrust. Colonel Auton, however, 
asked too many questions concerning military matters outside of 
the post of Franklin, and while this fact did not give rise to any 
direct suspicion, another matter did. He was recognized by an 
officer at the post as a former Federal officer accused of deserting 
to the enemy. He was, as a matter of fact, a lieutenant in the 
Tenth Infantry when the war broke out, and was appointed as 
colonel of the Second Cavalry. His real name was Lawrence A. 
Williams, and he was then on Bragg's staff. The name of his com- 
panion was Dunlap, and he was a hrst lieutenant in Forrest's 
command. The object in disguising themselves and making this 
excursion was to discover the exact military situation of Rosecrans' 
army. 

While the officer who recognized Williams did not betray the fact 
in his presence, it seems that the recognition was mutual, and the 
latter soon made an excuse to continue his journey. The pair had 
been gone but a few minutes when they were pursued and over- 
taken. They displayed nothing beyond surprise and annoyance at 
this incident, and wlien the post commander expressed his doubts 
about their identity, Colonel Auton haughtily replied : 

"Yery well, sir. A faithful officer cannot be too careful in 
these troublesome times. You will please telegraph to head-quarters 
at Mnrfreesboro and establish our identity." 

This remark was meant to disarm all suspicion, but, unfortunately 
for the pair, the post commander acted upon the idea. His telegram 
to head-quarters was replied to in effect that the men must be sus- 
picious characters, as no such officials had been sent out. 

Williams insisted that there must be some mistake, and exhibited 
documents which seemed to be regular and to prove that the pair 
were what they claimed to be. They had nothing whatever in 
their possession to implicate them, and the puzzled post commander 



CONFEDERATE SCOUTS AND SPIES. 



373 



agaiu resorted to tlie telegrapli. The answer was that they were 
spies, and to try the case and hang them at once. 

While it might have delayed the case for several days had the 
prisoners persisted in their innocence, the telegram from head-quar- 
ters denying their identity seemed to break the men down all at 
once, and they confessed their identity and mission and pleaded for 
clemency. This Rosecrans would not bestow, and there being no 
need of a trial since they had made fnll confession, they were 
ordered to prepare for death. They begged to be shot in place of 
a gallows execution, l)ut this request was not granted. 

At an early liour in the morning they were conducted to a hill- 
side about half a mile from headquarters, where a temporary 
scaffold had been erected under a cherry tree. A Federal who was 
present says that both men maintained their nerve and were pre- 
pared to face death. They shook hands, bade each other good-bye, 
and both met their fate like brave men and soldiers, true to the 
cause tliey had espoused. 




^"-^^ 



€\t J^stnution of tlje |^asl]btlk» 




NE of the quickest, boldest exploits performed by a 
Federal gun-boat outside the destruction of the Atlanta, 
was accomplished by the iron-clad Montauk in 18G3, 
and, as by the capture of the Atlanta the Confederacy 
lost a privateer which had cost nearly $1,000,000 in 
gold to tit out, so also it lost an equally valuable craft in the destruc- 
tion of the Nashville, brought about in a most singular manner. 

In the summer of 1862 an English iron built steamer ran the 
blockade into Savannah, carrj'ing a cargo valued at over $1,200,000. 
She had scarcely entered port when the blockade was strengthened 
by the arrival of two or three more vessels, and the steamer found 
it quite another thing to get out. She loaded with cotton, turpen- 
tine and rosin, and ran down the Ogechee to Fort McAllister, but 
there she came to anchor. The blockaders were waiting for her in 
the river and sound, and there was not one chance in a hundred of 
her being able to dodge them. 

For two or tiiree weeks the rimner remained in the river, steam 
up and hoping to tire the vigilance of the Federals and find some 
opening, but none came. One of the blockaders anchored in the 
middle of a channel not fifty feet wide, and no sort of weather 
could help the steamer to squeeze past such an obstruction. After 
waiting until further delay seemed useless, the steamer returned to 
the city, unloaded her cargo, and the Confederate government at 
once took her in hand and began the work of converting her into a 
privateer. 

The Nashville was the name given to the new craft, and owing 
to her strong build and speed the work of remodeling her was not 
a difficult task. Being intended for a privateer only, she was not as 
heavily armed as the Alabama, Atlanta, and others, nor was it ex- 
pected that she could be made invulnerable. Her engines, pilot- 
house, and other localities were securely protected from the projec- 

137-11 



THE DESTEUCTION OF THE NASHAHLLE. 375 

tiles of ordinary gun-boat ordnance, but a dozen places were left 
where a nine-inch gun would send a shot completely through her. 

Men who had worked on fitting out the privateer deserted at 
different times and carried the news to the Federals, and long 
enough before she was finished it was known in Washington what 
was iroine on at Savannah. Orders were issued to the blockading 
fleet to catch tlie Nashville at all risks when she came out, and for 
months some of the fleet did not move a hundred feet from where 
the anchor first went down. 

To prevent any expedition from the fleet ascending the river and 
destroying the vessel, the Confederates arranged various obstructions 
and planted several torpedoes, and a water patrol was maintained day 
and night from the fort to the ship-yard. This was not labor lost. 
Three different expeditions were planned and prevented, and two 
Federal scouts who were surveying the channels in a skiff by night 
were blown high-sky by a torpedo. A Confederate patrol boat was 
within two hundred feet of them when the explosion took place. 
One of the men, who seemed to be the center-piece of a water- 
spout, fell within ten feet of the boat, which was at the same 
moment nearly swamped with the water which descended. The 
man was unconscious, and though he revived after awhile, he was 
so badly hurt that he died within two or three days. The other 
man seemed to ascend perpendicularly, and to a great height, for he 
did not come down for several seconds after the first. His body 
was found fioating on the surface along with the fragments of the 
skiff, and those who overhauled it found legs and arms and almost 
every bone broken. It was said at the time that Du Pont received 
a hint from Washington that if the Nashville escaped to sea through 
the negligence of any of his commanders, some one would lose his 
official head. For more than five months a constant watch was 
kept for the privateer, and it was known to a day when she would 
be ready to move. 

After the Nashville was afloat and her guns and crew aboard, she 
discovered that she had no more opportunity to get out as a privateer 
than she had as a blockade runner. She ran down to the fort and 
reconnoitered and remained there several days, and then returned to 
her old berth. This programme of running up and down was fol- 
lowed until everybody became tired, and Confederates began td 
liint that the Nashville needed a new commander. The greatest 
dare-devil in the Confederate navy would not have taken the risks 
confronting the privateer. She had in front of her at least live 



37C THE DESTEUCTION OF THE NASHVILLE. 

Federal vessels, all of them better armed and each one with heavier 
mail than she carried. To run out of the river was to give the 
Nashville to the enemy. To remain was galling. 

Then the Confederates tried another plan. Just after a bad 
spell of weather the Nashville hid herself in a bend of the river 
above the fort, threw out pickets ashore to prevent Federal scouts 
from coming near, and it was given out among the garrison at Mc- 
Allister that the privateer liad escaped through the fleet and gone 
to sea. Then a chance was given two or three men to desert, and 
they carried the news to the Federal fleet. The Savannah papers 
gave an account of her dodging out, with a statement that she had 
been seen off Charleston. 

But Du Pont was not the sort of fox to stop for a whistle. The 
sharp eyes aboard his vessel had kept too good watch to believe 
these stories, and after it was seen that the trick had failed, the 
Nashville once more came down to the fort. 

On tlie twenty-seventh of February, as the Nashville was making 
her usual run in the river, she struck a newly-formed bar a mile or 
so above the fort. As she had full steam on when she struck, it 
was at once discovered that no little trouble would be experienced 
in getting her off. The tide also began to fall just then, and after 
working away for thirty minutes it became plain that she could not 
be got afloat before the next high tide. Every preparation was 
made to aid the tide in floating her next day, and but for an un- 
looked-for interference she would doubtless have been pulled off all 
right. 

It soon became known to the blockaders that the Nashville was 
aground, and a reeonnoitering vessel secured all obtainable particu- 
lars. Before midnight a deserter from the privateer had reached 
the fleet and given the exact state of afliairs. A boating expedition 
had almost been decided ou, but when the deserter stated that 
there were no hopes of getting the craft afloat before ten o'clock 
next day, she was considered as good as destroyed. 

At break of day the Montauk left the fleet and advanced to within 
less than one thousand yards of the fort. By way of the river around 
to where the Nashville was aground was a distance of nearly two 
miles, but across the peninsula it was no more than eight hundred 
yards. If the Montauk could stand the fire of the fort she could 
hold the privateer under short range. Setting herself down in her 
berth with the shot from the fort flying around her, the Montauk 
soon trained her guns on the Nashville. 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE NASHVILLE. 6 I ( 

Such a proceeding liad not been anticipated aboard the Nashville 
and the greatest excitement at once prevailed. She had no ordnance 
to compare with that of the Federal, and it was realized that she 
must be abandoned. Orders were issued to this efiect, and in fifteen 
minutes from the appearance of the Montauk the Nashville was 
abandoned. Officei's and crew saved most of their personal prop- 
erty and the retreat was made in good order. 

The Montauk now had it all her own way. Tlie fort opened on 
her from every gun which would bear, but paying no attention to 
these missiles she felt for the range of the privateer. At the third 
shot splinters were sent flying, and the fourth, fifth and si.xth went 
straight into her. The Nashville presented a fair broadside, and 
when the monster fifteen-inch shell struck her the crash of iron and 
wood could plainly be heard for a mile. An opening would be 
made lai"ge enough for a man to crawl into, and the river was soon 
covered with splintered wood. Inside of twenty-five minutes 
after the first shot was fired the Nashville was on fire, but the Mon- 
tauk kept pounding away until the craft was in fiames in three 
different places. 

One of the colored firemen had a bottle of whisky, and between 
four o'clock in the morning and the Montauk's first shot he drank 
enough to make him helpless. In this condition he stowed himself 
away and went to sleep, and the next thing he knew the eleven and 
fifteen-inch shells were tearing their way through the privateer and 
the crew had departed. I met the man in Atlanta in 1882, and as 
he gave a straight list of all the officers of the Nashville, with all 
the particulars of her running on the shoal, his story seemed entitled 
to full credit. As soon as he discovered what had occurred and 
what was then occurring he was perfectly sober. His only chance 
was to go overboard, and while looking for something to float liim 
the vessel was hit twice, and each missile made her rock from stem 
to stern. She was on fire in two places when tlie negro left her, 
and not only did he go overboard with a plank to sustain liim, but 
he floated past the fort and was picked up after he had drifted down 
among the blockaders. 

After the fourth or fifth discharge the practice on board the 
Montauk was perfect. At this fair range she could plant a shell 
wherever directed and each one seemed to start a fire in the hold. 
When the flames had taken a fair hold the Federal ceased firing and 
remained a quiet spectator of the destruction of a craft over which 
Uncle Sam had worried and grown thin for long months. About 



378 



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE NASHVILLE. 



nine o'clock she blew up with a loud report, and up to 1880 portions 
of the wreck were yet visible near the spot. 

The Nashville liad depended upon the fort to drive the Montank 
ofiF, and the fort had tried its best to do so. The Federal was under 
a steady fii-e from five to six guns for over an hour, but not tlie 
slightest attention was jJaid to the fort. Shot after shot crashed 
against tiie armor of the Montauk, but only to leave a sliglit dent 
and drop into the river. The mission was to destroy' the privateer, 
and even after tliat was accomplished, Commander Worden remained 
at anchor to watch the progress of the flames, while the fort was 
dropping an iron missile on his decks every thirty or forty seconds. 
One may search the whole record of naval affairs during the war 
and not find such another case where pluck and luck was com- 
bined in so happy a manner. It was only after the destruction of 
the Nashville that the Confederates who had been sneering at her 
commander for not pusliing his way past the biockaders realized 
what would have happened had she tried the experiment. 

The fifteen-inch siiell of the Montauk would have penetrated the 
Nashville at two thousand yards, though the firing would have been 
wild. At the range she had, it was almost rifle practice. One 
shell went completely through both sides of the ship and across the 
river before exploding, and years afterwards a piece of the shell 
weighing over two pounds was dug from a tree at a point eight 
feet above the ground. 

Hundreds of tliousands of dollars had been spent on the Nash- 
ville, and the Confederate government had built high hopes on her 
success, and yet a bit of ill-luck for which no one could be held 
responsible led to her destruction before her crew had ever beat to 
quarters or one of her guns been stained by powder. 




€\lt i'mt fot 0f t|t |rou-ClatJs. 




Admiral DU font eitlier did not believe in the 
monitors, or he had too much faith. It has been 
repeatedly charged that he was in a luifE when they 
were sent down to him in the winter of 1862-3, and 
that he pitted them against Fort McAllister with a 
secret hope that they would be sent to the bottom. 

It is more reasonable to believe that this test was made with a 
view to finding out what they would be able to accomplish when 
brouc^lit to face the sea-wall of Fort Sumter. It was a test wbic.i 
proved them through and through; and while the results tempo- 
rarily disappointed the friends of the new style of fighting-craft, 
they had strong grounds for future hope. 

Fort McAllister was the gate which guarded Savannah. It was 
built on a desolate site on the river within two or three miles of 
Os^abaw Sound, the country being swampy and the. river lined tor 
a part of the way with a thick growth of forest. The long years 
have settled the sandy parapets and wrought destruction to planks 
and timbers, but the fort still stands and the visitor will find much 
to surprise him. I believe that one might to-day dig out and pick 
up from that site three or four tons of shot and shell, and this 
would not be the fiftieth part of the metal hurled at it during the 

Fort Wao-ner, at Charleston, was built of sand because no other 

material wa°s convenient. Fort McAllister was designed as a sana 

fort and little else was used in its construction. Its walls of sand 

were in some places thirty feet thick, and its bomb-proofs were 

unusually safe ; but at the time of the Federal attack in March, 

1863 its armament included none of the new and powerful cannon 

used 'on Federal gun-boats. Long before any attack was looked for 

the eno-ineer of the fort was told that one monitor would knock the 

fort to'" pieces in one hour's work, but he merely heaped on more 

sand In thickness of embrasures no other Confederate fort ever 

matched it, and though Sherman finally captured the works, it was 

1379] 



380 THE FIE8T TEST OF THE IRON-CLADS. 

after the Coufederacy had been cut in two, Confederate armies 
scattered, and every soldier knew that the end was at hand. 

Du Pont had leai'ned that he could not pass the fort on account 
of the obstructions in the river, and he determined to batter down 
the fort itself. The fleet assembled consisted of the Passaic, Pa- 
tapsco, Montauk, Nahant and three mortar schoonei-s. Each iron- 
clad carried two guns of the heaviest calibre, and the schooners 
were armed with thirteen-inch mortars. 

On the Confederate side the only preparations made after it was 
seen that an attack was to be made consisted of a slight increase of 
the garrison and some addition to the stock of ammunition. Savan- 
nah was thoroughly excited, but such was the confidence in the fort 
that no alarm was felt. 

It was the first Tuesday in March, 1863. The morning was 
bright and balmy, and both fleet and fort were in fighting condition. 
The iron-clads were to steam straight wp the river and make a direct 
attack, but the mortar schooners were towed no further than the 
bend in the stream, about a mile below the fort. Here they were 
not only out of range, but out of sight of the enemy, and in position 
to drop their monster shells fair within the works. 

There was almost perfect silence on the Ogeeche as the iron-clads 
finally moved out from their anchorage and steamed slowly up the 
river. They were still advancing when the mortar schooners opened 
fire with a roar which shook the earth for miles around. Tlie grand 
attack so long contemplated and so carefully prepared for had 
begun. 

Previous attacks on McAllister had shown the Confederates that 
all future great movements towards reducing it would be made by 
way of the river. The stream had, therefore, been obstructed by 
logs and piles until it was impossible for a vessel to advance nearer 
than twelve hundred yards, while the channel up which the iron- 
clads now advanced was so narrow that they had to move up in 
single file. 

The Passaic was in the lead, and as she came within range of the 
fort a hot fire was opened on her. The very first shot fired by the 
Confederates struck the turret of the Passaic with a thud which 
made the whole craft tremble. The first shot fired by the Passaic 
fell short and exploded in the marsh and threw up a shower of mud 
and water which would have hidden a vessel of war from sight for 
a moment. 

The iron-clads now took position and opened fire, and all the guns 



THE FIEST TEST OF THE lEON-CLADS. 381 

in the fort which could be brought to bear returned the compliment. 
To this crash and roar was added the awful noise of the mortars. 
Savannah, more than lifteen miles away, kept up a continuous trem- 
ble. Two water glasses placed side by side would make a ringing 
which could be heard all over the house. Doors opened or shut, 
dishes were thrown off the shelves, and people standing on the cob- 
ble-stone pavements were jarred in every nerve. 

For upwards of three hours the fight continued at white heat, 
every gun being steadily worked and almost every shot seeming to 
tell. The fort was a target too big to be missed when the range 
was once obtained, but there was a serious offset. As the ports of 
an iron-clad are its vital spots, so are the embrasures of a fort — 
especially a sand fort. The guns in Fort McAllister were so 
mounted that they were in sight only when being fired, the same as 
the guns on the vessels, and the iron-clads thus found themselves 
compelled to fire away at the thick banks of sand. 

One can see to-day the evidences of the power of the big shells 
from the iron-clads. A fifteen-inch shell weighs not far from three 
hundred and fifty pounds. They are eight or ten inches in diam- 
eter, and from seventeen to twenty inches long. One of these 
monsters, hurled by a charge of thirty-five or forty pounds of 
powder from a distance of one thousand two hundred yards, would 
penetrate a distance of ten feet into the solid banks of sand and then 
explode, and the explosion would lift tons of sand high in air. 
Sometimes the greater amount would fall back into the hole, thus 
nearly refilling it, and at others it would be dashed clear across the 
fort, knocking men down and almost burying them alive. 

There is a spot near the fort where a fifteen-inch shell fell short 
and exploded in soft soil. The hole scooped out must have naturally 
filled xip considerably in the twenty years that have passed, and yet 
it is large and deep enough to-day to form a grave for a yoke of 
oxen. 

The quarters of the garrison inside the fort were of wood. I saw 
in Savannaii a piece of pine board a foot wide by three feet long 
and half an inch thick, which was sawed off and taken away after 
the fight as a relic. The board is loaded M-ith sand and fine gravel, 
driven into it by those explosions. Several small stones were driven 
clear through it, and hundreds of others so firmly imbedded that 
they can scarcely be moved with a stout knife-blade. 

The garrison were in a great measure protected from the projeo 
tiles of the iron-clads, because they were fired at point-blank range, 



382 TUE FIRST TEST OF TUE UtONCLADS. 

biit in case of the monsters from tlie mortar schooners there was no 
place of safety except in the bomb-proofs. They rose high in the 
air with a whir-s-s-s-h which sent a chill over the spectator, hung in 
mid-air for what seemed a long minute, and then took the other side 
of tlie curve and plumped down into the fort with a jar plainly 
felt half a mile away. Then followed the explosion, spreading 
terror and working destruction all over the fort. 

Men who have served on both iron-clads and mortar schooners 
assert that the deck of the latter is the worst place in war during an 
engagement. The discharge of the mortars fairly lifts a man off 
his feet. The ears soon get accustomed to the roar of a cannon, but 
the bellow of the mortar is not only positively painful to the ears, 
but has been known to produce neuralgia and violent cramps. Men 
on the deck of a mortar schooner who do not stand on tip-toe and 
with teeth apart, will be disabled in an hour. 

It was the mortar shells which set tlie wooden quarters within the 
fort on fire, but such an event had been anticipated, and therefore 
produced no confusion. A few men were quietly detailed to re- 
move property and the rest continued the fight. 

Just before noon a lieutenant in the fort had a most singular 
escape. He had mounted the parapet to examine and report the 
damage caused by a bomb-shell, when one fell within six feet of 
him. He heard it descending, but dare not move. Shutting his 
eyes and clenching his teeth, he waited for what seemed to him two 
minutes, and then heard the thud of the missile. The next thing 
he knew more than a quarter of an hour had passed away. As the 
shell exploded the officer was lifted fifteen feet into the air, whirled 
over and over, and he came down thirty feet from whei-e he had 
been standing. 

After the first half-hour of the fight, the Confederates directed 
the fire of six cannon at the Passaic, she being two hundred yards 
nearer tlian either one of the others, and almost upon the spot 
where the target had been placed for practice firing. Between nine 
and twelve o'clock she was struck twenty times, while the others 
were hit two or three times each by glancing balls. While the 
Confederates were doing some fine shooting, tiieir ordnance was so 
light that the solid shot scarcely left a dent in the armor. When it 
was seen that the iron-clads were receiving no damage, orders were 
given in the foi't to fire at longer intervals, and only at the port- 
holes of the vessela. 

About noon, the iron-clads ceased firing for two hours to pipe to 



THE FIEST TEST OF THE IRONCLADS. 383 

dinner and give the men a rest. During this interval the subject of 
landing infantry to attack the fort was sharply canvassed, but finally 
abandoned. Had such a movement been cai-ried out it would have 
resulted in a terrible slaughter to the attacking party, as the bomb- 
proofs were full of infantry and the grounds around the fort un- 
favorable to an advancing foe. One of the last shots fired before 
piping to dinner struck a columbiad in the fort and dismounted and 
rendered it useless. 

During the temporary truce both sides made ready for another 
grapple. Thus far four hours had been thrown away in a tremend- 
ous cannonade, for not a man had been killed on either side. 

From two until four o'clock there was a grand crash, and the 
news went round that the fort was being knocked to pieces. This, 
however, turned out to be false news. The iron-clads had now 
tried themselves and knew what they could do, and shortly after two 
they renewed the fight with such energy that the artillerists in tlie fort 
were more than once driven to the bomb-proofs. So fierce was the 
fire and so terrific the destruction of the shells that for an hour 
hundreds of men looked expectantly for a white flag to be run up 
in token of surrender. 

At four o'clock the Passaic was so heavily hit on the turret that 
it was in a measure disabled, and the ship dropped down out of the 
fight, soon followed by the others. It was generally believed that 
Fort McAllister had been so badly knocked to pieces that it would 
either be abandoned during the night or its destruction could bo 
accomplished in an hour next forenoon. To prevent the Confed- 
erates from making any repairs the mortars on the schooners were 
kept going the remainder of the afternoon and all night. 

Tlie fort mounted only one mortar, but this was manned early in 
the fight and was worked in reply to those aboard of the schooners. 
In either case the bombs had to be thrown over a belt of woods 
which completely hid the schooners from the fort, and the Fedei-als 
had a great advantage not only in number of mortars, but tlie fort 
was a great target and the range was reported by look-outs until it 
was exact. 

The bombs from the Confederate mortar were thrown by guess, 
and no actual damage was inflicted. Two of them fell within six 
feet of one of the schooners and exploded at the bottom of tiie river 
and sent up such showers of water as to nearly hide the craft from 
view for a moment. Others fell in the forest along the banks and 
tore great trees to pieces, but not one of them injured a Federal. 



384 THE FIRST TEST OF THE IKON-CLAD8. 

At an early hour next morning the iron-clads moved iip to finish 
the fort, but lo ! a great change had taken place in the few hours. 
jSTotwithstanding the tire of the mortars during the night, the garri- 
son had made all repairs and placed everything in complete prepar- 
ation for a new fight. Those walls of sand were again smoothed, 
every cannon ready to belch forth its ball, and one could not have 
told that a shot had ever been fired at the works. 

In this emergency the fleet was ordered to retire, and this ended 
the first real test of the iron-clads. They had come within good 
range, selected berths to suit them, and were provided with much 
the heavier ordnance and greatly assisted by the mortars, but yet 
they had accomplished nothing. Guns and mortars had together 
fired nearly three hundred shells of great size, and yet this sixty 
tons of metal might as well liave been thrown overboard into the 
river. 

What seems almost incredible can be substantiated by ofiicial 
reports and plenty of witnesses. During all that fight only three 
men in the fort were wounded and neither of them disabled, and 
not a single soldier was killed. Two guns were temporarily dis- 
abled, and the rough board quarters of the men demolished. Five 
or six hours' work by a hundred men tliat niglit made the fort as 
good as before. Federal reports at the time claimed that half the 
garrison was wiped out, but not even one life was lost. 

"This fight has proved the entire invulnerability of the monitors," 
wrote one Northern correspondent, and yet witiiiu a month he was 
to see the Keokuk go down in Charleston harbor, and tlie stoutest 
iron-clad in the fieet limp out from under the guns of Sumter. 

Place the monster ordnance of the present day in the embrasures 
of a sand fort so situated that five or six guns can be trained upon 
one iron-clad, and nothing made to fioat can remain within range 
an hour. On the other hand, a solid bank of sand, thirty-five or 
forty feet thick, cannot be breached like a wall, scooped out like 
dirt or clay, and will readjust its lines wherever broken by a shell. 
A fifteen-inch shell will drive from seven to ten feet into sand, and 
its explosion will disturb the face of the wall for a distance of 
twenty feet, but four-fifths of the sand upheaved will fall back 
into the hole, and enough more run in from the sides to level up 
the spot. 



%RmB, duii-Jjoats, anit |roii-Clait.s. 




NE of the great disadvantages under which the South- 
ern Confederacy hibored was in having such a long 
coast-line to defend. Another was in having so many 
water highways over which Northern gun-boats could 
pass. It took as many men and guns and hard work 
to prevent a gun-boat from passing up the Yazoo as it did to hold 
a division of Federal infantry in check on land. While the Mis- 
sissippi was of inestimable value to the Confederates in one sense, 
in another the forts and men and guns defending it were so nmch 
muscle lying idle seven-tenths of the time. While the Confederate 
Army of the Potomac had no lines to defend, the Western Con- 
federate armies had half a dozen, and as fast as one of these was 
lost to the South the result was felt to Charleston. 

One of the first meetings of the Confederate cabinet discussed 
the question of privateers, rams, and iron-clads. While the North 
flattered itself that the South was upset with excitement and was 
fighting the war without farther plan than to save Richmond, the 
very opposite was the truth. Within a month after the battle of 
Bull Run the Confederacy had its military plans for the defense of 
every mile of territory. The defenses of Richmond were begun 
no sooner than those of New Orleans. 

The idea of an iron-clad like the Merrimac was being worked 
out before the land forces had a skirmish. Had this same monster 
been set afloat on the Mississippi or in Mobile Bay, or in other 
Western waters, her career would have had a different result. She 
was not seaworthy and could not be made so. She could have 
traversed the Mississippi in defiance of every Federal cannon. 

There were some curious facts connected with the history of the 
Merrimac. It was generally believed that she would sink of her 
own weight as soon as the guns were put aboard, and the Confed- 
erate President was severely criticised in scores of papers for 
throwing away money on a scarecrow. Her guns were mounted 

Vol. L-25 ^^1 



386 BAMS, GUN-BOATS, AND IBON-CLADS. 

for point-blank firing, thus placing her under a great disadvantage 
the moment she was attacked by the Monitor. Her great draught 
made her unwieldy, and when lirst brought out four men had bard 
work to control her helm. None of her guns bad been tired, 
there had been no drilling, and an hour before she sailed for 
Hampton Roads her crew was not yet made up. She fought in 
water so shallow that she twice got aground, and her guns would 
bear on the Monitor only when the latter drew away and came 
under their range. If the guns of Fort Sumter, two years later, 
bored through the nine-incli plates of Federal irou-clads, what 
must have liappened had the Merrimac been provided with bolts 
instead of sliell to liurl against the five-inch plates of the Monitor? 

In February, 1S63. after the Federal iron-clad gun-boat Indianola 
had passed the batteries at Vicksburg, the Confederates fitted out 
an expedition to capture or destroy her. The steamer Queen of the 
West, captured a short time before, had her vulnerable parts pro- 
tected by bales of hay and cotton, a false bow or " ram " attached, 
and was armed with two heavy guns. The second of the fleet was 
the Webb, a wooden steamer with powerful engines and great 
speed. She had been partly iron-plated, furnished with an iron 
bow for a ram, and carried four guns. There were two other boats 
in the fleet, each armed with field-pieces and riflemen, and their 
machinery protected by cotton, but they did the gun-boat no real 
damage in the fight. 

The Indianola was supposed to be invulnerable. Indeed, she had 
been hit twenty times by shot from the Confederate batteries with- 
out cracking a plate or starting a bolt. In addition to her natural 
strength she had stacked up bales of cotton around her pilot house 
and elsewhere. When attacked she had a coal barge lashed on 
either side. While these were a defense against the rams, they 
impeded her movements, and in that respect were a disadvantage. 
The gun-boat was toiling slowly up stream on the evening of the 
twenty-fourth, when she discovered the four steamers in pursuit. 
As they were certain to overtake her in tlie course of an Jiour, even 
if she dropped her barges, the gun-boat cleared for action and 
turned and ran down the river to meet them. This action on the 
part of Commander Brown proves that he was a man of coolness 
and pluck. 

As the Indianola i-an down she made a direct line for the Webb, 
whom she had most reason to fear. In doing this she had to 
entirely neglect the Queen of the West. This latter steamer, ring- 



EAMS, GUN-BOATS, AND lEON-CLADS. 387 

ing the bell for the engineer to pull her wide open, rushed for the 
gun-boat on the port side and cut clear through the barge laden 
with coal and rammed the Indianola with force enough to heel her 
over at a sharp angle. Although this blow left the barge a wreck 
■ of planks and timbers held along-side by the lashings, the gun-boat 
did not change her course a point. 

Ringing the bell for all steam, the commander of the Indianola 
crashed her straight into the Webb. The ram had also held a 
straight com'se for the gun-boat, and they came together as squarely 
as two locomotives, but with greater force. The shock was dis- 
tinctly heard far away. The guns were knocked about, men 
flung here and there, and the crunching and munching of timber 
and breaking of iron led both contestants to believe that they 
would sink together. Strangely enough, the Webb, which was 
supposed to have by far the strongest bow, sustained all the dam- 
age. Her starboard bow was crushed in with such force that a 
horse could have been led through the breach. One of her guns 
was upset on its back, and the ram was held down until her crew 
thought she was sinking. Then, at the end of three or four min- 
utes, the boats drew away from each other and the fight began. 

While the gun-boat had sustained no damage from the shock, she 
now found herself in a perilous position. She was short-handed, 
entirely surrounded, and a furious fire was being rained upon her, 
while the two rams were determined to sink her. 

While the Webb was i-ecovering herself, the Queen backed off, 
and rushed iipon tlie gun-boat from the other side, this time cutting 
through the otiier barge, as if it had been paper. Boards and 
splinters from this collision were hurled fifty feet high, and came 
down in a shower. The loss of the barges left the Federal vessel 
free to move, and Commander Brown strained every nerve to sink 
his opponents by ramming. Both were his superiors in speed and 
dexteritj', and thus avoided his blows. 

The night being dark, all the fighting was done by the flashes of 
the guns, or, rather, bv the light of the sheet of flame, M'hicli was 
almost bright enough to read by. As each and every craft was con- 
tinually moving, most of the shots were thrown away. The third 
lilow was from the Webb, the fourth from the Queen, and the fifth 
and six from the Webb. Tiie fight was now so close that the rams 
could not get full headway before striking, and their blows were 
glancing ones, though the collision in each case knocked men down 
and made every timber groan. One who fought on the Webb that 



388 EAMS, GUN-BOATS, AJfD lEON-CLADS. 

night told me that every time she rammed it seemed as if the boil- 
ers and machinery of the boat moved backwards a foot. 

After the Queen had demolished the coal barges she made only one 
assault, her commander' having discovered that he would soon sink 
his own boat instead of the enemy. She therefore backed out of 
the way, and while the three boats maintained a steady and terrific 
fire on the gun-boat, the Webb watched every opportunity to use 
her ram. 

In delivering the sixth blow she took a run of an eighth of a 
mile, being driven with such vengeance that the flames blazed out 
of her smoke stacks and lit up the river for a mile around. She 
struck with a force which would have carried her through a brick 
wall five feet thick, crushing one of the gun-boat's wheels, breaking 
several jjlates, and starting a dozen leaks. The fate of the gun-boat 
was decided by that blow, but with the water rushing into her like 
a mill race, half her guns upset and her crew unable to hear an 
order on account of the terrible din, the Indianola continued the 
fight. 

The Webb again backed off, this time pulling away for a quarter 
of a mile. Wlien she rushed for her victim the sight was one never 
to be forgotten. With the powerful engines working at their best, 
her whistle screaming, her smoke stacks vomiting sheets of flame, 
and the craft herself seeming to rush upon the surface, she struck 
the gun-boat for the last time. The concussion would have shat- 
tered the sea wall of Fort Sumter. The stern of the Indianola 
was lifted high out of the water, a dozen plates M'cre broken, and 
as she settled back on the river the water poured into her in tor- 
rents. 

Both Grant and Sherman have officially complained that after 
certain Confederate forts were surrendered the oflicers winked at the 
destruction of public property. In this case the commander of the 
gun-boat ofiicially says that he kept his vessel in deep water until 
her powder, stores, etc., would be useless to the Confederates, and 
then ran her bow on the bank. It was by no means a fair fight, and 
had it been broad day instead of night the Indianola might have 
been the victor. The loss on either side was trifling, and the damage 
by shot and shell not worth mentioning. The Indianola was struck 
at least one hundred and fifty times by the guns of the enemy, but 
rolled the shot away without breaking a plate. On the other hand, 
as before mentioned, nearly all her own shot were thrown away. 



EAMS, GITN-BOATS, AND IKON-CLADS. 389 

The shells from her eleven-inch guns missed their targets in the 
darkness and went screaming into the woods to shatter the trees. 

The fate of the Indianola was surrounded by both glory and ridicule. 
Knowing nothing of the conflict and surrender below Vicksburg, 
the fleet above rigged up a sham monitor out of barrels, beams and 
planks and sent it adrift to fool the Confederate batteries. It was 
under tire for hours without the deception being suspected, and the 
current finally carried it beyond the last gun. The Indianola was 
still on the bank, and believing that the sham was a real iron-clad 
coming down to recapture the gun-boat, the Confederate blew up 
their prize and hurried down the river at their best speed. A Con- 
federate who examined her the day after the fight said that she had 
a mark of ball or bullet for every square foot of hull surface. The 
pilot house was struck by thirty-four cannon-balls, mostly from the 
field-pieces on the cotton-clads, and by over three hundred bullets 
from the riflemen. Not one single missile from the Indianola 
struck the cotton-clads, though a well-planted shell would have been 
enough to sink either one. 

In June, 1863, the Confederate iron-clad Atlanta was at Savannah 
and ready to run down and engage the Federal blockading fleet. 
She was an English-built steamer, provided with powerful engines, 
and had been altered from a blockade runner to an iron-clad. She 
had six of the best English guns, a crew of one hundred and seventy 
men, and was better equipped and provisioned than any other Con- 
federate craft afloat during the war. Her armor was a mixture of 
wood and iron, and was full twelve inches thick. I talked with 
men at Savannah who helped build her, and in their opinion 
she was the stoutest craft built b}' the Confederates from first to last. 
Her officers had not the least doubt of being able to whip the Fed- 
eral fleet and get to sea. 

The Confederate iron-clad had been heard of almost daily 
through deserters, and when it was known that she was in the 
river, and ready to come out, the Federal iron-clads Weehawken 
and Nahant took their station at the mouth of that stream and 
waited. One morning, at the end of a week, the Atlanta was sud- 
denly sighted. Before the Federals had cleared for action the Con- 
federate was within a mile of them, being accompanied by two 
gun-boats, which were to tow the captured Federals to Savannah. 
Both iron-clads had to weigh anchor and run out into the Sound 
and turn around, and in making this move the Weehawken got the 
lead and kept it. 



390 EAMS, GUN-BOATS, AND* lEON-CLADS. 

As the Weehawkeu turned about she steamed straight for the 
AtLanta, and the latter was coming down at the rate of ten miles 
an hour. Suddenly, and before a shot had been tired, she ran hard 
aground. In this position, while trying to work oflF, she opened lire 
on the advancing iron-clad. Such shooting was never done before 
in naval combat. She fired altogether six or seven times, the last 
shot when the Weehawken was only six hundred feet away, and 
yet none of her missiles even grazed the Federah 

The Weehawken fired only four times and every shot counted. 
Her second missile knocked the pilot house completely off the At- 
lanta, and the fourth knocked down nearly every man in the ship and 
wounded a full dozen. In fourteen minutes from the firing of the 
first gun the Atlanta surrendered, and that without the Nahant 
having taken any part in the action. Her going aground, of course 
placed her at a great disadvantage, but had this not occurred it is 
doubtful if she would have won the fight with such poor gunners as 
she liad aboard. She might have brushed past and got to sea, and 
had this occurred she would have been a veritable terror to Federal 
commerce. It was a loss of a full million dollars to the Confederate 
government, and her capture upset the plan to raise the blockade at 
Charleston and dash into New York harbor. 




Cje Jirst ithrd ^ttark on Jort Sumter. 




' T is two o'clock in the afternoon of the seventh of Aprils 
1863. 

An April day in 1861 began one of the bloodiest wars 
of the century. This April day, two years later, is to 
witness a sight in war which no nation has ever seen 
before. 

The Federal iron-clads are going to attack Fort Sumter ! 

That means more than you dream of. It means a revolution all 
over the world in the manner of building and arming ships of war, 
and it means that Fort Sumter will be the last brick fort ei'ccted on 
the American continent to withstand a bombardment from the 
water. 

It is a great epoch in the history of war. When the sun goes 
down this evening the wooden navies of Europe will be worthless, 
and the brick and stone forts of England and France will be un- 
tenable. 

We stand on the walls of Fort Sumter and look seaward. Off 
the bar are the blockaders — wooden vessels armed with from three 
to six and eiglit guns each. Inside the bar is the iron-clad fleet, 
named as follows: Weehawken, Patapsco, Nantucket, Patsaic, Iron- 
sides, Nahant, Montauk, Catskill, Keokuk. 

These nine iron-clads have a reserve of five vessels which can 
throw their projectiles into the Confederate batteries on Morris and 
Sullivan's islands. 

The channels have been obstructed by piles and rafts, and filled 
with nets and torpedoes, and the iron-clads will find themselves 
under the fire of Sumtei*, Moultrie, Beauregard, the Redan, and 
within long range of Castle Pinckney. Then there is the Wappoo 
Creek battery. Fort Johnson, Fort Ripley, Battery Bee, Fort Wag- 
ner, the Star and the Sand batteries. More than seventy heavy 
guns will be trained on the nine iron-clads. 

It is known in Charleston that the Federals are about to bombard 

[3911 



392 THE FIKST FEDERAL ATTACK ON FOET SUMTEE. 

Fort Sumter, auJ thousands of citizens liave gathered at the sea-wall 
park as spectators. It is a bright, clear day, the air bahny, tlae sun 
warm, and the water is smooth enough to float a canoe. 

It is two years since Major Anderson was bombarded out of 
Sumter. For two years the Confederates liave been adding to its 
strength and armament, and England's whole wooden navy would 
be no match for it at this hour. Fort Moultrie has also been 
strengthened in many ways, and the newer forts and batteries are 
very strong and well provided. 

Every commissioned officer but one in Fort Sumter is at dinner. 
Tliat one is on the ramparts with a spy-glass to his eye. He sees 
the iron-clads fall into line and begin the advance, and he reports 
the movement to the post commandant. Not an officer leaves the 
dinner table. The meal is coolly and deliberately finished, and 
then the long-roll is beaten, and every human being within those 
walls moves to the place assigned him without excitement or confu- 
sion. It is the same in every other fort and battery — no demon- 
strations, no excitement In a fort every man is one of the pieces 
of a great machine. When the machine moves every piece knows 
its place and falls into it. 

It was a strange siglit to see those grim iron-clads fall into line 
and advance. War had never witnessed such a spectacle before. 
When it was seen that the long anticipated attack was about to be 
made. Fort Sumter threw out the flag of South Carolina and saluted 
it with thirteen guns, wliile the music of the band on the ramparts 
was heard in every Confederate fort and battery — aboard the iron- 
clads — beyond the bar where the blockaders were lying and rock- 
ing on the swells. 

The iron-clads will be under tlie fire of the Star and Sand bat- 
teries and Fort Wagner before Moultrie or Sumter can fire a gun. 
After the salute of Sumter there is silence. In the Confederate 
works men whisper. On the esplanade in Charleston scarcely a 
foot moves on the gravelled walk. Aboard the iron-clads orders 
are given in low, stern tones full of terrible earnestness. The hun- 
dreds of men Jooking on from the reserve fleet and the blockaders 
fairly hold their breath. 

The whole world might well look on and tremble with excite- 
ment. The mightiest problem of naval warfare is about to be solved. 

Now the leading iron-clad is within range of the first Confederate 
work. Twenty thousand pairs of eyes look for a sudden puff of 
smoke and flame, but it does not come, /rhe Weehawken steams 



THE FIEST FEDERAL ATTACK ON FOKT SUMTEE. 393 

slowly on, and the others come up in turn, but that grim silence is 
unbroken. 

Straight on, until within easy range of the next, and yet that 
same grim silence. AVhat does it mean ? Have the Confederates 
deserted their works on Morris Island ? 

And now the Weehawken is within range of a third Confederate 
work. Its flag is flying, but not a man is visible. That same pro- 
found silence — that stillness which tries a brave man's nerves far 
more than the confusion of battle. One by one the other eight 
creep up and creep past, and ten thousand men whisper to each 
other : 

" What does it mean ? Why don't they fire ? " 

As has been written before, the attack had been anticipated for 
days and provided for. Instructions had been sent to every Con- 
federate work providing for the smallest details. The Confeder- 
ates wanted a fair fight. They wanted to give the iron-clads a fair 
chance to test their strength. The building of these monsters had 
frightened the South. If they could whip the forts and batteries 
in a fair fight, the fears would be well founded. If they could be 
beaten off, they would no longer be a terror. The instructions 
were to let the iron-clads advance as near as they desired without 
seeking to obstruct them. 

The head of the advancing line is full within the harbor of 
Charleston and within range of every work on Sullivan's Island be- 
fore the silence is broken. Then a puff of smoke shoots straight 
out from the ramparts of Moultrie, followed by a second, third and 
fourth, and the mightiest fight of the century has opened. It is 
iron-clad and turret, and ironsides, against brick and stone and sand. 

Let the whole world look on — there is a lesson to be learned. 

Eumors had reached the Federals of obstructions in the channels, 
but, if credited, no one knew what they were nor how placed. The 
instructions from Du Pont arranged for at least half the fleet to pass 
Fort Sumter and fire upon it from the rear. It was only when the 
Weehawken steamed ahead for this purpose that the piles and nets 
and torpedoes were discovered. Indeed, the iron-clad had picked 
up a seine with her wheel and was deprived of all motive power 
before the character of the obstructions was fully known. Thus 
fouled and iinraanageable, the iron monster drifts with the current, 
and the fire of her guns as she drifts seem like signals of distress. 
The Ironsides comes up and tries the otiier channel, followed hy 
two others, and in seeking to evade the obstructions there is a col- 



394 THE FIRST FEDERAL ATTACK ON FORT SUMTEE. 

lisioD and an entanglement, and for twenty rainntes the whole three 
are under a hot fire, without opportunity to answer it. When dis- 
entangled and in position to open tire the real fight begins. Du Pont 
has discovered that it is to be a square fight and he accepts. Here, 
then, ai'e the nine iron-clads within the circle of Confederate fire. 
They are supposed to be impregnable. They have ordnance war- 
ranted to knock a brick fort to pieces. Watch the fight — we shall 
see! 

The heaviest old-fashioned ordnance of the world is mounted 
upon the Confederate forts and batteries. The most effective guns 
of modern date are in the turrets of the iron-clads. Nearly eighty 
Confederate cannon are belching their fire into the circle in which 
the nine iron-clads move slowly about like bewildered monsters of 
the deep — -the iron-clads answer with thirty-two guns. It is a roar 
which sways the tree-tops in Charleston. It is an earthquake which 
raises bubbles of air along-side the blockaders seven miles away. It 
is a sound which rolls along the sea for fifty miles ! 

On the iron-clads they have coolly settled down to their work. 
Thirty-five pounds of powder are placed in one of the monster guns, 
a shot weighing four hundred and fifty pounds goes down after it, 
and the discharge seems to drive the vessel ten feet. Think of four 
hundred and fifty pounds of iron, tipped with steel, driven square 
against Sumter by such a weight of powder at a distance of one 
thousand yards ! Such a bolt would pass through ten ordinary 
brick walls as easily as a stone flies through a sheet of paper. The 
force of that blow is at least fifteen thousand tons, and it is being 
repeated once in a hundred seconds from every one of those thirty- 
two guns. 

Here in Fort Sumter, as in Moultrie, Beauregard and other 
works, they are using great bolts with the Brooke guns — solid shot 
and great shells with the eleven-inch cannon ^-rifled shot and bolts 
with the Eno-lish guns which have run the blockade. As the action 
continues, Sumter brings seven ten-inch mortars into play, and 
Moultrie two, and now the crash is terrific beyond description. 

The fire fi'ora the Confederates was at first by battery. At the 
end of ten minutes orders were given to fire at will, and then some 
of the closest shooting ever recorded was made. It seemed almost 
impossible for a Federal shot to miss the forts, but on the other 
hand the iron-clads sat low in the water, were kept moving, and 
appeared to oflier no chance to the best artillerists. Tlie Iron- 
sides was under the guns of Sumter at close range about fifteen 



THE FIKST FEDEKAL ATTACK ON FORT SUMTER. 395 

minutes, and at long range for three- quarters of an hour, moving 
every minute, and yet she was hit ten or twelve times in five min- 
utes. One of the iron shutters over a gun-port was struck and 
sent flying tlirough the air, a part of her stern was shot away, and 
three shells entered her bows and tore her in a frightful manner. 
She divided her fire between Sumter and Moultrie, but owing to 
some disai'rangement of machinery fired less than a dozen rounds. 
Had she remained ten minutes longer in the position first taken she 
would have been sent to the bottom. She was hit upwards of sixty 
times, or once for every fifty seconds of the engagement. The 
shot she fired would have disabled any two wooden ships afloat. 
One of her shot cracked the parapet wall of Fort Sumter for a 
distance of twenty-eight feet, and another struck and demolished a 
columbiad and its carriage. 

The Nahant did not advance nearer than one thousand yards, and 
yet she was hit eighty times. She presented no more of a target 
to the big guns at that distance than a floating hogshead, and yet 
certain pieces trained upon her from Sumter and Moultrie did not 
miss more than one shot out of six. Her crew went into action 
believing her impregnable, but the second shot received cracked 
one of her plates wide open. In ten minutes three plates had been 
fractured, and she was leaking. In twenty minutes it was seen that 
she could be pounded to pieces even at that distance. One of the 
last shots received was an enormous solid bolt from a Brooke gun. 
This bolt struck the pilot house squarely and fairly, driving in a 
dozen bolts and cracking the iron plates as a stone cracks a pane of 
glass. She had six of her crew wounded — one fatally — by flying 
Ijolts alone. She went out of the fight half a wreck, having fired 
about two dozen shots. 

The Passaic was hit over fifty times. One gun in Sumter struck 
her six times in succession. Had she been lying along-side of a three- 
decker she could have driven her shot completely through the craft 
every time, and every one would have made a hole as large as a barrel, 
but of the nine or ten shots she fired at Sumter only two struck, 
and those with no damage. There were a dozen places where the 
Confederate shot had plowed furrows in her iron plates as a plow 
leaves its mark on the soil. One plunging shot, which struck the 
top of her pilot house, left a cavity in the solid iron which would 
have held two quarts of water. She had nine plates cracked by 
one single shot, and such was the jar when the heavy shot struck 
her that men were knocked down. She showed three spots where 



396 . THE FIRST FEDEKAL ATTACK ON FOET SUMTEK. 

the iron plates were forced inwards until huge cones appeared on 
the inside, and she went out of the fight with her big gun disabled 
and her turret out of order. 

The Nantucket fired fifteen shots, nine of which were well 
planted, and was hit over fifty times. Three of the guns in Sumter 
tired only at her port shutters, and for seven or eight minutes 
eighteen guns were trained upon her at fair range. At the end of 
thirty minutes her large guns could no longer be worked, her turret 
was out of order, and she had received such wounds as proved that 
her destruction would be only a question of time under that fire. 

Tlie Catskill fired twenty-five shots and was hit fifty-one times. 
Three of the best sliots planted in Fort Sumter were fired from her 
guns. She was scarred and furrowed fi'om end to end, her plates 
cracked and broken, and one bolt went squarely through the iron 
deck, leaving a hole as lai-ge as a man's head. 

Despite her misfortune at the opening of the fight, the Weehaw- 
keii fired twenty-six shots, twenty of whicli hit. In turn she was 
struck about sixty times, liaving several plates cracked, and limped 
out of the figiit with her pumps going. 

The Patapsco fired eighteen shots, and was hit forty-five times, but 
most of the shot glanced oS. She had three or four plates cracked, 
was "bulged" in three or four spots, and one Confederate bolt 
peeled a furrow through solid iron three inches deep. 

Until just before the signal to drop out of the fight, none of the 
iron-clads were much nearer tlian a mile to Sumter. Suddenly 
the Keokuk, provided with double turrets, steamed ahead until 
within rifle range. She was one of the stoutest, if not the very 
best of the fleet, and her guns were served in a manner to elicit 
the admiration of the Confederates. She was hit ninety times — 
sixty of the shot striking her in the space of ten minutes. When 
she steamed aliead, thirty-eight guns concentrated tlieir fire upon 
her, and the sound of the projectiles striking the iron was plainly 
heard in Sumter and Moultrie. Here was the real test of the 
fight. Solid iron plating six inches thick had to give way before 
the Confederate shot. Before she could back out of the position 
in which she had voluntarily placed herself she had twelve men 
wounded, her turrets pierced in five or six places, and twenty holes 
in her iron hull. As she moved off down the bay the sea washed 
into her in a dozen places. Her pumps kept her afloat through 
the night, but at daylight she went down like a stone. 

The belief was that none of the nine iron-clads could be pierced 



THE FIKST FEDEBAL ATTACK ON FOET SUMTER. 397 

by any projectile in the hands of the Confederates. They, there- 
fore, went into action with perfect confidence. They were per- 
mitted to pass several batteries which could have at least greatly 
annoyed them, and to take np such positions as suited them best. 
After that it was give and take, and they were fairly whipped. 

Federal history has asserted that the fleet was opposed by at least 
three hundred guns. The number was exactly seventy-six, and not 
one of them was the equal of the new ordnance on the iron-clads. 
Fort Sumter was struck about sixty times, and had four men 
wounded. The damages were I'epaired in a single day. Fort Moul- 
trie had one man killed, and an hour's work would repair all dam- 
age. Wagner had three men killed and three wounded, but the loss 
of life was the result of an accident in the fort. None of the 
other Confederate works received damage or suffered loss among 
the garrison. The total number of shots fired by the Confederates 
was twent\'-two hundred. 

If Du Pont could have run a part of his fleet past Sumter and 
attacked its weak side, the result might have been different. The 
first lesson learned was that no wide-awake fort would permit such 
a maneuver. If again attacked, a square fight against its sea front 
must be expected. 

The second lesson learned was that no iron-clad could be made 
impregnable. None of the European iron-clads said to be imper- 
vious to projectiles of any sort have ever been tested as Du Pont 
tested that fleet. All iron-clads nmst have port shutters. Make 
them as they will, and a shot striking squarely and fairly will jam 
them so as to render the gun behind useless. A turret can be 
jammed by a shot, and a projectile from a fifteen-inch gun striking 
the pilot house will crack the plates or start the bolts. 

Sumter likewise learned a lesson. Though not severely damaged, 
it was easy to see that brick and stone could not resist shot and 
shell at such close range. Let such an attack be repeated often 
enough, and the fort must be knocked to pieces. The sand forts 
were undamaged. For years and years war had sought for the 
best material to construct forts, and lo ! a conflict of two hours had 
proved that it was the despised sand over wliich massive stone had 
been laboriously hauled. 

No other day in the world's history had taught the world so much 
of naval warfare. 



e i'mt Calralru fattle. 




'HILE there Iiad been more or less conflicts between 
Federal and Confederate cavalry in small commands 
up to the spring of 1863, the fight at Kelly's Ford in 
March, was recorded as tlie first real contest between 
regiments severe enough to honor the struggle with 
a page of history. 

The Confederacy encouraged the organization of cavalry from 
the very outset. The Federal government discouraged the idea dur- 
ing the first two years, and in the spring of 1862, actually disbanded 
several regiments in rendezvous. 

Up to the fight at Kelly's Ford it was hardly disputed that the 
Confederate cavalry was superior. Most of the horses were blooded 
animals, owned by the men who rode them, and the troopers in 
most cases furnished their own weapons. 

Tiie Federal cavalryman was, nine cases out of ten, almost a 
stranger to a horse, and it took months for him to get accustomed 
to the saddle. He had to learn to ride, to shoot, and to handle the 
sabre, and all the while he was doing this the government was look- 
ing upon him as a useless appendage, except as a dispatch or mail- 
carrier. 

In the month and year above named, General Averill cut loose 
from the Federal army opposite Fredericksburg, for a dash across 
the Rappahannock to strike the Confederate cavalry under Fitz- 
Hugh Lee and Colonel Jones. The Federal force consisted of two 
regiments of regulars, a battery of six guns, and the Sixth Ohio, 
Fourth New York, First Rhode Island, Third, Fourth and Six- 
teenth Pennsylvania. On the morning of the seventeenth this 
force reached the Ford in good order. 

On the other side of the river the Confederate force consisted of 
the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Virginia Calvary, but 
none of the regiments were half up to their complement, and the 
force aggregated only about thirteen hundred men. 

1398] 



THE FIKST CAVALKT BATTLE. 399 

The Ford was picketed by dismounted cavalry, and rifle-pits had 
heen dug and rude breastworks thrown up, while an obstruction 
in the shape of an abattis, filled the road on the Virginia bank. 
The New York regiment made the first dash into the river, but as 
the water was deep and progress slow, they broke back under the 
fire. Twice more tliey tried it, to be twice repulsed, and it was 
only when the Rhode Islanders came to the rescue that a crossing 
was effected. The Vii'ginia shore was held by less than sixty men, 
who had their horses in a safe place a quarter of a mile away. The 
firing alarmed tlie animals and stampeded a portion, so that when 
the pickets fell back they were overtaken and captured. 

Lee's main body was a mile or more from the river, and before it 
was ready to move towards the Ford, Averill had advanced over 
half a mile. Lines of battle finally confronted each other across 
an open meadow. Almost simultaneously the two forces left the 
cover of the woods and reached this field, and hardly a moment 
was lost in beginning the fiofht. 

o o O 

The Confederates made their first dash at the three Pennsyl- 
vania regiments on the Federal right. Not one man out of twenty 
in those regiments had ever seen a sabre flash in the hands of an 
enemy before. The Second Virginia formed in the meadow, and 
at the peal of tiie bugle rode straight down upon the Pennsyl- 
vanians, every man uttering his war-cry and every horse at full 
gallop. 

Near the middle of the meadow was a wide, deep ditch, full of 
water and mud. As the Virginians came to this they were thrown 
into disorder, and had to break their line and make a crossing at 
one place. Not half of them were yet over when tlie Pennsylva- 
nians went down upon them like a hurricane, capturing and killing 
a score of men and driving the regiment back to the woods. 

The next charge was made at the Federal left with a view of 
turning: it. This winsc consisted of the New York, Rhode Island 
and Ohio men, and was charged by the First and Fourth Virginia. 
The latter were not yet within striking distance when the Federals 
dashed at them, and for ten minutes it was the battle of a mob 
under a cloud of smoke — each man fighting on his own responsi- 
bility. The Virginians were outnumbered two to one, and soon 
had enough of the fight. 

The entire Confederate line was now retired, none of Lee's artil- 
lery having yet come up, and Averill's battery proving itself a dan- 
gerous annoyance. The Federals steadily advanced for nearly a 
mile, and halted again on the edge of a broad field. Lee had 



400 THE FIRST CAVALRY BATTLE. 

drawn up his cavalry in the center and was waiting. Averill had 
men enough to ride liini down, and it was a glorious opportunity to 
see what the Federals could accomplish with the sabre, but he did 
not seize upon it. Instead of so doing, he dismounted a regiment 
as skirmishers, brought up his artillery, and for twenty minutes 
waited to be charged. 

Lee endured the galling tire for that length of time, having a 
good defensive position and hoping to be attacked, but when no 
attack came, he sent the order down his lines for a cliarge. The 
brigade was formed in echelon, the lines dressing under a constant 
fire, and at sound of the bugle the whole command rode straight 
down upon tiie Federal front. 

It is doubtful if there was a more reckless charge of cavalry 
during the whole war. Averill's position was a very strong one 
the fences along his front being the greatest protection, and three 
of his field-pieces having the highway almost under their muzzles. 
A terrible fire was opened on the brigade as soon as in motion. 

It was a useless slaughter. It was scarcely ten minutes before 
the brigade was so knocked to pieces that retreat was its only sal- 
vation. Lee had failed on the front. He now ordered the Third 
and Fifth against the Federal right, and these regiments dashed 
down to find that flank protected by stone walls over which horses 
could not leap. In seeking an opening they galloped over half 
a mile under Federal fire, and were finally driven back suffering 
terrible loss. 

This ended the active fighting of the day, althougli Averill held 
his position until night. He lost in killed and wounded about 
eighty men, and had about sixty taken prisoners. Nearly all the 
killed and wounded were struck with the sabre, and scores of horses 
were likewise wounded by this weapon. 

Lee's loss was fully three hundred, but mostly from artillery and 
musketry. Those killed by the sabre were the first in the east who 
had fallen that way. While Averill repulsed the enemy he did not 
attack or pursue, and the most he could claim was that he held the 
ground until ready to leave. The moral effects were at once appar- 
ent. It had been the favorite boast of the Confederate cavalryman 
that the Federal trooper would not stand before him in a charge. 
Tlie emptiness of that boast was here proven. Federal cavalry 
would not only stand a charge, but gallop forward to meet it, and 
the time was near at hand when the trooper in bhie was to convince 
the military critics that he was a factor of importance in deciding 
battles. 



^Iicminisrnucs of tl^; |)arrirt '$m\L 




O vessel laixnched from the government ship-yard during 
the last fifty years had a more adventurous career than 
the Harriet Lane. Launched as a revenue cutter during 
Buchanan's term, and named after his niece, the Lane 
was made use of at once when the war opened, and 
owing to her light draft and speed she executed several important 
commissions on the coast at great risk, and in a satisfactory manner. 
She was then more completely armed and strengthened, plated to 
protect certain localities, and handed over to the navy as a gun-boat 
and bloekader. 

Just before the President's blockading proclamation went into 
effect there was a great outcry over a " rebel attempt " to destroy 
the Lane with all on board, as she lay at the Washington navy yard. 
As a matter of fact, a man in Washington who was a thorough 
Confederate and acting as a spy for the Richmond government, was 
instructed to go aboard the Lane and note her armament and 
strength of crew. The spy accomplished a part of his mission by 
getting aboard with some Federal army officers, but instead of 
being provided with a torpedo or an infernal machine, he was armed 
with a note-book and pencil, and his use of them aroused suspicion 
and ended in his being arrested. He was held for a few weeks and 
then discharged. The story that he intended to blow up the cutter 
was probably set afloat to add fire to the Northern heart. 

In January, 1863, Galveston, Texas, was garrisoned by about 
three hundred Federal infantry, and the naval force in the bay con- 
sisted of five or six gun-boats, among them the Harriet Lane. The 
Confederates had determined to repossess the place, and had planned 
a combined attack on both forces. Two hours before daylight two 
river steamers, armed with field-pieces and a large gun or two, and 
barricaded with cotton and filled witli picked men, armed with 
rifles, suddenly appeared on the bay, and almost at the same moment 

VOL.I.-26 t^« 



402 EEMINISCENCES OF THE HAEEIET LANE. 

Confederate infantry and artillery began an attack on the weak 
force holding the town. 

As soon as the Lane made out that the iieet was to be attacked, 
she at once took the initiative. She was armed with eight splendid 
guns and had a crew of one hundred and twenty-five men, and as 
she caught sight of the Confederate steamers bearing down upon 
her she ran for the nearest, calculating to cut her down and sink 
her. Her guns were being served at the same time, but owing to 
tlie targets being in motion and there being only moonlight to sight 
the guns by, her shot inflicted no damage. When the Lane struck, 
it was a glancing blow, and almost before she had slipped off, the 
otlier steamer was upon her with a shock which seemed to lift both 
out of the water. The Lane was not much injured, but the other 
started a leak which sent her to the bottom in seven feet of water, 
within the next fifteen minutes. 

The steamer which the Lane first struck had taken a circle and 
came about, and with a full head of steam on she ran for the Fed- 
eral and struck with a crash plainly heard on shore. Grapnels were 
ready and the two crafts were lashed together, and now the Con- 
federates could use tlieir riflemen to advantage. 

For ten minutes there was such a conflict as has seldom oc- 
curred on the water. The crew of the Lane were greatly outnum- 
bered, but they fought not only to save their own craft, but to 
capture the other. Both vessels were enveloped in such a cloud of 
smoke that men could not see ten feet away, bnt the fierce tight 
went on without abatement. 

The other Confederate steamer, though in a sinking condition, 
kept pouring in her fire on the Lane, and when the Federal com- 
mander, lieutenant-commander and nearly every other officer on 
deck had been wounded, and the guns rendered useless by the con- 
centrated fire of the Confederate riflemen, the Lane surrendered. 

The fight may be said to have taken place in the dark, it being 
only moonlight, at best, and clouds scudding across that luminary 
now and then made it so dark on deck that men had to feel their 
way about. One of the Lane's big guns was loaded and fired five 
or six times during the darkness and smoke, and it was found after- 
wards that each shell had passed through the gangway of the 
steamer along-side. 

The Court of Inquiry over the Galveston affair is glossed over by 
the Federal historians, and yet blunt old Farragut went down for 
bottom facts, and made a report which reflected anything but honor 



REMINISCENCES OF THE HAERIET LANE. 403 

on the affair as handled by the Federals. Both land and naval 
forces had thirty hours' warning of the attack, and yet no precau- 
tions were taken, and no one seemed solicitous. The Owasco was 
at anchor when the fight began, and the Westfield no sooner moved 
out of her berth than her pilot ran her hard aground on a shoal. 
Outside of the Harriet Lane, the Clifton was the only craft using 
her guns to any extent, and her firing was all directed at the Con- 
federate force ashore. As the Westfield could not be got off, it 
was planned to blow her up rather than see her possessed by the 
enemy. Some bungling brought about a premature explosion, in 
which the commander and a large number of the crew perished. 

While possessing the Clifton and Owasco, the one having seven 
and the other six guns, and each a crew full of fight, and while the 
Confederates had only the Lane, with which they would liave dared 
cross the bar for a fight, lieutenant-commander Law, who was now 
senior oflicer, left three vessels in tiie hands of the enemy and ran 
to sea, abandoning the blockade altogether for thirty hours. 

The Lane was a valuable prize to the Confederates. She was too 
good to aid in harbor defense, and yet not fitted for a privateer, and 
after awhile her guns were taken out, some alterations made, and 
she was changed to a blockade runner. The abandoned blockade of 
Galveston was resumed so soon and with such strength that the 
Lane was never outside the harbor as a Confederate armed vessel. 

There was much indignation at the North over the loss of the 
Lane, and the government seemed determined to recapture or 
destroy her. So long as she remained in Galveston harbor she was 
pretty safe from capture, and various plans were set on foot to 
destroy her. One of these was for two men to make their way 
from the Federal fleet along-side of the Lane on a night favorable 
for the purpose, and explode a torpedo under her. The other was 
to set her on fire. 

Late in tlie fall of 1863 a Federal scout said to have been sent 
from Washington for the purpose, landed on tlie coast within a few 
miles of Galveston and succeeded in entering that city in the guise 
of a Confederate purchasing agent. In the course of three or four 
nights he got aboard the Lane and set her on fire, but was detected 
almost in the act and fired upon as he went overboard. A.S he 
never afterwards reported to the Federal authorities the belief is 
that he was killed. 

Not only were a skiff and crew and torpedoes sent into the bay 
to destroy the Lane, but the men approached within two hundred 



404 REMINISCENCES OF THE HAEKIET LANE. 

feet of the vessel before the dangers of the mission caused them to 
turn back. There was talk of a steam launch with a spar torpedo, 
but after a while the startling events of war caused the subject to 
be forgotten, and nothing was done except to maintain a strict watch 
that she did not escape through the blockading fleet. 

When it was found that the Lane as a gun-boat was sealed up in 
the bay she was disarmed, some alterations made, and she was con- 
verted into a blockade runner. This change was carried to the 
Federals by deserters, and the vigilance of the blockaders was in- 
creased instead of diminished. 

For nearly a year the Lane was ready loaded to go out. Quite a 
few other blockade runners passed in and out, but for some reason 
she did not make the attemj^t. One of the fastest vessels in the 
Federal navy was on the station to give pursuit, and the bird was 
regarded as good as caged. 

One April night the Lane determined to make the attempt. 
There were in port at the time three Confederate steamers and 
a schooner, which had come in a few weeks before, and it was 
arranged that all should go out togethei'. 

It was a dark, gusty night, and the Lane being the fastest of the 
steamers took the schooner in tow and crept down the south-west 
channel. It was not supposed that any vessel of her size could 
enter or leave Galveston except by the main channel, and the south- 
west had only one blockader on watch. Going at half-speed, with 
every light hidden, the Lane crept down the channel with the 
schooner at her heels, and at intervals of half a mile came the 
others. 

The Federal blockader on the watch did not see the Lane as she 
crept past, and would have discovered nothing but for the noise and 
rattle made by a gust of wind in the schooner's rigging. A sail 
got loose, or something of the sort, and the blockader gave chase, 
under the idea that she was simply after a schooner. It was this 
defense which saved her commander's official head. Instructions 
had been issued to make certain signals in case the Lane was sighted, 
and as he had sighted only the schooner he went oS in chase with- 
out even a rocket to the fleet. The hope of prize-money doubtless 
had something to do with it, and it was only when too late that the 
commander saw what a mistake he had made. 

Off went the blockader after the schooner and the Lane, and 
behind her came the three other runners, and in this position aU 
got to sea. The schooner was a heavy drag on the Lane, but she 



REMINISCENCES OF THE HAKEIET LANE. 405 

hung to her even when under the fire of the blockader's guns, and 
did not let go until the sailing vessel was far enough off the coast 
to take care of herself and make her escape. Three shots passed 
over the Lane, but without damage. As soon as she cast off the 
schooner she ran rapidly out of range, and had no trouble in main- 
taining her distance. 

All through the night the Federal pursuer hung on in the chase, 
and when daylight came he found himself in pursuit of four steam- 
ers, instead of a schooner. All but one could easily keep away from 
him. This one was hit once or twice by Federal shells, but by 
throwing off some of her deck load and securing a better trim, she 
managed to gain on the chase and keep out of range. All through 
the day the blockader continued the pursuit, gaining and losing and 
hoping for some turn of luck, and when night came she would 
not haul off. The Confederates no longer feared her, and being 
anxious to get ahead they carried their lights and gave the pursuer 
their course. 

When morning came the schooner was out of sight, the Lane 
twenty miles away, and the other steamers had made a gain. Still, 
hour after hour, the chase went on, nor did the Federal slacken her 
speed until night aiwl a storm set in and she realized that she was 
losing instead of gaining. 

Thus the Lane not only escaped after the many plans to destroy 
her and the unceasing vigilance of months, but she had for company 
three noted bjockade runners which the fleet had been anxious to 
get hold of, and a schooner which had half a million dollars' worth 
of cotton in her hold. Each one of the runners reached Nassau in 
safety, and at least two of the steamers afterwards ran in and out 
of Wihnington and Georgetown. 




€\^t liijljt at C'irani^ (iulf. 




YEAR or two ago the great Father of Waters begau 
eating its way into the bhiffs at Grand Gulf, and there 
were those who predicted that the scene of one of the 
great naval lights of the war would soon be so trans- 
formed that no one could recognize it. But, as if the 
sight of the sinking and dilapidated earth-works on the bluffs had 
been an appeal to be spared, the current of the mighty river swerved 
away and left the relics to stand for a while longer. Every fort 
and wall and parapet and ditch can be traced to-day almost as easily 
as the day after the memorable fight, and there are hundreds of men 
yet living who took an active part that day on the gun-boats or in 
the fort. 

Farragut had passed down, but when Grant was ready to follow 
with transports and troops Farragut could not return to assist him, 
or at least did not, it being known that the place had been greatly 
strengthened and was considered almost impregnable. To give 
Grant a clear passage down, this position must be silenced, and after 
it had been decided that a land attack was wholly impracticable, 
Admiral Porter collected his seven gun-boats and prepared for a 
fight. 

Why a land attack was not made is something of a mystery. 
Confederate officers stationed there agree that there were no serious 
obstacles in the way, ard they were looking forward to and dread- 
ing such a movement. 

Grant had halted his transports three miles above the batteries, 
and there was nothing to prevent a brigade from picking its way 
down through the woods and making such a demonstration as would 
have given the fleet much less to do. The woods were thick, full 
of water here and there, and the movement would have called for 
extra exertion, but four thousand Federals could have walked into 
the back door of the Confederate position that day without more 
loss than was incurred by the fleet in partially silencing the guns. 

L400] 



THE FIGHT AT GRAND GITLF. 407 

The series of works ou the blufis mounted an aggregate of 
eio-hteen guns, some of them very heavy, and at least four pieces 
having a raking fire up and down the river. There could be no 
landine: along the front for a mile, and in case the fleet silenced 
every gun it could not hope to drive the Confederates out. 

Confederate scouts had brought news of the situation above the 
forts, and the assembling of the gun-boats could mean nothing but 
an attack. The orders at every battery were to use shell alone, and 
the men were instructed to fire coolly and slowly and only after 
taking careful aim. Ammunition was placed conveniently, the work 
of mounting a gun received a few days before hurriedly finished, and 
at daylight on the twenty-nintli of April, 1863, every Confederate 
was at his post and ready for what was to come. One of the scouts 
had mounted a tall tree on the bhiffs to act as a lookout, and about 
half-past six o'clock he signalled that Porter's gun-boats were mov- 
ing down. 

Tlie position of the works on the bluffs was known to the com- 
mander of every gun-boat, and a close estimate had been made of 
the number of guns and strength of troops within the forts. The 
boats must look out for swirls and eddies and a current running 
seven miles an hour. The advantage of position was with the Con- 
federates — the advantage of guns with the fleet. While it was 
almost gun for gun in the count, one eleven-inch Dahlgren on board 
an iron-clad was more than an offset for two thirty-two-pounders 
in the forts. 

When the first attack was made on Fort Sumter by the iron-clads 
not a gun was fired by the Confederates until every craft had 
reached its assigned position. So it was at Grand Gulf. The 
works extended for a mile or more, and there were seven vessels 
moving to the attack. There was front sufiicient for all to maneuver, 
and orders were passed that not a shot should be fired until the last 
was in position. This order was strictly observed. Four of the 
fleet ran past the chain of forts and rounded to in front of the 
lower fort before a shot was fired, although all were fair targets as 
they passed down. 

Men who were in the forts that morning saw a strange panorama. 
The stillness was most profound on shore and on the river. The 
boats moved slowly and grandly down, not a man in sight and with 
no sign of life, and a flock of ducks moved out of the patli of the 
advance without being alarmed. The trees up the river were black 



408 THE FIGHT AT GRAND GULF. 

with Federal spectators, and the chirp of birds was all about the 
men who stood waiting beside the huge cannon. 

Porter went at his work with a vim which made the forest trem- 
ble and the river bubble. That tight stands on record ahead of all 
for rapidity of firing by iron-clads, and the Confederates do not 
deny that for a few minutes they were appalled by its fierceness. 
When the forts had got down to work in earnest there was a roar 
so tremendous as to be painful to the Federal infantry three miles 
away. And there was a fierceness beneath this roar which at times 
made the blood chill. There were hate and spite in the whip-like 
crack of the nine-inch guns, and the scream of the monster shells 
from the forts seemed the roar of a lion sure of striking down 
his prey. 

Admiral Porter's plan was to engage every Confederate gun at 
the same moment. He had counted on silencing the lower guns 
first, and gradually moving his vessels up stream. His plan worked 
as anticipated, but not from his line of reasoning. When the Con- 
federates found that there was to be no attack by land, and that, in 
case they were lucky enough to disable a gun-boat, she would either 
float out of their reach or be towed above, they ceased to expose 
themselves so recklessly, and as a consequence their fire slackened. 
Porter attributed this to the execution of his own guns, which was 
far from being the case. 

One may stand to-day and look from the sinking parapets straight 
down upon the spots where the Louisville, Carondelet, Pittsburgh, 
and Mound City took positions and opened one of the hottest fires 
earth-works had ever been subjected to. Tons of screaming shells 
rushed at the isolated forts as if walls of earth were dust to be scat- 
tered, and tons of shell went screaming across the muddy waters 
to rend oak and break iron and splinter planks and beams in a 
manner gun-boats had never stood before. 

It was by direct orders that the Confederate fire slackened at the 
close of the first hour, and that during the second the guns were 
fired only at long intervals. Believing that the Confederates had 
been demoralized and driven to cover, the gun -boats moved on up 
the river to assist in the reduction of the other forts. 

For two hours and more four Federal gun-boats pounded away 
with rifled Parrotts and eleven and nine-inch Dalilgrens at close 
range, and yet, Confederate official reports and the assertions of men 
who were inside the works show that but little was accomplished. 
Tlie parapets were from sixteen to twentj'-two feet thick, the dirt 



THE FIGHT AT GEAND GULF. 409 

well packed down, and though the explosions of the great shells 
moved tons of earth at once, the men were not even driven to the 
bomb-proofs. Shell after shell tore away at the walls, but it would 
have taken three days to beat them down. Not a gun was dis- 
mounted, and only two or three men wounded. 

Owing to the swift current and the numerous swirls and eddies, 
none of the boats had any such positions as were taken before Forts 
Sumter, or Fisher, or AYagner. There they dropped an anchor or 
rode placidly upon the smooth sea. llei'e, it was bow down stream, 
or up stream — one moment broadside on — the next whirled around 
or carried away in a half-circle. Under such circumstances the lire 
could not approach accuracy, but as an offset the moving tai-gets 
offered the Confederates a poor chance for home shots. Many of the 
shells from the gun-boats passed over the fort and created havoc in 
the timber half a mile away, and plenty of the missiles from the 
forts plunged into the water along-side of the target aimed at. 

The four gun-boats engaging the lower works were repeatedly 
struck before moving up, the Pittsburgh losing three men by a 
single shell, but none of them had received any damage to machin- 
ery or guns, and had plenty of pluck for what was to come. 

It has been claimed tiiat the Benton, Tuscumbia and Lafayette — 
the three gun -boats detailed to engage the upper batteries ^ — fii'ed 
more rounds per hour than was ever accomplished before or equaled 
after. They were closer to the works and in a better current, and 
they went into the fight to win. If the Grand Gulf forts could have 
been battered down by iron, nothing but their clean-swept sites would 
have been left when that fight closed. There were three and four 
minutes at a time when the smoke hid the boats and the river com- 
pletely from view, and the Confederate artillerists took the red flash 
of guns as their targets. It was a square " stand-up-and-take-it 
and hurt-him-all-you-can " affair between tlie three boats and the 
forts, but the white heat was to come when the whole fleet got to 
work. 

In all that five hours' fighting not a shot entered an embrasure or 
struck a gun, altliough scores of tliem barely missed it. An artil- 
lerist who was at one of the big: guns said of the fight : 

" There was not one single minute in all that five hours in which 
I did not expect dcatli. We all worked away as if in a nightmare, 
and we all felt that any moment might be our last. The Benton 
fired repeatedly at my gun, and as many as twenty of her shells 
struck the opening, tearing holes in the parapet ten feet back. 



410 THE FIGHT AT GRAND GULF. 

Twenty times we were almost buried out of sight under the clouds 
of dirt, and the loose earth was knee-deep around our gun when the 
light closed. Not one of us was hit hard enough to draw blood, 
and yet we all felt ten years older for that five hours' work. I 
sighted the gun, and I saw fourteen of ray shot hit the Benton, and 
six plunge into another." 

When the gun-boats clianged from shell to grape and canister^ 
which they did now and then in hopes of driving the Confederates 
from their guns, the screeching and screaming of these missiles, as 
they cut their way over tlie forts, was enough to send a brave man 
to grass until he could rally his nerves. 

Porter's own ship might have been expected to take the lead, 
with General Grant at hand as a spectator, and the way the ship 
was handled, and her guns worked, were subjects long talked about 
in army and navy circles. She fired upwards of five hundred 
rounds, and not more' than ten of them went wild. In return, she 
counted sixty shot-holes in her liull after that fight, and at least 
thirty other shots created more or less damage above her deck. Her 
loss in killed was under ten, and her wounded not over twenty, but 
every man aboard narrowly escaped death a dozen times over. It 
was a wonder to those who inspected the Benton after the fight that 
she brought a sinsrle man of her crew out alive. The Confederates 
full}' expected to see her go to the bottom, and that there were good 
reasons for these anticipations becomes plain when it is stated that 
the Benton was leaking in tliirty different places when she dropped 
out of the fight. 

The fact that all the figliting was being done at rifle range, did 
not satisfy the Mound City. Having been repeatedly struck by a 
particular gun, she ran in so close to the shore that her bow actu- 
ally stirred up the mud, and lying in this position she opened with 
grape and canister until the Confederates at three different guns 
were driven to cover. The gun-boat fired so fast that after the 
first few rounds she could not be seen by friend or foe, but she had 
the range and kept hammering away until tiiere was no longer a 
reply. A perfect shower of bidlets was rained down upon her by 
the infantry without avail. She had a man or two wounded, but 
suffered no great damage. 

At one time in the fight as many as ten of the guns in the forts 
were trained upon the Pittsliurgh alone, and she was hit twenty- 
eight times in thirteen minutes, but her fire never slackened nor 



THE P1GHT Ai" GEAND yULF. 411 

would she be driven from her position. Siie lost three more men 
killed at the upper forts, and had in all about twenty men wounded. 

The reply to the first gun fired by the Lafayette was a shell which 
crashed through her side and exploded in a ward-room, knocking 
everything into kindlings, and when she left the fight she counted 
up over fifty scai's. Three different times she was reported to be 
sinking, and each time the reply of her commander was : 

"Very well, sir; keep right on firing until the guns are under 
water ! " 

Two shells from the Lafayette which cleared the parapets struck 
the same tree half a mile away, but again she buried five or six 
shell on top of each other in the wall and nearly breached it. 

The Tuscumbia was hit fifteen times below the rail and more 
than a score of times above, but got off with only three or four 
wounded men. One shell passed completely through her before 
exploding, and the fragments of one exploding in her hold dashed 
a package from the hands of its carrier without wounding him. 

As a fight, it was a drawn affair. Both sides had pounded away 
as hard as they could, and neither had been whipped. Porter had 
realized that if he succeeded in silencing the forts, Grant would not 
send his infantry to take possession, and the Confederates had dis- 
covered that if the transports could not pass down the river. Grant 
would land his troops and march them across the neck to a point 
below the forts. 

As soon as the fight closed the forts began to make repairs, and 
in no instance had they been driven out of their works. Porter 
said of them : 

"The enemy fought with a desperation I. have never yet wit- 
nessed, for, though we engaged him at a distance of fifty yards, we 
never fairly succeeded in stopping his fire but for a short time. It 
was remarkable that we did not disable his guns, but, though we 
knocked his parapets pretty much to pieces, his guns were apparently 
uninjured." 

At dark the gun -boats formed in line, the transports on the far 
side, and as the flotilla passed down, there was more or less firing, 
but without serious results. Porter had put his fleet where no other 
fleet had ever been tested, and the fact that the Confederates fought 
as they did gave him an opportunity to compliment each commander 
for his courage and staying qualities under such a baptism of shot 
and shell. 



'Raising tljr lilorlrak at Cfjarlrstan. 




NE of the boldest ventures by the Confederate navy, 
and one which led to the most serious complications, 
was the attempt to i\aise the blockade at Charleston in 
January, 1863. Owing to the interests at stake the 
Federal government suppressed many facts and threw 
discredit on others, and there is little reason to doubt that the affair 
might have been made a serious one for the j^orth if foreign gov- 
ernments had cared to follow it up. 

According to the laws of blockade, if the blockading fleet is 
driven out of sight of the harbor by force of arms, even only for 
an hour, the blockade is declared raised. In this case there was a 
direct conflict of testimony between Federal and Confederate, and 
had not this been the case the Northern government would still 
have paid no attention to the proclamation issued bj' the Confeder- 
ate Secretary of War. Had every Federal vessel been sunk or 
driven off the coast, and Charleston left unblockaded for three 
days, it would have made no difference. A new fleet would have 
been sent to that station, and if Europe protested the matter would 
have gone to the State Department, to be dragged along and worn 
oiit. I make this assertion on the authority of men who were high 
in official circles at Washington at the time, and who knew the 
decisions arrived at by cabinet meetings called to consider this case. 
There were on the blockading station at the time six Federal 
vessels, while three or four more had just left for Port Royal to 
coal up. The Confederate "fleet" consisted of only two iron- 
clads — the Chicora and Palmetto State. They were iron-clads only 
to a certain extent, neither claiming to be proof against the rifled 
guns of the blockaders. While the Chicora could show fair speed, 
the Palmetto State was very slow, and neither carried as large a 
crew as any one of the vessels on the blockade. 

The design of a dash at the Federal fleet was objected to by those 
high in authority on the grounds of its risk, and when finally con- 

[412] 



EATSING THE BLOCKADE AT cnAELESTON. 413 

sented to it was more to encourage the fleet and forts than from 
any anticipation of success. The project was kept a profound secret 
while all preparations were making, and when Charleston was 
turned out of bed by the firing off the bar there was intense excite- 
ment in the city. 

Both Confederate vessels crossed the bar shortly before five o'clock 
in the morning, this being the period of high water. It was a 
damp, nasty morning, with a fog circling over the waters, and the 
lookouts could not see any great distance from the vessels. 

As the Palmetto State stood out from the bar she found the Fed- 
eral steamer Mercedita in her jjath and ran down for her, hoping to 
make a comjolete surprise. In this she was disappointed, as she 
had been observed and her identity suspected before she was near 
enough to fire. As she came up she found the Mercedita beating 
to quarters and thoroughly alarmed. The ram was hailed several 
times, but, without replying, she rushed at the ship and fired a shell 
into her at the moment of strikinir. This shell wrought fearful 
destruction, passing clean through the vessel and exploding a steam- 
chest in its passage. The prow of the ram had cut the Mercedita 
down to the water's edge, and what with the steam blinding and 
scalding and enveloping everybody, and the water rushing in like a 
mill-race, it was no wonder that discipline gave way to confusion. 

The Palmetto State was so low in the water that not a gun on 
the Federal could be depressed sufficiently to reach her, and when 
she backed off it was speedily realized that she had the larger craft 
at her mercy. In this emergency the only thing that could be 
done was to surrender. But mark what followed it. An officer 
was sent aboard the Confederate to make the surrender, which he 
did in the name of his commander. He also stated the condition 
of the Mercedita, and his fears that she was sinking, and proposed 
the transfer of her crew to the ram to save them from going down 
with the sinking ship. This could not be done, as the ram had no 
room for them, and the result was that all officers and men were 
paroled on the spot and the ram steamed away to engage others of 
the fleet. When she had disappeared the crew of the Mercedita 
set to work and repaired damages sufficiently to enable the surren- 
dered ship to steal away and save herself to the Federal govern- 
ment. The paroles were considered as invalid, and were not in the 
least honored or observed. The single shell carried death to three 
men and injuries to three or four others. 

Day had fully dawned when the ram left the Mercedita and 



414 RAISING THE BLOCKADE AT CHAKLESTON. 

turned her attention to the rest of the fleet. Every vessel had got 
under way and made an othng, and most of them were engaged 
with the Cliicora at long range. The Palmetto Stite had less speed 
than any Federal on the station, and finding that none of them 
would engage her at close quarters, she ran back to the bar and 
came to anchor to wait for the tide to serve. She had captured one 
steamer, sent three shots into another, and followed two for a mile 
or more out to sea, and had not been struck by a single missile or 
received the slightest damage. 

When the Chicora crossed the bar and parted from the ram she 
came close upon a nest of blockaders and fired right and left as she 
stood on. Two or three of the vessels were struck, and all made 
haste to secure an offing where there was room to maneuver. 
When the Chicora sighted the Keystone State it was just after she 
had driven off the Quaker City, and the State was bearing gallantly 
down to come to close quarters. When the Federal was within 
easy range she fired one broadside at the Chicora, and then rounded 
to and gave her the other, but every shot went over the Confeder- 
ate and plunged into the water beyond. 

The Cliicora then opened fire in turn, and at her third shot the 
State was set on fire in the hold and she hauled off and out of the 
fight. As soon as she could subdue the flames aboard she turned 
and came back for the Chicora, determined to run her down. She 
was stopped by a shell which reached her boiler, and in a moment 
she was enveloped in a cloud of steam and the screams of the scalded 
men could be heard for a mile over the water. As the Chicora 
approached, the Keystone State hauled down her flag in token of 
surrender. The Chicora would have sent a boat aboard or run 
along-side herself, but the State kept one wheel working and drew 
out of the fight while the Chicora had her attention distracted by 
other vessels. When a mile or more away, the State hoisted her 
flag and re-opened fire. Both the Mercedita and Keystone State 
were fairly captured, both hauled down their flags in token of sur- 
render, and yet both took advantage of circumstances to make 
their escape. The Chicora also engaged the Augusta, the Quaker 
City, and the Memphis, striking them all at least once, and after 
an action lasting more than an hour she was signalled to join the 
ram in Beach Channel. 

It was claimed by the commanders of both Confederate craft 
that every single Federal vessel was driven off the blockading sta- 
tion and so far out to sea that nothing of them could be discerned 



EAI8ING THE BLOCKADE AT OHAELESTON. 415 

witli a glass. Then followed a proclamation signed by Gen. Beau- 
regard and Flag Officer Ingram, declaring the blockade raised by 
superior force. Secretary of State Benjamin then issued a circular 
to foreign consuls in the South, more especially directed to the 
French Consul at Wilmington, officially declaring the blockade 
raised and inviting commerce with the open port of Cbai'leston. 

In reply to these proclamations Admiral Dii Pont secured the 
statements of commanders and others to the effect that only two of 
the fleet were seriously injured, and that not a single vessel was 
driven off the blockade. It always has been and always will be a 
disputed question. One fails to see where the Confederates could 
hope to gain anything by issuing a proclamation based on falsehood 
and one which could easily be shown to be false, and one can hardly 
credit the fact that the two or three blockaders which did not come 
into action at all, being too distant from the bar, would have cow- 
ardly put to sea after the fight was over. 

However, as previously stated, had the blockade been raised, 
even by the sinking of every Federal on the station, the Confed- 
erate government would have reaped no benefit, nor would a foreign 
vessel have been permitted to enter that port. So far as the Fed- 
eral government had might, it was fully determined to make that 
power answer for right. 

The fate of the Atlanta has been recorded in a previous article. 
She was one of the strongest and fastest iron-clads built by the 
Confederates during the war, and it was intended that she should 
proceed to Charleston and attack the blockading fleet. On her trip 
out she got aground and was captured, after a contest of fifteen 
minutes. She was a match for any three vessels on the blockade, 
and had she got among the fleet the result might have justified 
Confederate expectations. 

The Albemarle, tiie Confederate ram, built at Plymouth, N. C, 
and having her first figlit near the mouth of the Roanoke Eiver, 
would also have made an attempt to raise the blockade at Charles- 
ton had she succeeded in getting out. She was fast, invulnerable, 
and with a proper crew to fight her she would have been a match 
for any three Federal iron-clads. 

In February, 1864, after the attempt of the Confederate iron- 
clads to raise the blockade at Charleston, the Confederates brought 
out a steam-launch torpedo which proved the wickedest thing of 
the war. The craft was about twenty-five feet long, shaped like a 
cigar, built of boiler plate, and provided with a screw wheel. She 



416 RAISING THE BLOCKADE AT CHARLESTON. 

had no smoke stack, and her deck was flush with the water. Run- 
ning out from her bow fifteen feet was a stout spar with an electric 
torpedo, containing a charge of two hundred pounds of powder. 

Just before nine o'clock in the evening this torpedo was discov- 
ered approaching the Ilousatonic, one of the finest vessels in the 
Federal navy. It was a bright night, with no sea on, and for a time 
the launch was supposed to be a large fish sporting around. When 
suspicion was aroused as to its true nature it was so close aboard 
that none of the guns could be depressed to reach it. The Ilousa- 
tonic slipped her anchor and started her engines, while everybody 
on deck who had a weapon to fire began shooting at the launch. 
The big ship was not yet off her anchorage when the launch dashed 
in and exploded the torpedo, and in the excitement got away with- 
out being seen. 

The explosion was something awful. A hole was made in the 
big ship through which one could have led a horse, and men on her 
decks were in some cases hurled fifty feet, and in others lifted 
fifteen feet high. The largest guns on board were thrown on their 
backs, and beams twelve inches thick were broken off as clean as a 
man can break a pipe stem. In five minutes the Ilousatonic was at 
the bottom and the launch out of sight. The loss of life was not 
great, only five of the crew being missing at the next muster, but 
nearly every mnn was more or less badly bruijed and injured. 

The success of the torpedo-launch solved the problem of how to 
raise a blockade, but the Confederates were not in position to reap 
the fruits. The war was near its close, the people greatly dis- 
couraged, and the government not in condition to build other 
launches. And to this must be added the fact that orders were at 
once issued that no blockader should thereafter anchor at night 
without being protected by a floating boom or rope-netting, and 
each vessel so anchored was ordered to keep out a patrol of boats. 

There is good authority for the statement that the model of this 
launch has been carefully preserved by the United States' Navy 
Department, and that in case it becomes necessary to protect our 
harbors a hundred of them can be turned out at short notice. 
The boast of certain European powers that one of their iron-clads 
could lay any American port under tribute might be carried out 
despite our navy, but Europe has never built a craft which could 
guard herself from one of these launches, nor one which could float 
ten minuj^s after being struck. 



ornaii tl)e fydkx. 




F all the cavalry raiders, Federal or Confederate, John 
H. Alorgan was doubtless the chief. He made raiding 
into Union territory a business and a success. 

One of his first raids had for its objective point 
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, and the destruction of the 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad. He crossed the Cumberland at 
Gainesville, and first entered Glasgow, where his command helped 
themselves to horses, mnles, clothing, and whatever struck their 
fancy. It made no difference to the raiders whether a citizen sym- 
pathized with the Federal or Confederate cause. If he had any- 
thing the raiders wanted it was taken, and if the owner protested 
he was told to go and see General Morgan. In two or three in- 
stances people who had been despoiled did go and see the genei-al. 
He listened patiently to their reports, and then kindly replied : 

" Is it possible that one of Morgan's men would do such a thing 
as that ! Well, well — but I must have the matter investigated, and 
if he is found guilty he shall be shot." 

A laughable incident occurred as Morgan closed in on Elizabeth- 
town. The only Federal force there to oppose him consisted of a 
single company belonging to the Ninety-first Illinois. These men 
at once began to throw up works, and just as Morgan's advance 
came in sight were reinforced by about five hundred men from their 
own regiment who had been posted at various points. The men 
at once made preparations for a fight, but in order to prevent any 
unnecessary waste of blood. Colonel Smith, commanding the six 
hundred Federals, sent a flag of truce into Morgan's lines to deliver 
the following communication: 

To the Commander of the Bebel Forces : 

Sir: I demand of you an immediate and unconditional surrender of yourself 
and foi'ces under your command, I liave you completely surrounded, and will 
open my batteries upon you in twenty minutes, and compel you to surrender. 
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

H. S. Smith, 
Commanding U. S. Forces. 

Vol. I.-27 l'"'^ 



418 MORGAN THE EAJDEK. 

Morgan had about seven thousand men with hira, and a full battery 
of artillery, while Smith did not have over six hundred men, and was 
entirely without artillery. Morgan knew the exact Federal strength 
and situation, and it is said by one of his stafE that he had a hearty 
laugh over the bombastic communication. He answered it by 
demanding Smith's surrender, but the latter had made up his mind 
to fight. 

Soon after one o'clock in the afternoon Morgan had the town 
completely encircled, and the battle opened. The Illinois troops 
were driven from one position to another, and finally took refuge 
in the brick buildings in the center of the town. Common human- 
ity, if not the usages of civilized warfare, should have compelled 
Morgan to again demand a surrender before opening with artillery 
on a town filled with women and children. He neither did this 
nor gave non-combatants an opportunity to get beyond danger. 
Such as attempted to leave were fired upon and driven back. 

From a distance of hardly more than rifle-range Morgan's artil- 
lery opened on the center of the town, and every shot and shell 
created havoc. The Federals could only reply with musketry, and 
with but little show for damaging the enemy, but Smith was plan- 
ning to collect his men and make a determined effort to cut his way 
out of the town when a portion of his forces, without waiting to 
consult him, hung out the white flag of surrender. This ended the 
fight and Morgan at once took possession of the town and the work 
of destruction began. 

When the railroad property had been burned, all the store-houses 
were given up to the torch, and a Kentuckian who had two sons in 
the Confederate army, and was himself an outspoken Confederate, 
lost wheat and oats to the value of five thousand dollars. While 
private houses were respected, Morgan himself led the pillaging of 
stores and shops. Dry goods, groceries, boots and shoes and jewelry 
to the amount of twenty thousand dollars were taken, and the 
country for five miles around robbed of every horse in condition 
to travel. 

The prisoners taken were paroled and told to look out for them- 
selves, so far as provisions were concerned. Every man in Smith's 
command who had a good overcoat or a pair of boots was obliged 
to hand them over to whomever fancied the articles. The raider 
carried away with him horses, mules, arms, vehicles and goods 
worth many thousands of dollars, and in and around Elizabethtown 
destroyed an immense amount of property worth as much more. 



MORGAN THE EAIDEE. 419 

One of the contemptible things perpetrated with Morgan's full 
knowledge was the invasion and robbery of tlie hospital. Blankets 
were pulled from under sick men, their clothing and personal 
property taken, and the doctors robbed of their medicine cases and 
the snrgeons of their instruments. 

Again, Morgan left Knoxville, Tennessee, for a raid into Ken- 
tucky, having under his command a force of about nine hundred, 
cavalry and artillery. Of his cavalry, two hundred or more were 
armed only witli revolvers and sabres, and were promised carbines 
when they could be captured from the Federals. 

The first blow fell upon Glasgow. The place was garrisoned by 
a few dozen Federals, who did not stay to see what business had 
called the great Confederate raider from his Tennessee retreat. 
From the fourth to the twenty-eighth of the month named, Morgan 
was raiding through Kentucky, fighting, plundering, burning and 
destroying. He carried a telegraph operator with him, and through 
this source was kept constantly posted of all movements against 
him. The operator sent fictitious dispatches countermanding orders 
to Federals, and kept things so mixed up that only the mail could 
be depended on. It was from Somerset that Morgan sent the fol- 
lowing dispatch to Prentice, of the Louisville Journal : 

SoMEKSET, July 23, 1862. 

George D. Prentice, Louisville : 

Good morning George D. I am quietly watcliing the complete destruction of 
all of Uncle Sam's property in this little burg. I regret exceedingly that this is 
the last that comes under my supervision on this route. I expect in a short time 
to pay you a visit, and wish to know if you will be at home. 
All well in Dixie. 

John H. Mokg.^n, 

Commanding Brigade. 

During the twenty-four days of the raid Morgan recruited four 
hundred men, traveled eleven hundred miles, captured seventeen 
towns, had twenty-two skirmishes, captured and paroled sixteen hun- 
dred Federals, and possessed himself of one thousand horses and 
mules, new arms and equipments for all, and destroyed several 
million dollars' wortii of public and government property. 

Taking but a week to rest after the raid through Kentuckv above 
detailed, Morgan suddenly re-appeared at Columbia, and from 
thence pushed on to Green River and attacked a Federal force of 
about one thousand men in a good defensive position. Morgan had 
over two thousand men and four pieces of artillery, but after a 



420 MORGAN THE EAIDEE. 

fight lasting upwards of an hour he was obliged to draw off, having 
lost over one Imndi-ed men and inflicted but little damage. In that 
fight he had twenty commissioned officers killed or wounded. 

At Lebanon the Federal force had received warning and was 
prepared for defense. It was only after a fight lasting four or five 
hours that the garrison was overpowered. Morgan paroled nearly 
five hundred prisoners, destroyed seventy-five thousand dollars' 
worth of stores, and sent back to the Confederacy a large supjjly of 
arms, ammunition, and medical stores. Plis brother Tom was 
killed in this fight, having been shot by a Federal who was posted 
in the second story of a house. Over seventy-five horses and mules 
were gathered up at Lebanon. 

At Bradensburg two steamers were captured and the whole com- 
mand crossed into Indiana, and during this transaction there was 
continual skirmisiiing with home guards. Near Corydon, Morgan 
encountered about three thousand home o;uards, and a fiirht 
lasting about half an hour took place. A charge by a single squad- 
ron of his command started a panic among the Federals, and about 
two thousand were captured and paroled, and nearly as many mus- 
kets destroyed. 

Knowing that the country must be aroused, Morgan again 
brought his telegraph operator into play, and in a few hours was 
able to locate every force organizing for pursuit. At Salem he 
destroyed a railroad bridge and depot and a mile of track. At 
Seymour two more bridges, another depot, and two or three miles 
of track. At Vienna another depot was burned, and the track 
again destroyed. At Lexington about fifty thousand dollars' worth 
of stoi-es were burned, and the command had by this time secured 
enough fresh horses to give every man a remount. In addition, 
many stores had been plundered, and nearly every person encoun- 
tered on the highway had been robbed. 

At Yernon the railroads were destroyed for miles, all depots and 
banks, and many public and private buildings burned. Between 
Vernon and Versailles the march was one of arson and plunder, and 
at the latter place Morgan got rid of his prisoners by the process of 
paroling. 

The state of Ohio was entered at Harrison, all important railroad 
bridges being burned as fast as met with. The command passed 
Cincinnati seven or eight miles to the north, tearing up railroad 
tracks wherever cro.ssed. The night march, as the raiders left Har- 
rison, was nearly fifty miles, bringing them to Camp Denisou in the 



MORGAN THE EAIDEE. 421 

morning. Here a train of cars was captnred and burned, and more 
prisoners taken and paroled. 

During the next four days and nights the raidei's rested only for 
an hour at a time, and were continually skirmishing. The entire 
state of Ohio had been aroused, and squirrel-hunters were offering 
their services by the thousand. By tlie free use of the telegraph, 
bodies of home guards were placed in Morgan's front at every 
cross-i'oad, and farmers turned out and delayed his progress by fell- 
ing trees across the roads and removing the planks from highway 
bridges. 

Morgan finally reached the Ohio river above Pomeroy. He 
found a large force there to receive him, and in the course of an 
hour was routed and left nearly three hundred of his men behind 
as prisoners. He then made for the ford at Belleville, where about 
three hundred men got over and the remainder were killed, cap- 
tured or scattered. "With the remnant Morgan again moved on, 
but at West Point was surrounded and had to surrender. Of his 
entire command only about two hundred and fifty returned to the 
Confederacy. 

The results of the raid, so far as directly benefiting the Confed- 
eracy, was the capture of about one hundred and fifty army wagons, 
six hundred horses and mules, and some three thousand stands of 
arms. This plunder reached Dixie in safety. During the raid 
Morgan burned forty bridges, about twenty depots, and tore up 
railroad tracks in over fifty places. In his official report he claimed 
to have inflicted damage to the amount of ten million dollars, while 
he captured and paroled over six thousand prisoners. So far as 
tliese prisoners and paroles went the Federal government refused 
to recognize any such action as binding. 

Morgan's raid, after leaving Kentucky, was simply the march of 
a band of thieves. No opportunity to commit robbery was lost, 
and when driven to bay and the plunder overhauled, the collection 
would have been described by an auctioneer as : " And so forth." 
Tiie men had loaded themselves down with dry goods, groceries, 
hardware, tinware, jewelry, clothing, boots and shoes, and odds and 
ends of everything. The government decided to treat the band as 
marauders, and while the rank and file were sent to prison-pens, 
Moi'gan, Basil Duke, and other of the higher officers were sent to 
the penitentiary at Columbus. 

From his capture in July to the following November, Morgan 
was confined in prison. In his ward were Hohersmith, Bennett,, 



422 



MOKGAN THE KAIDER. 



Hines, Taylor, Shelton and McGee, all officers in his command. 
As soon as it was realized that the Federal government would not 
exchange them, the men began casting about for a way to escape. 
It was charged that outside sympathizers furnished the men with 
tools to dig their way out, and money to carry them away after 
regaining their liberty. They went through two feet of brick and 
cement into the air-chamber below the cells, and thence through six 
feet of granite to the yard. The escape was made one dark ilight by 
means of scaling and descending two walls, but that there was conni- 
vance on the part of some of the prison officials has never been 
doubted. Morgan and Hines took the train for Cincinnati, ciossed 
the Ohio in a skiff, and after having many narrow escapes fi'om re- 
capture, and being several weeks on the way, arrived safely within 
the Confederate lines. 




"fy V^'ii 



C Cancel [orsb tile. 




:OOKER was a military enigma. At one time impetu- 
ous — at another lethargic. As a corps commander, he 
was a hard figliter ; as the head of an army, he exhib- 
ited incompetency and irresolution. Vain-glorious in 
some things — in others modest as a woman. Seemingly 
frank and open in military matters, Burnside charged him with 
plotting and conspiring against his superiors, and resigned because 
the President would not remove him and others from the army of 
the Potomac. 

Why Lincoln should have appointed Hooker to the command of 
that army, witli that grave charge hanging over him, was the great- 
est enigma of all. 

If he believed Burnside's charges, Hooker should have been 
dismissed. If he did not believe them, Burnside should have been 
court-martialed for making the allegations he did. 

Hooker went to work like a good general to improve the per- 
sonnel of the army which had been hurled back from Fredericks- 
burg and then worn out in the Maryland mud by marching and 
counter-marching to no purpose. A less energetic man would 
have been appalled at the outset. Many thousand men had openly 
deserted, and subordinate officers exhibited a mutinous sjurit. 
There was need of arms and clothing, and the men must be drilled, 
and Hooker had such a task before him as no man except McClellan 
had ever imdertaken. 

When the spring of 1883 opened ho had an army of one hun- 
dred and twenty thousand men — well drilled, enthusiastic — anxious 
to move against Lee ; and this army was supplied with artillery to 
the number of four hundred pieces. 

Lee, who still held possession of Fredericksburg, had, according 
to his own official reports, sixty thousand men and one hundred 
and ninety pieces of artillery. What could be easier than for one 
hundred and twenty thousand men to crush sixty thousand, if the 

[423] 



424 CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 

latter could be flanked out of their intrencluuents? And what 
could be easier than a flank movement at Fredericksburg? 

It was for Hooker to plan and for Lee to wait. Hooker planned 
to move by liis right flank, cross the Rappaliannock at fords far 
above Fredericksburg, and marcli in behind Lee. Tlie fords were 
defended only against raiding parties. When the lieads of corps 
reached them in that grand march the Confederate defenders were 
swept away in a breath. The marcli of that miglity army was a 
pageant never to be forgotten, and the men of tiie Army of the 
Potomac were never so certain of success. How could tliey fail ? 
All tlie roads led to Chancellorsville, twelve or fourteen miles to 
the south of and in rear of Fredericksburg. With the Federal 
army at Chancellorsville, Lee must march out and meet it and be 
defeated. Sedgwick's corps was left at Fredericksburg, with orders 
to cross and attack if Lee began withdrawing, and when tiie grand 
army reached Chancellorsville Lee was between two flres. Hooker's 
2)lan was simple, sensible, and certain of success; and when the last 
of his army corps swung into the wilderness around Chancellors- 
ville he felt no egotism in saying in his dispatch: 

" The rebel army is now the legitimate property of the Army of 
the Potomac!" 

So it looked to even the dullest private soldier. 

It is a singularly wild and picturesque ride from Fredericksburg 
to the battle field over the old plank road. There is no town — no 
hamlet — not even a four-roads. At the brick house where the 
Chancellors lived the road from Ely's Ford empties into the plank 
road, making a three-corners. The change since the battle was 
fought is but slight. That part of the house destro3'ed has been 
rebuilt, and the old walls have been allowed to retain the round shot 
and shell fired into them from the Confederate lines. Directly 
opposite the iiouse fifty acres of the forest have been cleared away 
and yet, between the Ely Road and the spot wliere Stonewall 
Jackson fell, there is not enough cleared field to maneuver one 
army corps. When Hooker massed his magnificent army there 
twenty-one years ago, seven-eighths of them were hidden in the 
woods and thickets. There was not even room enough in the clear- 
ings to mass all his cannon. 

The Army of the Potomac now being in the rear of Lee, the 
men expected to be marched towards Fredericksburg. Between 
Chancellorsville and the city are half a dozen splendid battle grounds, 
the poorest of which would give an army of one hundred and fifty 



CHANCELLOESVILLE. 425 

thousand men opportunity to come into action. If Lee had hurried 
out on the plank-road to meet Hooker, they would have fought at 
Salem Church, and had they fought there Lee would have been 
crushed in two hours. He had hurried out on that road — he had 
i-e;iched Salem Church — he had passed beyond it — he was within 
two miles of Chancellorsville before he saw a Federal. Hooker 
had started two corps on the march to Fredericksburg, and others 
were waiting to follow, when a dark shadow suddenly flitted across 
wood and tliicket, and Hooker's exultation changed to fear. The 
two corps were instantly ordered back. 

Then followed orders which mystifled everybody. The army 
which was facing up the plank-road towards Fredericksburg sud- 
denly received orders to face down the road, with their backs to* 
Lee, and with feverish haste breastworks were thrown up, trees 
felled, and preparations made to meet a foe which no one had ex- 
pected. 

The army, which had marched by the flank, to force Lee out into 
the fields to give battle, was now at bay, cooped up in the thicket 
and forest, hiding behind earth-works and abattis, and everybody 
mystified by the commander's strange orders. Mystify a soldier 
and you demoralize him. When the grand army crossed the Eap- 
paliannoek every man knew Hooker's plan. It was to swing in 
behind Lee and fight him. That army was never in better condition 
for marchins; and flffhtinof. When suddenly recalled from the 
march, ordered to change front, and pushed into forests and thick- 
ets so dense that a captain at the head of liis company could not 
see the thirtieth man in the line, a tremor of coming disaster swept 
over every division. Four hour's walk from the brick house will 
take 3'ou over every point of the battle field. The felled trees are 
rotting on the ground — the earth-works are there — the spot where 
Hooker massed thirteen guns — another spot where he massed sixty- 
three — you can pick up every detail and find the head-quarters of 
every division. Aye 1 you can do more. You can stand in the 
swamps and thickets and see slimy serpents dragging themselves 
through the black water — hear the lonesome cries of the whip-poor- 
will — feel that it is midnight in there forever. Strange place to 
hide away an army which had marched from the sunshine of Fal- 
mouth Heights to crush a foe of only half its strength ! 

The shadow which had thrown its chill over the thickets of 
Chancellorsville was that of Stonewall Jackson. Resting on Lee's 
right flank at Fredericksburg, he had waited until the Federal army 



426 CHANCELLOKSVILLE. 

had reached Cbancellorsville. Then he had let go his grip on the 
hills overlooking the muddy Eappahannock, and moved by the Tel- 
egraph road and across the fields, not to strike Hooker wiiere that 
commander was waiting to be struck, but to pass his right flank and 
reach his rear. Lee left six thousand men to hold Fredericksburg 
against Sedgwick, and advanced towards Chancellorsville by way of 
Salem Cliurch. When Hooker saw the plan to strike his flank and 
rear, he changed front again on a part of his lines and threw up 
further breastworks. He had come to attack Lee, but without see- 
ing a Confederate or firing a musket, he suddenly assumed the 
defensive. He had forced Lee out of his intrenchments and tlien 
sought cover himself. He had had his pick of the best battle 
grounds in Virginia, and had rejected all of them for the swamps 
and the thickets of the dark wilderness. Joe Hooker was a soldier 
and a fighter, but neither soldier nor historian has ever been able to 
satisfactorii}- explain his Chancellorsville campaign. Had his army 
moved up to Salem Church, Sedgwick's corps could have crossed at 
Banks' Ford and joined it, instead of fighting its way over the hills 
of Fredericksburg. He could have picked his positions and in- 
trenched, and Lee could not have carried one of them. 

All night Friday night Jackson was moving through the dark 
thickets across the Federal front, and in some places within a mile of 
it. Neither swamp nor slough nor darkness of midnight halted the 
march. Daylight found his thousands still in motion — noon found 
them on the Brock road — four o'clock in the afternoon saw them 
debouching into that same Chancellorsville plank-road, not a mile 
from Hooker's line of battle. 

In making this march to reach Hooker's rear, or what had been 
his rear until he faced about, Jackson came so near the Federal 
lines at a spot called the Furnace that a smart fight ensued and 
about seven hundred Confederates were captured. It was plain to 
all that Jackson was on the move. For what ? Some of the pris- 
oners said that it was a move to reacli Hooker's rear but Hooker 
begged to diiSer with them. He insisted that Jackson was retreat- 
ing towards Eichmond, and he sent off a dispatch that " the enemy 
are flying." While he was writing it Stonewall Jacks n was form- 
ing a line of battle witliin a mile of him. 

In front of Jackson was the Eleventh corps. The shadows of 
evening were drawing down, and twenty thousand men were busy 
cooking their suppers, when the Confederates came dashing at them i 
through the woods. There was something appalling in the sudden- 



CHANCELLOESVILLE. 427 

ness of the attack — something terrifying in the vigor with which it 
was made. The muskets were stacked, the batteries unprepared, 
and not a dozen shots were fired before that great army corps, sur- 
prised, terrified, and panic-stricken, rolled out of the woods and 
back upon the cleared fields around the brick house in one mighty 
mass of blue. Thousands saw the sight, and it was a sight never to 
bo forgotten. With one rush the Confederates had doubled a 
whole corps back on the center and captured its intrenchments, 
muskets, ammunition and provisions. The attack fell like a thun- 
derbolt — destroyed like a tornado. It ceased almost as suddenly 
as it began. Berry's brigade rushed into the gap, other brigades 
followed, and Jackson was checked. Then night fell, the moon 
rose, and but for groans and wails and straggling musket-shots, men 
could hardly have believed what their eyes saw half an houi- before. 

Perhaps the last Federal to exchange words with Jackson was 
Colonel William D. Wilkins, of Detroit, who was then assistant 
adjutant-general of the Twelfth army corps. In the dusk of 
evening he was riding to the head-quarters of different divisions 
with orders, and as he rode for the flag of the Third division he 
rode straight into the ranks of the Confederates. Recognized as an 
officer of distinction, he was at once conducted along the plank road 
to the spot where Jackson had his headquarters in the saddle. At 
this time the Federal cannon were throwing showers of shot, shell 
and grape into the woods, and one of the colonel's escort was killed 
at his side. At this time the dry ditches on each side of the high- 
way were full of Confederate infantry, lying close to escape the 
Federal artillery fire. General Jackson asked Colonel Wilkins his 
name, rank, etc., speaking in a quiet voice and a kindly manner, 
and the last words he ever spoke to a Federal were : 

'• Sorry for you, colonel. Take Colonel Wilkins to the rear, and 
see that he is well used." 

Ten minutes later he was lying under the pines mortally wounded. 

Had Jackson lived one hour longer. Hooker would have been cut 
off from the roads to the river. Then what ? It would have been 
tame surrender or a fierce and bloody wrestle to cut a way out. It 
is there to-day — the blind road leading from the plank in a half- 
circle around to the Ely road. It winds around thickets, crosses, 
swales, ascends hills and makes sharp turns to avoid quagmires, but 
twenty thousand men could be passed over it between dusk and 
midnight. Jackson's men were following it when death came 



428 CHANCELLOBSVILLE. 

to the great leader. Men have called it the hand of fate. To 
Hooker's army it was the hand of Providence. 

It was Stuart, of cavalry fame, who led the Confederates after 
Jackson had been stricken. At dawn of Sunday, twenty tliousand 
men in gray moved forward as one, and five thousand voices sang 
together : 

" Old Joe Hooker come out of the wilderness." 

Stuart's guns were hardly heard before Lee's ojiened. Hooker's 
army was between two fires. Then there was desperate lighting. 
From wood and thicket and swamp and field arose the shouts of 
men as they grappled with tlie foe — the screams and groans of the 
wounded as they fell to earth. Stuart was gradually forcing tlie 
center back, and the center was the key of the position. As the 
Federals fell back foot by foot, the woods blazed up in a hundred 
places, and serpents of fire chased each other from tliicket to thicket. 
Under a smoke-cloud so dense that men could not see a foe thirty 
feet away, the center fell back, the wing gave ground, and a retreat 
was made to a new battle line. Women living a mile away from 
the battle ground turn pale even now when they recall the horrors 
of that day — the smoke — the red tongues of flame — the awful 
roar of cannon and the crash of musketry, and in tlie intervals a 
sound to make the heart stand still — the cries and shrieks of the 
wounded, burning to death in the thickets. Hooker must have 
lost his head. With both wings driven, his center crushed, and 
that gi'and army driven back to a new line in the woods, he dis- 
patched Sedgwick to hurry up and " complete " Lee's destruction ! 
Lee had not lost one man to his eight. Lee had driven him over 
a mile, and Stuart had driven a part of his lines two miles, and 
yet he said in that same dispatch, " I have driven the enemy ! " 

It is long years since war's alarms filled the land. The South 
asks no man to excuse her defeats or exaggerate her victories. 
What she won she won, what she lost she lost ; and that partisan 
historian wlio excuses Hooker, Burnside, Grant, Tope or any other 
commander fi-om his blunders, wrongs the generation which came 
too late to fight but not too late to read. 

On Sunday Sedgwick crossed at Fredericksburg and drove the 
Confederates out. Then, obeying orders, he marched by the plank- 
road for Chancellorsville to strike Lee in the rear. He had scarcely 
left Fredericksburg when the defeated Confederates re-occupied it. 
This, then, was the situation, and a stranger one was never heard of 
in war. Beginning at the river, there were Early and Barksdale 



CHANCELLOESVILLE. 429 

holding Fredericksbui-g. Out on the plank-road was Sedgwick. 
Beyond him was Lee. Beyond Lee was Hooker. Beyond Hooker 
were Jackson's men. Again, beyond these was Stonemau with ten 
thousand Federal cavalry, raiding and destroying to prevent Lee's 
retreat to Kichniond. Who, before or since, ever saw foe and 
friend so strangely sandwiched ? It could not have been done by 
one blunder, but it was accomplished by half a dozen. The coming 
of Sedgwick delayed Lee's attack, and that delay again saved 
Hooker. 

Lee wheeled at the foe in his rear and fought him around Salem 
Church and drove him across Banks' Ford. That was Monday 
night. On Tuesday, Lee returned to Hooker, but there was no 
desperate fighting. There was marching and countermarching, and 
taking up positions for an attack which should destroy Lee or rout 
Hooker. Over ninety thousand Federals were waiting — less than 
forty thousand Confederates were watching. 

In the darkness of Tuesday night Hooker ordered that grand 
army to skulk away, and at daylight "Wednesday morning that ser- 
pentine earth-work stretching over three miles of country hadn't 
a Federal left behind it. Pontoon bridges had been laid in the 
darkness, and in the darkness Hooker had run away from an army 
not half the size of his own. Swinton has pricked him — Ileadly 
has staggered him ; but one must ride over that field to fully realize 
that a cam])aign was sacrificed and an army converted into a mob 
little better than skulkers through one man's stupid blundering. 
The retreat was not enough to humble the soldiers. It needed 
Hooker's address, delivered when safe beyond cannon-shot, saying : 

" The events of the last week may well cause the heart of every 
officer and soldier of the army to swell with pride ! We have 
added new laurels to our former renown ! " 

There is the old brick house, the half-burned thickets, every foot 
of breastworks — every spot on which blood was shed in that strange 
battle. Look over the ground for yourself, and furnish one single 
excuse for the Federal commander if you can. Patriotism requires 
no man to excuse the blunders, or ignorance, or drunkenness of a 
Federal, nor to demean the gallantry which made Confederate 
soldiers known the world over. 

In the dark thickets — in the shot plowed glades — in the denser 
woods — in the fields and on the highways Hooker left bloody 
proofs of his stupidity. Aside from the wounded removed as the 
army retreated, sixteen thousand dead and wounded were left 



430 



CHANCELLORSVILLK. 



behind. From Salem Churcli to the Wilderness Meeting-House 
the wounded crawled along the roads — hid away in the thickets — 
cried out in their agony of thirst from tlie barren fields and stony 
ravines. From Salem Church to the Wilderness Meeting-House 
the Federal dead turned their faces to the morning sun as it rose on 
the columns of Lee marching down to take possession of the field. 
Hooker had captured four thousand prisoners, four or five pieces 
of artillery, half a dozen standards, and inflicted a loss on Lee of 
about eiglit thousand killed and wounded. In his vain-glorious 
address ho forgot his own fearful loss of dead and wounded — the 
five thousand prisoners — the thirteen pieces of artillery — the 
seventeen battle flags^-the twenty thousand stands of arms — 
scores of wagon-loads of forage, provisions and ammunition which 
Lee had taken from him ! And add to tliis the demoralizing effects 
of defeat on an army, and to tliis again the fact that the result at 
Cliancellorsville determined Leo on invading the North ! 





w 
z 
o 

i- 



X 



^tcritetoaU farksait. 




'N eccentric citizen — a Christian soldier — a general of 
strange tactics! We found him at Kernstown fighting 
one to four — fighting, falling back — grimly giving 
way to fight again. We saw him strike the Federal 
armies right and left in the valley and fill Washington 
with white faces. 

It was the hammer in his grasp which shattered the Federal 
position at Gaines' Mill. Without him Longstreet and Hill would 
have been crushed back and annihilated. We saw him at Manassas 
— Groveton — Chantilly — Antietam — Fredericksburg — and for the 
last time in the dark pine thickets of Chancellorsville. 

A Christian in his faith — a child in his sympathies — a general 
who cared not for the world's admiration so much as for the com- 
fort of any single man who followed hira in his wonderful marches ! 
He had the courage of a lion and the heart of a woman. The 
pomp and glitter of war were not for him. His bannei-s grew old 
and faded and shot-torn. His legions grew ragged and foot-sore 
and weary. No matter who faltered — Jackson had faith. Fierce 
in the heat of battle, because it was his duty to kill — when the 
roar of cannon had died away the groans of the wounded reached 
a heart which had a throb for every wail. 

Partisans may keep their bitterness of heart, but the world has 
spoken. The man whom they hate died forgiving all. Struck 
down at Ciiancellorsville amidst the roar of battle, he was removed 
to die amidst the sweetest peace. Friends wept as they saw the dews 
of death gather upon his forehead. If foes exulted they were 
unworthy to be classed with brave men. 

With malice towards none — with forgiveness for all, his life 
went out as his pale lips whispered : 

" Let us cross over and rest under the shade of the trees ! " 
And may he ever rest ! 

14311 



iraiih Station. 




FEW weeks after Hooker had recrossed the Rappa- 
hannock he became suspicions that Lee intended a 
new movement in Maryland. In order to nncover 
tiiis plan, if such a one were forming, Pleasanton was 
sent on a reconnoissance in force. He had with him 
nearly six thousand cavalry, several batteries of artillery, and about 
three thousand picked infantry. Among the cavalry leaders were 
Buford, Kilpatrick, Gregg and Wyndiiam, all of whom had won 
more or less renown in that arm of the service. 

Before reaching the Rappahannock the Federal force was pretty 
evenly divided, Gregg taking one column and Pleasanton the other, 
and while one crossed at Beverly's Ford tlie other entered Virginia 
at Kelly's Ford, six miles away. The respective highways leading 
south from these fords followed the lines of the letter "V" and 
met at Brandy Station. 

Pleasanton's column, under the direct command of Buford, made 
the crossing at Beverly's just as day was breaking. Owing to the 
heavy mist hanging over the country, and the quiet manner in which 
the advance effected a crossing, the pickets on the further shore were 
completely surprised and many of them captured. Those who 
escaped fell back to the timber a hundred rods away iyid opened a 
hot fire to check the advance. 

While the Federal force was getting into line after the ci'ossing, 
the alarm reached Jones' brigade of Virginians encamped half a 
mile away. The men were still asleep, but the Federals had not 
yet cleared their front of the skirmishers when a portion of the cav- 
alry came dashing up. The Eighth New York had the Federal 
advance, and on this regiment fell the first blow. Under cover of 
the mist the Virginians formed for the charge and struck the New 
Yorkers a sudden and paralyzing blow. As the Eighth was disor- 
ganized and flung back, Colonel Harris, its commander, was sliot 
from his horse and lived only a short time. 

[4321 



BEANDT STATION. 433 

The loss of this brave leader at that date, when the cavah-y ser- 
vice was making itself such an important factor in war, was consid- 
ered almost a national calamity. It was this Colonel who led a large 
body of cavalry out of Harper's Ferry when he found that Miles 
was talking of surrender, and on the route to the Federal lines he 
captured a full wagon train of ammunition on the way to Long- 
street's corps. Had this ammunition reached Lee at Antietam, as 
it must have done but for Harris, the Confederate army would have 
held its position after the first day's battle, instead of crossing the 
Potomac. Colonel Harris had made his mark as a cavalry leader, 
and another year would have made him a general. 

As the New Yorkers were driven back, the Eighth Illinois came 
np in fine style, and, in turn, charged over and thi'ough the Vir- 
ginians, driving all who escaped the sabre and revolver back to the 
line which Jones was forming behind his camps. The fight had 
been in progress scarcely fifteen minutes, and nearly a hundred 
men had been killed or wounded. 

There were only three regiments of Confederate cavalry in all, 
aggregating about fifteen hundred men, but instead of making it a 
figlit between cavalry, Pleasanton brought up his infantry and 
formed a new battle line. While his artillery and infantry more 
than overlap])ed the Confederate line, he ordered the Sixth Penn- 
sylvania, supported by two regiments of the regular cavalry, to 
charge Jones' left flank, which then rested on a meadow and had 
no defense whatever. 

The Pennsylvanians had been recruited as a regiment of " Lan- 
cers," and had come down to the army to be unmercifully ridiculed 
by the other troops. Their lances had been replaced by carbines 
and sabres, but they were still known as the " Mexican cavaliers." 
Here was the first opportunity to show their mettle. The regiment 
left the cover of the woods in a solid body and dashed straight at 
two pieces of artillery near the Confederate flank. The guns were 
at once turned upon them, and they received a hot fire from dis- 
mounted cavalry, but the advance was not checked. The regiment 
had reached the guns when a re-inforcement of about six hundred 
cavalry which had reached the ground came rushing down upon the 
flank of the Pennsylvanians. The two regiments of regulars now 
charged, and for ten minutes the meadow was covered by a wild and 
excited mob of two thousand men — shooting — cutting — hacking, 
riding at and over each other in the smoke. As if by mutual con- 
sent, the respective forces finally separated, but in returning to 

Vol. I.— 28 



434 BEANDY STATION. 

cover the Federals were followed by a fire which created sad loss. 
From this hour until after noon, Pleasanton had plenty uf work to 
hold the ground he had gained and to foil the several attempts to 
cut him off from the ford by which he had crossed. Pleasanton 
must hold his ground and wait for Gregg to be heard from. In 
his otticial report he claimed the enemy far outnumbered him. 
Stuart's official report showed that Pleasanton had fifteen hundred 
more men than fought hiin there, with the benefit of six more 
pieces of artillery. 

Gregg, who had crossed at Kelly's Ford, found the Confederates 
ready for him, and every foot of ground he gained had to be paid 
for. He divided his column into three commands, and all headed 
for Brandy Station by parallel routes. At Stevensbnrg a foi-ce of 
four hundred Confederates, supplied with two pieces of artillery, 
gave battle to the entire force, but as Gregg's infantry moved 
against their front his cavalry charged both flanks at the same mo- 
ment and routed the force and captured one hundred and sixty-five 
prisoners and a battle flag. 

No force of any account opposed the Federals between Stevens- 
burg and Brandy Station, but, as they approached the latter place 
they found a strong force of cavalry, infantry and artillery blocking 
the way. The alarm had reached Culpepper, and trains were bring- 
ing down re-inforcements. 

In and around the railroad station there was desperate cavalry 
fighting for the next two hours. On the hill where Stuart had his 
head-quarters a chai'ge by a portion of Wyndhani's brigade envel- 
oped two pieces of artillery. In the melee every man and horse 
belonging to the guns were killed or disabled, and the guns were 
drawn off by hand. They had not yet been loaded when a Confed- 
erate regiment recaptured them, but could not take them away. 
Re-inforcements were hurried up from both sides, and for twenty 
minutes there was a battle between three thousand men in which 
only sabre and revolver were used. More than one hundred and 
fifty men were killed by cold steel, and as many more grievously 
wounded in that short time. 

The Confederates held the groTind and recaptured their guns, but 
the bodies of men and horses lay so thickly on the earth as to almost 
hide the pieces from sight. 

The Federal line was at once reorganized, and the Second and 
Tenth New York and First Maine charged the Confederate flank in 
the order named, and one at a time. They went in with cheers, 



BEANDY STATION. 



435 



but in each case were repulsed by the fire of artillery and dis- 
luouuted men and lost heavily. 

It was the presence and pressure of this force which finally drew 
the Confederates from Pleasanton's front and permitted liim to 
come up and make the junction as planned. During the afternoon 
the fighting was entirely confined to the artillery and the infantry 
skirmishers, and before dark the Federal command fell back to and 
recrossed the river. The loss on either side in killed, wounded and 
prisoners was about eight hundred, and it was hard to see how 
either side could claim a victory. Pleasanton had lost a regiment 
of men in discovering just what any scout could have ascertained 
without much danger, and Stuart had lost as many more in defend- 
ing a position which the Federals really did not care to take. 




Ca|tun of fxaiiifo. 




I N the spring of 1863, when the water in the Ohio River 
was at an unusually low stage, a band of about eighty 
men, under coniraand of Captain Hind, of Morgan's 
regular force, crossed the stream into Indiana, a few 
miles below New Albany. Tlie}' had with them a citizen 
who had formerly been a tin peddler, and knew all about the coun- 
try into which they were raiding. Indeed, he had a list of the 
names of all the prominent stock-raisers in three or four river 
counties. 

Vallini was the first village reached after crossing the river, and 
here the band picked up sixteen horses, stole about three thousand 
dollars' worth of goods from the stores, and set the town on fire 
because the citizens were slow in serving up a banquet for them. 
A Mrs. Scott, a farmer's wife, was in the village witii a horse and 
buggy. One of the raiders began unhitching the animal prepara- 
tory to a change of ownership, when Mrs. Scott rushed up and 
smashed an umbrella over his head and gave the band so much 
"jaw" that her horse was left unmolested. 

Pushing on to Paoli, the band entered the town before a warning 
had been sounded, and while a squad of twenty or more rode up 
and down the streets to keep citizens in awe, the remainder scat- 
tered over the place in search of plunder. Twenty-five horses were 
secured here, and not a store in the town escaped robbery. If a 
door was locked against them they broke it open, and if a store- 
keeper attempted to argue the question he had tlie muzzle of a 
revolver thrust into bis face. 

From Paoli the band headed for Orleans, but farmers and home 
guards met and drove them towards Salem. Between Salem and 
Hardinsburg they encountered an old gentleman riding a fine horse, 
and when he refused to give up the animal he was shot dead from 
his saddle. This was the only occasion where human life was taken 

[436] 



CAPTURE OF EAIDEES. 437 

during the raid, and the act was nothing less than cold-blooded 
murder. 

At Hardinsburg about twenty more horses were obtained, and 
the stores were robbed of whatever the raiders fancied. By this 
time some of the men had as many as seven or eight watches 
apiece, and every one liad a big roil of plunder strapped to his 
saddle. Hind learned that the country was aroused and parties in 
pursuit of him, and he headed for King's Mills. The stores there 
were plundered and three or four citizens roughly handled, and by 
the time the band left every man was mounted on an Indiana horse. 
A straight path was made for the Ohio River, near Leavenworth, 
but before the band reached it the home guards began to be heard 
from in an emphatic manner. A portion of them secured a steam- 
boat and a piece of artillery and held the ford, and when the raiders 
attempted the crossing in deep water they were demoralized by the 
fire of musketrv. Seven or eight were killed, and the remainder 
returned to the Ohio shore and surrendered. Not one single man 
of the band escaped, and nearly all the stolen property was recov- 
ered and returned to the owners. 

The enraged citizen-soldiery were at first determined to hang 
every raider, and before calmer counsels prevailed ropes had been 
passed over the heads of a score of badly frightened men. It was 
finally decided to turn them over as prisoners, but many of them 
were roughly handled during the interval. 

Wlien it came to restoring the property taken from the raiders, 
the authorities found themselves in trouble. There was not one 
single instance where one of the despoiled came forward and made 
a correct report of his loss. If he had lost one horse he swore to 
two or three, and if it was a watch or revolver he swore to half a 
dozen. One farmer's wife, who had been robbed of some washed- 
jewelry, laid claim to six hundred dollars' worth of diamonds, and 
the merchant who had lost a bolt of cotton wanted a package of 
silk in place of it. So much trouble was found in returning the 
goods that the attempt was abandoned before half of it had been 
called for. 



%[Vu m\^ Si^Mcburg. 




ROM the last days of May to the middle of June, General 
Hooker's cavalry were scouting on his front to develop 
Lee's plan. That the Confederate army had some seri- 
ous movement in view there was no room to doubt, and 
the Federal government was suspicious of invasion. 

When Lee moved out of Fredericksburg to attack Hooker in the 
thickets, the Army of Northern Virginia was at its best, both in 
equipment and discipline. The losses in that battle were made 
good within a fortnight, and for the next four weeks Lee was mak- 
ing his preparations for a second invasion. This time he would 
cross the State of Maryland. 

On the seventoentli of June, when the head of Lee's Army had 
already entered Pennsylvania, a large body of Confederate cavalry 
under Stuart appeared at Aldie, having advanced through Ashby's 
and Snicker's Gaps on tlieir way to Maryland and the Nortli. 
Gregg's division of Federal cavalry was scouting in this direction to 
feel for Lee. and as it reached Aldie it found the place in possession 
of Stuart's advance, wliich consisted of the First, Third, Fourth and 
Fifth Virginia Cavalry. 

Gregg had witli liim the Sixtli Ohio, First Massachusetts, and 
Second and Fourtli New York, these making up Kilpatriek's 
brigade, and the First Maine and a battery of flying artillery. 

The Confederates had been in the place three hours before their 
pickets caught sight of Gregg's advance. Equipments and accou- 
trements were being overhauled, horses reshod, and preparations 
made for the long ride into Pennsylvania. 

They were by no means prepared for the movement which Kil- 
patrick at once initiated. He no sooner found their pickets than 
he folloN^ed tliem up with a cliarge through the town whicli swept 
everytliing back to the hills in rear. Here the Confederates rallied 
in good order, planted four guns to command the roads, and 

[4581 



ALDIE AND MIDDLEBUEG. 439 

a portion of two regiments were dismounted and stationed behind 
the stone walls and other cover. 

The right of the Confederate position rested in a field in which 
were several stacks of hay and broken ground which formed 
natural rifle-pits. This flank was held by dismounted men. Kil- 
patrick determined to turn this flank as a beginning, and the 
Second New York was ordered forward by squadrons. To reach 
the stacks they had to charge down the open highway under tiro of 
the artillery, halt and throw down a stout fence, and then advance 
over the open field under a hot fire from the dismounted men. 
The first two squadrons were badly cut up and considerably demor- 
alized, but were promptly supported by others, and when tiie whole 
regiment was up the fight around the stacks was a bitter one. The 
dismounted Confederates had cover and a great advantage, and the 
New Yorkers were being hard pressed when the Sixth Ohio came 
to their relief. 

In five minutes the Confederate wing was crushed back on the 
center, but as it retreated, a portion of the Third Virginia charged 
down the Middleburg higliway and drove the Second New York 
clear back to its supports. This diversion enabled Stuart to get 
his guns in position and form new lines, and he was preparing to 
assume the offensive when Kilpatrick ordered up the First Maine, 
First Massachusetts and a portion of the Fourth New York and 
formed for a charge up the road. 

The men were under a hot fire, and became demoralized. Kil- 
patrick rode to the front, but they would not follow. Colonel 
Douty of the Maine regiment rode out beside liim,but still the lines 
hesitated. Custer, then a captain, and serving on Pleasanton's 
staff, pushed his way to the front, and as he drew sabre and pointed 
up the road the troopers cheered and pushed after him. Kilpatrick, 
Douty and Custer rode side by side into the storm of death. Douty 
went down, struck by two bullets — Kilpatrick's horse was killed 
before he had taken a hundred leaps — Custer alone led the charge. 

The highway for half a mile was full of Confederate cavalry,' 
and into this mass of men dashed the Federals — shooting — cutting 
— hacking — determined to drive them at any cost. The gray 
troopers were pushed back and routed, the artillery driven off — 
Aldie was won and held by the Federals. 

During the advance to Aldie, Colonel Duffie's First Rhode Island 
Regiment was ordei-ed to pass through Thoroughfare Gap to Mid- 
dleburg, and from thence make a circuit and rejoin the command 



440 ALDIE AND MIDDLEBURG. 

at J^olan's Ferry. The Rliode Islanders reached Middleburg just 
in time to cut Stuart's marching column in twain. Altiiough Duf- 
lie had less than tiiree hundred men with him he cleared the town 
of Confederates and determined to hold it until he could learn 
more of Stuart's movements. lie dismounted his regiment, barri- 
caded the streets with wagons, carts, planks and whatever the men 
could bring into use, and had not yet made himself secure when 
the troopers of Stuart surrounded the town and made desperate 
attempts to recapture it. Each assault was repulsed, and at sun- 
down the Colonel could count more dead and wounded Confed- 
erates on his fronts than he liad in his whole command. 

An hour before daybreak on the morning of the eighteenth, 
Colonel DufBe gathered his force together to cut his way out. He 
had then lost about forty men, and was completel}' surrounded. 
On the highway between him and Aldie were three thousand Con- 
federates with artillery, but this route offered him the only hope of 
success. He had scarcely moved out when he was attacked. The 
order was to ride down anj' force in front, and while this was done 
it resulted in a running light lasting more than an hour, with 
Stuart's men ahead, in rear and on both flanks. 

Duffie cut his way througli, but he brought with him only thirty- 
one men out of his whole command. Of the remainder scarcely 
one was taken prisoner, but nearly all of them were killed with 
sabre or bullet. 

The fight at Aldie was a square battle with the sabre, and the 
Confederates were again forced to acknowledge that the Federal 
cavalry could not only stand a charge, but make one in turn which 
carried something more than cheers with it. 




fallgreii's ias|. 




OLONEL ULRIC DAHLGEEN'S cavalry dash into 
Fredericksburg, Va., has been recorded as one of the 
most brilHant affairs ever accomplished by a small force. 
Sigel's corps, to which Dahlgren was attached, was 
encamped around Gainesville. Burnside wanted informa- 
tion as to the strength of the enemy in Fredericksburg, and Sigel 
detailed Dahlgren to secure it. The brave young officer was ten- 
dered Sigel's body-guard — lifty-five men belonging to the First 
Indiana Cavalry — and on his way to Fredericksburg he picked up 
seventy-five or eighty men belonging to the Sixth Ohio Cavalry. 

Dahlgren could count on the town being occupied by at least 
twenty times his own force, and when, after an all night's ride, he 
reached Falmouth in the full light of morning and found the tide 
in and the regular ford too deep to cross, his men looked to see him 
order a retreat. Instead of this he at once took the upper ford — a 
crossing so dangerous that the citizens never used it, and with tive 
hundred Confederates looking down upon him he crossed with his 
body-guard, leaving orders for the Sixth Ohio to follow and guard 
the Fredericksburg side of the ford. A few shots were fired at the 
crossing column, but no one was injured. Confederates who were 
in the town at the time assert that the column was supposed to be 
Confederate cavalry returning from a raid. The crossing at the 
upper ford seemed to bear out this idea, and many of those who 
would have fired at the column were restrained by orders. 

There were nearly five hundred Confederate soldiers in the town, 
most of them cavalry, and as Dahlgren reached the shore at the 
upper end his identity was no longer doubted. A part of the force 
mounted to receive him, and the remainder took such positions as 
promised a good defense. Dahlgren waited only long enough to 
form his men in squadrons and then rode straight down into the 
town, having given orders to use nothing but the sabre. Just below 
where the main street turns to the left to strike Mayre's Hill a 

L441] 



i42 dahlgeen's dash, 

force of two hundred Confederates had gathered to receive the 
advance. The half a hundred men fell upon tliem in a furious 
charge, troopers shouting and sabres whirling, and in three minutes 
the street was clear. Again and again did the Confederates rally at 
street corners, knowing their own strength and believing that it was 
but a dash, but each time they were furiously charged' and quicl<ly 
dispersed. Tiie panic felt by everybody when it was first realized 
tliat the Federals were at hand was felt whenever a stand was made, 
and many of the Confederates hid themselves in barns and cellars 
and took no part in the action. When the town had been cleared 
tlie (./onfederate officers made one more appeal and succeeded in 
rallying about one hundred and fifty men, who returned to the 
defense, but were charged upon and scattered. 

Captain Sharra was the company commander of tlie body-guard, 
aided by a lieutenant named Carr. In the hour's fight Sharra 
killed five men and the lieutenant four — men who were struck with 
the sabre and inspected after death. One of those killed by Carr 
was a captain, and his first stroke cut the brim ofi; the lieutenant's 
hat. In half a dozen instances the charging squadrons were stuck 
fast and surrounded by a mob, who punched with the bayonet or 
clubbed their guns, and nearly all the wounds received by the 
Fedei-als were inflicted in this way. One Confederate had his nose 
sliced off, another was scalped by a blow, and a third had his chin 
shaved away. 

Through some misunderstanding the Sixth did not cross. They 
were supposed to be over, and as fast as prisoners were captured 
they were sent to the river to be taken care of. As there was 
nobody to receive them, the greater share made their escape. The 
Confederates twice succeeded in passing to Dahlgren's rear in 
force, and, having his command divided by the river, should 
have been able to capture the portion in the town. That they 
did not do so was probably owing to the hot fire maintained by 
the Buckeyes from the northern bank, and the lingering suspicion 
that this was but the advance of a large force. 

Dahlgren pai-oled a dozen prisoners, brought away a score or 
more, captured about forty horses, a Confederate flag, a quantity 
of arms, and lost in killed only one man. He inflicted a loss of 
thirty-one killed and wounded, held the town over two hours, and 
secured all the information desired at head-quarters. 



C|^ (iettphirg Campip. 




■ IIE Gettysburg campaign was fraught with such tre- 
mendous issues that the liistorian and the reader should 
follow it step by step. 

Hooker's defeat at Clmncellorsville, following as it 
did Burnside's repulse at Fredericksburg, put the Con- 
federacy in good spirits. During the thirty days following the 
battle of Chancellorsville the South received more encouragement 
from England than had been shown for a year before. Semi-official 
hints were dropped that it needed but another success to secure 
official espousal of the cause. 

There was, too, a large and growing Peace Party in the North 
to be affected by another Confederate victory. If this victory was 
won on Northern soil, the effect must be greater. 

Hundreds of the patriots who cheered themselves hoarse over 
the result at Appomattox in 1805 were engaged during the spring 
of 1S63 in assuring Jefferson Davis that the feeling in the North 
was for compromise and peace. The fallen leader of the Confed- 
ei-acy has kept his secrets well. At any hour since his arrest by the 
Federal government he had but to take up his pen to tear the hypo- 
critical masks from the faces of scores of public men in the North 
who once gave his cause aid and consolation. 

After Chancellorsville — what? 

The press was crying out over Hooker's blunder. Would the 
Army of the Potomac have a new commander? 

Burnside had struck at Lee's front and suffered a terrible repulse. 
Hooker had struck at his flank, and the list of Federal dead had 
shocked the country. 

What would be the next move? So Ions: as Lee rested in his 
defenses at Fredericksburg, the Federal forces must remain idle in 
front of him or chance the perils of a movement to draw him out. 
Hooker was impatient — disgusted — desperate. 

But the Confederate army could not afford to rest there 

[«3] 



444 THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 

while the Confederacy was being invaded at half a dozen other 
points. It was in the field to fight — not to rest and watch. In 
the course of time Hooker or his successor would move, and another 
battle would result. Lee must either tight that army in Virginia or 
north of the Potomac. 

There was an element in the South which cried for retaliation, but 
General Lee did not consult that element in laying his plans. By 
a move northward he would threaten Washington. That alone 
would move the Federal army concentrating at Frcderiekslnirg. 
Lee could penetrate Pennsylvania before the Federal army could 
halt him. If it attacked him, he could choose his own battle 
ground. The sight of the Confederate flags in the North would 
cause intense excitement at home, and perhaps give the Southern 
government the European recognition it was longing for. The 
movement was canvassed and discussed for long weeks before a 
step was taken. Lee could not hope that his progress northward 
would be unopposed ; but he could hope to postpone the great 
blow which the Federal government was preparing to strike — to 
upset the plans of the Federal commanders. He would be attacked 
in force sooner or later. If he won, so much the better. If he 
lost, he could fall back, and would be no worse off than losing a 
battle in Virginia. 

When invasion had been decided on, the Confederate government 
went to work to equip the army. No matter what the sacrifice, 
arms, munitions, and subsistence M'ere collected and sent to Lee. 
It was almost the last time in the history of the Army of Northern 
Virginia when its soldiers had full suits, decent equipments, and 
rations to spare. Longstreet was called in from his useless pound- 
ing away at Suffolk, companies and regiments were filled up as far as 
possible with recruits, and when Lee was finally ready to move he 
must have been filled with hopes of success. Cavalry and artillery 
were never so well equipped — infantry never in such good spirits — 
the South never so enthusiastic in supporting a military movement. 

Milroy, at Winchester, was first to feel the advance. Ewell 
rushed through Chester Gap into the Shenandoah, and was upon 
the Federals at Winchester almost before a bugle sounded. His 
advance was taken for a raid by a flying column, and Milroy pre- 
pared for battle. But as brigade after brigade came tramping up, 
he saw defeat staring him in the face. The Confederates scarcely 
made a halt before striking him. Columns obliqued to the riglit 
or left to form battle lines as they marched, and when they attacked 



THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 445 

they were assured of victory. Milroy has been charged with many 
ugly things, one of which was in knowing more about browbeating 
non-combatants than handling soldiers, but it will always be remem- 
bered by friend and foe alike that he did not leave Winchester that 
day without a fight. He was in the same situation that Banks was 
at Strasburg the year before, but, unlike Banks, he did not show 
his heels until obliged to. He had five to one opposed to him, and 
yet he did not give way until pushed with the bayonet. When 
he did go it was a helter-skelter to avoid a force already on his 
flank, and Milroy and staff were first at the Potomac, leaving over 
three thousand prisoners and nearly all his artillery in the hands of 
the Confederates. Lee had planned this very move among a 
dozen others. He did not want the prisoners, but he \vanted the 
six thousand muskets and the four batteries of artillery, and the 
train-load of ammunition and supplies which fell into his liands 
and were used against the Federals all through that campaign. 

It was when Ewell had defeated Milroy and was pushing for 
Maryland that the news reached Washington. Lincoln realized 
wiiat it meant. Taking down the map he saw that Lee's army was 
scattered over a front of more than seventy-five miles, and in posi- 
tion to pass Hooker's flanks. He also saw that an attack would 
break that front at any point and cut Lee in two, and it was this 
that caused his famous dispatch to Hooker, asking him if he could 
not break the long, slim animal somewhere. Hooker could have 
done it, but the hue and cry about protecting Washington brought 
him orders to fall back. 

Ewell had not yet reached the Potomac when the head of Long- 
street's corps appeared in Winchester. With a long and steady 
tramp they pushed on, scarcely halting to prepare their meals. The 
invasion once begun there must be no lagging. Hooker was 
already falling back from Fredericksburg, and ere long Ewell 
would need support. Longstreet was barely out of the way when 
A. P. Hill swung in beiiind him from Fredericksburg, and then the 
grand movement was unfolded to all. A thousand Federal cavalry 
could have passed from the Rappahannock to liichmond, but the 
Federal government no longer cared for the capture of that city. 
Washington, Baltimore and other great Northern cities were of 
more consequence and in more danger. 

Ewell's cavalry had already reached Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, 
before Hooker would credit Lee with the intention of invading the 
North. While he had invaded — while one corps was already in 



4J:6 THE GErrYSBUKG CAMPAIGN. 

the Keystone State, a second hastening througli Maryland, and the 
head of a third tramping down the Shenandoah and headed for the 
Potomac, Hooker sent his cavalry south and struck the Confeder- 
ates at Aldie and Upperville. Stuart was there with his troopers to 
protect the flanks of the infantry tiling through the passes of the 
Blue Ridge. Even after the cavalry had sighted and reported the 
long gray columns, Hooker could not believe that Lee's whole army 
was moving. 

He had all along flattered himself that Lee was making a feint 
at Maryland to cover some move on the Federal flank. He bad 
once tried the plan of getting behind Lee to draw him out, but 
Jackson had got behind him, with serious results. Lee was now 
retaliating. Tiiis much for Hooker: He was hampered and handi- 
capped in a dozen ways. Each day brought him suggestions and 
instructions from the citizens at the head of the government, who 
knew so little of war that they could not have put a squad of men 
through the simplest maneuver. Everything must be sacrificed to 
protect Washington. When McClellan followed Lee in 1862 he 
had no control over the force at Harper's Ferry, and Jackson swept 
it away. When Hooker started to follow Lee in 1863, he found the 
same queer state of affairs. The two full brigades there were 
ordered to join his force. Halleck countermanded the order. 
Hooker moved when he realized Lee's plans — moved with amazing 
celerity, but he had offended Halleck. The Federal army was 
massed in Maryland, everything in hand and in the best shape to 
follow Lee, when Hooker discouraged and disgusted with the policy 
at Washington, asked to be relieved of his command. His request 
was granted, and Meade was called to fill the place. 

As the commander of a grand army Hooker had met with ill-lnck 
at every move, but who can say how much of this was the fault of 
the well-meaning but unmilitary President, and the jealous-minded, 
overbearing and block-headed citizens \vho liad influence? 

One of the first acts of the President was to give Meade control 
of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, and to assure him that the entire 
Federal forces should be placed absolutely under his personal con- 
trol. 

One of the first acts of Halleck was to arrest the deposed Hooker 
for being in Washington without leave, although he had no instruc- 
tions to report elsewhere. 

The world has asked why the Federal government had to raise 
three million men to conquer six hundred thousand, and why it was 



THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN. 447 

four years in bringing about tliat end. The conduct of the admin- 
istration towards McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker will tiirow some 
light on the subject. 

When Lee's intentions had been fully developed, the President 
issued the following proclainatiou : 

" Whereas, the armed insurrectionary combinations now existing in several 
of the states are tlireateiiing to make inroads into tlie states of Maryland, Western 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, requiring immediately an additional military 
force for the service of the United States. 

Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and coni- 
maader of the army and navy thereof, and of tlie militia of the several states 
when called into tlie actual service, do hereby call into the service of the United 
States one hundred thousand militia from the states following, namely: 

Prom tlie state of Maryland, ten thousand. 

From the state of Pennsylvania, titty thousand. 

From the state of Ohio, thirty thousand. 

Prom the state of West Virginia, ten thousand. 

To be mustered into the service of the United States forthwith, and to serve for 
the period of si.\ months from the date of such muster into said service, unless 
sooner discharged, to be mustered in as infantry, artillery, and cavalry, in propor- 
tions which will be made known through the War Department, which depart- 
ment will also designate the several places of rendezvous. 

These militia are to be organized according to the rules and regulations of the 
volunteer service, and such orders as may hereafter be issued. 

The states aforesaid will be respectively credited under the enrollment act for 
the militia service rendered under this proclamation. 

ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

Before entering Pennsylvania, General Lee issued the following 
address to his army : 

Head-quarters Army Northern Virginia. I 
June 21, 1863. I 

While in the enemy's country the following regulations for procuring supplies 
will be strictly observed, and any violation of them promptly and rigorously pun- 
ished : 

1. No private property shall be injured or destroyed b}' any person belonging 
to or connected with the army, or taken, except by the officers hereinafter desig- 
nated. 

2. The chiefs of the commissary, quartermaster, ordnance, and medical de- 
partments of the army will make requisitions upon the local autliorities or inhab- 
itants for the necessary supplies for their respective departments, designating the 
places and times of delivery. All persons complying with such requisitions shall 
be paid the market price for the articles furnished, if they so desire; and the 
officer making such pa}'ments shall take duplicate receipts for the same, specify- 
ing the name of the person paid, and the quantity, kind, anil prire of the prop- 
erty: one of which receipts shall be at once forwarded to the chief of the depart- 
ment to which such officer is attached. 



448 THE GETTTSBUEG CAMPAIGN. 

3. Should the authorities or inhabitants neglect or refuse to comply to such 
requisitions, the supplies required will be taken from the nearest inhabitants so 
refusing, by the order and under the directions of the respective chiefs of the de- 
partments named. 

4. When any command is detached from the main body the chiefs of the sev- 
eral departments of such command will procure supplies for the same, and such 
other stores as they may be ordered to provide, in the manner and subject to the 
provisions herein prescribed, reporting their action to the heads of their respec- 
tive departments, to which they will forward duplicates of all vouchers given or 
received. 

5. All persons who shall decline to receive payment for property furnished on 
requisitions, and all from whom it .shall be necessary to take stores or supplies, 
shall be furnished Ijy the officer receiving or taking the same with a receipt speci- 
fying the kind and quantity of the property received or taken, as the case may 
be. the name of the person from whom it was received or taken, the command 
for the use of which it was intended, and the market price. A duplicate of said 
receipt shall be at once forwarded to the chief of the deparlment to which the 
officer by whom it is executed is attached. 

6. If any person sliall remove or conceal propertj' necessary for the use of the 
army, or attempt to do so, the officers hereinbefore mentioned will cause such 
property and all other property belonging to such person that may be required by 
the array, to be seized, and the officer seizing the same will forthwith report to 
the chief of this department the kind, quantity, and market price of the property 
so seized, and the name of the owner. By command of 

General R. E. LEE. 
R. H. Chilton, A. A. and I. G. 

Lieutenant-General R. S. Ewell, Commanding Second Army Corps. 

After reaching Pennsylvania, complaints were made to liim by 
farmers and others that his soldiers were foraging. Although these 
were comparatively isolated instances, General Lee issued the fol- 
lowing supplementary address : 

Headquarters Army Northern Virginia, / 
Chambersbdrg, Pa., June 27. ) 

The Commanding General has observed with marked satisfaction the conduct 
of the troops on the marcli, and confidently anticipates results commensurate 
with the high spirit they have manifested. No troops could have displayed 
greater fortitude or better performed the arduous marches of the past ten days. 
Their conduct in other respects has, with few exceptions, been in keeping with 
their character as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise. 

There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness on the part of some that 
they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties 
exacted of us by civilization and Christianity are not less obligatory in the country 
of the enemy than in our own. The commanding general considers that no 
greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the 
perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenseless, and 
the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the 
enemy in our own country. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetratois 
and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency 



THE GETTTSBUEG CAMPAIGN. 449 

of the army, and destructive of the ends of our present movement It must be 
remembered that we make war onlj- upon armed men, and that we cannot take 
vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in 
the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemy, 
and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, and without whose 
favor and support our eflorls must all prove in vain. 

The commanding general therefore earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain with 
most scrupulous care from unnecessary or wanton injury to private property ; and 
he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who 
shall in any way offend against the orders on this subject. 

R. E. LEE, 
General. 

Governor Curtin issued a proclamation, as also did the governor 
of Maryland, calling for the people to rally and repel the invaders, 
and the mayor of Philadelphia issued this, his second appeal; 

Mayor's Office, PmLADELPHiA, June 29, 1863, 
Citizens of Philadelphia: 

One more appeal is made to you in the name of duty and of manhood. You 
can close your eyes no longer to the startling danger and disgrace which hang 
over your state and city. The foot of the rebel is already at the gates of your 
capital, and unless you arouse to instant action it may in a few days hence cross 
your own thresholds. There is yet time to prepare for defense. You number more 
than fifty thousand able-bodied men; the means to arm and equip yourselves are 
at hand. Close your manufactories, work-shops, and stores before the stern 
necessity for common safety makes it obligatory. Assemble yourselves forthwith 
for organization and drill. Come ready to devote yourselves to the protection of 
yonr homes until your services shall be no longer needed. 

Spurn from you those who would delude you to inactivity or disaffection. 
Their tongues and hearts are more false and hateful than even the invaders of 
your soil. Let no one refuse to arm who will not be able to justify himself be- 
fore man and God in sight of a desolated hearth or of a dishonored family. 

ALEXANDER HENRY, 

Mayor of Philadelphia. 

General Schenck, then in coinraand at Baltimore, proclaimed 
martial law, adding to the general excitement; and proclamations 
were issued in Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and other states, call- 
ing upon the militia to turn out and help drive Lee from Pennsyl- 
vania. 

When Early reached York he made a requisition on the city for 
socks, shoes, hats and provisions, and demanded one hundred thou- 
sand dollars in cash. The goods demanded were furnished him, 
but only about twenty thousand dollars of the money was raised. 
Before leaving he put forth the following: 

Vol. I.— 29 



450 THE GKTTYSBDEG CAMPAIGN. 

York, Pa. , June 30, 1863. 

To the Citizens of York : 

I have abstained from burning the railroad buildings and car-shops in your 
town, because after examination, I am satisfied that the safety of the town would 
be endangered, and, acting in the spirit of humanity which has ever characterized 
my government and its military authorities, I do not desire to involve the inno- 
cent with the same punishment of the guilty. Had I applied the torch without 
regard to consequences, I would have pursued a course that would have been 
fully vindicated as an act of just retaliation for the unparalleled acts of brutality 
perpetrated by j'our own arm}' on our soil. But we do not war upon women and 
children, and I tru.st the treatment you have met with at the hands of my soldiers 
will open j'our eyes to the odious tyranny under which it is apparent to all you 
are groaning. 

J. A. Early, Major- General C. S. 

Wliile Longstreet and Hill halted at Chambersburg to see what 
steps the Federal army now under Meade would take, Ewell pushed 
on for the Susquehanna river. He had long passed Carlisle — he 
would have been in the suburbs of Harrisburg in another day, when 
he was recalled. Meade was moving. Lee was to be attacked. 
When the order was sent to Ewell to fall back no man knew wliere 
the battle was to be fought, but a battle was to come somewhere, 
and all realized it. Meade was coming up — Lee was planning. 
If Hooker had been puzzled when Lee began his movement, Lee 
was now puzzled to know wliat Meade intended. The intention 
was to cut his line of communication and then fall upon him with 
all force, and his moving to checkmate this plan brought both 
armies face to face at Grettysbiirg. Prisoners captured by the Fed- 
eral cavalry reported that Lee had ordered his three corps to con- 
centrate east of the mountains, and Meade at once hastened his ad- 
vance in the direction of Gettysburg. Buford was first in with liis 
cavalry, and he found Hill's infantry already on the ground. The 
First Corps hastened up as the roar of battle reached them afar 
down the dusty road, and an hour before noon the hills of Gettys- 
burg were shaking under the steady crash of musketry and the 
bellowing of artillery. 




^^ttjsbuq — t\}t I'irst gag. 




O one battle of the war has been the subject of so much 
acrimonious debate and stubborn dispute, and yet 
friend and foe have ever agreed on one thing — that 
Gettysburg was not willingly chosen by either side 
as a great battle-ground. Meade moved to cut Lee's 
communications — Lee pushed Hill forward to prevent. As Hill's 
men poured through the mountain gap on the Cashtown road 
Buford's cavalry were coming up. Federal and Confederate had 
found each other — a fight was the natural result. The First Corps 
came up — Hill re-inforced his lines. The Eleventh Corps came up 
— Hill brought his last man into action. A single shot from a 
Federal trooper's carbine had brought on a conflict which was to 
involve two hundred thousand men in a whirlwind of flame, and 
smoke and death. From noon until two o'clock Hill's corps stood 
up against the two Federal Corps, giving ground here — gaining 
ground there, and at one point having three entire regiments cap- 
tured at a dash. Ewell was coming — he was there before three 
o'clock. He sent two divisions into the fight, and Howard was 
flanked both right and left. There was nothing to do but fall back, 
and right gallantly did his men contest every foot of ground. 
Howard's heaviest artillery had been left on Cemetery Eidge as 
he passed through the town to attack Hill. This precaution saved 
it, and his command as well. So fierce was the Confederate attack 
when Ewell got into position that the guns would doubtless have 
been captured. As Howard was pushed back through the town 
this artillery was let loose upon the Confederate pursuit, and that 
pursuit was checked. Howard fell back behind his guns and would 
not yield another inch. He thus, almost by accident selected the 
Federal position for the fighting to come. When night fell Howard 
and Hill confronted each other — both waiting. They were but 
two cards in the great game being played. The hand of destiny 
was to deal them out — no one could say who would win. 

[4511 



452 GETTTSBUEG THE FIRST DAY. 

Meade and Lee were separated by the mountains, but they moved 
as if one voice Lad issued orders to both. Each knew what had 
occurred at Gettyslnrrg — each pushed forward to be there on the 
morrow. They were marching under the hot afternoon suti- — when 
night fell— when the stars came out — when midnight cast its grim 
shadows upon mountain and valley. The Federal position had 
been selected by accident ; Lee must search for his. Through the 
gloom the lines in gray hurried on — through the gloom the lines 
in blue pressed forward. Gettysburg had been sprinkled with blood. 
Fate had waved its gory hand, and the shadow had been seen against 
the summer sky twenty-five miles away. 

No man could have been persuaded on the first of July that 
EwelTs failure to drive Howard beyond Cemetery Ridge was to 
defeat Lee two days after, yet such was the case. Fie had orders 
from Lee to be cautious. Repulsing Howard's attack and driving 
him beyond Gettysburg was as far as he dared go under orders 
received. A part of his corps had not fired a gun to accomplish tliis. 
Had he brought up his whole command and hurled it upon Howard 
at sundown he must have carried the Federal position. With Lee 
on Cemetery Ridge, and holding the key-hills, Meade would not 
have attacked him. Had Ewell gone beyond his orders Gettysburg 
would have scarcely been mentioned in history, but he obeyed the 
letter and the spirit, and waited. 

The first day's fight decided nothing. The gallant Reynolds had 
been killed and Howard had been driven. Each side had captured 
about the same number of prisoners, and the loss in killed and 
wounded was an offset. Howard had taken a strong position — 
Ewell was satisfied to leave him there for the night. The camp fires 
of Federal and Confederate twiidvled in the summer evening, and 
the wounded men who could crawl, dragged themselves to Wil- 
loughby Run in search of water. At ten o'clock there was scarcely 
a sound to tell men that war had raged across those fields. Li the 
ripening wheat where the pickets lay hidden the crickets chirped 
without fear, and in the tall grass ready for the scythe one heard 
the whir of insects as they sailed about. What would the morrow 
bring ? 

Meade had sent Hancock forward to inspect the Federal position 
and pronounce upon it. Hancock's report as to its strength brought 
orders to mass the army there. One of the Federal corps was thii-ty 
miles away, but when the order came the march was begun, and no 
man rested until the lines swung into position at Gettysburg. Le& 



GETTTSBUEG— THE FIE8T DAY. 453 

had sent forward to learn of the fight, and Ewell's report hurried 
up Longstreet. The choice of positions liad gone to the Federals. 
Lee must take the poorer one and make the best of it. He has 
been censured for not retreating. During the night of the first of 
July, Evvell and Hill could have fallen back without molestation, and 
before noon next day the whole Confederate array could have been 
massed. But he did not know until the morning of the second the 
real strength of Meade's position. He could not know that Meade 
would be able to bring his whole army up before the Confederate 
attack. There had been no close inspection of the ground by Ewell 
or Hill, and their reports go to show that they deemed the Confed- 
erate position the more advantageous. 

So the night wore on, and the women and children of Gettysburg 
heard no sounds to break their slumbers. Half a regiment of Con- 
federates could have crept out in the darkness and seized Round 
Top and intrenched themselves there. The other' half could have 
taken possession of Culp's Hill without firing a shot. Those were 
the keys of the Federal position, and yet they were unguarded. 
Next morning it was too late. When the eyes of the Confederates 
turned that way Federal bayonets glittered among the thickets. 




(ifttiisiuirg — ^Tljc ^ffonii gau. 




fj^ T is daybreak of the second of July, 1863. On the 
hills — in the valleys — spread over fields — hidden in the 
woods around Gettysburg, are two hundred thousand men 
making ready for a terrible battle. 

In the gray of morning one can hear the chii-p of birds 
in the orchards, and the lowing of cattle in the pastures. It is a 
glorious morning. The sky is without a cloud, and a slight breeze 
riffles across the wheat fields and rustles the leaves of the apple 
trees. A hundred thousand men are awake and moving before 
there is a flush in the east. When the sun shows his face to the 
world he looks down upon two armies ready to begin their bloody 
work. 

Mark every point well, for this is to be the grapple of the war — 
a field to live forever in history. 

The life of a nation is at stake. Defeat here will tear a hundred 
leaves from the histories of republics. 

Hill and Ewell were here the day before — Longstreet and Lee 
have come up after midnight — Howard is here — Doubleday is 
ready for another battle — Hancock is ordering more artillery to 
the defense of Cemetery Ridge. The Second, Fifth, and Sixth 
Corps are coming up, some of the brigades in the first on the 
double-quick, and the music of bands and the tap of drums are 
heard everywhere. Sedgwick and his Sixth must march thirty 
miles to reach the field, but they are hurrying up, determined to be 
counted in when the fight is hottest. 

From daybreak to eight o'clock, one standing on Round Top can 
see regiments, brigades, and divisions moving in every direction. 
Guns are slowly brought into position, gaps filled, ammunition 
brought up. The Federal lines are slowly pushed out until they 
reach a front of five miles, and Lee must push out his lines to cover 
the same front. Following the hills and key-points, the Federal 
lines bend almost in the shape of a horseshoe. Lee cannot conform 

[454] 



GETTYSBURG - 



THE SECOND DAT. 455 



to this, but liis lines describe a crescent, with his choicest troops 
and best guns at points most exposed. Slocum's Twelfth Corps is 
opposite Ewell — Howard is opposite Hill — Sickles is opposite Long- 
street. Meade reported to the committee on the conduct of the 
war, that he had between ninety-five thousand and one hundred 
thousand men on the field of Gettysburg. Lee's report placed his 
fighting force at sixty -two thousand men. Davis says those figures 
were exact. Confederate reports now in the archives of the gov- 
ernment give the force at sixty thousand. Confederate reports say 
Lee left Virginia with less than seventy thousand men, and deduct- 
ing for cavalry off on raids, guards, details, and stragglers, they 
insist that he could not have had over sixty-live thousand men on 
tiie field that day. 

At nine o'clock in the morning the whole of the Federal army 
is in position except Sedgwick's Corps, the head of which is yet 
fifteen miles away, and the Fifth Corps, which has a march of ten. 
Then the rumble of cannon wheels and the tramp of men is hushed. 

Ten o'clock comes and silence continues. 

At eleven o'clock most of the men are lying down in line. Aides 
and orderlies rush here and there, but not a musket breaks the 
stillness. 

It is noon by the clocks in the iiouses of Gettysburg, and yet 
there has been no advance. 

That waiting means much. Lee has seen that the Federal posi- 
tion is well-nigh impregnable. Meade has seen that the Confeder- 
ate position is scarcely inferior, li Meade moves out to attack, Lee 
has the advantage. If Lee moves out, he must be defeated. Stand 
to-day wiiere Howard lield tlie center that morning, and you will 
afhrm that assertion. Meade was waiting for Lee to attack — Lee 
was waiting for Meade. That was why the hours slipped past and 
the clocks struck again and again. Every hour was a loss to Lee. 
Two Federal corps had swung into position since sunrise. Every 
hour was a gain to Meade. Sedgwick and Sykes were coming up, 
and every regiment in both corps was a stone wall. 

Confederate military writers say that Lee intended to attack at 
sunrise. Indeed, his orders for such a movement are on recoi'd. 
He had realized that Round Top was the key of the whole field, 
and Longstreet was ordered to mass and attack. The rising sun 
was to be his signal, and had he hurled his corps against that hill at 
that early hour he must have captured it. But somebody blun- 



456 GETTTSBUKG — THE SECOND DAY. 

dered — orders miscarried, or were not understood, and instead of 
attacking at sunrise Long-street was not ready at noon. 

Tile clocks have struck one, two, three, yet Meade is not anxious 
to leave his strong position and dash his troops across tlie open 
fields against Lee. It is a wise decision. If there is anything 
humane in war, it is a humane decision. Lee must attack. It is 
too late now to retreat. He planned for a battle in Pennsylvania, 
and it is ready for him. At half-past three o'clock, just as the first 
regiment of Sykes' Corps comes limping up, a, move is seen on the 
Confederate front, and every Federal springs to his feet. There is 
to be an attack all along the Federal front, but the real movement 
is against Sickles, who has thrown a part of his force out in front 
of Round Top as a further precaution against a sudden surprise. 

Boom! The voice of that single cannon has scarcely echoed 
across the fields, when there comes a ci'ash of artillery which makes 
the hill-tops shake. One can count the explosions at first, but after 
three or four minutes individual sounds merge into one tremen- 
dous crash which heav^en's thunderbolts never equalled. Ilill thun- 
ders — Ewell thunders — Longstreet makes the earth rock under the 
wheels of his cannon as he paves the way for a dash at Sickles, and 
over Sickles to Round Top. Under cover of the smoke his lines 
are forming. Hood places himself at the head of one division — 
McLaws at the head of the other. At four o'clock the fire of artil- 
lery ceases and the columns move out. 

Meade knows what is coming. He knows where the heaviest 
blow will fall, and he is conferring personally with Sickles when 
the cannonading begins. He had thirty minutes to prepare for the 
infantry attack, and he loses not a moment. The artillery fire is 
appalling, and from the Confederate position it seems as if the 
ground in front of Round Top must be swept clear. But it is not. 
The Federals also take cover in the ravines and behind the ridges 
and are neither demoralized nor badly cut up. They are ready in 
line when the gray masses move out. 

The instant the Confederates move out, every Federal gun which 
can be brought to bear is turned upon them, and Sickles braces him- 
self for the shock. There is no halting by the Confederates — no 
giving way by the Federals; twenty thousand men move as one — a 
mighty battering-ram faced with steel. A living wall of twenty 
thousand men stands firm to receive the blow. A rush, a cheer, and 
the shock comes. For the next ten minutes on that mile and a half 
of front men use the bayonet. Lines are broken, and blue and gray 



GEITYSBUEG THE SECOND DAY. 457 

are mixed in a mob. Then tlie impetus of the Coufederate wave 
begins to tell, and Sickles is pressed slowly back. He will not 
retreat, but lie can be pushed ofT his feet by the greater force. 

As Sickles' lines are gradually pushed back over the broken 
ground, three or four brigades cut loose from Sykes and come to 
his assistance. The new lines form across a meadow — over a liig-h- 
way — under the peach trees, and stretch out toward the pines at the 
base of Kound Top. They are going to stop the advance of McLaws 
I'ight there, but it will require some terrible fighting to do it. 
Every man in Longstreet's corps knows to gain that hill is to gain a 
victory over Meade's whole army, and they cheer as they rush upon 
the Federal bayonets. Every Federal likewise realizes the import- 
ance of the position, and men die in tlieir tracks sooner than yield 
the ground. Again and again McLaws gathers his Texans in liand 
and throws them at this or that point, but he meets a firm line every- 
where. In the peach orchard the fight is a struggle between savages. 
The Texans charge there as many as five times before they get a foot- 
hold. How anyone remains alive under that terrible Federal fire 
is one of the mysteries of war. It is one continuous crash of mus- 
ketry, so coolly delivered that every man is a target. Peach trees 
as large as a man's leg are cut down by bullets, and rocks in the line 
of that fire are marked hundreds of times. 

Five o'clock finds the struggle growing fiercer. At six o'clock it 
is terrific. At sundown the Confederates have slowly puslied 
Sickles back until he has to be again re-inforced to hold his ground. 
Two thousand dead men are lying between Seminary Ridge and 
Sickles' lines when the stars come out and the clash of war dies 
away in sullen gi'owls. Sickles has been wounded, and the soil has 
drank deeply of some of the best blood in his corps. 

Hood and his Texans have charged directly at Hound Top, and 
the first rush almost carries it. He has no skirmishei's to lead the 
way, but charges in solid lines with cheers which are licard above 
the roar of artillery. There should have been a Federal division on 
that hill. There is not a full regiment there. The Federal line 
should have rested its flank on the slope as it stretched away 
across the peach orchard. That flank is a hundred rods away, leaving 
a gap through which whole brigades rush without meeting a foe. 
The gray wave is at the base of Round Top when the few Federals 
at the summit open fire, and re-inforcements are hurried forward. 
Artillery can be used up there, but men must drag the guns up by 
hand. In a wild, frenzied mob, lines broken and ofiicers and men 



458 GETTTSBUKG THE SECOND DAT. 

mingled, the Texans swarm up the slope and rally at its crest. They 
are too late ! They have reached the crest of Round Top, but can 
they hold it ? 

As the Confederates rush up one side the Federals are climbing 
the other. They meet at the crest, and that is the hell-spot of 
Gettysburg. Lines do not advance, but mobs of men sway back 
and forth over the rocks and through the thickets, howling, scream- 
ing and shedding blood. No ])risoners are taken here. When 
these mobs sway upon and into each other, muskets blaze, steel 
flashes, and the frenzied living trampled over the gory dead. Men 
who are pierced with the bayonet draw the stock of the musket 
from the enemy's grasp and die trying to pnll the horrible weapon 
from the gaping wound. There are dead here who liave their skulls 
beaten in — there are wounded here who have been knocked sense- 
less by stones and rocks. 

For forty minutes this bloody struggle surges to and fro over the 
crest, and then the Confederates begin to give way. The Federals 
advance with renewed enthusiasm, and Plood's division is soon 
hurled into the fields below, shattered and broken, but stubbornly 
sticking to the advance position. Fate has scored another march 
against Lee. Hill could have taken Round Top on the first day 
without seeing a blue coat. Longstreet could have carried it on 
the morning of the second day without the loss of a hundred men. 
Hood wins it in the evening at a fearful cost, but he cannot hold it. 

The Confederate center, under Hill, has moved up slowly and 
cautioiisly. It is a grand advance of regiments and brigades, which 
moved with flying banners, flashing steel and peals of artillery. 
The First, Eleventh and Twelfth Corps are to feel the shock of the 
assault, but the great blow is to be struck at the Eleventh. From 
the moment Hill leaves his position he is under the Federal artil- 
lery fire. Shot and shell tear through brigades iintil all order is 
lost in a wild rush to get out of line of the fire, but the advance can- 
not be checked. If he can prevent the center from re-inforcing 
Sickles, Longstreet may win. This is his object, and he did not 
mean a hot fight ; but, once the troops get under fire they cannot 
be held back. All along the center is a steady sheet of flame and a 
continuous thunder, but Hill batters in vain. Where one portion 
of his lines gain ground, another portion loses, and as night falls he 
has secured no advantage, and has lost a thousand men. 

Ewell, holding the Confederate left opposite the Federal right, 
has more cover for his assaulting columns, and has attacked with 



GETTTSBUEG THE SECOND DAY. 459 

a grim determination to win. He means all tlie tight he can get, 
and he gets plenty. For the first hour every advance receives a 
bloody check. From five to six he gains ground. From six to 
seven the breastworks hastily thrown up by the Federals are cap- 
tured and recaptured three or four times, and i-egiments stand up 
and deliver volleys at each other with less than three hundred feet 
between them. They are fighting as the sun goes down — as dark- 
ness comes on — as the harvest moon throws its white light over 
field, highway, and forest. Ewell cannot gain another rod of 
ground, but he will not let go of a foot of the line he has won. 
The Texans have won and lost Round Top. Hill has won nothing, 
but his attack was a diversion. 

Is this suflicient to encourage the sixty thousand to renew the 
attack next day against the ninety-five thousand ? Each corps com- 
mander thinks it is, and Lee is of the same opinion. He can fall 
back, or he can move by the flank, but he will do neither. On the 
morrow he will carry his banners over Cemetery Ridge. 

Sickles has lost ground on the left, and the Federal right has 
been driven, but Meade has saved Round Top, and Sykes and Sedg- 
wick are up and in position. Longstreet has done his best — Ewell 
has done his best, and Hill has battered at the center in vain. 
Meade is encouraged ^even enthusiastic. 

Few men will sleep to-night. The pickets thrown forwai-d are 
in some places not over two hundred feet apai-t. Meade must 
shorten his line to remove the salient or horseshoe. Lee must 
shorten his for the work of the morrow. On either side brigades 
are changing position and artillery moving. Ewell must be driven 
back. Undei' cover of darkness the Federal commander masses a 
corps in position to strike him as soon as daylight comes. 

And under this harvest moon, with the night breeze singing ten 
thousand requiems in the pines — with Heaven looking pitj'ingly 
down on the blood-stained meadows — with the torn and trampled 
wheat fields burdened with tlie dead and the dying, we pass the 
pickets and move down into the slaughter-pen. 

And this is war ! 

Fences leveled — walls battered down — orcliards swept as by a 
cyclone! Blue and gray intermingled — dead — dying! Gray and 
blue intermingled — dismembered — shattered — each one the center 
of a horrible pool of blood ! 

For each one of these dead some one will grieve — some home be 
desolated — some other life desolated. 



4ilU 



GETTYSBUEG THE SECOND DAY. 



Cannon and musket are heard no more — the rush of living lines 
has been stayed by the darkness. But, with hands held up in pity — 
with eyes full of terror — with voices which no longer seem human, 
ten tliousand wounded men cry out in anguisli. 

On the right — in the center — on the left — everywhere on that 
front is heard the groan of despair — the call for aid — the shriek 
of pain, as the poor victim seeks to turn, or to drag himself within 
the lines. 

Let the night wind wliisper softly — the moon be with them 
through the awful nisht. War is not vet satisfied. To-morrow is 
to add to their muaber — to the list of the dead. 




^'^y-.jt^^: i.tY'-,3ii^i''' 



05ctti)sliur§ — (Tlje (tijiri) gim. 




AY is breaking again. At the close of the second day's 
tight Ewell had secured a position on the Federal right, 
from which Meade determined to drive him at any cost. 
While he had a lodgment among the Federal breast- 
works and rifle-pits he had a base from which to drive a 
further wedge. He know what would come with daylight, and he 
had reformed his lines and made all preparations. 

It is not yet light in tiie woods when Ewell pushes forward to 
assault the Federals. His lines have advanced but a few hundred 
feet when they And the Federals pushing forward to attack them. 
Neither Hill nor Longstreet are advancing, but Ewell has not 
been engaged five minutes before the crash of musketry and the 
roar of cannon sounds all along the line, and the awful work of the 
third day had begun. But the real fight is between Slocum and 
Ewell. The one is determined to crush the other, and the bravery 
exhibited b}' blue and gray on that flank was never excelled in war's 
history. Lines of gray rush forward through the smoke to find 
lines of blue standing as firm as the hills under them, and whole 
companies fire into each other at such close range that the flames 
burn the clothing of the dead and wounded. When the gray lines 
roll back the blue lines follow, and there is another shock and 
another hand to hand struggle. 

Ewell's first advance drove the Federal lines. In the rebound 
he loses more than he has won. Then Ewell is pushed a quarter of 
a mile, but he rallies and crushes Slocum back. So it is for hours — 
a wave of war rolling back and forth in its efforts to beat down the 
living walls which imprison it. At nine in the morning Ewell puts 
forward fresh troops, and then the climax comes. Above the 
steady crash of musketry and the roar of artillery the shouts of the 
advancing Confederates can plainly be heard as they advance to 
the last grapple. 

On come the gray lines, massed for assault, some singing, some 

[461] 



462 GETTYSBUKG — THE THIKD DAY. 

cheering — all ready to die. The blue answers cheer for cheer, and 
then conies the sl.ock. Slocum said it was the coolest, fiercest 
fighting he ever saw. Birney said lie never saw such reckless fear 
of death. Geary said the Confederates charged into his lines again 
and again, and no fire could push them back. Ewell said, as his 
men closed in for the climax : *' Such fighting must soon decide 
the day or leave no one alive to fight." 

Slocum stands firm for half an hour. Then, as the fire of several 
regiments begins to slacken for want of ammunition, tlie Confed- 
erates begin to push him. Reinforcements are sent from the Sixth 
Corps, artillery advances, and then Ewell has to give way in turn. 
He had done his best. Slowly the gray lines are puslied back over 
the windrows of dead and wounded — fighting grimly — dying sul- 
lenly, and an hour before noon Slocum has recovered all the ground 
lost the day before, and Lee has played another card and lost. He 
has only one more left. 

From eleven until two o'clock there is a treacherous armistice, 
broken now on the right by the boom of a cannon — in the center 
by the fire of sharpshooters — on the left by a ripple of musketry. 
Ewell has lost. Lee has in turn attacked both wings, and both 
attacks have been repulsed. He is now to attack the center. Every 
man in both armies knows wliere the blow is to fall, and one has 
but to cast his eyes over that center to realize at what cost Lee will 
attack. Every exposed situation has been fortified, hundreds of 
rifle-pits excavated, and every ravine will be packed with Federal 
infantry. Tliere are stone walls, hills and ridges as natural covers 
for the defenders, and no field of war has offered better positions 
for artillery. Tlie Federal artillery on Cemetery Ridge can pour 
in its fire over the heads of the infantry on the slopes, and the grim 
cannon in position on Cemetery Hill will enfilade all the front at 
grape and canister range. 

Meade is ready at noon — Lee not until two o'clock. One by one 
his guns are massed in the center, his choicest troops put forward 
as a wedge, and when he takes a last survey of his lines he feels 
that the climax of three days of terrific fighting is at hand. Every 
order has been carried out — every suggestion considered. If he 
can penetrate the Federal center Meade is beaten. If he fails to 
do it, he must fall back to the Potomac. 

At two o'clock while there is almost perfect silence over that 
great battlefield, the sudden boom of a gun is heard from Lee's 
center. Its echoes are yet rolling back and forth from hill to hill 



b 



GETTYSBUKG THE THIRD DAT. 463 

when there comes a crash as if the heavens and the earth had met. 
Lee has opened with nearly a hundred and fifty pieces of artillery. 
Meade has massed eighty or more guns in the center to reply, and 
now two hundred and fifty cannon began their awful din. 

An oflBcer standing within thirty feet of three six-pounders which 
are being rapidly tired must shout his orders. One standing as near 
as that to a full battery can not hear a thunder-clap in the sky 
above. The roar of twenty pieces of artillery will drown ordinary 
voices half a mile away. McClellan had sixty or seventy guns 
massed at Malvern Hill, and dishes were shaken down in houses six 
miles away. The cannonade at the first Bull Run was as nothing 
compared to subsequent battles, and yet the reverberations were 
distinctly heard in Washington, twenty miles away. The cannon- 
ade at Fredericksburg toppled down farm-house chimneys eight 
miles distant, and was heard twenty-five miles. Think, then, of 
two hundred and fifty pieces of artillery, many of them Parrott 
guns, massed on the crest of hills and all firing as fast as men can 
serve them ! Men become giddy and stagger, and houses seem to 
lift oii their foundations. In ten minutes after the first gun is fired, 
one can no longer distinguish single reports. All reports are con- 
solidated into one terrible roar, which alarms cattle in the fields 
twenty miles away, and is plainly heard by human ears forty miles 
distant. Regiments on the flanks of that awful artillery fire cannot 
believe that a single Federal regiment can hold its position half an 
hour. 

Solid shot of all weights — shells of every make and form — 
whir and whistle and shriek through the air. The earth is plowed 
and furrowed and torn as if ice-bergs had grounded there. The 
rocks are rent and riven. Some of the stone walls are battered 
down and crushed in fragments. 

In talking with Confederates who were in the center that day, I 
have many times asked for the particulai'S of the damage done by 
the Federal fire. All answered alike. Its effect was terribly 
demoralizing, but not so destructive as one would imagine. Hun- 
dreds of shot and shell flew over their heads and hurt no one. 
Others struck into bodies of men getting into position for assault, 
and opened lanes through whole brigades. Here and there a. shell 
mutilated a dozen men, killed three or four horses, or dismounted a 
cannon, but Lee's entire loss by the whole cannonade did not 
amount to five hundred men. 

On the Federal side the loss was no greater — the demoralization 



46i GETTYSBUKG THE THIED DAY. 

about the same. The best troops in the world will not stand in line 
under artillery lire. If they are moving it is different, and the 
whir of shot and scream of shell are part of the programme. The 
Confederates planted almost every shot into the Federal position, 
and for a time every living thing sought cover. Showers of dirt, 
llnng high in air by the shells, descended upon men lying in the 
i-avines, and it is a singular fact that two of the artillerists in 
Thomas' battery were killed by stones flnng out by shot or shell. 
A Confederate shot which struck a breastwork flung a jagged splin- 
ter more than two hundi'ed feet at right angles and killed one man 
and broke the arm of a second. The Federal guns were short of 
ammunition on the start, and thronghont the cannonade the lire was 
slower and more regular than the Confederates. Thomas alone had 
four caissons hit and blown np, and some of the batteries lost half 
their horses and a fourth of their men. 

About four, as if by mutual consent, the firing on l)oth sides began 
to slacken, and in ten minutes more every gun was silent. Then 
Federal regiments sprang from cover, and in a moment Cemetery 
Ridge was again dotted witii blue. Lee was going to assault. 

It is close upon four o'clock, when a long line of Confederate 
skirmishers moves out of the woods beyond the Emmetsburg road. 
Not far in rear is Pickett's division of Virginians in double line of 
battle, flags rippliqg and bayonets gleaming. Kemper, Gafnett, 
Arinistead, "Wilcox — all but one brigade are there, and a brigade of 
Hetti's division of North Carolinians are on the left flank. Look 
carefully now, for never again on this continent will such an ad- 
vance be seen. It is the third day of the fiercest battle in our 
history. Lee has assaulted the right — the left — the center. The 
mettle of every man has been tried, and there is not a coward 
among them. This is the last assault, and it will be made on the 
Federal left center, where Hancock is watching and waiting. Here 
come the skirmish lines, creeping nearer and nearer and undulating 
like a serpent. Behind them are the solid columns of Virginians — 
swinging out of the woods are the best brigades in Lee's army — a 
column of assault fifteen thousand strong. There is deep silence as 
a hundred thousand pairs of eyes look at the picture. Every line 
in that column is perfectly dressed — every officer at his post. 
They do not come with tlie rush of Hood or the frenzy of Ewell. 
It is march ! march ! march ! with a stead}' step and a front of 
gleaming steel. Even an enemy waiting with loaded musket can 
cheer such bravery — such firm discipline. 



GETTYSBtTKG THE THIRD DAT. 465 

It has been officially asserted that many of the men in Petti- 
grew's command had never before seen a battle, but had they been 
veterans of a hundred fights they must have been broken by their 
terrible reception at the hands of the Federals. Their assault is 
aimed at Hays. He has four thousand men down behind the stone 
walls in his front, and on his right a battery fully jjrovided with 
grape-shot and canister. "Steady, men — steady !" is the command 
all along Hays' front, and scarcely a musket is fired until the Con- 
federates are within pistol-shot. Then the battery opens with can- 
ister, and the infantry pour in their volleys, and in ten minutes 
hardly a Confederate is left on his feet. At such close range the 
canister wipes out men by the dozen, and it seems as if almost every 
bullet finds a living target. When the smoke lifts Pettigrew has 
fallen, and with him three-fifths of his commissioned officers. Com- 
panies are wiped out, regiments reduced one-half, ajid those not in 
retreat are lying flat down to escape the bullets. But Woodruff, 
whose battery has rendered victory so decisive, is mortally wounded, 
and the dusty road and trodden fields are drinking the blood of 
many a Federal hero. 

The advance of Armistead first strikes against the First Corps, 
but obliques to escape the fire and strikes Gibbons' division. Here 
is also a stone wall, and here Gibbons has thrown two regiments out 
in advance of his main line. The rush of the Confederates meet 
with a feeble fire, and they surge over the defenses and send the 
Federals flying up the hill. For a moment it seems as if the main 
line will be swept back, but the flrmness of two or three regiments 
allays the panic and prevents disaster. Armistead presses on, 
encouraged by what he has accomplished, and although the fire of 
musketry is terribly hot, his rush is not checked until blue and gray 
are fighting breast to breast with the bayonet. For a quarter of 
an hour he clings there, unable to advance and determined not to 
retreat, but reinforcements come to the Federals and the assaulting 
column is broken and pushed back. 

It is the same with Kemper — with Garnett — with every column 
of assault. In their first rush they swarm over Federal breast- 
works, capture rifle-pits and leap through the flames to bayonet 
gunners, but when the rebound comes they are swept away. Six, 
eight and ten men return to Seminary Ridge to represent a com- 
pany. A hundred return to represent a regiment. Out of brigades 
scarcely a full regiment can be found. Pettigrew, Armistead, 
Kemper, and Garnett are dead or wounded — field officers are 

Vol. I.-30 



466 



GETTYSBURG — THE THIRD DAT. 



among every heap of dead — regiineuts witli scarcely a captain left. 
The picture of fifteen thousand men marching forward with waving 
flags and steady step hud been framed in blood and veiled with 
death. 

Lee had played his last card, and lost ! 

Again night falls upon hill and ridge and field and valley, and 
the roar of cannon and the crack of musketry sink into silence. 

The wind blows in fitful temper — the pure, white face of the 
harvest moon seeks to veil itself behind the driving clouds. The 
dead and wounded lay thickly here last night, but on this night 
even the greed of War is appeased. Sixteen thousand Federal 
dead and wounded, and nineteen thousand Confederate rest on this 
field ! God in His pity for the living brings night to shut the 
awful sight from view. 



*V f . s'r?. 




(iettijslntrg — "^Ifsitlts. 




'ITHIN an hour after the repulse of that grand and 
desperate effort it was known to the entire Confeder- 
ate army tliat trains were ah-eady moving soutliward, 
and that the array would soon follow. 

Sixty-five thousand men had failed to drive ninety- 
five tliousand from one of the strongest positions ever seen on a 
battle field. That fact, and that alone, constituted the Federal 
victory at Gettysburg. 

But would the ninety-five thousand attack the sixty-five thousand 
in turn ? All night, Friday night, Lee's sliattered commands were 
being consolidated and his lines strengthened. He was there and 
ready at daybreak, but Meade would not attack. He was there and 
ready at high-noon, but not a man was moved to disturb him. 
Night found him there, and then he realized that he had so shat- 
tered and demoralized Meade that the Federal army dared not 
attack him. Meade confirmed this before the committee on the 
conduct of the war. 

Lee had failed to carry Meade's position, but still held half the 
battle field and was ready to be attacked. 

Not a gun is fired at him as he finally moves off to the South, and 
it is not until Meade is re-inforced, and then only on Sunday morn- 
ing, that he ordered a division of troops in pursuit. Thei-e is no 
proof that Meade would have attacked had Lee remained on Sem- 
inary Ridge for a week, but Lee could not remain. His supplies 
were becoming exhausted, his ammunition had run short, and the 
Federal cavalry were cutting his line of communication. 

Retreat was the word, but he took his time about it, sending off 
his sick, a great share of his wounded, and many prisoners. He 
took with him across the Potomac several thousand head of live- 
stock, and large quantities of flour, meal, sugar, coffee, tea and 
clothing. 

Lee left Gettysburg on the fifth by way of the Cumberland 
Valley, and it was not until the seventh that Meade moved by way 
of the lower passes of South Mountain to strike him in flank. 

1467] 



468 GETTYSBURG — RESULTS. 

But for the heavy rains which had swollen the Potomac, Lee would 
have been across before Meade came up, but finding tiie river 
unfordable and his pontoons destroyed he sat down to build more 
and wait for the river to fall. Meade found him in battle line all 
the way from Williamsport to Falling Waters, but instead of a vig- 
orous attack he ordered his army to intrench against Lee ! For 
two days the armies confronted each other, but on the morning of 
the third Lee had crossed the Potomac. 

General Meade reported the capture of the following battle-flags : 

First V^irginia Infantry — captured by Eighty-second New York 
volunteers. 

Third Virginia Infantry — no statement of capture. 

Seventh Virginia Infantry — captured by Eighty-second New York 
volunteers. 

Eighth Virginia Infantry — captured by private Piam Haines, Co. 
E, Sixteenth Vermont volunteers. 

Ninth Virginia Infantry — statement of capture not legible. 

Fourteenth Virginia Infantry — statement of capture not legible. 

Eighteenth Virginia Infantry — no statement of capture. 

Twenty-eighth Virginia Infantry — no statement of capture. 

Thirty-eighth Virginia Infantry — captured by Co. G, Eighth 
Ohio volunteers, First Brigade, Third Division, Second Corps. 

Fifty-third Virginia Infantry — no statement of capture. 

Fifty-sixth Virginia Infantry — no statement of capture. 

Fifty-seventh Virginia Infantry — statement of capture not 
legible. 

Battle-flag, Virginia Infantry — no statement of capture. 

Seventh North Carolina — no statement of capture. 

Twenty -second North Carolina — captured by Forty-second 

volunteers, Second Division, Second Corps. 

Twenty-third North Carolina — captured by Second Division, First 
Corps. 

Thirty-fourth North Carolina — captured by Co. G, Eighth Ohio 
volunteers, First Brigade, Third Division, Second Army Corps. 

Fifteenth Georgia — captured by Sergeant J. B. Thompson, Co. 
G, First rifles, Pennsylvania Reserve Corps. 

Forty-eighth Georgia — no statement of capture. 

Thirteenth Alabama — captured by Co. C, First Delaware volun- 
teers. 

Second Florida Regiment — captured by Sergeant Charles D. 
Brink, color-bearer, Co. K, Sixteenth Vermont volunteers. 

Second Mississippi Regiment — captured, with the entire regiment. 



GETTYSBURG-- RESULTS. 469 

by the Sixth Wisconsin, kept for two days by Sergeant Evans, while 
a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. 

Battle-flag, (State number not given) — ^ captured by Corporal 
Naveris, Tliirty-ninth Regiment, New York volunteers. 

Battle-flag, (State number not given) — captured by Dore, 

Co. D. 

Battle-flag, (State number not given) — captured by Twelfth New 
Jersey volunteers. 

Battle-flag, (State number not given) — on blue field the words 
'■'• Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori ; " reverse side, a female, 
with wreath, and the words, " A crown for the brave." Captured 
by Sixtieth Regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Abel Goddard, 
Third Brigade, Second Division, Twelfth Army Corps. 

Battle-flag, (State number not given) — captured by First Sergeant 
Maggi, Thirty-eighth New York volunteers. 

Battle-flag, (State number not given) — captured by Captain M. 
Brown Jr., Co. A, One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New York 
volunteers. 

Battle-flag, (State immber not given) — captured by Sixtieth New 
York volunteers. 

Battle-flag, (State number not given) — captured by Twelfth New 
Jersey volunteers. 

To this number miist be added five others captured by the 
cavalry. 

The Federals gathered from the battle field large quantities of 
spoils, among them being twenty-seven thousand, five hundred and 
fifty-four muskets. It has been placed on record that twenty-four 
thousand of these guns were loaded ; eleven thousand contained 
two loads ; ten thousand contained four loads ; fifteen hundred con- 
tained five loads, and many of the guns were tilled to the muzzle 
with bullets. 

Looked upon in a purely military aspect, Lee's campaign can 
scarcely be matched in war. It properly began at Fredericksburg, 
where he inflicted a terrible defeat on Burnside. The next step was 
to defeat Hooker at Chancellorsville, and the next to bafile Hooker's 
curiosity for a whole month and finally get a week's start of him 
in the race for the North. It was a great military feat to penetrate 
as far as Gettysburg, witii the entire North apprized of the move- 
ment and hastening to oppose it, and a still greater one to retire 
across the Potomac after such terrible fighting without suffering 
more loss than he did, and being able to remove the spoils he did. 



Clje ('iettusbuq Cam|)aip an^ tlje Cabalrg. 




"""^ ^HE fights at Aldie, Middleburg aud Upperville were 
the result of Hooker's seeking information as to Lee's 
moveineuts northward, and while the three conflicts 
resulted favorably to the Federal troopers, Stuart was 
not prevented from continuing his march into Penn- 
sylvania. 

On the twenty-sixth of June the cavalry of the Army of the 
Potomac rendezvoused at Frederick City, and were organized into 
three divisions. Hitherto this arm of the service had been at loose 
ends, commanded by everybody, and the drudge for everybody, and 
it is not to be wondered at that victories over the thoroughly or- 
ganized Confederate cavalry were so few and far between. 

Buford was assigned to the First Division, Gregg to the Second, 
and Kilpatrick to the Third. All these men had shown themselves 
fitted to command, and were full of pluck and enthusiasm. 

Kilpatrick's division included all loose detachments and new 
recruits, and Custer was then promoted to a Brigadier-General and 
given the command of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade. 

On the twenty-seventh the entire Federal cavalry set out for 
Gettysburg, or in that direction. Stuart was protecting Lee's long 
column, and the Federals did not have to ride far for a fight. As 
they reached Hanover, Pennsylvania, and while strung out on the 
march through the town. Wade Hampton suddenly charged down on 
the flank and rear. It was but a single brigade of Hampton's divis- 
ion, and the Federal force consisted of Farnsworth's brigade of Kil- 
patrick's division. Stuart was there in person to direct operations 
on the one side, and Kilpatrick was there to match him. 

The first assault threw the Federals into confusion and resulted 
in the capture of thirty men, but without loss of time Kilpatrick 
threw the Fifth New York against the advancing brigade, and 
although it was repulsed with considerable loss, time was gained to 
dispose of the other three regiments to make a good defense. 

[4701 



THE GETTrSBDEG CAMPAIGN AND THE CAVALRY. 471 

Back and forth through the quaint old town, Federal aud Con- 
federate charged by companies and squadrons, and finally, as if 
both desired room for a fair fight, the struggle was taken from the 
village to the suburbs. There, fighting dismounted and in the 
saddle, three long hours went by without any great advantage to 
either. 

Custer had taken his Michigan brigade and rode towards Ab- 
bottsville. Hearing the guns of Kilpatrick and Stuart he halted, 
hoping to receive word that he was wanted. As this did not come, 
and as the fight continued so long, he took the responsibility of 
returning with his command. He was needed. Stuart was bring- 
ing up reinforcements. 

As the Michigan brigade reached the scene of conflict it was 
sent to position, regiment by regiment, and in half an hour Stuart 
was driven out of sight. His mission was to protect Lee's flanks 
and trains, and while defeated at Hanover he nevertheless fully 
carried out his orders. Kilpatrick lost fifty or sixty men, and 
Stuart about the same number. The Tenth Virginia suffered the 
most, losing over forty prisoners, in addition to the killed and 
wounded. 

On the second of July, Kilpatrick had reached Hunterstown, and 
Stuart again confronted him. After clearing the town Kilpatrick 
found the Confederate cavalry along the Gettysburg road. He 
formed his battle-line with Farnsworth on the right and Custer on 
the left. In front of Custer was a force of cavalry which seemed 
to be forming for a charge. He determined to charge and break 
up the formation, if no more. Dismounting two companies of the 
Sixth Michigan, they were placed in the fields on each side of the 
highway with orders to cover the retreat in case the charge was 
repulsed. 

Company A, of the Sixth, numbering not more than fifty men, 
was then ordered to form in the road for a charge. When this 
had been done Custer rode up and took his place with the cap- 
tain at the front. The brigadier was about to lead a single com- 
pany in the charge. There was a yell of delight from the company, 
cheers from the entire command, and away went the little band at 
a furious gallop, Custer holding the reins in his left hand and 
carrying his naked sabre in his right, and charging straight down 
the middle of the road. 

What was supposed to be a force of perhaps two hundred men 
turned out to be infantry and cavalry to the number of six hundred 



472 THE GETTYSBUEG OAMPAIGN AND THE CAVALRY. 

or more. They filled the road for a quarter of a mile in an almost 
solid mass, and they were prepared for the charge. Company A 
rode straight at the mass, entered it like a wedge driven into sand, 
and in another moment six hundred men were shouting and slash- 
ing at fifty. Custer pressed on, and was closely followed until he 
found two lines of dismounted men drawn across the road. Then 
the bugle sounded the recall. Company A did not return alone. 
It had the presence of at least three lumdred cavalry, and every 
inch of the way was a running fight and a desperate one. Men 
slashed and cut and sliot and yelled, and those waiting down the 
road towards Hunterstown saw a mob bearing down upon them. 
Sabres flashed, streams of fire darted through the smoke, and iiorses 
fell and obstructed the way. When the mob readied the troops 
stationed in the fields Company A shook itself out of the melee 
and a fire was opened which drove the Confederates back. 

The Federal loss in killed and wounded was about thirty men — 
one-half the command. The Confederate loss was more than double. 
Some of the wounded on either side were slashed twice and three 
times with sabres, and there was not a man in Company A who 
could not show a close call from a bullet. It was in this charge that 
young Churchill, of the First Michigan, detailed himself from his 
command and charged with the company. Custer had his horse 
shot under him, and in the confusion a Confederate leveled a car- 
bine within six feet of his head and was on the point of firing when 
young Churchill shot him dead. The captain was wounded and 
his horse received three bullets, but both got back to the Federal 
lines. Probably there was never another instance in modern war- 
fare of a brigadier-general leading a single company into action, 
and the incident serves to show the make-up of the man. He 
shared in the personal danger of his command, and his men came 
to believe that he bore a charmed life. 

There was no further fighting by the Third Division until the 
next day. Kilpatrick was spying around to locate Lee's ammu- 
nition trains. When he found them lie also discovered that they 
were protected by a heavy force of cavalry, and hardly had skir- 
mishing begun when a brigade or more of infantry was sent down 
to strengthen the cavalry. The Confederate position was terribly 
strong. Along the front was a " Quaker " fence — a stone wall 
three feet high with a strong rail fence about the same height run- 
ning along the top. Forty rods in rear of this was a second. The 
occupied ground being a farm, and all the fields divided off, the 



THE GETTYSBUEG CAMPAIGN AND THE CAVALEY. 473 

Confederates had both tianks covered by otlier walls, and a look 
over the ground was enough to convince one that any ordinary 
attack would meet with repulse. But Kilpatrick was playing for 
a big stake. Nothing would cripple Lee so much as the loss of his 
ammunition train. 

The troops detailed to charge the walls in front were composed 
of the First Vermont, First Virginia, a part of the Eighteenth 
Pennsylvania, and a few squadrons of Wisconsin cavalry. General 
Farnsworth put himself at the head of the Pennsylvanians, who 
were instructed to dismount at the wall and tear the fence down, 
and away the entire body went. Up to the moment the fence was 
down the Confederates stood firm, and killed man after man with 
their muskets resting on the wall. Wiien the cavalry began to leap 
into the field the gray lines fell back or broke up into squads, 
and the fight continued. 

In chargino; at the second wall the Federals received a fire from 
front as well as on both flanks, and for five minutes ranks were 
broken and veteran troopers were confused and bewildered. Then, 
suddenly a blast of the bugle restored order and sent the whole 
body at and over the fence. Here men were hacked with sabres 
and prodded with bayonets, and the fight meant kill. 

Farnsworth lost his horse but not his cool spirit. A mile and a 
half away he could see the white covers of the train he was after. 
To retreat was to run the gauntlet of that terrible cross-fire. To 
advance was to meet the Confederate army, but the bugles blew 
"Forward!" Squadron and company and regiment pushed for the 
train. A fire of musketry followed, and musketry and artillery 
opened from right and left and ahead. The rush from the second 
fence to the train was one of the most desperate things ever 
attempted by cavalry. It was too desperate to be successful. Tlie 
concentrated fire broke up all formations, and tlie command sepa- 
rated into small bodies, each one to look out for itself. Some of 
these squads pushed through the train and beyond the rear of Lee's 
army, while others bore to the right oi- left and circled back. Farns- 
worth was killed — his body fairly riddled, and the loss in men and 
horses, considering numerical strength, was appalling. The First 
Vermont lost about one man out of five, and out of the whole 
command not more than twenty horses came out without a wound. 
Some of the men had five bullet-holes in their clothing, and one 
had four in his hat alone. 

While Kilpatrick was holding one position, Custer was holding 



474: THE GETTYSBUKG CAMPAIGN AND THE CAVALET. 

another on his left, which covered the York and Oxford highways. 
Soon after noon the Confederates began pushing forward on both 
roads, driving in Custer's pickets, and at one o'clock the advancing 
lines were in sight. Colonel Alger's Fifth Michigan was dis- 
mounted, pushed to the front, and, having the shelter of stone 
walls and natural rifle-pits, this one depleted regiment held at least 
three thousand Confederates in check until the men had fired their 
last cartridge and were obliged to fall back. Being armed with the 
Spencer seven-shot carbine, the firing of this regiment was so rapid 
and well sustained as to create the belief that a large force of 
infantry was posted behind the walls. 

When Alger fell back he was followed by both infantry and 
cavalry, and now Colonel Mann's Seventh Michigan was ordered to 
form and charge. With a yell and a hurrah, the Seventh rode 
down upon four times their number. The highway was the only 
clear route. Those advancing over the fields were obstructed by 
ditches, fences, hedges, and walls, and the line was sometimes almost 
a triangle. Mann pushed on until a heavy stone wall, flanked by 
"stake and rider" fences, barred his way, and here his regiment 
halted and fought the Confederates on the other side. It was a 
conflict at such close range that almost every man shot was burned 
by the flame of the powder. The Seventh had to fall back from 
the position upon the support of the Fifth, and while these two had 
their hands full an officer in the First, which regiment was then in 
reserve, suddenly cried out: 

" G-reat Heavens ! we will all be swallowed up ! " 

Just coming over the ridge in their front was a whole brigade 
of cavalry, formed in column of regiments. To meet this new 
force Custer had a single battery and the one regiment. The Old 
First did not number over five hundred men, and when ordered up 
for the charge and formed in column of battalions it seemed as if 
every man was riding to his death. 

As the First advanced at a trot, with drawn sabres, they were 
greeted with shouts of derision. Then the little command closed 
np, the horses passed from a trot to a gallop, and as it hurled 
itself against five to one it opened a wide lane through the entire 
force. There were five minutes of smoke and fiash and fury, and 
lo ! when the smoke lifted the Old First held the field and the 
Confederates had been driven. Custer said of this charge in his 
ofiicial report : 

" I cannot find language to express my high appreciation of the 



THK GETTY8BUKG CAMPAIUN AND THK CAVALKY. 475 

gallantry and dai'ing displayed by the officers and men of the 
First Michigan. They advanced to the charge of a vastly superior 
force with as much order and precision as if going upon a pai'ade, 
and I challenge the annals of vparfare to produce a more brilliant 
or successful charge of cavalry." 

Many writers upon military affairs have scouted the idea of 
sabre-cuts and cavalry charges. Let such men hunt up the reports 
of company commanders after the Gettysburg iiglit and see how 
tliey read. Over seventy men in the Michigan regiments engaged 
during a single day are reported : "Sabre cut on the head." In 
the cavalry fights of that eventful week the sabre killed and wounded 
at least one thousand men, and the troopers' pistols may be credited 
with as many luore. Custer's loss in one brigade in this action 
was live hundred and forty-two, being as great a number as any 
single regiment contained. The Sixtli was supporting the flanks 
and the battery, and though making no charge its loss was severe, 
and Colonel Gray received especial mention in official reports. 

The fight at Gettysburg had scarcely closed when Kilpatriek was 
ordered to move and intercept Lee's trains. He at once marched 
for Emmetsburg, passed on to the little hamlet of Fountaindale at 
the foot of the mountain, and there began the ascent at Monterey 
Gap. It had rained steadily all day long, and it was raining as the 
column of cavalry pushed up the dark and narrow defile towards 
the crest. 

The Confederates had expected a movement in this direction, and 
at the crest of the mountain had planted artillery and supported it 
with infantry, to command the Gap. Kilpatriek rode almost upon 
this force in the darkness, and as the artillery blazed up in his front 
and a shell screamed over the heads of his men tliere was confusion. 
The Fifth Michigan, in the advance, sought for the rear, but there 
was no rear. The road was only wide enough for four liorsemen to 
ride abreast, and the first move to the rear created a jam. 

Orders were at once issued to dismount a company, and the men 
felt their way forward in the darkness, some crawling on hands and 
knees, and in ten minutes had driven the Confederate force away. 
The Confederate officer in command should have been court- 
martialed. A hundred men and his artillery could have held that 
narrow and rocky defile against a division of infantry until daylight. 

Not half a mile away was the pike running from Gettysburg to 
Hagerstown, and over this a Confederate wagon-train was passing. 
The cowardly abandonment of the defense of the Monterey road let 



470 TUE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN AND IHE CAVALliY. 

the Federal cavalry down on this train. It was unguarded, except by 
sick and wounded men, and the van of the Federal advance dashed 
along the train for a distance of seven or eight miles, or until the 
head was reached. This train belonged to Ewell, and scarcely a 
wagon escaped. Of the prisoners captured many made their escaps 
in the darkness. 

From Williainsport, Kilpatrick ordered ten regiments to Falling 
Waters, but, through some blunder never yet made clear, Custer and 
his four skeleton regiments alone obeyed the order. A part of 
Lee's force was crossing here, and to protect them the Confederates 
had thrown up strong earth-works and manned them with three 
brigades of A. P. Hill's corps. The force of the Confederates was 
not known, and believing that a sudden attack would throw them 
into confusion, companies D and C of the Sixth Michigan dis- 
mounted and ran forward as skirmishers. In ten minutes they had 
(apparently) driven the Confederates behind their works, and now 
companies B and F formed for a charge and rode straight down 
upon the earth-works. The charge was made with such speed that 
the horses were over the breastworks before a man was hit. Cries 
of " We surrender ! " were heard on every hand, and the squadron 
passed towards the river, leaving the prisonci's to be cared for by 
the expected reserve. No reserve came up, and seeing the small- 
ness of the Federal force, the Confederates rallied and nearly anni- 
hilated it, killing, wounding, and capturing seventy four out of one 
hundred and two. A Federal captain, major and lieutenant were 
among: the killed. 

A. P. Hill was here in person, and the charge was so sudden that 
he could have been captured had he been known. While he was 
making ready to mount his horse, a Federal cavalryman rode on 
either side of him, and one looked back and ordered him to report 
at the front with the other prisoners. The general reported on the 
bank of the Potomac instead, and as he crossed the river the balls 
splashed him with water until he seemed to have had an accidental 
bath. He afterwards referred to it as the closest call he had ever 
had. 



I'rom |ulij to Slcffiiilirr. 




\ECAUSE Lee was given opportunity to witlidraw his 
army at Antietam, McClellan was criticised and insulted 
on all sides. Lee had twenty-four hours in which to 
cross the Potomac. 

Meade not only permitted Lee to withdraw from 
Gettysburg without serious menace, but gave him eight or nine 
days in which to reach the river and recross. The critic who 
drew comparisons was silenced by the cry of " traitor! " 

At Antietam McClellan was forced to attack ; at Gettysburg 
Meade stood on the defensive. For every Confederate whom Mc- 
Clellan killed at Antietam, Meade should have killed four at Gettys- 
burg, to make a fair comparison. McClellan's army was shattered 
by having to attack ; Meade's army was well covered, and should 
not have been demoralized. 

All things considered, the campaign of Antietam reflects more 
credit on the Federal generalship than does Gettysburg. 

As Lee crossed the Potomac after Gettysburg he pursued his 
way to the Shenandoah Valley. Spurred to exertion by orders 
from Washington and by the criticisms of the public press, Meade 
followed after, taking the east side of the Blue Ridge. Lee 
marched in a leisurely manner, knowing exactly what Meade was 
striving for, and encountered no Federals until he reached Manassas 
Gap. Buford had come through this Gap from the eastern side, 
and finding a brigade of Confederate infantry holding the western 
end he at once reported that Lee was pushing his column through 
the Gap. This was false news, and it cost Meade thirty hours of 
valuable time, and fifteen thousand of his men many miles of 
marching, before correct information was obtained. Tlie brigade 
had been posted there to prevent an attack upon the flank of the 
Confederate army as it mai-ched past. 

Lee passed on to Chesters' Gap, swung around to the Rappahan- 
noek, and finally settled down near Culpepper, where Meade finally 

1477] 



478 FROM JULY TO DECEMBER. 

confronted liiin. From the last of July to the middle of Septem- 
ber the armies faced each other with no movements of account. 
Recruits were coming in very slowly to the Confederate armj', and 
to keep Lee further embarrassed Longstreet's corps was detached 
and sent to help Bragg strike a blow in the West. 

On the sixteenth of September Meade crossed the Rappahannock 
with an army three times as large as Lee's, and without much effort 
puslied him to the Rapid Anna and across it. Here the armies 
rested again for a month, and Meade was obliged to part with two 
corps for the western campaign. 

Abont the tenth of October a curious thing occurred. Meade 
had determined to cross above Lee's left flank and turn it. Lee, 
who knew that the Federal army liad been reduced by two corps, 
determined to cross above Meade's right flank and turn it. Lee 
moved one day before Meade was ready, and the first intimation of 
his presence came when he struck the Federal flank. Before mid- 
night Meade had recrossed the Rappahannock and blown up the 
bridges, but as he was not followed he took heart next morning and 
threw three corps to the southern side. 

Lee at once began another flank movement, making for the upper 
Rappahannock. The Federal cavalry blocked his path, but he 
brushed them aside and crossed the stream, and headed for the 
North. 

Meade could only retreat, and for one whole day both armies 
marched north by parallel roads. Lee hoped to cut Meade off at 
Bristow Station, and both armies used every exertion to reach that 
point first. Meade won the race, passed through Bristow and 
gathered his army together on the hills about Centreville. Lee did 
not advance further, but after tearing up many miles of the rail- 
road track fell back to his old position on the Rappahannock. Three 
weeks later Meade moved up to his old position. 

In the first week of November, Lee's official report gave him less 
than forty thousand men present for duty. Meade's gave him over 
seventy thousand. Winter was close at hand, but smarting under 
the feeling that he had been outgeneraled and disgraced, Meade 
was determined to restore his lost prestige by striking a vigorous 
blow. 

Meade moved on tlie seventh, and on the next day Sedgwick 
reached Rappahannock Station and found two Confederate brigades 
to defend it. Sedgwick threw the Fifth and Sixth Corps against 
this small force, but it took him four hours to carry the defenses. 



FKUM JULY TO DECEMBER. 479 

His battle line overlapped the Confederates so as to touch the river 
on each Hank, and when the direct attack was made the result was 
surrender. Sedgwick captured about fifteen hundred prisoners, 
several pieces of artillery, seven or eight battle flags aud a pontoon 
bridge, but met with a loss of about five hundred in killed and 
wounded. 

The left of the array likewise drove everything before it, and 
Lee at once fell back to his old position beyond tlie Rapid Anna. 
Botii armies were now in exactly the sarae positions as when Lee 
first moved, and nothing of importance had been effected by either. 

It was Meade who now got the start of Lee in a flank movement. 
If he could cross the Rapid Anna and reach Orange Court House 
before Lee knew of the movement there was every prospect of his 
having the Confederate army at a great disadvantage. A portion 
of it was in winter quarters, and the whole strung out on a front of 
many miles. 

But Lee was watchful. The movement had scarcely begun when 
he made preparations to meet it. He rapidly concentrated on the 
hills at Mine Run, threw up fortifications on a line seven miles long, 
and the dense thickets made his rear and wings safe. 

On the tweut^'-eighth Meade was i-eady, and Warren and Sedg- 
wick were ordered to attack Lee's flanks and seek to crush them 
back on the center. The attacks were to be made at the same hour, 
and then Meade would open on the center. Wari'en was to attack 
Lee's right, but when he got into position he saw that an attack 
must result in repulse and slaughter. Everywhere on the Confed- 
erate front were rifle-pits, breastworks, redoubts and abattis, and 
Warren waited for Meade to come up and make a personal inspec- 
tion. The result was the withdrawal of the Federal arm>' with- 
out a fight, and three days later it went into winter quarters near 
the Rappahannock. 

From July fourth to December first, the Array of the Potomac 
had marched back and forth without gaining one important advan- 
tage. It had been forced into retreat by two thirds its strength, 
and its seventy thousand men had been dared to battle by forty 
thousand and the challenge refused. 

Trulj', the critics who had used up McClellan, Pope, Burnside 
and Hooker had hard work to wreathe a crown for Meade. He had 
been given the grandest opportunities of all, but his sole achieve- 
ment was to mass ninety-five thousand men at Gettysburg and beat 
ofJ the attacks of sixty-five thousand. 



f |e f^^\)t in ^tono llito. 




NE of the most einban-assing situations possible for an 
armed vessel to find herself in occurred to the Federal 
gun-boat Marblehead, in Stono River, South Caro- 
lina, in December, 1S63. 

The Marblehead was at anchor near the little hamlet 
of Legreeville, three or four miles from the mouth of the river, 
and had kept that locality clear of Confederates for many days 
past. She lay within pistol-shot of tlie bank, and on the morning 
of the attack no one had a suspicion that tliere was an armed Con- 
federate within five miles of tlie spot. During the night a com- 
mand numbering about one hundred and fifty men, having a battery 
of five pieces, made a march of sixteen miles to strike the river 
where the gun-boat lay. One of the guns broke down on the 
march and was abandoned, and the Confederates were thus left 
with only four field-pieces to match the six heavy guns on board 
the Federal. 

The Confederates took up their position in the woods near the 
hamlet, their guns being in battery and everything ready for the 
attack two hours before daylight. The entire body were so close 
to the gun-boat that the lookouts could be heard talking. The 
apparently careless watch being maintained on board the vessel led 
to a plan to capture her as she lay. Two Confederates, one of 
whom was named York, and the other Williams, threw off their 
clothes on the bank above the gun-boat and swam out to her, each 
carrying a knife in his teeth. The idea was to board her and kill 
the men on watch and then quietly signal for additional help to 
come off. 

Williams was the first off, and had almost reached the vessel ' 
when he felt a cold nose touch his leg. He thought of alliga- 
tors, sharks, and a dozen other things like a flash, and was so 
unnerved that he scarcely had strength to turn and reach the shore. 
Whether it was a piece of drift-wood or some reptile which touched 

[4801 



THE FIGHT IN STONO RIVEK. 481 

him he had no means of knowing, but the incident so cooled his 
ardor that he would not take to the water again. 

York reached the gun-boat without adventure, and while hanging 
to the rudder he heard the lookouts walking and talking and real- 
ized that they were too wide awake to enable him to carry out his 
plan. One of them saw his ripple in the water as he swam away, 
but thought it was caused by a fish. The Confederates could have 
easily affixed a torpedo to the Marblehead's stern, but the party had 
not come provided with anything of the kind. 

Soon after six o'clock the darkness began to thin out, and by a 
quarter past the gunners could plainly make out the gun-boat 
before them. Two or three men were seen moving about her decks, 
but it was evident that the attack would be a grand surprise party 
to all on board. As soon as daylight was strong enough to enable 
the gunners to sight their pieces the fight began, the first shell 
passing over the hull, and so near the head of the officer of the 
watch that he dodged and fell flat. 

The gun- boat had an anchor down and was without steam enough 
to move her. While the crew were tumbling up and rushing to 
their stations, the majority of them only half-dressed and some 
without hats or shoes, the Confederate battery had everything its 
own way. Shell after shell struck the gun-boat, and for ten minutes 
she was perfectly helpless, having no steam to move and none of 
her guns bearing on the battery. 

It seemed as if the gun-boat miist surrender or go to the bottom, 
when she raised steam enough to move her slowly. The cable 
was slipped, and as the vessel swung round she opened with her 
broadside on the battery. As she did so she had two men killed at 
one of the guns, and almost the next shot took the top of a man's 
head off and carried it clear off the ship. 

Each moment gave the Federal more steam and more speed, and 
when she had a full head on she ran as close to the bank as possible 
and worked every gun which would bear. The Confederates stood 
square up to the fight, their guns being in plain sight and without 
protection, and for nearly an hour it was give and take, without 
flinching. In this time, at least twenty shot and shell were lodged 
in the hull of the gun-boat, knocking down bulk-heads and smash- 
ing state-rooms, and she had three or four killed and half a dozen 
wounded. 

After the Marblehead got up steam and was able to move she 
kept up a steady fire with her heavy guns, and it seems wonderful 

Vol. 1.-^31 



482 



THE FIGHT IX STONO KIVEK. 



that every Confederate on shore was not annihilated. The slielis 
from the eleven-inch guns shivered trees, cut off limbs, and in one 
instance threw a cloud of dirt over one of the guns with such force 
as to drive every man from it. Between the Confederate guns and 
the river was a strip of marsh, and where a shell fell short and 
exploded in the soft ground black mud and dirty water were thrown 
clear over the tree-tops. 

There was a detachment of Federal infantry at Legreeville, but 
any movement which they might have made was checkmated at the 
start by the position of the Confederates. Plad the Marblehead 
fought less valiantly, the Federal infantry would have been gobbled 
up. Indeed, had she not fought as she did she would have been 
captured herself. 

For more than an hour the fight continued with the greatest 
s])irit on both sides, but then another gun-bc)at was seen approaching 
from the inlet, and the best gun in the shore battery was at the 
same time dismounted by a shot from- the Marblehead. Fearing 
that a Federal force would be landed to cut off their retreat, the 
Confederates gave up the fight and left in such haste that the entire 
battery was abandoned, it being impossible to bring a horse up 
under such a fire. 

It was not only a lucky escape and plucky fight for the gun-boat, 
but the bravery of the Confederates in planting a battery as they 
did and maintaining a fight for an hour and a half against big odds 
could not be overlooked. Their loss was only one killed and three 
wounded. 




Clje Jfcknil ^ittacks on ^ovt M'd^mc. 




ILMORE never believed that the iron-clads would be 
able to take Fort Sumter, and for this reason he early 
set about securing a foothold on Morris Island. When 
he had accomplislied this he had secured a solid founda- 
tion for cannon which could throw shot into Charleston 
and keep Fort Sumter under a constant pounding. It has ever 
seemed strange that the Confederates were not on the watch for and 
fully prepared for such a move, but it was doubtless believed that 
Fort Wagner was the key to the situation, and that the Federals 
could not maintain themselves anywhere within reach of the guns. 
On the other hand, Gilmore looked upon Wagner as a work wliich 
might be taken by a dash, and the erroneous impression by friend 
and foe resulted in some terrible blunders and bloody butcheries. 

The lirst attack on Wagner was made on the night of the tenth 
of July, 1863. On the previous day and night a command consist- 
ing of the Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania, the Ninth Maine and two 
companies of the Seventh Connecticut had by a sudden attack in 
boats captured several detached batteries within easy range of the 
fort, and had won such an easy victory that General Strong, who 
was in command, determined to make a push for the fort itself, 
believing the Confederates to be disorganized and panic-stricken by 
what had occurred. Instead of being in this condition they were 
preparing to move out at daylight and attack. General Strong 
looked upon Wagner as a sand-heap which could offer but feeble 
resistance to a rush, while in truth it was one of the strongest forts 
around Charleston. 

An hour before daylight the Federal troops moved out, the com- 
panies from the Seventh Connecticut leading. The only way to 
take the fort was to go over the parapet, and General Strong must 
have counted on the garrison being sound asleep to permit such a 
rush to be successful. The garrison was not only awake, but under 
arms, and had at least ten minutes' warning. The Federals came 

[483] 



484 THE FEDEKAL ATTACKS ON FORT WAGNER. 

with a gallant rush, and unchecked by a volley which killed thirty 
men outright, dashed through tlie moat and up the parapet and lay 
down just below its crest. Had there been a thousand men instead 
of one hundred and seventy-five, the force would liave leaped the 
parapet and attacked the garrison, but such a small body of men 
had no alternative but to wait until the other troops came up to re- 
inforce them. 

The two Federal regiments moved up so slowly that the Confed- 
erates had time to get every man in line and posted to the best ad- 
vantage. The fight was short, sharp, and bloody. The two regi- 
ments liad moi'e than they could do to hold the first position taken, 
saying nothing of going to the aid of the Connecticut men on the 
parapet, who were bravely holding the lino and popping away at 
the garrison. At the end of fifteen minutes fighting the two regi- 
ments began to waver. Then a dozen voices cried out, " We are in 
a traj)!" and a hundred more cried, "retreat!" Every soldier 
must have realized from the first that there was no show to carry 
the fort, and it was a wonder that the men held the position as long 
as they did. When they started to retreat it was a helter-skelter, 
and no one seemed to remember the brave little command waiting 
on the parapet to be re-inforced or rescued. 

The action of that small command from the Seventh Connecticut 
was one of the bravest things of war. To gain the parapet it 
dashed through a fire which would have thrown a full regiment 
into confusion, and as the men crouched on the sand each one began 
fighting on his own hook. There was no confusion until it was 
discovered that the supporting regiments had been driven back. 
Then the Confederates devoted their whole attention to the handful 
of men clinging to the parapet, and in three or four minutes tlieir 
position was made untenable. Lighted shells were tossed over by 
hand, liand grenades used without stint, and a fiaiik fire opened 
with musketry, and it was either retreat or be slaughtered in line. 
Word was passed to retreat, and tliose who ran the gauntlet in 
safety looked upon their escape as miraculous. A fire of shot, shell, 
grape, canister, and musketry followed them for half a mile, and 
the sandy beach offered no protection. The loss was frightful. 
Only a fraction over half the Connecticut men came out alive, 
while the otlier regiments were terribly cut up witliout having in- 
flicted the least loss on the enemy. The Confederate loss did not 
exceed twenty-eight killed and a dozen wounded. But for Strong's 
rash move at the time, an attack three or four nights later, by a 



THE FEDEEAL ATTACKS ON FORT WAGNER. 485 

lieavier force, might have been successful. This attack called for a 
large increase of the garrison and other steps which contributed to 
a still greater slaughter when next attacked. 

Between the eleventh and the eighteentli of July, the Confeder- 
ates strengthened Fort Wagner as far as was possible, and largely 
increased the garrison, having discovered that Gilmore desired to 
go to Charleston by way of Morris Island. Up to the eleventh, 
Wagner had given no thought to the iron-elads which had sent her 
a shot now and then as they poured destruction into Sumter. After 
the fight of the eleventh, a Federal deserter gave the exact number 
of Gilmore's forces and information of what works he had thrown 
up. He had made a permanent lodgment on the island, was heavily 
intrenching, and there was reason to believe that the iron-clads 
would be called upon to bear a hand in the next assault. Fully five 
Lundred men were employed during the next five days in making 
Fort Wagner ready for bombardment as well as assault, and it was 
perfectlv prepared when the time came. 

At this time the Federals held a good share of Morris Island, and 
liad put about fifty guns and mortars into position, each one able to 
hurl its missile into the fort. These guns were backed by more 
than a division of infantry, and there lay Admiral Dahlgren's fleet 
of six iron-clads with their terrible guns. 

The garrison of Fort Wagner consisted of one thousand four 
hundred men, with heavy guns, a battery of light artillery, and 
bomb-proofs enough to shelter the entire garrison. 

Soon after noon on the eighteenth, the sea being smooth and the 
day perfect, the iron-clads moved forward and took positions about 
seven-eighths of a mile from the beach and opened on Wagner. It 
was believed by both Dahlgren and Gilmore that the iron-clads 
could knock Wagner to pieces before sundown, and that nothing 
would be left for the Federal infantry except to bury the dead. 
This was the Admiral's first wrestle with a sand fort. He was to 
gain some valuable experience. 

Each iron-clad went right to business as soon as getting into 
position, using shell alone. Wagner was a fair target at easy range, 
and before the fleet had been engaged half an hour predictions 
were made that the fort would surrender within two hours. The 
firing was steady and regular, one great shell after another scream- 
ing over the water to bury itself in the parapet and fill the air with 
clouds of dust. 

Gilmore's fifty guns opened fire as soon as the fleet was stationed, 



486 THE FEDERAL ATTACKS ON FORT WAGNER. 

and three of the four faces of Wagner were swept by a fiercer fire 
than was bestowed upon any other fort during the war. The 
screaming and shrieking of missiles was deafening, and every foot 
of Morris Island kept up a constant tremble under the concussions. 

It was well understood in the fort that the bombardment would 
be followed by an assault. It was a wise policy, therefore, that 
sent all the infantry and most of the gunners into the bomb-proofs 
within five minutes after the fight opened. Only three guns were 
manned, and these were ordered to tire only at intervals of four or 
five minutes, more to prove that the fort was not deserted than 
from any expectation of infiieting any harm on the enemy. 

Fort "Wagner would not have been built of sand had other mate- 
rial been at hand. It was not surveyed for anything more than a 
battery to mount three or four guns which should have the range 
of vessels coming into the harbor. It received half a dozen shots 
during the first Federal bombardment of Sumter, and the Confed- 
erates were quite pleased to find that it was not plowed down on a 
level with the island. When it was found that Gilmore wanted 
to get nearer Sumter and Charleston by occupying Morris Island, 
Wagner had to be strengthened to oppose him, and again there was 
no material at hand save sand and a few timbers. These were used 
as a matter of dire necessity, and without a thought that the events 
of the next fortnight would upset the theories of a thousand years 
of war. 

There is not to-day a sea-coast fort in the world, no matter how 
massive nor what its cost, which can stand a bombardment with a 
sand fort thrown up in twenty-four hours by a regiment of soldiers. 
The American war tried forts as they had never been tried before, 
and while the big guns of the iron-clads could pulverize brick and 
stone to powder, they could scarcely deface the walls of sand. 

When the bombardment had lasted four hours it was believed, 
both by the fleet and land forces, that Fort Wagner had been dis- 
mantled and deserted, and that its garrison had been driven to take 
refuge behind the sand-heaps outside. From the moment the first 
shell had struck, the spot had been half-hidden by a cloud of dust, 
and the only sign of life was the occasional firing of a gun which 
seemed more like a signal of distress than a token of defiance. At 
four o'clock in the afternoon, had the iron-clads hauled off, Gilmore 
would have moved to the assault. 

While men who were among the garrison of Fort Wagner that 
day agree that it was the most terrible fire they ever experienced. 



THK FEDJiKAL AITACKS ON FOET WAGNEB. 487 

human life inside the works was as safe as on board one of the 
monitors. The bomb-proofs were crowded, but there was no danger. 
The sand walls could have been leveled down and yet the men in 
the dark holes under ground would have been perfectly safe. 
Great shells from the mortars descended inside the fort with a thud 
which jarred the ground for yards around, and exploded with a 
sound which made one think that the sandy island was being riven, 
but it was a waste of powder. During the worst of the bombard- 
ment not more than a dozen men were left outside the bomb-proofs. 
These sheltered themselves to watch and note pi'oceedings, and they 
witnessed the full terrors of a concentrated fire from seventy-five 
guns and mortars. 

Gilmore's land artillery could not have inflicted a scar on the 
fort, and his fire would not have necessarily driven a single man to 
shelter, but the shells from the big fifteen-inch guns on the iron- 
clads were filled with destruction. They were driven with a force 
which sent them into the parapet a distance of eight or ten feet, 
and when they exploded it seemed as if the whole island lifted 
itself up a foot or two. One who has not seen the awful work of 
these great shells can form no idea of their power for destruction. 
In one spot, where the fire seemed to be concentrated for half an 
hour, at least a thousand tons of sand were moved a distance of 
fifty feet. The bursting of a single shell would lift three or four 
tons of sand and hurl the cloud all over the fort. There were a 
dozen places where the moat was filled up until on a level with the 
crest of the parapet. 

More or less timber had been used with the sand. In one spot 
a shell penetrated five feet of sand and passed directly through a 
pine beam twelve inches square. Another shell cut six feet off the 
end of a still larger beam and hurled the missile so high in the ^ir 
that hundreds of Federals saw it. After the bombardment fairly 
opened, the fort was struck ten times a minute for eight hours, and 
as the sun went down the Federals were justified in believing that 
a body of infantry could occupy the works without resistance. 

As the boom of the last gun from the fleet died away orders were 
given in Fort Wagner which brought over one thousand two hun- 
dred men from their graves, as it were. Cooped up for seven or 
eight hours in the foul-smelling bomb-proofs, the men were only 
too glad to get out and face the coming danger. Only two of the 
guns had been dismounted, and the others were speedily manned, 
the garrison posted, and then they waited. That bombardment 



488 THE FEDERAL ATTACKS ON FORT WAGNER. 

meant an assault by infantry, but Gilmore was to gain anotlier 
painful experience. 

It was growing dark when the Federal column of assaidt formed 
on the beach in plain sight of Wagner, Sumter and other Confed- 
erate works. It consisted of the Ninth Maine, Third New Hamp- 
shire, Sixth Connecticut, Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania, Forty-eighth 
New York and Fifty-fourth Massachusetts. This last was a colored 
regiment led by Col. Shaw. It had heard the whistle of bullets 
only once. Indeed, there was not a single regiment in the column 
which could be depended on, as only a few men had been under 
fire. Why the colored troops should have led, when it might be 
fairly doubted if they would follow, is a question to be settled 
along with Burnside's blunder at the Petersburg crater. The mo- 
ment the column moved out it was under fire from Cumrnings' 
Point, Fort Sumter, Wagner and the Redan, and before it had 
marched fifty yards it was known that Wagner was alive to the 
situation and prepared to receive them. 

As soon as within musket range of Wagner the assaulting column 
made a rush which carried it fairly up to the works. Had there 
been no bombardment they would have stood a better chance of suc- 
cess. They found themselves tumbling into deep pits, falling over 
sand ridges, and utterly confused by the work of the shells. The 
moat was full of water at one point and filled with sand at another, 
and the parapets were simply banks full of caverns. The lines of 
formation were broken up, the darkness was confusing, and in ten 
minutes those able to withdraw made a hasty retreat. It was the 
most foolhardy assault of the war. There was no show whatever, 
no matter what bravery was exhibited, and the confusion was added 
to by the action of the colored troops. They no sooner saw what 
sort of a trap they were in than dozens of them shouted out : 
" Hold on ! Don't shoot — I surrender ! " Twelve hundred Confed- 
erates, cool and fresh, and safely protected, had only to fire away at 
a brigade of Federals — broken, confused, and tumbling over each 
other. That brigade did not stand there " for nearly lialf an hour," 
as stated by Federal historians. It did not stay there twelve minutes. 
Ten minutes more of the murderous fire would not have left a man 
alive. 

Gilmore had excuses for his first assault, !)ut in the face of the 
terrible repulse and the statements of survivors that the fort was 
intact and full of men, the second assault was a slaughtering blunder 
for which history should hold him responsible. 



THE FEDERAL ATIACKS ON FOKT WAGNEK. 



4:89 



The second colimm was composed of the Sixty-second Ohio, 
Seventh New Hauipshire, Sixty-seventh Ohio and One Hundredth 
New Yorii. This column began to stumble over the dead bodies of 
Federals before it had traversed half the distance to the fort, and 
was likewise subject to such a front and enfilading fire as to almost 
disorganize it. Sheer pluck carried it thi-ough to the fort, and des- 
peration held it there twenty-five minutes to be decimated. It stood 
no more show to capture Wagner than one barge load of men would 
have stood to capture Sumter, but even though every man fully 
realized this, every company stood square up to its work and every 
man died like a hero. At one moment, desperate and determined, 
over half of that brigade swept into the fort, but in five minutes 
they were swept out of it again and again they took up the fight 
from the parapet. When the retreat was sounded a third of the 
brigade was wounded. Gilmore's mistake wet the parapets of 
Wagner with blood. His blunder left the dead and mangled in 
such heaps that the bravest veterans were appalled. 










% .Stnn§c llrfasthiork. 




>]Sr 1863, when the Confederate General McCuUoch, hav- 
ing about three thousand men in his command, discovered 
that Milliken's Bend was lield by a Federal force of less 
than fifteen hundred, a part of whom were negro troops, 
he moved forward to snatch up the prize. His first 
attack was on a Saturday, and he was repulsed after a hot fight last- 
ing several houi-s. During Saturday night a Federal gun-boat came 
to the rescue of the post, and her presence was not even suspected 
by the Confederates. The Federal commander packed his whole 
force into the rifle pits and earth-works, and waited for the attack 
he knew must come. 

When McCulloch began to advance upon the works he discovered 
that his lines would be swept by a terrible fire before they could 
get near enough for a dash. To shelter the men as they moved up, 
he brought out about six hundred mules and formed them in line. 
The idea was for a soldier to advance along-side of each mule, making 
the living breastwork cover him. Everything worked all right at the 
start, but as soon as the mules came under tire they began plunging 
and kicking, and raised such a row that the Confederate lines were 
uncovered. The gun-boat now opened, and, between shell and 
bullet, McCulloch soon had more than he could stand, and the 
retreat was sounded. He lost, in killed, wounded and prisoners, 
over six hundred men, together with a field battery and many small 
arms, while the Federal loss, in killed and wounded, was nearly as 
many. McCulloch was the first general in either army who 
attempted to make a breastwork out of a living mule, and, as far 
as known, he was, also, the last. His men found the heels of the 
terrified animals about as dangerous as the Federal bullets. 

[490] 



Sragg's ^ic§c of QiJiattuiiooga. 




F there is another war between the North and the South, 
Chattanooga, Nashville, and Knoxville will again be 
strategic positions worth fighting for. The (Joufederates 
early discovered their value and clung to them with grim 
tenacity. Nature had done so much for Chattanooga that 
man had only to plant a few guns to make the position seemingly 
impregnable. 

When Genei-al Bragg held it in the fall of 1863, he reported to 
the War Department that the Federals could not inarch enough 
men into Tennessee to capture Chattanooga. When Rosecrans held 
it, two weeks later, he reported to Grant that he could hold the 
place against the whole Confederacy. But both commanders had 
to learn that an army without rations is already defeated. 

When Rosecrans reached Chattanooga and surveyed the position, 
he saw that a direct assault would end in disaster. Then he began 
hunting for the weak point, and he moved by the flank. When 
he had cut Bragg's lines to the west and south, not another pound 
of rations could enter Chattanooga, and starvation was only a ques- 
tion of days. Bragg, sure tliat Rosecrans meant to assault, and 
confident that he could repel him, was deceived into remaining 
quiet until the flank movement had been accomplished. Then, in 
a day, the blow fell, and he saw that he must either evacuate or 
march out and attack the Federal army. That he did not choose 
the latter course was at first attributed to cowardice, but subsequent 
events proved that he meant to meet strategy with strategy. Before 
any Confedei-ate had come down to half rations Bragg was marching 
out of Chattanooga, bands playing, flags flying, and the men in 
good spirits. None of his earth-works were disturbed, and the 
bridges were all left in perfect order. 

Awake at last to what Rosecrans was doing, Bragg had bestirred 
himself with such energy that before leaving Chattanooga he knew 
the position of every Federal division. The nearest corps was eight 

L-1911 



492 beagg's siege of chattanooga. 

miles away, and the farthest was about forty. By rapid marching 
he could strike them in detail. The fact that Bragg was retreating 
proved to Roseerans that he was demoralized, and he started Crit- 
tenden's corps in pursuit. This command, by making a shoi-t cut 
to head Bragg off, escaped annihilation. He had the trap set for 
his game, but the game had taken another road. It was these 
movements which brought on the battle of Chiekamauga. Bragg 
had faced about, ready to fight, and in ten days more it was Rose- 
erans who was shut up in Chattanooga, and it was Bragg who was 
playing the role of besieger. 

Bragg's army had been supplied by railroads running into the 
Confederacy, but when Roseerans found himself penned up he 
realized that every pound of rations for his large army must not 
only come by wagon, but be hauled mo7'e than fifty miles over roads 
which to-day a farmer's team can hardly pull along with ten bushels 
of oats. If the Confederates did not meddle with the Nashville 
Railroad, supplies could be wagoned over the mountains in limited 
quantities. Roseerans had to trust to luck and arrange his trains. 

A brigade of soldiers lying within half a mile of a depot of su}> 
plies will keep twenty wagons on the move all the time. Think, 
then, how many wagons it would take to supply haj', corn, cloth- 
ing, rations, equipments, etc., to a large army sixty miles from a 
depot ! For all that long sixty miles there was not a spot in that 
fall of 1863 where a team could strike a trot. It took two days 
and a half or three days to go with empty wagons, and four and 
five to return. Where the road crossed a valley the mud was hub- 
deep. Where it ascended a hill six spans of mules were necessary 
to handle the load. In many jjlaces there are stretches of two miles 
where the road is too narrow for vehicles like army wagons to pass. 
This fact sometimes delayed the wagons for hours. 

Bragg was determined that Roseerans should leave Chattanooga 
before help could come from the West. He would not make an 
assault, and Roseerans would have met with defeat in marching out 
to attack him. Therefore his plan was to starve the Federals out, 
and he came so near success that none who were shut up there will 
ever forget the short rations dealt out. The Nashville Road was 
several times torn up at diflferent points, and systematic attacks 
made on the wagon trains. Over a thousand wagon-loads of sub- 
sistence were destroyed in two months, and after a few weeks the 
whole route was lined with wrecked vehicles and dead mules. 
Roseerans might keep his soldiers in bread and meat a little longer, 



BEAGG's siege of CHATTANOOGA. 493 

but there came a day when nothing further could be thought of. 
The horses must starve, and the men who were without shoes and 
overcoats must make the best of it. 

Fall came on, cold and rainy, and hundreds of the men were suf- 
fering for the want of clothing and tents. Bragg threw his lines 
across from Missionary Ridge to Lookout Mountain, and one of his 
most advanced forts now stands within the city limits and close 
beside a summer resort. He was not idle an hour day or night. 
There was a constant firing all along the picket lines, and the Con- 
federate cavalry was particularly aggressive. The country was 
entirely stripped of forage, and the question of "how to beat 
Bragg" was finally lost in the search for food. Some regiments 
were without coffee for days at a time. Others had coffee but no 
pork. Others yet considered themselves lucky to get coffee and 
hard-tack. Rosecrans could not march out and attack, and had he 
evacuated Chattanooga, Bragg was ready to pursue and overwhelm 
him. He had only one course — to stick. 

Men who fought under Rosecrans are not satisfied with the treat- 
ment he received at the hands of Grant. Take all that has come 
to light in these long twenty years, and there is much for him and 
something against him. He was a fighter. Where other generals 
would have realized their defeat he had only commenced to fight. 
He had the confidence of ofl[icers and men. Another might have 
moved out and attacked Bragg, goaded on by newspapers and politi- 
cal clamor, but he refused certain defeat. It is a good general who 
knows when not to attack. 

On the other hand, it is claimed that Rosecrans lacked strategy ; 
that his pursuit of Bragg was a woeful mistake, and that in so doing 
he was doing exactly what Bragg planned for him. Bragg had 
plenty of time to evacuate Chattanooga, yet he did not touch a 
bridge nor destroy such stores as he could not carry off. Critics 
have said that these incidents should have shown Rosecrans that his 
enemy was in no way demoralized. Had he hurried up his scat- 
tered corps and slipped into Bragg's warm nest, his army would 
have secured all the key-positions and been in trim for a fight at 
any point. The battle of Chickamauga not only reduced the army 
in a fearful manner, but demoralized it for weeks, and thousands of 
the infantry were left without arms. 

And, too, Rosecrans could have at any time accomplished what 
Thomas set about before he had been in Chattanooga twenty-four 
hours — opening a shorter line of communication. It seems not to 



494 beagg's siege of chattanooga. 

have been his failure as a fighter so much as the claim that he was 
a failure as a strategist, which caused his removal. But, whatever 
the causes and whatever the criticisms, " Old Rosj's " name will 
ever bring a cheer to the lips of the men who fought under his 
standard. 

In the last days of the siege there was not enough forage in 
Chattanooga to supply the horses of one full battery. Had Rose- 
crans attempted to retreat he could not have drawn a dozen field- 
pieces away. Shade and fruit trees were cut down for the animals 
to browse on, and in some instances citizens were routed off their 
straw beds that the contents might go to the horses. By and by 
every horse was a gaunt skeleton, weakly wandering over the black 
fields in search of patch or shrub, and one after another they fell 
down and died of sheer starvation. 

The soldiers had to make the most of their slim fare, and even to 
divide with the women and children of Chattanooga. After the 
lapse of a month not a house in the place had flour, meat, butter, 
milk or potatoes. When families had eaten what they had in stock 
they appealed to the soldiers. 

When Bragg evacuated the city one of his colonels left a young 
wife behind. She was from South Carolina and a thorough Yankee- 
hater. She was at first comfortably provided with provisions, but 
as the days went by and she divided with this neighbor and that, 
her stock ran low. She finally had nothing left but corn-rneal and 
dried peas, and one night a servant girl stole all the meal. Other 
women were appealing to the Federals, but this one determined to 
die first. She had pea soup, pea pudding, and peas cooked in vari- 
ous other shapes, and when the peas gave out she gave a negro a 
dollar to cut her a steak from a mule which had fallen dead in a 
field across the way. She had made up her mind to brave it 
through, but the mule meat was worse than the blue-coats and she 
locked up her pride and applied for Federal rations. 

Lookout Mountain seems to hang right over Chattanooga ; but 
one must ride for two long hours from the center of the city to 
reach the spot where Bragg had four guns planted to bombard the 
place. There was more talk than shoot, as only one of his pieces 
could be sufficiently depressed to strike the town, and his occasional 
blazing away amounted to nothing when summed up. Two shells 
struck a hotel without damage to anybody, and a piece of another 
wounded a colored boy on the street. Had he been offered a reward 
for killins: ten Federals in a month's bombardment he could not 



BRAGG's siege of CHATTAiJOOGA. 495 

have earned it. One has but to ride to the crest of the mountain 
to see how greatly his position was overestimated. He had three 
guns behind a breastwork which stills stands in good repair, and a 
fourth down between the rocks on the knob. Thirty rods in rear 
of these guns was a breastwork thrown up to cover two regiments 
of infantry. It is there to-day, looking just as it did on that event- 
ful day when Hooker's troops struck it in flank and sent-the Confed- 
erates rushing through the pines. Had Grant ignored the position 
entirely it must have been evacuated as soon as Missionary Ridge 
was captured. 

" Give me ten days more." So said Bragg when things were at 
their worst in Chattanooga, and if Thomas hadn't bestirred himself 
starvation would have compelled a surrender. In the effort to 
supply the army from Bridgeport by wagon, Eosecrans lost eleven 
thousand five hundred mules and horses on the i-oad. One could have 
walked the entire distance on their dead bodies, and in journeying 
over a part of the route the last year, I saw many of the skeletons 
still bleaching on the hill-sides and in the ravines. There was also a 
loss of over three thousand army wagons, and at least a million dol- 
lars' worth of stores. That the Federal forces held the key to East 
Tennessee, with a victorious army in front and starvation in rear, 
is a matter deserving of more praise than history has given it. Had 
Bragg retaken the place, the consequences would have been felt 
from the Army of the Potomac to Vicksburg. 




I^ohr farts Satugnfr aii^ (Srcgg toerf g^bini^oit^^. 



f//^^ AELY in September, 1863, it became plain to the Con- 
(C I^^ federates that they could not hold Forts Wagner and 
■^i^^J Gregg many days longer. The iron-clads had pounded 
them from one side and Gilmore's troops from the 
other, and tliat the greater part of Morris Island would 
soon be in the hands of the Federals was a conclusion which must 
be met and prepared for. 

And now here was the grimness of war. The sand forts had 
been almost leveled to the surface tliree or four times over, and yet 
repairs had been made and the garrisons re-inforced. They had the 
iron-clads on the one hand and the Federal infantry on the other, 
and it had come to that pass that a linger could not be lifted above 
the parapet without finding a sharp-shooter watching for it. Gil- 
more had about thirty guns in a semicircle before Wagner, and not 
satisfied with raining tons of shot and shell daily upon the work, 
he began a new movement. 

Here was the terror of war — sap and mine. Foot by foot, inch 
by inch, the Federals had crept as near as was possible, rolling their 
sand earth-works before them almost as easily as one could roll 
bales of cotton. Within pistol-shot of the parapet they halted. 
War had now become cold-blooded murder. A strip of sand, not 
four hundred feet wide, was the neutral ground, and tiie Tiger of 
War raved back and forth over this in search of blood. He found 
it — blood by the gallon — by the barrel — blood flowing out upon 
the white sands until the tracks of the Tiger could be plainly seen 
in the dampness. 

The iron-clads could neither reduce Fort Sumter nor pass it, and 
the attempt to reach Charleston by way of Secessionville had failed. 
If tlie Federals could gain possession of Morris Island, Charleston 
wonld be under the fire of common artillery and Fort Sumter could 
be attacked from a new side. 

Gilmore had secured the lower end of the island and intrenched 

L4961 



HOW FOBTS WAGNEE AND GREGG WERE ABANDONED. 497 

his position, but he could advance no further until Wagner and 
Gregg were overcome. Wagner had received the most terrific 
pounding from the iron-clads — a fire so fierce and continuous that 
army and navy oflicers asserted that all human life behind the sand 
pilfcs had been wiped out, and yet the echoes of the last giin had 
scarcely died away when a thousand Confederates emerged from 
the bomb-proofs and coolly began making repairs. A column of 
three thousand Federals had fiung itself at the fort, fought with 
desperation, and retired shattered and broken. A second column, 
stronger by a thousand, had rushed over the ditch — up the slopes — 
over the walls of sand — fought hand to hand with the ferocity of 
tigers, and when the broken ranks were reformed within the Fed- 
eral lines six hundred men were not there to answer to their names. 

Battery Gregg had been pounded at for weary days — its garri- 
son torn to pieces by the monster shells, its guns dismounted and 
its walls torn out or leveled flat — but there they were, sullen, 
defiant, and saying to the Federal Lion : 

" We are in your path and prepared for you ! " 

The English, the French and the Germans have their histories of 
that great four years' struggle in America, and their historians 
have praised pluck wherever it cropped out. An American who 
attempts it will be called a patriot for praising the one side and a 
" rebel " for praising the other. There was pluck at Wagner and 
Gregg and Sumter and Charleston — such pluck and determination ; 
such uncomplaining sacrifices for the cause ; such a steadfast pur- 
pose to defend every brick and beam and plank to the last as 
Greek or Spartan rarely ever exhibited. 

When it was finally realized that neither the missiles from the 
fleet nor the bayonets of the infantry on shore could reduce the 
forts of sand it was determined to blow Wagner out of the path of 
the advance. Wagner out of the way, Gregg would be evacuated. 

Beginning about the fifteenth of July, the Federal forces may 
be said to have advanced foot by foot. During the night the sap- 
pers would advance underground, burrowing their way with pick 
and shovel, and next morning the Confederates would look out upon 
a new Federal position. Wagner was being fought with its own 
weapon — sand. Its sand walls had saved it — other sand walls were 
to overwhelm it. Gilmoi-e was the Spectre of War. His shadow 
was reaching further and further np Morris Island, and that shadow 
never moved backwards. Where it rested it burned into the sand, 
and left a horrible trace. There was scarcely a day that the Spectre 

Vol. I. -3 2 



498 HOW FORTS WAGNER AND GREGG WERE ABANDONED. 

did not seek to devour more groimd — never a night that the men 
who followed it or opposed it did not scream out as bullets tore 
their flesh. 

In the last days of July the sight of the gaunt and blood-stained 
Spectre roused the Confederates to fury, and it was planned to 
thii3w enough infantry upon Morris Island to make a quick dash at 
the Federals and overwhelm tliem. The regiments to make this 
move had beea named, when it was discovered that lack of trans- 
portation would pi-event. 

T\vent3'-four hours later it was realized that the knell of fate wa3 
about to ring out its warning over Morris Island. Gilmore the 
Spectre was as inflexible as death and as unyielding as fate. A 
snail might have progressed faster, but it was progression just the 
same. Each morning saw his tracks of blood a little nearer — each 
night there were burials in the sand hills behind "Wagner. The 
fort was holding out — the guns were roaring defiance at fate, but 
fate ever conquers. 

In the first week of September Gilmore's trenches ended within 
stone's throw of Wagner, but covered from its guns. From here 
he could drive mines into its very bomb-proofs, or he could assemble 
a suflicient force to make the chances of a sudden rush almost cer- 
tain. The guns from land and sea had an enfilading tire, the mor- 
tars had the exact range, and it had come to pass at last that death 
groped in every nook and corner and bomb-proof in search of vic- 
tims. 

Fort Wagner would not surrender, but it must be evacuated. 
Everything was planned in the coolest manner. Only the sandy 
site, rent and torn by explosions, was to be left for the Spectre to 
gloat over. 

One of the preliminary steps was to excavate trenches and rifle- 
pits in rear of Wagner. These, filled with the rear guard of the 
garrison, would check pursuit long enough to enable everybody' to 
escape. Such ammunitions of war as could be removed to Gregg 
and beyond were taken away. 

At dark on the night of the sixth the evacuation began. The 
greater part of the garrison was withdrawn to the rifle-pits, two or 
three light guns dragged away with them, and presentlj' the fort 
which had been tenanted so long and had withstood so much, was 
witiiout sentinels to challenge or artillerist to flre. 

There was a suspicion in the Federal mind that some movement 
was taking place among the Confederates, but whether it was an 



HOW FORTS WAGNER AND GEEGG WERE ABANDONED. 499 

increase of garrison or an evacuation no one could determine. To 
be prepared for any emergency, a strong calcium liglit was thrown 
upon the fort from one of the iron-clads. From the vessel it 
seemed as if one could have seen a cat walking along the parapets, 
but the light was deceiving. It was a ghostly glare which betrayed 
those who watched instead of those who worked. Men stood upon 
the parapets without discovery, and the strong glare on the front of 
the fort deepened the darkness on all other sides. 

On this night Federal pickets lay in their rifle-pits within thirty 
steps of the ditch of Wagner, but they neither saw nor heard any- 
thing to arouse their suspicions. There were less than eight hun- 
dred men in the garrison, and as night came on they marched out 
of the fort and moved away like shadows. The soft sand echoed 
no footstep, and no voice was raised above a whisper. 

While the ghostly glare of the calcium light fell upon the ram- 
parts, and while the Tiger of War crouched in the sand only a few 
steps away, listening, peering, glaring, seven hundred and fifty men 
flitted across the sand to Battery Gregg without the whisper of an 
alarm. For every pound of sand used in constructing Wagner and 
repairing it two pounds of Federal iron had been hurled to batter 
it down, but on this night it stood there as proud and strong and 
defiant as ever. 

Before ten o'clock the garrison of Wagter was rowing away 
from Morris Island. The men had taken their muskets, but little 
else. Not one of the cannon had been saved. Before midnight the 
garrison of Gregg had left, and there remained only the small party 
charged with blowing up both works. 

The intention of the Confederates was to leave nothing but two 
great holes in the sand to mark the sites of the forts. The orders 
transmitted from head-quarters were very plain and concise. The 
guns were to be spiked, the trunions knocked off, and the carriages 
broken. All ammunition was to be placed in the main magazine, 
and time-fuses used for the explosions. The big guns were to be 
rammed full of powder, sand and shot and arranged with time-fuses 
to burst about the time of the grand explosion. Gregg, being five 
minutes' walk from Wagner, was to have a ten minute fuse in place 
of a fifteen, and the programme was to have the two explosions 
occur in the same second. 

No move could be made at Wagner until after dark, and then it 
was found that a blow struck upon a gun would arouse all the Fed- 
eral pickets lying beyond the ditch. The guns were spiked by men 



500 HOW FOKTS WAGNER AND GEEGG WEEE ABANDONED. 

crawling about like cats, but they could not be arranged for burst- 
ing nor the carriages destroyed. The spiking was better done at 
Gregg, being further away, but yet within six hours after the Fed- 
erals took possession every gun was in good workiug order. 

The fuses had been repeatedly tested, and each time they had 
burned brightly and exactly such a distance to the minute. In each 
fort the fuse was carefully laid and led to a barrel of powder and 
they were burning all right when the last boat left the island. And 
yet, strangely enough, neither fuse accomplished the result deemed 
positively certain. One went out altogether six or eight feet from 
the powder and the other became disarranged and was consumed 
without damage to anything. 

Tiie last boat from the island was discovered by Federal picket 
boats and fired at, and ten minutes later it was known to Gilmore's 
forces that Morris Island had been evacuated by the Confederates. 

At a given signal Forts Sumter, Johnson and other works turned 
their tire upon the evacuated forts, to prevent the Federals from rush- 
ing in and extinguishing the fuses, and though this fire answered 
the object in one sense it failed in another. 

From April to September Wagner had been stormed and assaulted 
and pounded until almost every grain of sand had soaked a drop of 
blood, but here it was at last in Federal hands. Ten thousand 
infantry, thirty cannon and mortars in battery, backed by a fleet of 
iron-clads, had finally driven seven hundred and twenty men out of 
a sand heap, and Gilmore was half a mile nearer Charleston. 

Federal history called it a great victory, and the masses shouted 
glory without counting the cost or consulting the facts. To-day 
the sea is pouring across the sand bar in three or four different 
channels, and a few months more may see white-capped waves roll- 
ing over the spot where whole pages of a nation's histoi-y were 
written with bayonets dipped in blood. 




^Dcrilfs '^'diii. 




"HE profit of Stonewall Jackson's raid down the Slienan- 
doab in 1862 was offset by an expedition under Averill 
the Federal cavalry leader, in West Virginia in 1863. 
With three regiments of loyal Virginians and a part of 
a Pennsylvania regiment, accompanied by a field bat- 
tery, he made a ride of three hundred miles in eight days. At 
Salem, where he struck the Tennessee & Virginia Railroad, the Con- 
federates had accumulated an immense quantity of stores, and 
Averill destroyed two thausand barrels of flour, ten thousand bushels 
of wheat, ninety thousand bushels of shelled corn, forty-five thou- 
sand bushels of oats, twelve thousand pounds of meat, five thousand 
sides of leather, eight thousand pounds of salt, six thousand infantry 
uniforms, ten thousand pounds of cotton, one hundred sets of har- 
ness, two thousand pairs of shoes, three hundred saddles, fifty sets 
of blacksmith tools, two hundred muskets, one hundred and fifty 
eabres, one hundred and fifty tons of hay, two hundred barrels of 
peas and beans, one hundred barrels of molasses and one hundred 
army wagons. 

Around the station he destroyed all turn-tables and water-tanks, 
tore down the telegraph lines, tore up the tracks, blew out the cul- 
verts, and burned the bridges. The cash value of the material 
destroyed amounted to several million dollars, and a great railroad 
line was broken for several days. During the raid Averill captured 
two hundred prisoners, lost one hundred and twenty in killed, 
wounded and missing, and fought with the respective commands of 
Imboden, Jones, Early, Fitz-Hugh Lee, Echols and Jackson. For 
a quick dash, it was perhaps the most successful of anything of the 
kind during the war, and the damage in money was over half a 
million dollars per day for every day the raid lasted. 

[501] 



iljfriiian Versus QrarlD. 




O in ! " 

So said Grant to Sheridan, as he looked over the 
situation in the Shenandoah valley in September, 1863. 
I ride np the long street of Winchester town on 
this October day — out past the fair grounds on the 
Martinsburg road, and when I draw rein at the Redeford farm, I am 
on the extreme right of Sheridan and the extreme left of Early as 
they faced each other on that hazy morning of September nineteen. 
Up this road came the blue cavalry as it massed to strike and crush 
Early's left, and at the first rush Imboden's cavalry was picked up 
and hurled down the pike and through the stony streets of the 
quaint old city. 

A landscape painter would rejoice at the scene before him as I 
half-face to the right to follow the battle lines. The ground is 
made up of hills and dips and bits of woodland and orchards and 
wheat and corn fields. Here and there the eye catches a husband- 
man following the plow — sleek cows and horses grazing in the 
rich clover or half asleep under the shade trees or beside the stone 
walls, and it is hard to believe that men once grappled here and 
fought to the death. 

The Little Opequan, wandering lazily in and out of the willows — 
shining through the rich meadows — kissing the roots of pine and 
sycamore and oak down in the dark woods, separated the armies. 
Sheridan had forty thousand of the best men who ever fought in 
the valley — Earlj' had less than one-third of this force. Whoever 
questions this may turn to history. It was safe, therefore, to order 
Sheridan to attack, and it would have been safe to telegraph a vic- 
tory even before the first bugle had sounded. Early tried to stretch 
his lines to meet those of Sheridan, and he got them so thin that 
they were broken in a dozen places by the advance of the skirmish- 
ers. From where his left clung to the Martinsburg road across to 
where his right held the Berryville pike is a ride of over three miles, 

1502] 



SHEEIDAN VEKSUS EARLY. 503 

and when he had to let go of the former road two divisions of 
Union cavah-y had a broad highway to strilie his iiank. 

Dead men lay thick on tliis turnpike road that day. This farm- 
yard behind rae has its own story of that bloody day. These peach 
and apple trees sheltered over five hundred wounded men from the 
blazing sun, and the old log house was filled to overflowing. Out 
behind the house the surgeons swept the drying apples from a long 
table and used it as legs and arms were amputated. Groan and 
shriek and prayer found strange echo in the crack of carbine, the 
hiss of shell, and the wild whistle of grape and canister. I look up 
and see where limbs of trees were crushed and severed, where 
grape-shot found lodgment in log and roof — where bullets struck 
with angry thud and fell among the pinks and roses, to be picked 
up twenty years after. Shell screamed over the great stone chim- 
ney — the heap of bloody arms and legs grew larger — men shrieked 
and gasped and clutched the tulips and lilies in the last moments of 
life, and yet this was only the extreme right — only loosening 
Early's weak grasp on the Martinsburg road. In the matted grass 
around the bee-hives I stumble over a grim fragment of a shell. 
Half-buried in the roadside ditch is a solid shot. In the plowed field 
across the road a hundred bullets could be picked up in ten minutes' 
search. Early let go his hold, but he left scars which a fifth of a 
century has not wiped out. 

" To Wood's mill." So reads the guide-board at the next corner, 
and I turn to the right and gallop down a red-clay road which will 
strike the Berryville pike nearly four miles away. This leads 
straight across Early's front of that day. Oak and sj'camore bear 
marks wherever I find them, but the sweet-smelling pines have 
thrown out new bark and mercifully hidden tlie scars of war from 
the new generation. Here and there are the blackened ruins of a 
farm house or barn, and a farmer stops from his wall-building at 
the road-side and says : 

"Right through this yere was the bloodiest part of that fight. 
Early clung to these yere woods and hills and ravines, and afore they 
got him out there was a dead man for every bush and tree. That was 
where my old house stood, and I picked ninety bullets out of the logs 
without reaching above my head. Powerful skeery times that 
day for wimin and children, stranger." 

" And for men, too." 

" Deed it was. I was with Early, and my regiment made a stand 
right over thar on that crest. You uns was coming in from over 



504 SHEEIDAN VERSUS EAELT. 

thar, and the way we kivered the ground with blue made me sick. 
Some of the Yanks got in behind my house, and our battery histed 
shell and shot right through it. I knew that my old woman and 
seven children war' down cellar, and as each gun fired I was ready 
to drap with fear. More'n a dozen shot and shell struck the house, 
but not one o' the family got a hurt. Eide straight down the road 
if you want to see whar hell broke loose that day ! " 

The pines whisper softly as I ride down the dark highway. If 
they could talk, they would tell how the infantry grappled in these 
ravines — how the cannon shook these knolls — how dying men 
crawled by the hundreds to lap the waters of this tiny creek which 
hurries down to empty its poor mite into the treasury of the larger 
Opequan. The pines cannot talk, biit the oaks and sycamores can. 
Solid shot have torn great limbs awa}', bursting shells have rent and 
splintered, and bullets meant for human targets found lodgment in 
the hard wood. Every ravine had regiments of human tigers 
creeping swiftly upon their prey. Every little basin was full of 
dead — every knoll shook and trembled as desperate men made 
desperate stands. 

Between tlie Opequan and the lieights above Winchester, Early 
made a dozen different stands. While he was greatly outnumbered 
he had the advantage of being attacked. He could select his positions 
as he fell back, and in every case he had the higher ground. But 
he yielded grudgingly, and at each new stand he fought with in- 
creased desperation. Sheridan could push him in front and flank 
him right and left, and rod by rod lie was forced back. When at 
last, after hours of desperate fighting, he made liis last stand to 
cover Winchester, he had lost his hold on the Berryville pike for 
any distance beyond a mile from the town. His flanks were driven 
in on his center, and that center rested on what is now the Dinkle 
farm. This is a hill or ridge facing north and east. Thei-e are 
hills to the north, woods along the pike to the south, and open 
ground to the west. Federal infantry were pouring out of the 
woods and fields to the left of the ridge, infantry was hastening 
down the pike from tlie south, and Federal cavalry held Winches- 
ter at his back. 

No wonder the people of the neighborhood call the ridge Dead 
Man's Hill. I sit on the porch of the old farm-house and see 
shocks of corn where on that day dead men lay too thick to be 
counted. Over there where the drag is covering fall wheat more 
than five hundred pounds of bullets have been picked up. To the 



SHEEIDAN VERSUS EAELT. 505 

left, where the cows munch the sweet clover, was a forest of fifty 
acres, cut down a year or two after the fight. Out of that forest 
cliarged the Ohioans and New Yorkers, and the numberless head- 
stones in the National Cemetery half a mile away, tell how they 
fought. Fury was let loose here. Defeat here meant rout beyond 
for Early. Under tlie canopy of smoke, guns were taken and re- 
taken, regiments decimated, companies wiped out. The hill was 
charged by regirao:its, then brigades, then divisions. The dead lay 
so thickly along its crest that they were used as a breastwork for the 
living, but war M'as not satisfied. It demanded more blood, and 
more was shed, and when Early was pushed across the bend of the 
pike the victorious cheers of the pursuers could not be heard for 
the shrieks and screams of the wounded gray and blue, who held 
up bloody hands from among the dead. 

Under the north front window is a hole made by a grape-shot. 
In the kitchen is the terrible gap made by a shell. In logs and roof 
and sills and casings are the marks of bullets. The apple trees in 
front died from wounds received that day. On the grass are thirty 
solid shot and shell, most of the latter unexploded, which were 
plowed up last week on a space of ground ten rods square. In 
the chamber are two bedsteads bearing the marks of a dozen bullets, 
and every floor in the house bears blood-stains which neither sand 
nor soap can efface. 

To the left of the house is a row of young peach trees on the 
brink of a grassy bank four or five feet high and thirty feet long. 
I slide down this, a bit of board in hand, and at the first effort out 
rolls half a dozen bullets and two grape-shot. At the next I strike 
a canncn-ball, and so it goes until I no longer wonder that the 
brigade cf Confederates resting where the peach trees now grow, 
were reduced to a regiment in less than twenty minutes. A scent of 
bl^od and a mist of horror will ever linger around the spot, and we 
marveled not that the women lowered their voices and cast anxious 
looks around as the sun went down and I turned my horse into the 
narrow lane and rode for the highway. 

Driven at last from the hill, Early retreated across the pike and 
over the fields where now is a national cemetery, and where then was 
and now is the town graveyard. Every house, of brick or stone or 
wood, proves that he was driven foot by foot. Aye! the ancient 
gravestones have their say. Bullets chipped them without feeling 
for the dust beneath — chipped and marred and defaced thein in 



506 SHEKIDAN VERSUS EAELT. 

savage hatred for the liviug who made each grass-grown mound a 
breastwork. 

"I have sent them whirling through Winchester," telegraphed 
Sheridan. 

He had fought all day with three to one, to drive the foe less than 
six miles, and when Early " whirled through "Winchester " he left 
a path of dead men in blue to mark his route. The waters of the 
Opequan had the horrible color of blood. Wounded men crept 
down to the red stream with shriek and groan and curse. In the 
dark ravines the stars of night looked feebly down through flying 
clouds upon the dead, with their white faces or headless trunks — ■ 
on gnarled oaks blotclied with red — on sycamore splintered and 
riven — on the dark pines which cast their shadows over blood- 
stained rocks. And out on the meadows there were trails of blood 
as wounded men drew themselves along, and the bright moon 
brushed the clouds away now and then to count the corpses and 
render war's spectacle more hideous. From summit and side and 
base of Dead Man's Hill groans and shrieks were caught up by the 
night breeze and wafted into the dark woods beyond — as if the 
thousand corpses under the shuddering trees would echo them back! 

Night did not weep. She shuddered and was speechless ; and as 
a darker cloud hid the horrible sights the plaintive bird of night 
called out above war's horrors : " Whip-poor-will ! Whip-poor- 
will!" and the night owl muttered to himself. 

Next day Early was driven up the valley to Fisher's Hill. Here 
he stretched his battle-lines across the valley and made a new stand, 
but they were so thin that Sheridan broke thera at the first onset 
and drove the Confederate army into the gaps of the mountains. 

There was reason to believe that Early was thoroughly routed 
and demoralized, and that he would be seen no more in the Valley, 
but scarcely had Sheridan gone into camp north of Strasburg when 
Early returned to Fisher's Hill, and his pickets covered the Mid- 
dletown pike beyond the town. Never did two armies hold better 
defensive positions. An attack by either was almost certain of 
defeat. Sheridan held three ridges, beginning where Cedar Creek 
empties into the North Fork of the Shenandoah and ending five 
miles diagonally across the valley. Breastworks were thrown up to 
defend every assailable point, and he who rides among them will 
wonder how troops were ever driven out. Early had fewer fortifica- 
tions but stronger natural positions, and the dogs of war looked 



I 



SHEEIDAN TEKSDS EARLY. 507 

across the neutral ground and growled at and dared each other to 
strike the first blow. 

The defeat at Winchester rankled and stung. The defeat at 
Fisher's Hill nerved Early to desperation. He wanted to strike 
Sheridan a blow in revenge, but he would not have dared it in 
front, even had their numbers been equal. Ten tliousand men in 
either position could have beaten back an attack by three times 
that number. Tlie Massinutton Mountain, beginning properly at 
Fisher's Hill, or continuing from that, sweeps round to the south 
and southeast of the town, and the end was the left of Sheridan's 
first line. Its sides are jungle and forest and rock and ravine. At 
its base flows Cedar Creek. History says a blind and forgotten 
road followed the windings of the creek. Let historians travel it and 
correct their error. Some of Early's staff officers and signal corps 
men made a ride of ten miles one day to look down on Sheridaw's 
camps. From their eyrie among the clouds they could see every 
tent and cannon and army wagon. If an army could move along 
the base of the grim old mountain and strike the Union lines on 
the flank, something must happen. It was a daring project. 
Armies may seek the shelter of woods and ravines, but they march 
by highways and tlirougli open fields. Early's army was to march 
through a pine jungle, witliout even dayliglit to guide tliem. 

At sunset ten thousand infantry were called into line, at Fisher's 
Hill and directed to prepare for the march. It did not take them 
long. They had no overcoats to strip off. Few had knapsacks to 
leave behind them. Canteens were taken off, cartridge boxes filled 
to the brim, and as darkness settled down they turned into the 
jungle and the march had begun. 

I turned my horse into the trail at eight o'clock in the morning. 
There was only a blind path, made by cows and hogs, winding 
around great boulders, crossing and recrossing the creek, aiid 
losing itself in the pines after running a mile. I can hardly credit 
that from nine thousand to ten thousand infantry crept along this 
mountain side that dark October night. It is twilight under these 
pines even at noon-day. Trees have died and fallen this way and 
that until my horse can no longer find passage-way. I therefore 
turn liim over to the guide, to meet me at Slieridan's camp, and 
push on afoot. 

Here on the mountain side I could scarcely read the heading of 
a newspaper at ten o'clock of a bright October morning. When 
the jungle bars the way and forces me into the babbling creek the 



508 SHERIDAN VEKSUS EARLY. 

light is stronger, but so is the feeling of loneliness. If it was niid- 
niglit I would not dare to move a foot, and yet thousands of men 
felt their way over these rocks and twisted among these pines when 
they could touch the man in front and still not see him. One 
single lantern would have betrayed them to Sheridan. One yell of 
affright on that still night would have been followed by disaster. 

" Softly ! Softly ! " So whispered the rebel officers as the lines 
dragged themselves over the rocks and through the pines and across 
the creek. Men fell over banks ten feet high, or slipped from these 
rocks and brought up far below, but not a gun was discharged nor a 
word uttered above a whisper. Here are grape-vines which were cut 
in two and pulled aside to let men pass. Here are dead pines, up- 
rooted as ten thousand hands grasped them as a support up the steep 
bank. As I mount a huge boulder and peer to the right and left to 
discover traces of the way, an evil-looking snake rises up among the 
dead branches, utters a hiss of anger at being disturbed, and slowly 
wriggles away in the direction of the noisy creek. Bruised by the 
rocks and wounded by the limbs, and midnight darkness enshroud- 
ing one and all, the men of Early toiled on. 

A strange night it must have been to them. It took me six hours 
of the hardest work, each step made by daylight, to traverse the 
route they passed over in eight or nine hours by night. When at 
last, two hours before daylight, they emerged from the pine jungles 
and debouched into the vallej', not one man from all the thousands 
had been left behind. It was a march of spectres across the valley. 
Half a mile away were Sheridan's pickets. The neighing of the 
battery horses was wafted down the valley to the ears of the men 
in gray as they extended their lines across the Federal flank. Camp- 
fires could be seen on the hill-sides, and once a whole brigade 
dropped to the earth and hardly breathed as a lone horse came gal- 
loping over the stony field to find companionship. On! on! on! — 
and at last that gray line halted to wait for daylight. It was fairly 
on the left flank of Sheridan's first line of camps, and within 
musket-shot of ten thousand sleeping men, whose first awakening 
was to be from a crash of musketry and the fierce yells of assault. 

This was Early's right. His left took across the fields above 
Strasburg — his center passed through tlie town on the pike. Day- 
break was to be the signal for a general attack. While the men 
who had crept through the jungle were to strike the Federal left, 
the center and right were to be attacked at the same moment in 
front. All the artillery advanced by the pike, followed in part by 



SHEEIDAK VEESUS EAELT. 509 

the cavalry. They had less than three miles to go, and it was a 
weary niglit as they stood massed on the pike in and beyond the 
town. After midnight tiie line moved spasmodically, sometimes 
advancing a hundred yards, and again halting for half an hour. 

The rumble of cannon over the hard and flinty pike would have 
been heard by the Federal pickets but for the precautions taken. 
The horses moved only at tho slowest walk, and on the long hill 
beyond tho first Stickley farm each wheel of cannon and caisson was 
seized by an infantry man who acted as a break. A hundred rods 
from the foot of tho hill the pike bends away to the left and is 
presently spanned by z bridge. Along the creek spanned by this 
bridge, and even beyond it, were Federal videttes, and yet three or 
four complete batteries came up to within sixty rods of them and 
turned out right and left into the fields and took positions on the 
ridges. It takes nearly five minutes to walk from the point where 
the batteries turned into the fields to the willow under which a Fed- 
eral picket stood staring in wonder and amazement as the breaking 
of day revealed to his sight the black muzzles of a score of field- 
pieces on the crest above, with long lines of men in gray behind 
them. 

Sheridan had departed for Washington saying that his position 
was impregnable. So it seemed to every soldier under him, and 
while Early marched they slej)t and dreamed of home. So it seemed 
to me yesterday as I rode over and along the lines of earth-works 
which the Federal army had thrown up. Hills which natui'e had 
laid out for forts were still further strengthened with spade and 
pick, and stone walls and deep ravines were powerful supports. No 
wonder that Sheridan smiled in contempt when he heai'd the roar 
of guns that morning as he came up the Winchester pike. 

Day was slow in breaking. It had been a chilly night, and a fog 
had settled down over hill and valley — over the tents in which the 
Federals slept — over the men in gray who were creeping softly 
down. As the Confederate ai'tillerymen stood at their horses' heads 
to prevent them from neighing they could hear from across the 
creek : 

" Who goes there ? " 

" Friend with the countersign ! " 

" Advance one !" 

Now the birds began to twitter and chirp in the pines and oaks, 
the fog whirled about in fantastic shapes, and just as the green wil- 
lows showed their tops through the flying fog a crash of musketry 



510 SHERIDAN VERSUS EARLY. 

down by the raountaiu said to fifty thousand men that a battle had 
begun. 

Early had brouglit his infantiy safe out of the jungle and formed 
them in line of battle within pistol-shot of the first row of Federal 
tents. They were heard moving through the thickets and across 
the stony hill-sides, but the pickets believed the noise to come from 
horses which might have escaped from the line. Two thousand 
feet above their heads towered the pine-clad mountain, and what foe 
could break over this defense ? Horses were neiffliing for their 
provender, camp sentinels lazily paced their beats, and a few early 
risers were stirring up the slumbering camp-fires, when out from 
the morning mist, yelling and cheering and firing, came the Con- 
federate battle-lines. At that first volley of musketry Early's 
center and left pushed forward on the double-quick, and it wasn't 
ten minutes before Sheridan's first line was rolled back on his 
second. 

The Federal camps were supplied with everything in provisions 
and wearing apparel. The Confederates were hungry and ragged, 
and poorly equipped. It was but natural that the men should stop 
to eat and plunder. A third of the entire Confederate army halted 
in the first line of camps to plunder the tents, catch np horses, and 
in many instances to cook breakfast. Whole companies broke from 
the battle lines to riot and plunder, and men drank coffee with shot 
and shell plunging over their heads. 

Sheridan's second line was not surprised. It was astonished, but 
there was ample time to prepare for the shock. But no stand was 
made. Ten thousand panic-stricken Federals, closel}' pressed by a 
gray line of battle, carried the second line into the third, and 
breastworks were deserted without a shot being fired. 

The third line stood. It had timely warning of the advance. 
Every piece of artillery had a plunging fire, and every soldier had 
cover. When Early struck the third line over half of his army 
was behind him engaged in plundering the camps of Crook and the 
Nineteenth Corps. Early had no artillery on his right. jSTot a 
horse or a gun could be moved through that jungle. He depended 
on the musket to help him capture Federal cannon, and as fast as 
they were taken they were manned by men who had to lay down 
the musket. Almost every cannon in the two first camps were cap- 
tured and used to drive the third line, but there were instances 
wliere whole batteries were deserted by the artillerists in order to 
secure plunder. 



SHERIDAN VERSUS EAELT. 511 

The Sixth Corps could have held its line but for the panic. 
Thousands of Federal fugitives covered the fields in every direction, 
all without arms, some only half dressed, and the great majority 
too frightened to be rallied. Officers were as thoroughly panic- 
struck as the men, and this panic soon extended to the great army 
train in rear. Back through Wright's camp poured these thousands 
of frightened men, hundreds of them wounded, and the effect was 
to break the Sixth Corps. Then the rout became general, and First 
Bull Run was more than repeated in that headlong flight to New- 
town. 

More than a thousand men were routed out of Crook's camps in 
their night clothes. Thousands of men were hatless and coatless 
and barefooted. One fat colonel carried his pants under one arm, 
a boot under the other, and a coffee-pot in his right hand, and, after 
a run of five miles, he had only the boot left. At the Stacy House, 
a mile out of Middletown, five officers, two of whom had on 
only shirts and drawers, halted and cleaned the house of old clothes 
to cover their nakedness. The turnpike road was full of upset 
wagons, bales of hay, bags of oats, sacks of coffee, boxes of ammu- 
nition, and almost everything else found with an army, and Early 
followed so closely that the fugitives had no time to rest. The 
Sixth Corps forced the fighting, and the cavalry was not in the 
least disorganized, but fully one half of Sheridan's army was routed 
and disarmed. 

Men of rank in Early's army point out two grave mistakes he 
made that day. Not a man should have been permitted to plunder. 
After the second camp was carried Early's fighting force was I'e- 
dueed one-half by the dropping out to plunder. One brigade could 
have collected everything worth taking and carried it off to Fisher's 
Hill. The second mistake was in the lengthy pui'suit. After 
Wright was driven the panic would have carried the Federal army 
seven or eight miles without another shot being fired. With his 
army closed up he had one of the best defensive positions in the 
valley, and he could have held it against all odds. But, flushed 
with success and conceited with victory, the Confederates lost their 
organization in pursuit and plunder, and when brought to bay at 
Newtown, they had no fight in them. They were rolled back 
almost as easily as they had driven the Federals, routed whenever 
they made a stand, and when night fell not even a brigade of that 
army could be found. Sheridan retook all his artillery, all his 
wagons, all the plunder of the morning, all the prisoners and thou- 



512 



SHBEIDAN VERSUS EAKLT. 



sands more, and pushed the flying Confederates until liorses could 
no longer travel. Strange battle! Victory won — enough spoil 
captured to equip an army of twenty thousand men — then defeat 
and the loss of all. 

Leaning against the walls of the old mill, the interior of which is 
full of thrifty shrubs and vines, I look down into a basin in the 
meadow in which more than two thousand Federals were confined 
as prisoners that day. A dash of cavalry freed them all and cap- 
tured tlieir guards. Across the road where the old gray-haired 
man sits on the farm-house porch, the surgeons cut and hacked and 
sawed, and the yellow leaves of the apple trees fell softly down 
\ipon the dead and dying. A mile up tlie pike, where a lone old 
woman rocks to and fro at the door of her humble home, the fields 
were covered with blue and gray, the dusty pike was blocked with 
corpses, and under the pear trees in the yard the groans of the 
wounded rose above the roar of battle. Under the oaks on the 
hill — what? Nothing but the trenches in which a thousand men 
were buried. Further down the pike it was the same — back over 
the fields where the camjjs slept that morning it was worse. 

I follow the breastworks of the Sixth Corps across the stony 
fields, into thickets and out, and here and there are relics of the 
long past. A jiiece of bone, an old canteen, a fragment of shell, a 
rusty gun barrel, an old bayonet, a heap of bullets, and what not. 
And yet, as I stand on the earth-works on which no grass has ever 
yet taken root, I look down on the orchards laden with fruit, chil- 
dren returning from school, the plowboy in the mellow fields, and 
hear around me the soft notes of bluebird and robin! Aye! as I 
look, the plowboy stops to pull from the fresh-turned earth and 
hold up CO my siglit a grinning skull. Strange grimness — stranger 
peace ! 




dilmore at Cljarleston. 




HERE was another just such a man as General Grant 
in the army — obstinate, determined, persistent — disap- 
pointed to-day but to try the harder to-morrow. That 
man was General Gilmore, of Morris Island fame, and 
had circumstances placed him where they phiced Grant 
he would have pursued the same policy and attained the same 
results. 

Gilmore's achievements should have brought him honor and glory 
and lasting memory, but the shadow of one general has concealed 
the figures of a score just as deserving. The close of the war 
dropi^ed hundreds of brave army and naval officers out of sight as 
if they no longer had an existence, and the anxiety of the Federal 
historian, to especially favor men in high places has caused them to 
suppress many of the achievem.ents originated and successfully 
carried out bj' heroes whose names should be remembered by every 
one in the land. 

flunter had been wasting months of precious time around 
Charleston when superseded by Gilmore. The former was always 
going to do something — the latter was always doing it. Had he 
been called to Charleston a year before he was, he would certainly 
have obliged a change of programme on the part of the Con- 
federates. 

When he succeeded to the command, Beauregard had had two 
years in which to raise defenses in front of Charleston, the iron- 
clads had pounded away in vain, and there seemed no possible hope 
of the Federals advancing one rod nearer. Gilmore had scarcely 
become acquainted with his officers when he developed a plan and 
a bold one. 

Morris Island, to the left of Sumter as one looks up the harbor, 
and within easy range, was not only under the direct fire of Sumter 
but Battery Gregg was at one end, Wagner near the center, and the 
lower end was defended by field works in which were both cannon 

Vol. 1,-33 ^"1 



514 GIIiMOBB AT CHARLESTON. 

and mortars and a strong garrison to work them. This position 
seemed so strong tliat no one had ever tliouffht of inakinj; a direct 
attack, but that was just what Gihnore 2:)roposed as soon as lie liad 
looked the situation over. On tlie tenth of July, 1863, the attack 
was made by a force in boats and was successful, the very boldness 
of the project having much to do with its success. What the iron- 
clads had failed to do with their ponderous guns, worked in almost 
absolute safety, Gilmore accomplished with row-boats and musketry. 
The fleet was, however, a valuable auxiliary at this moment, as its 
fire swept the island and prevented re-inforcements being sent 
from Wagner. 

Once landed on Morris Island, Gilmore was there to stay. He 
quickly intrenched, brought over mortars and cannon, and there he 
stuck. His attacks on Wagner have already been described. That 
his last assault was a blunder has been admitted, but there were 
mitigating circumstances. He had seen the fort subjected to such 
a continuous fire as was supposed to have annihilated the last man, 
and the admiral of the fleet encouraged the assault. While the 
blunder did not cost Gilmore his head, it cost the government the 
lives of hundreds of brave men, and cheered Wagner to hold out 
to the bitter end. 

When the war opened there was a clear channel between Mori-is 
and James Islands. In 1863, a maish had risen in this spot — a few 
acres of flags, grass, and quicksand not dense enough to hide a 
duck nor firm enough to sustain the weight of a water-rat. In 
1884, I sailed in a skiff over the spot where guns had been planted 
to shell Charleston. 

Gilmore's next move was to possess this marsh or island, so 
strangely growing day by day while all else was being destroyed. 

Miles away timbers were cut and gravel loaded upon barges, and 
night after night, for weeks and weeks, the island was being slyly 
added to and slyly stolen. It was an enterprise laughed at by 
hundreds of Federals, and would have excited the ridicule of the 
Confederates had the}' known what was passing. The rafts and 
barges had to be moved entirely by hand, and all the work done 
within musket-shot of the Confederates, and sometimes the waves 
destroyed in an hour the labors of men for a week. 

It was one of the strangest incidents in war — stealing the site 
for an island — and yet that was what Gilmore planned and 
accomplished. Just where he desired to place his battery a pole 
twenty feet long could be thrust out of sight into the quicksand. 



GILMORE AT CHARLESTON. 515 

Piles must be driven here, and to drive them without alarming 
the Confederates was a line bit of work. A pile-driver was rigged 
to work witli tlie least possible noise, and the hammer was drawn up 
by hand by means of a rope and pulley. The blow of the hammer 
was deadened by cushions, and no man at work on the island dared 
speak aloud. Every evidence of work had to be removed before 
daylight, and that the ends of timbers and logs might not be seen 
rushes and grasses were cut and scattered over the water. It was 
several times noticed in Fort Sumter that the island was growing 
very fast, but no suspicion was aroused. 

The piles were driven close together and braced with stones 
and gravel. On this foundation was built a floor of timbers, each 
stick heavy enough for the sill of a warehouse, and upon this floor, 
laid the opposite way and mortised and dovetailed, was a second 
raft of square timber. The whole made a solid foundation just 
above the level of high tide and covering an area of half an acre. 
This foundation had to be hidden under rushes, and the guns 
were covered with the same as fast as landed. 

The labor of loading, rafting, unloading, and mounting the 
heavy guns — nearly forty — was enough to appall an engineer, but 
Gilmore saw it accomjjlished. This was the first time that a 
monster gun, like the "Swamp Angel," had ever been moved 
any distance by hand, and a thousand men were sick and weary 
before the tremendous mass of metal had been moved five hun- 
dred feet. 

The pinch came when it was necessary to do as much work in 
one night as had heretofore been accomplished in ten. The guns 
must be landed, mounted, and protected between dark and day- 
light of a summer's night. Over four thousand men were set to 
work to accomplish this result. While one detachment landed the 
guns another mounted them. A third filled bags with sand, which 
had been obtained two miles away, and placed them in position. 

One August evening the sentinels on the ramparts of Fort Sum- 
ter looked down upon Grassy Island to wonder how fast it was 
growing. At daylight next morning they cast their eyes that \.'ay 
to discover walls of sand-bags, massive guns and blue uniforms. 
Gilmore was ready to open on the fort and the city. One looking 
across from Sumter cannot imagine the distance to be over a mile, 
but it is over two. It does not seem over two to Charleston, and 
yet it is four. 

There was amazement and consternation in the various Confeder- 



516 GILMOEE AT CHAELESTON. 

ate works as day fully dawned and it was realized that Gilmore was 
firmly fixed. He now had the range on the weak points of Sumter, 
and from this point he cunld I'eaeh the city. 

But for this move of Gilmore's no Federal shell would have ever 
entered Charleston, nor would Fort Sumter have lost its barbette 
guns. 

The first bombardment of Sumter by the iron-elads had shown 
Beauregard that brick and stone could not stand before the ponder- 
ous shells. Without delay he had set about providing a protection 
and a substitute. 

Before Gilmore was ready to open fire the fort had been rebuilt, 
as it were. Walls of masonry fifteen feet thick were protected by 
walls of bags of sand twenty feet thick. Casemates had been 
strengthened, the magazines further protected, and the bomb-proofs 
could not have been made more secure. Had it still been Fort 
Sumter versus the iron-clads, the fleet would have simply thrown 
away its ammunition. But Gilmore had stolen a position between 
the two, and one morning in mid-August he opened fire on the fort 
from nearly forty guns. The fleet added its metal, and every Con- 
federate gun which would bear made haste to reply. 

Once the bombardment was opened there was no cessation for 
seven long days and nights. Federal and Confederate stood at tlieir 
guns until they almost slept. In fort and battery and on board the 
fleet men became deaf. Gilmore's Island was shaken until the men 
staggered about like sea-sick passengers. 

Charleston was shaken as if by an earthquake. The steady 
trembling of the earth loosened the brick and mortar, rattled down 
pictures and ornaments, opened and shut gates, and prevented sleep 
until people became exhausted. Fish in the Stono and Edisto 
rivers and in the harbor darted about as if suffocating, and thou- 
sands threw themselves upon the shores. Again, they would 
gather in schools and rush for the sea, and as they reached the 
obstructions in the channel hundreds would be flung out of the 
water by the pressure. 

Those defending Sumter had more of war crowded into that week 
than some warriors see in a decade. At least once a minute for 
seven times twenty-four hours a shot or. shell or bomb struck the 
fort or fell within it. Visit the spot to-day and you can pick up half 
a ton of pieces of shell, though twenty years have jiassed, and a 
hundred car-loads of missiles have been gathered up and sent away. 
One after another of the barbette guns was dismounted, and foot 



GILMORE AT CHAKLESTON. 517 

by foot the sand-bags were eaten into and scattered and the masonry 
behind pulverized. 

When tiiat long bomljardnient closed — the longest period in the 
liistory of the world in which an unceasing fire had been kept up 
from great guns — Fort Sumter was no longer a fort. It was an 
island covered with debris, and that debris consisted of stones, 
brick, broken and exploded guns, riven and charred timbers and 
splintered planks and beams. Twenty feet of the walls had been 
pounded off. In falling they had covered the casemates in such a 
manner that no ini.ssile could hereafter reach them. Five or six 
guns in these dark burrows were still serviceable, and a tunnel led 
iinder the debris to the sally-port. There was no longer a fort to 
defend, but there was an immense heap of brickbats which would 
be held to the last. In battering down Fort Snmter, the Federals 
placed it in the power of the Confederates to hold it. During the 
last year of the war it was simply a cave or burrow, dark, damp, 
and dismal, and every brick spattered with blood, but it passed into 
Federal hands only when Sherman's flank movements made it 
necessary to evacuate Charleston, and the garrison marched out to 
the echoes of a grand salute. 

Federal history has greatly exaggerated the results of Gilmore's 
bombardment of Charleston. He only reached the lower portion 
of the city with his shells, and in not one single instance did a shell 
start a fire of any consequence. A few people were killed, a few 
houses shattered and a hundred families hurriedly removed to safer 
quarters — that was all. The Federal officers who were placed 
under fire were in no more datiger than hundreds of women and 
children, and those on the race-course were not reached at all. 

Charleston's woe was a malignant epidemic a hundred times 
more fatal than the shells — her anxiety was the fire-l)Uo;s who 
started tlie two or three great conflagrations for the sake of plunder. 
The bombardment did not stop the wiieels of a factory for one 
minute, and ships were loaded with shells flying over them. 




Ill tlje iarkncss. 




I^E marched by the left flank along a blind road in the 
woods until the trees no longer hindered our move- 
ments, and then the brigade came to a " front" and 
advanced in line. Here and there we came upon 
our dead or wounded skirmishers, and before we 
were quite clear of the woods we opened the lines to let a dozen or 
twenty men pass to the rear, driven foot by foot by an advancing 
line. There was smoke hanging low over woods and fields, but 
now and then I caught sight of flags and men and horses in our 
front. Cannon were booming, muskets cracking and officers shout- 
ing orders, and amidst this terrible racket we suddenly quickened 
our pace and drove straight forward at the battery. The distance 
was perhaps a hundred rods. It was like dashing into a fog. I 
stepped over two wounded and three dead men, stumbled against a 
horse lying on his side, and looked up to notice that our line was 
out of dress. What had become of my comrade on the right — 
where was the one on the left? We had touched elbows as we 
moved forward. Now the nearest man was ten feet away. 

Now we halt — now we close up — now I hear men cheering, 
and we breast forward into a fog which is cut and streaked with 
long, red tongues of flame. In a minute more I can see the cannon 
wheels and the legs of the gunners under the smoke. Fear ? No ! 
It is a wild exultation — a feeling that may truly be called devilish. 
I want to shoot and stab and kill some one. I yell at the top of 
my voice. I grip the arm of the man on my left to hurry him for- 
ward, and I chuckle as I notice how fierce his look — how the 

hungry tiger can be read in his eyes. Then ! 

********** 

The sun had gone down. There was a spiteful roaring of 
artillery — a vengeful sputtering of musketry — a trembling of the 
earth, which hurt me. All this came to me as I opened my eyes, 
but it came slowly. Dead ! I wondered for a moment whether I 

[518] 



IN THE DARKNESS. 519 

was or not. No ! I had been hit — wounded. Where ! Tliere was 
no pail) — not the slightest twinge. Ah! Come to remember, I 
had stumbled against a corpse just as the picture of the battle field 
faded before my eyes. Curious that I should have lost coneiousness 
in the fall. I would get up and hurry on and rejoin my company. 

I rose to a sitting position, and then — Well, my right leg stuck 
fast to the grass. The blood had poured out and dried to a paste, 
and all of a sudden a twinge of pain racked my very soul. All 
around me I saw the bodies of my comrades. I called aloud, but 
not a soul answered. Not a man of us had reached the battery. 
Grape and canister had saved the guns. To move was to feel the 
stabs of a dozen knives, but I drew myself along, inch by inch, to 
a stump. Then I had a prop at my back and could wait. The 
roar of the battle was dying away and grim night was mercifully 
hiding the horrible sights of a battle field. 

" Help ! " 

A shadow passed me, never heeding the call, and knelt beside a 
dead body. It was that of a young lieutenant in the Twelfth New 
York. 1 remember his crying. " Forward ! " just as I fell. I 
looked again, and the shadow covered its face with its hands, and 
rocked to and fro over the dead and moaned : 

"My husband — my darling! They have robbed me of my 
treasure — they have turned my joy into deepest sorrow ! " 

A shadow on my right. It moved slowly with hands tightly 
pressed over the heart. It was that of an aged woman. The hair 
was snow white, the limbs were weak and trembling, and the voice 
was choked and broken as it called : " Where is my boy — where 
is he lying dead?" I pointed to the body of a youth, scarce 
eighteen, which was lying beside a bush whose every leaf and twig 
was spattered with blood, and she sank beside it and sobbed : 

"And this is the glory of war! They rob a poor old mother of 
her last-born and then ring the bells for victory ! Oh ! God. I am 
heart-broken ! Let me die here beside him ! " 

Shadows on my left. There were four of them. The first was 
that of a wife and mother — the others her children. They looked 
at me in mute appeal, and I beckoned to them. At my feet, with 
his broad breast shattered and torn, was a stalwart sergeant of the 
Second Massachusetts. It was he who had dashed into the front 
rank and encouraged us when we wavered under tlie storm of grape. 
They sank down beside him, and while the children moaned and 
sobbed the mother raised her hands to Heaven and cried : 



520 IN THE DARKNESS. 

" Widowed — desolated — broken-hearted! What is victory to me 
wlien here lies the corpse of husband and father i " 

And yet another shadow came. It was that of a fair young girl. 
Her beautiful face was deadly pale, her brown eyes were filled with 
horror, her white teeth were shut tiglitly, as if she feared that she 
would scream out and awaken the dead. Ah ! I knew for whom 
she searched. When our right flank was doubled back on the 
center and the regiments confused and mingled, I found him at my 
side. He belonged to the Sixth Ehode Island. I pointed to the 
spot where he lay, half his handsome face shot away by the ter- 
rible grape, and with a shriek she knelt beside him. I saw her 
white fingers toying with his brown curls. I saw her hold his hand 
and kiss it again and again. By and by she rose up and with hand 
outstretched towards the ragged clouds of night she cried aloud : 

" And you call this victory ! You cripple and kill and break 
hearts and make widows and orphans, and you wave your flags in 
rejoicing ! " 




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